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The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
"Sam Huntington, one of the West's most eminent political scientists, presents a challenging framework for understanding the realities of global politics in the next century. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order is one of the most important books to have emerged since the end of the Cold War." --HENRY A. KISSINGER
Based on the author's seminal article in Foreign Affairs, Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order is a provocative and prescient analysis of the state of world politics after the fall of communism. In this incisive work, the renowned political scientist explains how "civilizations" have replaced nations and ideologies as the driving force in global politics today and offers a brilliant analysis of the current climate and future possibilities of our world's volatile political culture.
"An intellectual tour de force: bold, imaginative, and provocative. A seminal work that will revolutionize our understanding of international affairs." --ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
"The book is studded with insights, flashes of rare brilliance, great learning, and in particular, an ability to see the familiar in a new and provocative way." --MICHAEL ELLIOTT, THE WASHINGTON POST BOOK WORLD
"A benchmark for informed speculation on those always fascinating questions: Just where are we in history? What hidden hand is controlling our destiny?...A searching reflection on our global state." --RICHARD BERNSTEIN, THE NEW YORK TIMES
"This is what is so stunning about The Clash of Civilizations: It is not just about the future, but may actually help to shape it." --WANG GUNGWU, THE NATIONAL INTEREST
Based on the author's seminal article in Foreign Affairs, Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order is a provocative and prescient analysis of the state of world politics after the fall of communism. In this incisive work, the renowned political scientist explains how "civilizations" have replaced nations and ideologies as the driving force in global politics today and offers a brilliant analysis of the current climate and future possibilities of our world's volatile political culture.
"An intellectual tour de force: bold, imaginative, and provocative. A seminal work that will revolutionize our understanding of international affairs." --ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
"The book is studded with insights, flashes of rare brilliance, great learning, and in particular, an ability to see the familiar in a new and provocative way." --MICHAEL ELLIOTT, THE WASHINGTON POST BOOK WORLD
"A benchmark for informed speculation on those always fascinating questions: Just where are we in history? What hidden hand is controlling our destiny?...A searching reflection on our global state." --RICHARD BERNSTEIN, THE NEW YORK TIMES
"This is what is so stunning about The Clash of Civilizations: It is not just about the future, but may actually help to shape it." --WANG GUNGWU, THE NATIONAL INTEREST
368 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1996
About the author
Samuel P. Huntington
53 books623 followersSamuel Phillips Huntington was an American political scientist who gained prominence through his "Clash of Civilizations"(1993, 1996) thesis of a new post-Cold War world order. Previously, his academic reputation had rested on his analysis of the relationship between the military and the civil government, his investigation of coups d'etat and for his more recent analysis of threats posed to the U.S. by contemporary immigration.
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June 15, 2009
This is a masterpiece of scare mongering, not recommended for the faint of heart. Sage Huntington can make you groan inside: omg, tomorrow there will be a massive conspiracy between the democracy-hating Sinic and Islamic civilizations (whatever that means) to destroy our democracy, civilized society and freedom and push us back to the Dark Ages. Don’t you see how they’ve already started infiltrating the US government with an African Muslim communist called Obama? And hapless America will heroically fight that struggle against evil and oppression until the end of time and come out gloriously victorious. But before that, we need to fight terror, terror, terror and build more aircrafts, missiles, military bases and bomb the shit out of them if necessary. I’m sorry I can’t pass this test of valor and courage, before this apocalypse happens, I’d rather drive to Mars. A rather depressing thought.
So much for the ranting. Now the serious stuff.
Samuel Huntington laid out his analysis of conflicts in the Post Cold War world in his article in 1993:
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future
He divides the world into 8 major “civilizations”: sinic, western, orthodox Christian, Islamic, Hindu, Japanese, Latin American, African, and basically says that in the future, when the age of ideology is over, the cultural and civilizational rifts will be the main cause of conflicts. The only way the West can survive is to get stronger both militarily and economically and ally with civilizations sympathetic to itself to fight against the rise of Islamic and Confucian countries (i.e China).
This line of argument has some major flaws. First, it defines civilization as an all-encompassing and monolithic concept and ignores all the interaction and diversity within one culture. How would you define Islamic civilization? Islam of Saudi Arabia? Indonesia? Iran? Dubai? Similarly for all the rest.
But more importantly, often I find this kind of confrontational mind-set rather dangerous. It takes conflicts out of context and strips them of their much wider and more complex socio-political backdrop and reduces them to over simplistic terms of “us vs. them”, “cultural differences” or “civilizational faultlines”. But I never believe in such things, I never believe that people have enough time sitting on their ass and hating another group just because their culture and religion are different. If people fight, that must be for a reason, often one group are conquered or oppressed and resist, otherwise, economic reasons such as land, exploitation or resources. Invoking jealousy or ethnic hatred to explain conflict is a chauvinistic and foolish way of looking at it. The Vietnamese did not hate the Americans because the Americans drove cars and watched tv while the Vietnamese slogged behind buffalos. The Palestinians don’t hate the Israelis because the Israelis have swimming pools and have nuclear warheads. The Afghans hated the Russians not because the Russians rode tanks and had an empire. It’s never about jealousy, all about conquest, oppression, injustice and subjugation. Aren't these legitimate things to hate?
Conflicts are always about the conqueror and the dominated, about power and oppression, never so much about ideology or ethnic hatred. And if there’s an element of ethnic hatred, it often has a lot to do with the way the power structure was distorted to favour a group to oppress another during the colonial period. Need I say any more about Algeria, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq, Bosnia? But then again, don’t take my word because I might be oversimplifying things as well.
I find Huntington’s idea dangerous also because it represents a primordialistic world view, in which people are inherently and inevitably different, therefore, conflicts are unavoidable. Once you talk about something grand and presumably rigid and static in this case like civilization and culture as an innate part of human nature and as causes of war, you’re heading for a dead end. If people are inherently irrational, antagonistic, confrontational, aggressive, then what’s the point in preventing war and addressing political issues underlying them? That’s it, we’re doomed.
So let’s put all this in context because it’s the last thing this book would ever do. After the end of the Cold War, America came out as the sole superpower. So people started asking: ok, now the Russians are gone, why don’t we reduce our military budget and invest more in education, healthcare, aid to the third world, technology, infrastructure? Why do we need this half a trillion dollar military budget when we have massive social problems at home in this most advanced industrialized country? So America needed to invent something to replace the Russians to justify all that. Shush, it can’t be about the humongous profits for the military industrial complex, it can’t be about defending our corporate interests overseas. So voila, that must be the clash of civilization. America is perpetually at war with other rival civilizations, especially Islam. The paradigm of the West vs. the Rest never changed. Gone with the Russians, in with the Muslims. That’s why we need $500b in military spending (6 times the second largest, China, and the Pentagon squeaks) and 700 military bases in Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Djibouti, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the list goes on.
After 9/11, this book rocketed in influence because now obviously, the Islamic world is waging war against America. The real civilization clash IS happening. How scary indeed. Huntington even declared:
"It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power” and hate people “who are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world."
But the attack led by a group with a couple of thousand members (or say, even a million, still 0.1% of total Muslim population) against a country with a population of 1/4 of the “West” is defined as a civilizational war. Very representative huh? Some of them are Saudi, er but let’s forget that for a moment because that’s our closest friend in the region, although rather nasty bastards…
So yes, Huntington would easily dust off his hands and say this has nothing to do with US foreign policies in the Middle East at all. They hate us because we love freedom, democracy and we’re more civilized than them. Because this pre-renaissance backward fanatical people hate progress and are jealous of us living in our first world luxury. This rhetoric has been parroted again and again and again by Emperor Bush and his friends to justify his increasingly militant approach in the ME. Oh, there’s no limit to chauvinism and ignorance in this world.
Truly, I’d be rather upset if Americans buy this lie. The idea of CoC obscures the real grievances and frustration of people in the Middle East at many decades of American dominance in the region. Let’s remind ourselves that America is great friends with the despots of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Israel, the PLO (rather a rocky friendship), the mujahedeen (who gives a shit about Islamic fundamentalism if all we cared about was to kick ass the Russians out of Afghanistan), Jordan and a long time ago, Iran and Iraq. And many other friends that torture its citizens under US auspices (politics jargon: extraordinary rendition). Could anyone still say it has nothing to do with politics at all?
Finally, is it just me or anyone else that finds the idea of a respected professor writing such provocative arguments seemingly not to mitigate the problem but to aggravate it, to defend “our” superiority at all cost, rather disturbing? Is this honest and balanced historical analysis or is there a hidden agenda behind? I’m not good at conspiracy theory, but mind you, this guy’s book in the 1960s advocating stable dictatorships to achieve economic development over troublesome democracies also had great influence on US foreign policy in Africa and Asia. No wonder why America loved some dictators and overthrew a couple of trouble makers. Expert on democracy and civilization indeed.
(if you’re interested listen to this brilliantly eloquent critique by Edward Said: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=boBzrq... )
So much for the ranting. Now the serious stuff.
Samuel Huntington laid out his analysis of conflicts in the Post Cold War world in his article in 1993:
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future
He divides the world into 8 major “civilizations”: sinic, western, orthodox Christian, Islamic, Hindu, Japanese, Latin American, African, and basically says that in the future, when the age of ideology is over, the cultural and civilizational rifts will be the main cause of conflicts. The only way the West can survive is to get stronger both militarily and economically and ally with civilizations sympathetic to itself to fight against the rise of Islamic and Confucian countries (i.e China).
This line of argument has some major flaws. First, it defines civilization as an all-encompassing and monolithic concept and ignores all the interaction and diversity within one culture. How would you define Islamic civilization? Islam of Saudi Arabia? Indonesia? Iran? Dubai? Similarly for all the rest.
But more importantly, often I find this kind of confrontational mind-set rather dangerous. It takes conflicts out of context and strips them of their much wider and more complex socio-political backdrop and reduces them to over simplistic terms of “us vs. them”, “cultural differences” or “civilizational faultlines”. But I never believe in such things, I never believe that people have enough time sitting on their ass and hating another group just because their culture and religion are different. If people fight, that must be for a reason, often one group are conquered or oppressed and resist, otherwise, economic reasons such as land, exploitation or resources. Invoking jealousy or ethnic hatred to explain conflict is a chauvinistic and foolish way of looking at it. The Vietnamese did not hate the Americans because the Americans drove cars and watched tv while the Vietnamese slogged behind buffalos. The Palestinians don’t hate the Israelis because the Israelis have swimming pools and have nuclear warheads. The Afghans hated the Russians not because the Russians rode tanks and had an empire. It’s never about jealousy, all about conquest, oppression, injustice and subjugation. Aren't these legitimate things to hate?
Conflicts are always about the conqueror and the dominated, about power and oppression, never so much about ideology or ethnic hatred. And if there’s an element of ethnic hatred, it often has a lot to do with the way the power structure was distorted to favour a group to oppress another during the colonial period. Need I say any more about Algeria, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq, Bosnia? But then again, don’t take my word because I might be oversimplifying things as well.
I find Huntington’s idea dangerous also because it represents a primordialistic world view, in which people are inherently and inevitably different, therefore, conflicts are unavoidable. Once you talk about something grand and presumably rigid and static in this case like civilization and culture as an innate part of human nature and as causes of war, you’re heading for a dead end. If people are inherently irrational, antagonistic, confrontational, aggressive, then what’s the point in preventing war and addressing political issues underlying them? That’s it, we’re doomed.
So let’s put all this in context because it’s the last thing this book would ever do. After the end of the Cold War, America came out as the sole superpower. So people started asking: ok, now the Russians are gone, why don’t we reduce our military budget and invest more in education, healthcare, aid to the third world, technology, infrastructure? Why do we need this half a trillion dollar military budget when we have massive social problems at home in this most advanced industrialized country? So America needed to invent something to replace the Russians to justify all that. Shush, it can’t be about the humongous profits for the military industrial complex, it can’t be about defending our corporate interests overseas. So voila, that must be the clash of civilization. America is perpetually at war with other rival civilizations, especially Islam. The paradigm of the West vs. the Rest never changed. Gone with the Russians, in with the Muslims. That’s why we need $500b in military spending (6 times the second largest, China, and the Pentagon squeaks) and 700 military bases in Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Djibouti, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the list goes on.
After 9/11, this book rocketed in influence because now obviously, the Islamic world is waging war against America. The real civilization clash IS happening. How scary indeed. Huntington even declared:
"It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power” and hate people “who are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world."
But the attack led by a group with a couple of thousand members (or say, even a million, still 0.1% of total Muslim population) against a country with a population of 1/4 of the “West” is defined as a civilizational war. Very representative huh? Some of them are Saudi, er but let’s forget that for a moment because that’s our closest friend in the region, although rather nasty bastards…
So yes, Huntington would easily dust off his hands and say this has nothing to do with US foreign policies in the Middle East at all. They hate us because we love freedom, democracy and we’re more civilized than them. Because this pre-renaissance backward fanatical people hate progress and are jealous of us living in our first world luxury. This rhetoric has been parroted again and again and again by Emperor Bush and his friends to justify his increasingly militant approach in the ME. Oh, there’s no limit to chauvinism and ignorance in this world.
Truly, I’d be rather upset if Americans buy this lie. The idea of CoC obscures the real grievances and frustration of people in the Middle East at many decades of American dominance in the region. Let’s remind ourselves that America is great friends with the despots of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Israel, the PLO (rather a rocky friendship), the mujahedeen (who gives a shit about Islamic fundamentalism if all we cared about was to kick ass the Russians out of Afghanistan), Jordan and a long time ago, Iran and Iraq. And many other friends that torture its citizens under US auspices (politics jargon: extraordinary rendition). Could anyone still say it has nothing to do with politics at all?
Finally, is it just me or anyone else that finds the idea of a respected professor writing such provocative arguments seemingly not to mitigate the problem but to aggravate it, to defend “our” superiority at all cost, rather disturbing? Is this honest and balanced historical analysis or is there a hidden agenda behind? I’m not good at conspiracy theory, but mind you, this guy’s book in the 1960s advocating stable dictatorships to achieve economic development over troublesome democracies also had great influence on US foreign policy in Africa and Asia. No wonder why America loved some dictators and overthrew a couple of trouble makers. Expert on democracy and civilization indeed.
(if you’re interested listen to this brilliantly eloquent critique by Edward Said: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=boBzrq... )
January 3, 2009
"Clash of Civilizations" is an easy book to misread. Many have taken Huntington to task because he pessimistically forecasted a world of discord following the Cold War. The headlines of the past decade beg to differ.
The world according to Samuel Huntington was going to reset to its multi-polar default setting, each pole being the center of a culture/religion/ethnicity that had always existed in world history. The border regions between these centers were going to be fraught with friction and conflict, just as they always have. The bipolar Cold War was the aberration, just as un-natural as a "unipolar" world following the fall of the Soviet Union.
"Clash of Civilizations" is an ideal companion to Paul Kennedy's "Rise and Fall of Great Powers," but use it as a substitute for Chapter 8 in Kennedy's book. Many misread this book as well, skipping all the material just to read what Kennedy forecasted for the world post-1990. Where Kennedy got it wrong, Huntington got it right, offering an analysis based on a continuity so simple that it was easy for the sophisticated to overlook.
The world according to Samuel Huntington was going to reset to its multi-polar default setting, each pole being the center of a culture/religion/ethnicity that had always existed in world history. The border regions between these centers were going to be fraught with friction and conflict, just as they always have. The bipolar Cold War was the aberration, just as un-natural as a "unipolar" world following the fall of the Soviet Union.
"Clash of Civilizations" is an ideal companion to Paul Kennedy's "Rise and Fall of Great Powers," but use it as a substitute for Chapter 8 in Kennedy's book. Many misread this book as well, skipping all the material just to read what Kennedy forecasted for the world post-1990. Where Kennedy got it wrong, Huntington got it right, offering an analysis based on a continuity so simple that it was easy for the sophisticated to overlook.
October 27, 2016
The Preservation of The West
or
Making America Great Again
Huntington polarized his readers, being a book the liberals would rather not believe as it implies religious and cultural differences will continue to divide humanity, and also one that the right would rather ignore, preferring Fukuyama's thesis of Capitalism as the supreme achievement of mankind, over this more accommodating world-view.
Now we are far enough from the end of the Cold War to be able to judge this book more fairly. In the immediate aftermath of the cold war, strategists were looking for a "theory" that will help us understand the world in conceptual terms - the conceptual simplicity of the bipolar cold war world enticed them into believing that a new world order will be formed, which can again be explained under a new framework.
Huntington probably came up with one of the most realistic models - unlike the ideologically divided world before the cold war, the post-Cold War world's inhabitants will increasingly define themselves not on ideological grounds, but on cultural (civilizational, even religious) lines and hence the new world order will be organized around the same. As this happens and various civilizations vie for 'space', inter-civilizational fault-lines will become the new sources of major conflict, especially between "West & the Rest" (primarily economically?) and between "Islam & its Neighbors" (militarily?). These two conflicts along with China's sphinx like role will define the future according to Huntington.
So far so good.
However, as Huntington himself says, the best test of any theory is its predictive capacity. And that is the first place where this cultural or civilizational model of world order falls short. According to Huntington, intra-civilizational conflicts are to die down fast in the post cold war world as core states of each civilization rallies its allies around its own sphere of influence - this would include China taking up its hegemonic role in Asia, the Koreas uniting, the Middle-East somehow redrawing artificial boundaries and creating a core state that can guide them (according to Huntington civilizational stability is not possible with a "core state" rallying the civilization), the South Americas either uniting to form a distinct civilization or just bandwagoning with the west, etc. But the world we see today shows us that most of the real hot zones are along intra-civilizational fault-lines - along fault-lines that are not defined so much by broad civilizational identities, but rather by narrower ethnic, historical and sometimes quite random identities. So the civilizational model might still work, but instead of the small set proposed by Huntington, we might need a much larger set of civilizations to be invoked, which would then render the theory pretty useless.
The second issue is with the real core message of the book - How to protect the western civilization. Huntington is in truth issuing a clarion call to the whole of western civilization' to band together against this new post cold war world which is not exclusively west-facing anymore.
Huntington faces up boldly against Fukuyama's partisan view that Capitalism is the final stage of history (extending Hegel), but falls into the same trap by implying throughout the book that the western culture is the best and is in dire need of preserving, dedicating much of the later part of the work to strategies aimed at this end.
As per this thesis, as the Asian and Islamic civilizations rise into economic prominence, the new world order will also tilt towards them (not to mention the additional demographic and immigrational pressures fueling this). The only way to arrest this tilt and to avoid the tragedy of losing all the culture the west has built up and perfected is for the western countries to set aside their differences and band together, especially the United States.
The book is an exhortation to the US of A to skirt any aspirations to being multi-cultural itself (and thus diluting the holy western culture), but stay pure and take up the mantle of being the core state for the western civilization (and this involves cozying up to Russia too, btw, just fyi) and thus make sure that the new multi-cultural world is still as western in culture as possible.
or
Making America Great Again
Huntington polarized his readers, being a book the liberals would rather not believe as it implies religious and cultural differences will continue to divide humanity, and also one that the right would rather ignore, preferring Fukuyama's thesis of Capitalism as the supreme achievement of mankind, over this more accommodating world-view.
Now we are far enough from the end of the Cold War to be able to judge this book more fairly. In the immediate aftermath of the cold war, strategists were looking for a "theory" that will help us understand the world in conceptual terms - the conceptual simplicity of the bipolar cold war world enticed them into believing that a new world order will be formed, which can again be explained under a new framework.
Huntington probably came up with one of the most realistic models - unlike the ideologically divided world before the cold war, the post-Cold War world's inhabitants will increasingly define themselves not on ideological grounds, but on cultural (civilizational, even religious) lines and hence the new world order will be organized around the same. As this happens and various civilizations vie for 'space', inter-civilizational fault-lines will become the new sources of major conflict, especially between "West & the Rest" (primarily economically?) and between "Islam & its Neighbors" (militarily?). These two conflicts along with China's sphinx like role will define the future according to Huntington.
So far so good.
However, as Huntington himself says, the best test of any theory is its predictive capacity. And that is the first place where this cultural or civilizational model of world order falls short. According to Huntington, intra-civilizational conflicts are to die down fast in the post cold war world as core states of each civilization rallies its allies around its own sphere of influence - this would include China taking up its hegemonic role in Asia, the Koreas uniting, the Middle-East somehow redrawing artificial boundaries and creating a core state that can guide them (according to Huntington civilizational stability is not possible with a "core state" rallying the civilization), the South Americas either uniting to form a distinct civilization or just bandwagoning with the west, etc. But the world we see today shows us that most of the real hot zones are along intra-civilizational fault-lines - along fault-lines that are not defined so much by broad civilizational identities, but rather by narrower ethnic, historical and sometimes quite random identities. So the civilizational model might still work, but instead of the small set proposed by Huntington, we might need a much larger set of civilizations to be invoked, which would then render the theory pretty useless.
The second issue is with the real core message of the book - How to protect the western civilization. Huntington is in truth issuing a clarion call to the whole of western civilization' to band together against this new post cold war world which is not exclusively west-facing anymore.
Huntington faces up boldly against Fukuyama's partisan view that Capitalism is the final stage of history (extending Hegel), but falls into the same trap by implying throughout the book that the western culture is the best and is in dire need of preserving, dedicating much of the later part of the work to strategies aimed at this end.
As per this thesis, as the Asian and Islamic civilizations rise into economic prominence, the new world order will also tilt towards them (not to mention the additional demographic and immigrational pressures fueling this). The only way to arrest this tilt and to avoid the tragedy of losing all the culture the west has built up and perfected is for the western countries to set aside their differences and band together, especially the United States.
The book is an exhortation to the US of A to skirt any aspirations to being multi-cultural itself (and thus diluting the holy western culture), but stay pure and take up the mantle of being the core state for the western civilization (and this involves cozying up to Russia too, btw, just fyi) and thus make sure that the new multi-cultural world is still as western in culture as possible.
September 1, 2013
This is still a very valid book today. The author’s premise is that with the collapse of communism and the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Cold War is over and therefore we need a new paradigm in which to view our world. We are back to the basics of culture and religion.
Mr. Huntington constructs a frightful world; whereas, before, there could be rationality between liberal democracy and the communist block, the room for agreement between absolutist religions in the Islamic and Western Christian worlds are fraught with problems.
Russia is back to Orthodoxy and its peripheral borders are dangerous. As Mr. Huntington would say Russia has “Fault Lines” – with the Christian Catholic world in Northeast Europe, with Islam in the south and in Southeast Europe with both Islam and Christianity. The author talks at length of the emerging China and how its’ increasing power and geographical reach could lead to conflict with the West. China will become less subservient and the countries bordering it, like Japan, will need to redo their alliances.
The author is also adept at changing our perspective. The U.S. saw the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as a victory for the West against communism, but the Islamic world viewed it as a successful religious jihad against a superpower. The West – and the U.S. in particular, seems unable to relinquish its Cold War paradigm. The U.S. (and I would include Canada) feels hubristically that the rest of the World wants to be like the West. There is much danger in this universalistic mentality.
The world has now become more complex with several competing powers, instead of two superpowers. With religion back in the equation, this adds an unstable emotional level when a conflict begins, or in most cases, when the conflict reasserts itself after a dormant period.
I take issue with Mr. Huntington on the universality of Human Rights. There are basic Human Rights, like gender equality and the evil of torture, which many view as “sacrosanct universal principals”. Many countries today do not adhere to these values, much to the detriment and dignity of their people. It is generally the rulers of these countries who disparage Human Rights as being a “Western Concept”. As a Chinese dissident said (to paraphrase): “If you are in a jail in China you will soon be asking for your rights, without worrying about whether they were “American” or “Chinese”.
This is an essential book for understanding the world and makes for illuminating reading. Many of us thought that with the end of the Cold War the world had become a safer and more humane planet – and we were all off to a better and greater way of living. As Mr. Huntington suggests the Cold War was just an ideological anomaly; we are back to fundamentals.
A favourite quote about the Soviet-Afghan war: “They [Islam] beat one of the world’s two superpowers and now their working on the second.”
Mr. Huntington constructs a frightful world; whereas, before, there could be rationality between liberal democracy and the communist block, the room for agreement between absolutist religions in the Islamic and Western Christian worlds are fraught with problems.
Russia is back to Orthodoxy and its peripheral borders are dangerous. As Mr. Huntington would say Russia has “Fault Lines” – with the Christian Catholic world in Northeast Europe, with Islam in the south and in Southeast Europe with both Islam and Christianity. The author talks at length of the emerging China and how its’ increasing power and geographical reach could lead to conflict with the West. China will become less subservient and the countries bordering it, like Japan, will need to redo their alliances.
The author is also adept at changing our perspective. The U.S. saw the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as a victory for the West against communism, but the Islamic world viewed it as a successful religious jihad against a superpower. The West – and the U.S. in particular, seems unable to relinquish its Cold War paradigm. The U.S. (and I would include Canada) feels hubristically that the rest of the World wants to be like the West. There is much danger in this universalistic mentality.
The world has now become more complex with several competing powers, instead of two superpowers. With religion back in the equation, this adds an unstable emotional level when a conflict begins, or in most cases, when the conflict reasserts itself after a dormant period.
I take issue with Mr. Huntington on the universality of Human Rights. There are basic Human Rights, like gender equality and the evil of torture, which many view as “sacrosanct universal principals”. Many countries today do not adhere to these values, much to the detriment and dignity of their people. It is generally the rulers of these countries who disparage Human Rights as being a “Western Concept”. As a Chinese dissident said (to paraphrase): “If you are in a jail in China you will soon be asking for your rights, without worrying about whether they were “American” or “Chinese”.
This is an essential book for understanding the world and makes for illuminating reading. Many of us thought that with the end of the Cold War the world had become a safer and more humane planet – and we were all off to a better and greater way of living. As Mr. Huntington suggests the Cold War was just an ideological anomaly; we are back to fundamentals.
A favourite quote about the Soviet-Afghan war: “They [Islam] beat one of the world’s two superpowers and now their working on the second.”
August 30, 2021
Politically correct-কথাটির অর্থ আসলে কি? ছেলেবেলায় আমরা আদর্শলিপিতে শিক্ষা পেয়েছি “কানাকে কানা, খোঁড়াকে খোঁড়া বলিও না”। মানসিক বা শারিরীকভাবে অক্ষম ব্যাক্তিকে তাঁর অক্ষমতার দিকটি মনে করিয়ে দেয়াটা মানবিক শিষ্টাচার বহির্ভুত এ কথা সর্বজনস্বীকৃত। কিন্তু বুদ্ধিবৃত্তিক ও অর্থনৈতিকভাবে খোঁড়া এবং ক্ষীণদৃষ্টিসম্পন্ন কোন জাতিকে তার দীনতার দিকটি চোখে আঙুল দিয়ে দেখিয়ে দেবার বেলায় শিষ্টাচারের এ চেতনাটি কিভাবে কাজ করে? সুবিধাবাদী মানুষ মাত্রেই ঝামেলা এড়িয়ে চলতে ভালোবাসেন। সম্ভাব্য দ্বন্দ্ব-ফ্যাসাদ এড়িয়ে চলবার কারণেই জাতি-গোষ্ঠী-দেশ ইত্যাদিকে নিয়ে সমালোচনামূলক কথা বলতে গেলে এই সুবিধাবাদী ‘শান্তিপ্রিয়’ মানুষেরা আলোচনাটির গায়ে Politically incorrect তকমাটি লাগিয়ে দেন। বৈশ্বিক ভদ্রতার খাতিরে অধিকাংশ সময়েই সত্য কিন্তু politically incorrect কথাগুলো কবর চাপা পড়ে যায়। তবে সত্যের মতো বদমাশ আর হয় না, এবং ভাগ্যবশতঃ সত্য প্রকাশের মতো বদমাশও মানবজাতির কপালে কালেভদ্রে জুটে যায়। ‘দি ক্ল্যাশ অফ দি সিভিলাইজেশনস অ্যান্ড দি রিমেইকিং অফ দি ওয়ার্ল্ড অর্ডার’ তেমনি সত্যের মতো বদমাশ একটি বই। ১৯৯৬ সালে প্রকাশের পর থেকে আজতক বইটি প্রচুর আলোচনা-সমালোচনার জন্ম দিয়েছে। আলোচনা হয়েছে বইটির পেছনে ব্যায়কৃত গবেষণা ও জ্ঞানের প্রয়োগের জন্য। সমালোচনা হয়েছে politically incorrect বেআরামদায়ক বেফাঁস সত্য উচ্চ কণ্ঠে বলে দেবার জন্য। বইটির ব্যাপারে মূল আলোচনায় যাবার আগে বইটি রচনার প্রেক্ষাপট নিয়ে দুটো কথা খরচ করা প্রয়োজন।
আশির দশকের শেষে যখন সোভিয়েত রাশিয়ার পতন হয়, ফ্রান্সিস ফুকুইয়ামা তখন তাঁর একটি নিবন্ধে ‘দি এন্ড অফ হিস্টরী’ শীর্ষক একটি তত্ত্ব উপস্থাপন করেন। তাঁর এ তত্ত্বের সারাংশ হলো সোভিয়েত বনাম পশ্চিমা মুক্ত গনতন্ত্রের লড়াইয়ে পশ্চিম বিজয়ী হয়েছে, এবং এই পশ্চিমা চিন্তাধারাই মানব সভ্যতার ক্রমবিকাশের শেষ ধাপ। বৈশ্বিকভাবে মানুষ এখন পশ্চিমা সভ্যতার ছায়াতলে এসে একটি একীভূত মানবজাতির লক্ষ্যে কাজ করে যাবে (ইউনিভার্সাল সিভিলাইজেশন)। বিচ্ছিন্নভাবে এখানে ওখানে কমিউনিজমের ভুত থাকবে সত্যি, বিশেষত তৃতীয় বিশ্বের দেশগুলোতে, কিন্তু সার্বিকভাবে গোটা বিশ্বের মানুষ আসলে যুদ্ধ বিগ্রহ ভুলে ‘এক পৃথিবী-এক জাতি’ এমন একটি মহান লক্ষ্যের দিকে পা বাড়াবে। ফুকুইয়ামা কিছুটা যেন ক্ষেধের সাথেই বলেন যুদ্ধ-সংঘর্ষহীন সে পৃথিবীটা বরং বেশ একঘেয়ে হয়ে উঠবে। ফুকুইয়ামার এ তত্ত্বের জবাবে স্যামুয়েল পি হান্টিংটন রীতিমতো পিএইচডি গবেষণাপত্র-স্বরূপ এই বইটি লিখে ফেলেন।
হান্টিংটনের 'ক্ল্যাশ অফ সিভিলাইজেশন' তত্ত্বটি মূলত বলে সোভিয়েত পরবর্তী পৃথিবীতে এখন অন্যান্য সভ্যতাগুলোর মাঝে সংঘর্ষ তৈরি হবে। সোভিয়েত যুগের পৃথিবীকে ব্যখ্যা করতে প্রয়োজন ছিলো 'সোভিয়েত বনাম আমেরিকা' মডেলের। হান্টিংটন বলছেন 'সোভিয়েত বনাম আমেরিকা' মডেলটি যেমন আজ অকেজো, তাঁর নিজের 'ক্ল্যাশ অফ সিভিলাইজেশন' মডেলটিও একসময়ে অকেজো হয়ে পড়বে। তবে তার আগে পৃথিবীর বিভিন্ন দেশে বিভিন্ন সভ্যতা একটি বৈশ্বিক কামড়াকামড়িতে জড়িয়ে পড়বে, সবার লক্ষ্য পশ্চিমকে ক্ষমতাচ্যুত করে সে জায়গায় নিজেকে স্থাপন করা। বৈশ্বিক এ ‘গেইম অফ থ্রোন্স’-এ মূল সংগ্রামটি হবে পশ্চিম বনাম মুসলমান বিশ্বে, যাকে কেন্দ্র করেই বাকী সভ্যতাগুলোর সংগ্রামের চালগুলো পরিচালিত হবে।
হান্টিংটনের মতে গোটা বিশ্বের সভ্যতাগুলোকে মেরেকেটে আট থেকে নয়টি ভাগে ভাগ করা য���য়ঃ পশ্চিমা, হিন্দু, মুসলিম, ল্যাটিন আমেরিকান, আফ্রিকান, চৈনিক, জাপানী, বৌদ্ধিক এবং অর্থোডক্স (রাশান)। এর মাঝে অনেকগুলো সভ্যতাই পশ্চিমের শাসনাধীন ছিলো, বা কোন কোন ক্ষেত্রে আজও আছে। সময়ের সাথে সাথে পশ্চিমের অধীনে থাকা সভ্যতাগুলো নিজেদের স্বাধীনতা এবং অস্তিত্বের ব্যাপারে সচেতন হতে থাকবে এবং পশ্চিমের প্রভাব সম্পূর্ণরূপে ছুঁড়ে ফেলে দিয়ে নিজেদের সংস্কৃতি এবং মূল্যবোধের ওপর জোরারোপ করা শুরু করবে-এটি হান্টিংটনের তত্ত্বের অন্যতম একটি স্তম্ভ। মানুষ মাত্রেই নিজের দল ভারি করতে চায়। পৃথিবীর কোণায়-কানায় ছড়িয়ে থাকা সভ্যতাগুলোর মাঝেও একই প্রবণতা দেখা যায়। হান্টিংটন বলেছেন দুটি ভিন্ন সভ্যতা পরস্পরের বন্ধু হয়ে ওঠে একইরকম সংস্কৃতি, ভাষা, ধর্ম ইত্যাদির ভিত্তিতে, ভৌগোলিক অবস্থানের ভিত্তিতে নয়। উদাহরণস্বরূপ উল্লেখ করেছেন সোমালিয়ার রক্তক্ষয়ী সংঘর্ষ প্রতিবেশী দেশগুলোর শীরঃপীড়ার কারণ হয়নি। ইউগোস্লাভ সংকটের সময় রাশিয়া সাহায্য করেছে সার্বিয়াকে, ওদিকে মুসলমান-প্রধান দেশ বসনিয়ার সাহায্যে এগিয়ে এসেছে সৌদি আরব, ইরান, তুরস্ক ও লিবিয়া। যে জিনিষটির ভিত্তিতে এ দেশগুলো নিজেদের শত্রু-মিত্র সজ্ঞায়িত করেছে সেটি হলো সাংস্কৃতিক পরিচয়; অর্থোডক্স এবং ইসলাম-এ দুটি ধর্মের সংস্কৃতি এখানে বড় ভূমিকা রেখেছে। তাই বলে কি একই ভাষা, ধর্ম এবং সংস্কৃতির বাহক সকল দেশ এবং সে সব দেশগুলোর মানুষেরা হাজার হাজার মাইল দূরত্বের পার্থক্য ভুলে গিয়ে একে অপরের প্রতি ভ্রাতৃত্ববোধের একটি অমোঘ টান অনুভব করে? না, মানব সমাজ এভাবে কাজ করেনা। এখানে রাজনৈতিক স্বার্থই আসল ভূমিকা রাখে। যে দেশগুলোকে নৈতিক সমর্থন দিলে জনগণের কাছে নিজেদের গ্রহণযোগ্যতা বাড়বে, বৈশ্বিক রাজনীতিতে নিজেদের খুঁটি শক্ত হবে, শাসকেরা তারই জটিল হিসেব নিকেশ কষে শত্রু মিত্র নির্ধারণ করেন। বসনিয়ার সাথে সৌদি আরব বা মধ্যপ্রাচ্যের অন্যান্য মুসলমান দেশগুলোর মাঝে দূরত্ব দু'হাজার মাইলের ওপর; রাজনৈতিক স্বার্থটি-যা ধরা ছোঁয়া এবং শোঁকা যায়-এখানে ওতপ্রোতভাবে জড়িত। 'ইসলামী ভ্রাতৃত্ববোধ' বিষয়টি একান্তই বায়বীয় এবং কাল্পনিক।
হান্টিংটন তাঁর নিজের মডেলের কার্যকারীতার আলোচনায় তুলনা টেনেছেন জন মার্শেইমারের 'স্টেটিস্ট' (statist) মডেলের সাথে। মার্শেইমারের statist মডেল বলছে দুটো ক্ষমতাশীল প্রতিবেশী রাষ্ট্র যখন একই অরক্ষিত সীমানা নিজেদের মাঝে ভাগাভাগি করে, তখন প্রায়ই তারা নিজেদের মাঝে দ্বন্ধ-ফ্যাসাদ মিটিয়ে এক জোট হবার জন্য হাত মেলায���। এ মডেলের সূত্র ধরে মার্শেইমার ভবিষ্যৎবাণী করেছেন, রাশিয়া এবং ইউক্রেনের অদূর ভবিষ্যতে বন্ধু রাষ্ট্রে পরিণত হবার সম্ভাবনা রয়েছে। অপরদিকে, হান্টিংটনের 'ক্ল্যাশ অফ সিভিলাইজেশন' মডেলটি প্রথমেই আলোচনা করে সুদূর অতীত থেকে চলে আসা ইউক্রেনের অর্থোডক্সপন্থী পূর্বাঞ্চলের সাথে পশ্চিমাঞ্চলের ঐতিহাসিক সংঘাতের কথা, যার সূত্রপাত অঞ্চল দুটির সাংস্কৃতিক এবং ধর্মীয় পার্থক্যের ভিত্তিতে। হা���্টিংটন বলছেন সভ্যতার সংঘাতের এ তত্ত্বের পথে হাঁটলে রাশিয়া বনাম ইউক্রেন পরিস্থিতির চেয়ে বরং ইউক্রেন দেশটির আদৌ একসাথে থাকা হবে, নাকি, পূর্ব-পশ্চিম এ দুভাগে ভাগ হয়ে যেতে হবে-সে প্রশ্নটিই বেশী জরুরী হয়ে ওঠে। ���উক্রেনের দু’ভাগ হয়ে যাওয়া নিয়ে হান্টিংটনের ১৯৯৬ সালে তোলা এ প্রশ্নটি ২০১৯ সালে আজও অত্যন্ত প্রাসঙ্গিক।
সভ্যতার সংজ্ঞা নির্ধারণ করতে গেলে কি কি বিষয় আমলে নেয়া উচিৎ প্রথমেই সে প্রশ্নটি চলে আসে। হান্টিংটন উল্লেখ করেছেন ভাষা, ধর্ম, জীবনাচার এবং নৃতাত্ত্বিক পরিচয়-প্রাচীন গ্রীকরা এই বিষয়গুলোর ভিত্তিতে নিজেদের সাথে অন��য জাতিদের পার্থক্য নিরূপণ করতো। অ্যাথেনিয়ানদের মতে সভ্যতার সংজ্ঞা নিরূপণকারী এই স্তম্ভগুলোর মাঝে ধর্মের ভূমিকাটাই সবচেয়ে বড়। এই পর্যবেক্ষণটির ওপর ভিত্তি করেই হান্টিংটনের নিজস্ব তত্ত্ব অনেকখানি দাঁড়িয়ে আছে। একই ভাষা, একই জীবনাচার এবং একই নৃতাত্ত্বিক গোষ্ঠীর সদস্য হবার পরও ধর্মের পার্থক্যের কারণে খুনোখুনির ইতিহাস পৃথিবীর জন্য নতুন কিছু নয়। প্রাচীন কাল থেকে শুরু করে হালের সময়ের লেবানন, ইউগোস্লাভিয়া আর আমাদের উপমহাদেশের ধর্মভিত্তিক হানাহানি অ্যাথেনিয়ান এই দাবীটিকেই সত্য প্রমাণ করে চলেছে। তত্ত্বীয় আলোচনা বাদ দিয়ে সভ্যতা বলতে আমরা আসলে যা বুঝি তা হলো ‘সভ্য আমরা’ ও ‘বর্বর ওরা’। প্রতিটি সভ্যতাই বস্তুতঃ এই ‘সভ্য-বর্বর’ মোটা দাগটির ভিত্তিতে নিজেদের পরিচিত করে, দাগের এ-পারের নিজেরা সবাই সভ্য এবং শিক্ষিত, আর ও-পারের সবাই বুনো, অসভ্য এবং বর্বর। ধর্মভিত্তিক গোষ্ঠীগুলোর ভেতর সভ্য-বুনো’র ভিত্তিতে মানুষকে ভাগ করে দেখার প্রবণতাটি সবচেয়ে বেশী; নিজের ধর্মের অনুসারী ছাড়া আর কেউ স্বর্গে যেতে পারবেনা, নিজের ধর্মীয় কিতাবের অনুশাসন ছাড়া মনুষ্যনির্মিত দ্বিতীয় কোন শাসন-ব্যবস্থাই খাঁটি নয়, ধর্মত্যাগকারীকে প্রাণদণ্ড দিতে হবে... ইত্যাদি ইত্যাদি। প্রতিটি ধর্মই নিজ অনুসারীদের অপর ধর্মের অনুসারীদের পতিত এবং নিচু চোখে দেখবার শিক্ষা দেয়। ইহুদী ঘরে জন্ম না নিলে আপনি যেমন ইহুদী হতে পারবেন না, হিন্দু ঘরে জন্ম না নিলে তেমনি আপনার হিন্দু ভগবানটির দেখা পাবারও কোন আশা নেই। ইদানিং ইস্কন অবশ্য অহিন্দুদের হিন্দুতে পরিণত করবার একটি রাস্তা খুলেছে তবে সেটি ভিন্ন আলোচনা। প্রসঙ্গত উল্লেখ্য, ইস্কনের অন্যতম শ্লোগান পৃথিবীকে মুসলমান-মুক্ত করতে হবে, অর্থ্যাৎ, ধর্মভিত্তিক সেই বর্ণবিদ্বেষটাই মূল কথা, তাতেই ভগবানের যতো সুখ।
হান্টিংটন তাঁর তত্ত্বে ইসলামকে যে কারণে পশ্চিমের সবচেয়ে বড় শত্রু হিসেবে দেখিয়েছেন সেটি হলো পশ্চিমা সমাজ এবং ইসলামী বিধানের মৌলিক বিষয়গুলোর আদর্শগত দ্বন্দ্ব। পশ্চিমা সমাজের মূল বিষয়গুলো যা পশ্চিমকে শ্রেষ্ঠত্ব দান করেছে সেগুলো হলো গণতান্ত্রিক রাজনীতি, ধর্মীয় প্রতিষ্ঠান ও রাষ্ট্রীয় শাসন ব্যবস্থার পৃথকীকরণ, ব্যক্তিস্বাধীনতা এবং মত প্রকাশের অধিকার। একটি রাষ্ট্রকে আধুনিক হতে হলে এই বিষয়গুলো নিশ্চিত করতেই হবে, তবে তার মানে এই নয় যে আধুনিকীকরণ মানেই পশ্চিমাকরণ। হান্টিংটন বলছেন এই বিষয়গুলো ৮ম-৯ম শতক থেকেই পশ্চিমা সমাজের মূল বৈশিষ্ট্য হিসেবে প্রচলিত হয়ে আসছে, যেখানে পশ্চিমের নিজের আধুনিকীকরণ হলো ১৫-১৬ শতকের দিকে এসে। ইসলামী বিধির সাথে পশ্চিমা এই ধারণাগুলো অত্যন্ত সাংঘর্ষিক; পশ্চিমা চিন্তা যেখানে ব্যক্তিস্বাধীনতায় বিশ্বাস করে, ইসলাম সেখানে-নিজের রুচিমত-কাপড় পরবার, মানুষের সাথে মেশার, খাবার খাওয়ার কিংবা শিল্প-সাহিত্য চর্চার স্বাধীনতায় হস্তক্ষেপ করে। ধর্মীয় প্রতিষ্ঠান এবং রাষ্ট্রীয় শাসন ব্যবস্থার পৃথকীকরণ, গণতান্ত্রিক শাসনব্যবস্থা কিংবা নারী স্বাধীনতা-এর সবই ইসলামী বিধিতে অকল্পনীয়। মুসলমানরা বিশ্বাস করেন আল্লাহ্র আইন-ই সব সমস্যার একমাত্র সমাধান এবং পশ্চিম মাত্রেই ইসলামের নামে কালিমা লেপনের ষড়যন্ত্রে রত। পশ্চিমের সাথে ইসলামী সমাজের এ পার্থক্য দিনকে দিন আরো বাড়বে কারণ ইসলাম পৃথিবীর সবচেয়ে দ্রুত বর্ধনশীল ধর্ম। এর মানে এই নয় যে প্রচুর মানুষ আগের ধর্মের ভুল বুঝতে পেরে ধর্মান্তরিত হয়ে ইসলামকে গ্রহণ করছে। ইসলাম সবচেয়ে দ্রুত বর্ধনশীল ধর্ম কারণ মুসলিম-প্রধান দেশগুলোর প্রজনন হার সবচেয়ে বেশী। অন্যভাবে বলা যায়, মুসলিম দেশগুলোতে শিক্ষার অ���াব প্রকট হওয়ায় এবং মানবিক যৌন-অনুভূতিগুলোকে কৃত্রিমভাবে জোর করে অবদমিত করে রাখায় বিনোদনের সবচেয়ে ওঁচা রাস্তাটিতেই দেশগুলোর অধিবাসীদের আগ্রহটা বেশী। পরকালে এঁদের হুর-প্রাপ্তির প্রণোদনা দেখিয়ে ধর্মটির অনুসারী করে রাখতে হয়, সেটি খুব বিচিত্র কিছু নয় বৈকি!
বস্তুগত দিক থেকে ভীষণ পিছিয়ে থাকা মুসলিম দেশগুলোর ভেতর শিক্ষায়, বিজ্ঞানে, প্রাচুর্যে পশ্চিমের সমকক্ষ হতে চাইবার প্রচণ্ড একটি ক্ষিধে আছে, কিন্তু একই সাথে আদর্শগত পার্থক্যের কারণে পশ্চিমের প্রতি প্রবল ঘৃণাও তারা লালন করে। পশ্চিমের আধুনিকতাবাদ ও ইসলামী দৃষ্টিভঙ্গির টানাপোড়েনে ক্ষতিগ্রস্ত হয়েছে বহু মুসলিম দেশ। হান্টিংটন উল্লেখ করেছেন আদর্শের এই দড়ি টানাটানি খেলায় মিশর, তিউনিশিয়া, আলজেরিয়া, ইরান এবং লেবাননের মতো শিক্ষিত এবং অসাম্প্রদায়িক মুসলিম দেশগুলোতেও ইসলামী জঙ্গিবাদ মাথাচাড়া দিয়ে উঠেছিলো আগের দশকগুলোতে। ধর্মীয় উগ্রবাদ ছড়ানো গোষ্ঠীগুলোর লক্ষণীয় দিক হলো এরা আধুনিক যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম এবং প্রযুক্তির পরিপূর্ণ ব্যবহারে অত্যন্ত দক্ষ; প্রযুক্তিবিদ্যার সর্বাধুনিক সংযোজনগুলো এরা সবার আগে গ্রহণ করে মানুষের কাছে তাদের প্রাগৈতিহাসিক বর্বর মতবাদ পৌঁছাবার কাজে।
হান্টিংটনের পর্যবেক্ষণ বলছে উগ্র ধর্মবাদে প্রধানত দুই ধরণের মানুষ বেশী যোগদান করেঃ প্রথম দলে আছে উন্নত জীবনের লক্ষ্যে যারা বিভিন্ন নতুন জায়গায় বা শহরে অভিবাসী হয়। সম্পূর্ণ অপরিচিত, ব্যস্ত সে জায়গার সাথে খাপ খাওয়াতে তাদের মানসিক, সামাজিক এবং বস্তুগত সহায়তার প্রয়োজন পড়ে যা ধর্মীয় গোষ্ঠীর চেয়ে ভালোভাবে কেউ দিতে পারেনা। ধর্ম সাধারণ মানুষের জন্য আফিম হতে পারে, কিন্তু দুর্বলের জন্য তা ভিটামিন-স্বরূপ। ধর্মীয় সংস্থাগুলোর কৃতজ্ঞতায় বাঁধা পড়া এই অভিবাসীরা সংস্থাগুলোর হাতের পুতুল হয়ে পড়ে। দ্বিতীয় যে গোষ্ঠীটি ধর্মীয় জঙ্গিবাদের প্রতি বেশী ঝোঁকে, এরা আসে শহরের মধ্যবিত্ত অংশটি থেকে যারা মূলত তাদের পরিবারের দ্বিতীয় প্রজন্ম। ধর্মীয় জাগরণ আলোড়ন তৈরী করে মূলত শিক্ষিত, আধুনিকতামনস্ক ছাত্রছাত্রী এবং কর্মজীবিদের মাঝে যারা ব্যবসা, রাজনীতি, সরকারী চাকরী বা অন্যান্য সম্মানজনক পেশায় নিয়োজিত। হান্টিংটন দেখিয়েছেন মুসলমান সমাজে তরুণদের ভেতর ধর্মীয় উৎসাহটা প্রবল এবং ধর্মের দিকে তাদের ঝোঁকার প্রবণতাটাই বেশী, যেখানে তাদের বাবা-মা’রা নিজেরা বেশীরভাগক্ষেত্রেই ধর্ম-নিরপেক্ষ। এই তরুণদের লক্ষ্য আধুনিকতাকে বাদ দেয়া নয়, পশ্চিমকে আস্তাকুঁড়ে ছুঁড়ে ফেলা। হান্টিংটন মন্তব্য করেছেন, বিশ্বজুড়ে তরুণদের মাঝে যে উগ্রবাদী একটি ইসলামী বিপ্লব জেগে উঠছে, তা অস্বীকার করা হবে ষোড়শ শতকে ইওরোপে প্রটেস্ট্যান্ট রিফর্মেশনকে অস্বীকার করবার মতো, অথচ প্রটেস্ট্যান্টিনিজিম আজ একটি বড় বাস্তবতা, খ্রিষ্টবাদের দ্বিতীয় বৃহত্তম শাখা। তাঁর এ পর্যবেক্ষণ জানিয়ে দেয়, বাঙলাদেশের হলি আর্টিজান আসলে বিচ্ছিন্ন কোন ঘটনা নয়, ইতিহাসের পুনরাবৃত্তি মাত্র। মধ্যপ্রাচ্যের বহু দেশ তাদের ধর্মবাদী তরুণ সমাজের হাতে একইভাবে নিগৃহীত হয়ে এসেছে পেছনের দশকগুলোতে।
�� বইতে মিশরের ইসলামী জঙ্গিবাদী একটি গোষ্ঠীর সদস্যদের ওপর চালানো একটি গবেষণার কথা এসেছে যেখানে ইসলামী জঙ্গিদের সার্বজনীন ৫টি বৈশিষ্ট্য চিহ্নিত হয়েছে। এই জঙ্গিদের প্রায় সবার বয়েস বিশ থেকে ত্রিশের মাঝে, এদের ৮��� শ���াংশই বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ে পড়েছে, এদের অর্ধেক জনবল এসেছে দেশের অভিজাত শিক্ষাপ্রতিষ্ঠানগুলো থেকে এবং তারা সচরাচর প্রযুক্তিবিদ্যা সংক্রান্ত অনুষদগুলোর ছাত্র-ছাত্রী। এদের ৭০ ���তাংশ এসেছে নিম্ন-মধ্যবিত্ত পরিবার থেকে এবং তারা নিজেদের পরিবারের প্রথম বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়-পড়ুয়া প্রজন্ম। এরা প্রায় সবাই-ই এদের ছেলেবেলা কাটিয়েছে গ্রামে বা মফস্বলে এবং বড় হবার পর শহরে অভিবাসী হয়েছে।
১৯৯৬ সালে লেখা এই বইটির সাথে পরিচিত হবার যথেষ্ট সময়-সুযোগ বাঙলাদেশের নীতি-নির্ধারকদের ছিলো, তবে দেশটির রাষ্ট্রনীতি শিক্ষিত লোকদের কলমে নির্ধারিত হয়না। এ ভূমিকাগুলো পালন করতে যারা আসেন তারা চুরি এবং লুটেপুটে খাওয়াতে এত ব্যস্ত থাকেন, অন্যদিকে চোখ ফেরাবার অবসর তাঁদের হয় না। ফলস্বরূপ, কয়েক দশক আগে মূর্খ দেশগুলো যে ভুল করে আসে, বাঙলাদেশ সেই একই রাস্তায় একই জুতোর ছাপে পা ফেলে পৃথিবীর মানচিত্রে আরেকটি মূর্খ দেশ হিসেবে নাম লেখায়। একটি (মুসলিম) দেশের তরুণদের ভেতর এ ধরণের জঙ্গিবাদ তখনই ছড়ায় যখন দেশটির সরকার তার দায়িত্ব পালনে ব্যর্থ এবং চরম উদাসী হয়; জাগতিক চাহিদাগুলো পূরণে ব্যর্থ হয়ে হতাশ তরুণরা আশ্রয় খোঁজে ধর্মের মাঝে। অতীতে এবং বর্তমানে যে দেশগুলোতে ইসলামী জঙ্গিবাদ মাথাচাড়া দিয়ে উঠেছে, তার প্রতিটিতেই সরকারের ক্ষমতার বৈধতা এবং দেশ শাসনের আন্তরিকতা প্রশ্নবিদ্ধ। ইসলামী খিলাফতে বিশ্বাসীরা মুসলমান বিশ্বে প্রচলিত 'দেশপ্রেম ঈমানের অঙ্গ' হাদীসটিকে জাল বলে অভিহিত করেন, কারণ, খিলাফতের সাথে দেশপ্রেমের ধারণাটি সাংঘর্ষিক। এভাবেই একইসাথে মানব-রচিত আইন বা 'তাগূতী মতবাদের প্রতি ঘৃণা, অসৎ সরকারের প্রতি ক্ষোভ, জীবনের হতাশা এবং পরকালের প্রতিশ্রুতি-এই সবগুলো উপাদান এক একটি সম্ভাবনাকে ধ্বংস করে দিয়ে তৈরী করে এক একটি অনুভূতিহীন জঙ্গি যন্ত্র।
স্যামুয়েল পি হান্টিংটন তাঁর এ বইয়ে ঘৃণা ছড়াননি, বাস্তবতার একটি ছবি শুধু এঁকেছেন। পৃথিবীর কোন সভ্যতাই একে অপরকে সহ্য করতে পারেনা। টিভিতে হিন্দী অনুষ্ঠানের জোয়ারে আপনি যেমন বিরক্ত হন, আমেরিকায় জাপানী গাড়ীর আধিক্যে আমেরিকানরাও শঙ্কিত হয়। নিজের ভাষা, পরিচয়, সংস্কৃতি ইত্যাদিকে কেউই ছোট হতে দেখতে চায় না। পশ্চিম বহু বছর ধরে একক শক্তি হিসেবে পৃথিবীর ওপর ছড়ি ঘুরিয়ে যাচ্ছে এটি বহু সভ্যতার জন্যই শীরঃপীড়ার বিষয়। পশ্চিমকে টেনে ফেলে দেবার ইঁদুর দৌড়ে চীন অন্য আর বাকী সবার চেয়ে এগিয়ে আছে প্রযুক্তি এবং অর্থনৈতিক দিক দিয়ে। পশ্চিমের প্রতি ঘৃণাটা চীন আর মুসলিম বিশ্বের প্রায় একই পর্যায়ের, যদিও কারণগুলো ভিন্ন। শত্রুর শত্রু বন্ধু, এই নীতিতে চলে চীনের সাথে মুসলিম বিশ্ব একাট্টা হয়ে পশ্চিমের বিরুদ্ধে উঠে পড়ে লাগবে এই ভবিষৎবাণী হান্টিংটন করে গেছেন যার বাস্তব প্রয়োগ আজ আমাদের চারপাশেই দেখি। গেলো বছরের অক্টোবরে সৌদী আরব চীনের সাথে ২৮ বিলিয়ন ডলারের বাণিজ্যিক চুক্তি সম্পন্ন করে। পাকিস্তানে চীনের সমালোচনা কার্যত ট্যাবু, মালয়েশিয়ার সাথে ১০০ বিলিয়ন ডলারের বাণিজ্য... এমনকী চীন যে তার নিজের দেশের উইঘুর মুসলমানদের নিপীড়ন করে চলেছে, জাতিসংঘে সে ব্যাপারটি উত্থাপিত হলে যে ৩৭টি দেশ চীনের সমর্থনে এগিয়ে আসে, তাদের অর্ধেকই মুসলিম দেশ। এ দেশগুলোর কয়েকটিই মুসলমানদের কাছে ইসলামী বিশ্বের নেতা-স্বরূপ (ইরান, সৌদী-আরব, তুরস্ক, মিশর, পাকিস্তান, কাতার, সিরিয়া, কুয়েত, বাহরাইন, ওমান)। চীনকে সমর্থনকারী ইসলামী দেশগুলোর প্রতিটিরই অর্থনৈতিক এবং অন্যান্য জাগতিক প্রাপ্তির সুযোগ রয়েছে চীনের কাছে। আখিরাত বা পরকালের প্রাপ্তির যে বিষয়টি মুসলমানদের কাছে সবচেয়ে বড় পুরষ্কার, যা পৃথিবীর সমস্ত মুসলমানকে এক চাদরের নিচে নিয়ে আসার কথা বলে, পার্থিব লোভেই মুসলমান দেশগুলোর গনেশ উল্টে যাচ্ছে দেখা যায়।
হান্টিংটন তাঁর বইয়ে পশ্চিমকে সতর্ক হতে বলেছেন চীন ও মুসলিম বিশ্বের ঐক্য বাহিনীর বিরুদ্ধে। হান্টিংটন নিজে পশ্চিমা, আমেরিকান। তিনি তাঁর দেশের, তাঁর সভ্যতার রক্ষায় তাঁর দেশকে অস্ত্র এবং সামরিক শক্তি বাড়াতে বলবেন সেটাই স্বাভাবিক। হান্টিংটন তাঁর জীবদ্দশায়ই তাঁর ভবিষ্যৎবানী ফলতে দেখেছেন, ২০০১ সালের টুইন টাওয়ার হামলা এবং পরবর্তী ইরাক-যুদ্ধের মধ্য দিয়ে। হান্টিংটনকে বর্ণবিদ্ধেষী, যুদ্ধবাদী ইত্যাদি বলে গালমন্দ করে মুসলমানরা সাময়িকভাবে নিজেদের স্বান্তনা দিতে পারেন, কিন্তু তাতে নিজেদের পিছিয়ে পড়ার ধস ঠেকানো যাবেনা। মুসলমানরা যদ্দিন পর্যন্ত নিজেদের ধর্মের উগ্রবাদী বিষয়গুলো আমলে না আনছেন, এবং সংস্কারের প্রয়োজন অনুভব না করছেন, তদ্দিন পর্যন্ত তাঁরা বিশ্বের কাছে খলনায়ক হয়েই থাকবেন। হান্টিংটন নিজেই বলেছেন, বিশ্বের মোড়ল হয়ে ওঠার পেছনে পশ্চিম যত না উন্নত বিজ্ঞান বা প্রযুক্তির সহায়তা পেয়েছে, তার চেয়ে ঢের বেশী ভূমিকা রেখেছে পশ্চিমের সংঘবদ্ধভাবে আক্রমণ বা জুলুম করবার ক্ষমতা। এতদস্বত্ত্বেও, মানবিকতার মূল্যটা এ মূহুর্তে আর সব অঞ্চলের চেয়ে পশ্চিম-ই সবচেয়ে বেশী দেয়। মুসলমান দেশগুলোর নিজেদের ভেতরই ঐক্যের ভীষণ অভাব আছে, দ্বিমত আছে কে বেশী মুসলমান তা নিয়ে। যে ৫০টির মতো মুসলমান দেশ রয়েছে পৃথিবীতে, সেগুলোতে ৭০-এর ওপর 'ফেরকা' বা ইসলামী আদর্শের ব্যখ্যা রয়েছে, যার কোনটির সাথেই কোনটির মিল নেই, এবং প্রতিটি মতবাদের অনুসারীরা অপরদের ভ্রান্ত বলে রায় দিয়ে চলেছেন। জ্ঞান-বিজ্ঞান চর্চায়ও তাঁদেরই আজ সবচেয়ে করুণ দশা। এখন পর্যন্ত যে একমাত্র মুসলমান বিজ্ঞানী পদার্থবিজ্ঞানে নোবেল পুরষ্কার পেয়েছেন, সেই আব্দুস সালাম আহমাদী মুসলমান বলে পাকিস্তানের মুসলমান সমাজ তাঁর মুসলিম পরিচয়টিকে অস্বীকার করেছে। তাঁর কবরের ফলকে লেখা ছিলো 'In 1979 became the first Muslim Nobel Laureate', সেখানে 'Muslim' কথাটি মুছে দেয়া হয়েছে, ফলকটি আজও 'In 1979 became first Nobel Laureate'-এই অর্থহীন বাক্যটি বহন করে চলেছে। সম্মিলিত উদ্দেশ্যে একজোট হয়ে পৃথিবী শাসন মুসলমানদের কম্মো নয়। তাঁরা যাদের কাঁধে চেপে পশ্চিমকে হঠাতে চাইছেন, সেই চীন কিংবা উত্তর কোরিয়া আমেরিকার জায়গায় এলে পৃথিবী আদৌ কতটা বাসযোগ্য থাকবে সেটি ভেবে দেখতে পারেন।
আশির দশকের শেষে যখন সোভিয়েত রাশিয়ার পতন হয়, ফ্রান্সিস ফুকুইয়ামা তখন তাঁর একটি নিবন্ধে ‘দি এন্ড অফ হিস্টরী’ শীর্ষক একটি তত্ত্ব উপস্থাপন করেন। তাঁর এ তত্ত্বের সারাংশ হলো সোভিয়েত বনাম পশ্চিমা মুক্ত গনতন্ত্রের লড়াইয়ে পশ্চিম বিজয়ী হয়েছে, এবং এই পশ্চিমা চিন্তাধারাই মানব সভ্যতার ক্রমবিকাশের শেষ ধাপ। বৈশ্বিকভাবে মানুষ এখন পশ্চিমা সভ্যতার ছায়াতলে এসে একটি একীভূত মানবজাতির লক্ষ্যে কাজ করে যাবে (ইউনিভার্সাল সিভিলাইজেশন)। বিচ্ছিন্নভাবে এখানে ওখানে কমিউনিজমের ভুত থাকবে সত্যি, বিশেষত তৃতীয় বিশ্বের দেশগুলোতে, কিন্তু সার্বিকভাবে গোটা বিশ্বের মানুষ আসলে যুদ্ধ বিগ্রহ ভুলে ‘এক পৃথিবী-এক জাতি’ এমন একটি মহান লক্ষ্যের দিকে পা বাড়াবে। ফুকুইয়ামা কিছুটা যেন ক্ষেধের সাথেই বলেন যুদ্ধ-সংঘর্ষহীন সে পৃথিবীটা বরং বেশ একঘেয়ে হয়ে উঠবে। ফুকুইয়ামার এ তত্ত্বের জবাবে স্যামুয়েল পি হান্টিংটন রীতিমতো পিএইচডি গবেষণাপত্র-স্বরূপ এই বইটি লিখে ফেলেন।
হান্টিংটনের 'ক্ল্যাশ অফ সিভিলাইজেশন' তত্ত্বটি মূলত বলে সোভিয়েত পরবর্তী পৃথিবীতে এখন অন্যান্য সভ্যতাগুলোর মাঝে সংঘর্ষ তৈরি হবে। সোভিয়েত যুগের পৃথিবীকে ব্যখ্যা করতে প্রয়োজন ছিলো 'সোভিয়েত বনাম আমেরিকা' মডেলের। হান্টিংটন বলছেন 'সোভিয়েত বনাম আমেরিকা' মডেলটি যেমন আজ অকেজো, তাঁর নিজের 'ক্ল্যাশ অফ সিভিলাইজেশন' মডেলটিও একসময়ে অকেজো হয়ে পড়বে। তবে তার আগে পৃথিবীর বিভিন্ন দেশে বিভিন্ন সভ্যতা একটি বৈশ্বিক কামড়াকামড়িতে জড়িয়ে পড়বে, সবার লক্ষ্য পশ্চিমকে ক্ষমতাচ্যুত করে সে জায়গায় নিজেকে স্থাপন করা। বৈশ্বিক এ ‘গেইম অফ থ্রোন্স’-এ মূল সংগ্রামটি হবে পশ্চিম বনাম মুসলমান বিশ্বে, যাকে কেন্দ্র করেই বাকী সভ্যতাগুলোর সংগ্রামের চালগুলো পরিচালিত হবে।
হান্টিংটনের মতে গোটা বিশ্বের সভ্যতাগুলোকে মেরেকেটে আট থেকে নয়টি ভাগে ভাগ করা য���য়ঃ পশ্চিমা, হিন্দু, মুসলিম, ল্যাটিন আমেরিকান, আফ্রিকান, চৈনিক, জাপানী, বৌদ্ধিক এবং অর্থোডক্স (রাশান)। এর মাঝে অনেকগুলো সভ্যতাই পশ্চিমের শাসনাধীন ছিলো, বা কোন কোন ক্ষেত্রে আজও আছে। সময়ের সাথে সাথে পশ্চিমের অধীনে থাকা সভ্যতাগুলো নিজেদের স্বাধীনতা এবং অস্তিত্বের ব্যাপারে সচেতন হতে থাকবে এবং পশ্চিমের প্রভাব সম্পূর্ণরূপে ছুঁড়ে ফেলে দিয়ে নিজেদের সংস্কৃতি এবং মূল্যবোধের ওপর জোরারোপ করা শুরু করবে-এটি হান্টিংটনের তত্ত্বের অন্যতম একটি স্তম্ভ। মানুষ মাত্রেই নিজের দল ভারি করতে চায়। পৃথিবীর কোণায়-কানায় ছড়িয়ে থাকা সভ্যতাগুলোর মাঝেও একই প্রবণতা দেখা যায়। হান্টিংটন বলেছেন দুটি ভিন্ন সভ্যতা পরস্পরের বন্ধু হয়ে ওঠে একইরকম সংস্কৃতি, ভাষা, ধর্ম ইত্যাদির ভিত্তিতে, ভৌগোলিক অবস্থানের ভিত্তিতে নয়। উদাহরণস্বরূপ উল্লেখ করেছেন সোমালিয়ার রক্তক্ষয়ী সংঘর্ষ প্রতিবেশী দেশগুলোর শীরঃপীড়ার কারণ হয়নি। ইউগোস্লাভ সংকটের সময় রাশিয়া সাহায্য করেছে সার্বিয়াকে, ওদিকে মুসলমান-প্রধান দেশ বসনিয়ার সাহায্যে এগিয়ে এসেছে সৌদি আরব, ইরান, তুরস্ক ও লিবিয়া। যে জিনিষটির ভিত্তিতে এ দেশগুলো নিজেদের শত্রু-মিত্র সজ্ঞায়িত করেছে সেটি হলো সাংস্কৃতিক পরিচয়; অর্থোডক্স এবং ইসলাম-এ দুটি ধর্মের সংস্কৃতি এখানে বড় ভূমিকা রেখেছে। তাই বলে কি একই ভাষা, ধর্ম এবং সংস্কৃতির বাহক সকল দেশ এবং সে সব দেশগুলোর মানুষেরা হাজার হাজার মাইল দূরত্বের পার্থক্য ভুলে গিয়ে একে অপরের প্রতি ভ্রাতৃত্ববোধের একটি অমোঘ টান অনুভব করে? না, মানব সমাজ এভাবে কাজ করেনা। এখানে রাজনৈতিক স্বার্থই আসল ভূমিকা রাখে। যে দেশগুলোকে নৈতিক সমর্থন দিলে জনগণের কাছে নিজেদের গ্রহণযোগ্যতা বাড়বে, বৈশ্বিক রাজনীতিতে নিজেদের খুঁটি শক্ত হবে, শাসকেরা তারই জটিল হিসেব নিকেশ কষে শত্রু মিত্র নির্ধারণ করেন। বসনিয়ার সাথে সৌদি আরব বা মধ্যপ্রাচ্যের অন্যান্য মুসলমান দেশগুলোর মাঝে দূরত্ব দু'হাজার মাইলের ওপর; রাজনৈতিক স্বার্থটি-যা ধরা ছোঁয়া এবং শোঁকা যায়-এখানে ওতপ্রোতভাবে জড়িত। 'ইসলামী ভ্রাতৃত্ববোধ' বিষয়টি একান্তই বায়বীয় এবং কাল্পনিক।
হান্টিংটন তাঁর নিজের মডেলের কার্যকারীতার আলোচনায় তুলনা টেনেছেন জন মার্শেইমারের 'স্টেটিস্ট' (statist) মডেলের সাথে। মার্শেইমারের statist মডেল বলছে দুটো ক্ষমতাশীল প্রতিবেশী রাষ্ট্র যখন একই অরক্ষিত সীমানা নিজেদের মাঝে ভাগাভাগি করে, তখন প্রায়ই তারা নিজেদের মাঝে দ্বন্ধ-ফ্যাসাদ মিটিয়ে এক জোট হবার জন্য হাত মেলায���। এ মডেলের সূত্র ধরে মার্শেইমার ভবিষ্যৎবাণী করেছেন, রাশিয়া এবং ইউক্রেনের অদূর ভবিষ্যতে বন্ধু রাষ্ট্রে পরিণত হবার সম্ভাবনা রয়েছে। অপরদিকে, হান্টিংটনের 'ক্ল্যাশ অফ সিভিলাইজেশন' মডেলটি প্রথমেই আলোচনা করে সুদূর অতীত থেকে চলে আসা ইউক্রেনের অর্থোডক্সপন্থী পূর্বাঞ্চলের সাথে পশ্চিমাঞ্চলের ঐতিহাসিক সংঘাতের কথা, যার সূত্রপাত অঞ্চল দুটির সাংস্কৃতিক এবং ধর্মীয় পার্থক্যের ভিত্তিতে। হা���্টিংটন বলছেন সভ্যতার সংঘাতের এ তত্ত্বের পথে হাঁটলে রাশিয়া বনাম ইউক্রেন পরিস্থিতির চেয়ে বরং ইউক্রেন দেশটির আদৌ একসাথে থাকা হবে, নাকি, পূর্ব-পশ্চিম এ দুভাগে ভাগ হয়ে যেতে হবে-সে প্রশ্নটিই বেশী জরুরী হয়ে ওঠে। ���উক্রেনের দু’ভাগ হয়ে যাওয়া নিয়ে হান্টিংটনের ১৯৯৬ সালে তোলা এ প্রশ্নটি ২০১৯ সালে আজও অত্যন্ত প্রাসঙ্গিক।
সভ্যতার সংজ্ঞা নির্ধারণ করতে গেলে কি কি বিষয় আমলে নেয়া উচিৎ প্রথমেই সে প্রশ্নটি চলে আসে। হান্টিংটন উল্লেখ করেছেন ভাষা, ধর্ম, জীবনাচার এবং নৃতাত্ত্বিক পরিচয়-প্রাচীন গ্রীকরা এই বিষয়গুলোর ভিত্তিতে নিজেদের সাথে অন��য জাতিদের পার্থক্য নিরূপণ করতো। অ্যাথেনিয়ানদের মতে সভ্যতার সংজ্ঞা নিরূপণকারী এই স্তম্ভগুলোর মাঝে ধর্মের ভূমিকাটাই সবচেয়ে বড়। এই পর্যবেক্ষণটির ওপর ভিত্তি করেই হান্টিংটনের নিজস্ব তত্ত্ব অনেকখানি দাঁড়িয়ে আছে। একই ভাষা, একই জীবনাচার এবং একই নৃতাত্ত্বিক গোষ্ঠীর সদস্য হবার পরও ধর্মের পার্থক্যের কারণে খুনোখুনির ইতিহাস পৃথিবীর জন্য নতুন কিছু নয়। প্রাচীন কাল থেকে শুরু করে হালের সময়ের লেবানন, ইউগোস্লাভিয়া আর আমাদের উপমহাদেশের ধর্মভিত্তিক হানাহানি অ্যাথেনিয়ান এই দাবীটিকেই সত্য প্রমাণ করে চলেছে। তত্ত্বীয় আলোচনা বাদ দিয়ে সভ্যতা বলতে আমরা আসলে যা বুঝি তা হলো ‘সভ্য আমরা’ ও ‘বর্বর ওরা’। প্রতিটি সভ্যতাই বস্তুতঃ এই ‘সভ্য-বর্বর’ মোটা দাগটির ভিত্তিতে নিজেদের পরিচিত করে, দাগের এ-পারের নিজেরা সবাই সভ্য এবং শিক্ষিত, আর ও-পারের সবাই বুনো, অসভ্য এবং বর্বর। ধর্মভিত্তিক গোষ্ঠীগুলোর ভেতর সভ্য-বুনো’র ভিত্তিতে মানুষকে ভাগ করে দেখার প্রবণতাটি সবচেয়ে বেশী; নিজের ধর্মের অনুসারী ছাড়া আর কেউ স্বর্গে যেতে পারবেনা, নিজের ধর্মীয় কিতাবের অনুশাসন ছাড়া মনুষ্যনির্মিত দ্বিতীয় কোন শাসন-ব্যবস্থাই খাঁটি নয়, ধর্মত্যাগকারীকে প্রাণদণ্ড দিতে হবে... ইত্যাদি ইত্যাদি। প্রতিটি ধর্মই নিজ অনুসারীদের অপর ধর্মের অনুসারীদের পতিত এবং নিচু চোখে দেখবার শিক্ষা দেয়। ইহুদী ঘরে জন্ম না নিলে আপনি যেমন ইহুদী হতে পারবেন না, হিন্দু ঘরে জন্ম না নিলে তেমনি আপনার হিন্দু ভগবানটির দেখা পাবারও কোন আশা নেই। ইদানিং ইস্কন অবশ্য অহিন্দুদের হিন্দুতে পরিণত করবার একটি রাস্তা খুলেছে তবে সেটি ভিন্ন আলোচনা। প্রসঙ্গত উল্লেখ্য, ইস্কনের অন্যতম শ্লোগান পৃথিবীকে মুসলমান-মুক্ত করতে হবে, অর্থ্যাৎ, ধর্মভিত্তিক সেই বর্ণবিদ্বেষটাই মূল কথা, তাতেই ভগবানের যতো সুখ।
হান্টিংটন তাঁর তত্ত্বে ইসলামকে যে কারণে পশ্চিমের সবচেয়ে বড় শত্রু হিসেবে দেখিয়েছেন সেটি হলো পশ্চিমা সমাজ এবং ইসলামী বিধানের মৌলিক বিষয়গুলোর আদর্শগত দ্বন্দ্ব। পশ্চিমা সমাজের মূল বিষয়গুলো যা পশ্চিমকে শ্রেষ্ঠত্ব দান করেছে সেগুলো হলো গণতান্ত্রিক রাজনীতি, ধর্মীয় প্রতিষ্ঠান ও রাষ্ট্রীয় শাসন ব্যবস্থার পৃথকীকরণ, ব্যক্তিস্বাধীনতা এবং মত প্রকাশের অধিকার। একটি রাষ্ট্রকে আধুনিক হতে হলে এই বিষয়গুলো নিশ্চিত করতেই হবে, তবে তার মানে এই নয় যে আধুনিকীকরণ মানেই পশ্চিমাকরণ। হান্টিংটন বলছেন এই বিষয়গুলো ৮ম-৯ম শতক থেকেই পশ্চিমা সমাজের মূল বৈশিষ্ট্য হিসেবে প্রচলিত হয়ে আসছে, যেখানে পশ্চিমের নিজের আধুনিকীকরণ হলো ১৫-১৬ শতকের দিকে এসে। ইসলামী বিধির সাথে পশ্চিমা এই ধারণাগুলো অত্যন্ত সাংঘর্ষিক; পশ্চিমা চিন্তা যেখানে ব্যক্তিস্বাধীনতায় বিশ্বাস করে, ইসলাম সেখানে-নিজের রুচিমত-কাপড় পরবার, মানুষের সাথে মেশার, খাবার খাওয়ার কিংবা শিল্প-সাহিত্য চর্চার স্বাধীনতায় হস্তক্ষেপ করে। ধর্মীয় প্রতিষ্ঠান এবং রাষ্ট্রীয় শাসন ব্যবস্থার পৃথকীকরণ, গণতান্ত্রিক শাসনব্যবস্থা কিংবা নারী স্বাধীনতা-এর সবই ইসলামী বিধিতে অকল্পনীয়। মুসলমানরা বিশ্বাস করেন আল্লাহ্র আইন-ই সব সমস্যার একমাত্র সমাধান এবং পশ্চিম মাত্রেই ইসলামের নামে কালিমা লেপনের ষড়যন্ত্রে রত। পশ্চিমের সাথে ইসলামী সমাজের এ পার্থক্য দিনকে দিন আরো বাড়বে কারণ ইসলাম পৃথিবীর সবচেয়ে দ্রুত বর্ধনশীল ধর্ম। এর মানে এই নয় যে প্রচুর মানুষ আগের ধর্মের ভুল বুঝতে পেরে ধর্মান্তরিত হয়ে ইসলামকে গ্রহণ করছে। ইসলাম সবচেয়ে দ্রুত বর্ধনশীল ধর্ম কারণ মুসলিম-প্রধান দেশগুলোর প্রজনন হার সবচেয়ে বেশী। অন্যভাবে বলা যায়, মুসলিম দেশগুলোতে শিক্ষার অ���াব প্রকট হওয়ায় এবং মানবিক যৌন-অনুভূতিগুলোকে কৃত্রিমভাবে জোর করে অবদমিত করে রাখায় বিনোদনের সবচেয়ে ওঁচা রাস্তাটিতেই দেশগুলোর অধিবাসীদের আগ্রহটা বেশী। পরকালে এঁদের হুর-প্রাপ্তির প্রণোদনা দেখিয়ে ধর্মটির অনুসারী করে রাখতে হয়, সেটি খুব বিচিত্র কিছু নয় বৈকি!
বস্তুগত দিক থেকে ভীষণ পিছিয়ে থাকা মুসলিম দেশগুলোর ভেতর শিক্ষায়, বিজ্ঞানে, প্রাচুর্যে পশ্চিমের সমকক্ষ হতে চাইবার প্রচণ্ড একটি ক্ষিধে আছে, কিন্তু একই সাথে আদর্শগত পার্থক্যের কারণে পশ্চিমের প্রতি প্রবল ঘৃণাও তারা লালন করে। পশ্চিমের আধুনিকতাবাদ ও ইসলামী দৃষ্টিভঙ্গির টানাপোড়েনে ক্ষতিগ্রস্ত হয়েছে বহু মুসলিম দেশ। হান্টিংটন উল্লেখ করেছেন আদর্শের এই দড়ি টানাটানি খেলায় মিশর, তিউনিশিয়া, আলজেরিয়া, ইরান এবং লেবাননের মতো শিক্ষিত এবং অসাম্প্রদায়িক মুসলিম দেশগুলোতেও ইসলামী জঙ্গিবাদ মাথাচাড়া দিয়ে উঠেছিলো আগের দশকগুলোতে। ধর্মীয় উগ্রবাদ ছড়ানো গোষ্ঠীগুলোর লক্ষণীয় দিক হলো এরা আধুনিক যোগাযোগ মাধ্যম এবং প্রযুক্তির পরিপূর্ণ ব্যবহারে অত্যন্ত দক্ষ; প্রযুক্তিবিদ্যার সর্বাধুনিক সংযোজনগুলো এরা সবার আগে গ্রহণ করে মানুষের কাছে তাদের প্রাগৈতিহাসিক বর্বর মতবাদ পৌঁছাবার কাজে।
হান্টিংটনের পর্যবেক্ষণ বলছে উগ্র ধর্মবাদে প্রধানত দুই ধরণের মানুষ বেশী যোগদান করেঃ প্রথম দলে আছে উন্নত জীবনের লক্ষ্যে যারা বিভিন্ন নতুন জায়গায় বা শহরে অভিবাসী হয়। সম্পূর্ণ অপরিচিত, ব্যস্ত সে জায়গার সাথে খাপ খাওয়াতে তাদের মানসিক, সামাজিক এবং বস্তুগত সহায়তার প্রয়োজন পড়ে যা ধর্মীয় গোষ্ঠীর চেয়ে ভালোভাবে কেউ দিতে পারেনা। ধর্ম সাধারণ মানুষের জন্য আফিম হতে পারে, কিন্তু দুর্বলের জন্য তা ভিটামিন-স্বরূপ। ধর্মীয় সংস্থাগুলোর কৃতজ্ঞতায় বাঁধা পড়া এই অভিবাসীরা সংস্থাগুলোর হাতের পুতুল হয়ে পড়ে। দ্বিতীয় যে গোষ্ঠীটি ধর্মীয় জঙ্গিবাদের প্রতি বেশী ঝোঁকে, এরা আসে শহরের মধ্যবিত্ত অংশটি থেকে যারা মূলত তাদের পরিবারের দ্বিতীয় প্রজন্ম। ধর্মীয় জাগরণ আলোড়ন তৈরী করে মূলত শিক্ষিত, আধুনিকতামনস্ক ছাত্রছাত্রী এবং কর্মজীবিদের মাঝে যারা ব্যবসা, রাজনীতি, সরকারী চাকরী বা অন্যান্য সম্মানজনক পেশায় নিয়োজিত। হান্টিংটন দেখিয়েছেন মুসলমান সমাজে তরুণদের ভেতর ধর্মীয় উৎসাহটা প্রবল এবং ধর্মের দিকে তাদের ঝোঁকার প্রবণতাটাই বেশী, যেখানে তাদের বাবা-মা’রা নিজেরা বেশীরভাগক্ষেত্রেই ধর্ম-নিরপেক্ষ। এই তরুণদের লক্ষ্য আধুনিকতাকে বাদ দেয়া নয়, পশ্চিমকে আস্তাকুঁড়ে ছুঁড়ে ফেলা। হান্টিংটন মন্তব্য করেছেন, বিশ্বজুড়ে তরুণদের মাঝে যে উগ্রবাদী একটি ইসলামী বিপ্লব জেগে উঠছে, তা অস্বীকার করা হবে ষোড়শ শতকে ইওরোপে প্রটেস্ট্যান্ট রিফর্মেশনকে অস্বীকার করবার মতো, অথচ প্রটেস্ট্যান্টিনিজিম আজ একটি বড় বাস্তবতা, খ্রিষ্টবাদের দ্বিতীয় বৃহত্তম শাখা। তাঁর এ পর্যবেক্ষণ জানিয়ে দেয়, বাঙলাদেশের হলি আর্টিজান আসলে বিচ্ছিন্ন কোন ঘটনা নয়, ইতিহাসের পুনরাবৃত্তি মাত্র। মধ্যপ্রাচ্যের বহু দেশ তাদের ধর্মবাদী তরুণ সমাজের হাতে একইভাবে নিগৃহীত হয়ে এসেছে পেছনের দশকগুলোতে।
�� বইতে মিশরের ইসলামী জঙ্গিবাদী একটি গোষ্ঠীর সদস্যদের ওপর চালানো একটি গবেষণার কথা এসেছে যেখানে ইসলামী জঙ্গিদের সার্বজনীন ৫টি বৈশিষ্ট্য চিহ্নিত হয়েছে। এই জঙ্গিদের প্রায় সবার বয়েস বিশ থেকে ত্রিশের মাঝে, এদের ৮��� শ���াংশই বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ে পড়েছে, এদের অর্ধেক জনবল এসেছে দেশের অভিজাত শিক্ষাপ্রতিষ্ঠানগুলো থেকে এবং তারা সচরাচর প্রযুক্তিবিদ্যা সংক্রান্ত অনুষদগুলোর ছাত্র-ছাত্রী। এদের ৭০ ���তাংশ এসেছে নিম্ন-মধ্যবিত্ত পরিবার থেকে এবং তারা নিজেদের পরিবারের প্রথম বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়-পড়ুয়া প্রজন্ম। এরা প্রায় সবাই-ই এদের ছেলেবেলা কাটিয়েছে গ্রামে বা মফস্বলে এবং বড় হবার পর শহরে অভিবাসী হয়েছে।
১৯৯৬ সালে লেখা এই বইটির সাথে পরিচিত হবার যথেষ্ট সময়-সুযোগ বাঙলাদেশের নীতি-নির্ধারকদের ছিলো, তবে দেশটির রাষ্ট্রনীতি শিক্ষিত লোকদের কলমে নির্ধারিত হয়না। এ ভূমিকাগুলো পালন করতে যারা আসেন তারা চুরি এবং লুটেপুটে খাওয়াতে এত ব্যস্ত থাকেন, অন্যদিকে চোখ ফেরাবার অবসর তাঁদের হয় না। ফলস্বরূপ, কয়েক দশক আগে মূর্খ দেশগুলো যে ভুল করে আসে, বাঙলাদেশ সেই একই রাস্তায় একই জুতোর ছাপে পা ফেলে পৃথিবীর মানচিত্রে আরেকটি মূর্খ দেশ হিসেবে নাম লেখায়। একটি (মুসলিম) দেশের তরুণদের ভেতর এ ধরণের জঙ্গিবাদ তখনই ছড়ায় যখন দেশটির সরকার তার দায়িত্ব পালনে ব্যর্থ এবং চরম উদাসী হয়; জাগতিক চাহিদাগুলো পূরণে ব্যর্থ হয়ে হতাশ তরুণরা আশ্রয় খোঁজে ধর্মের মাঝে। অতীতে এবং বর্তমানে যে দেশগুলোতে ইসলামী জঙ্গিবাদ মাথাচাড়া দিয়ে উঠেছে, তার প্রতিটিতেই সরকারের ক্ষমতার বৈধতা এবং দেশ শাসনের আন্তরিকতা প্রশ্নবিদ্ধ। ইসলামী খিলাফতে বিশ্বাসীরা মুসলমান বিশ্বে প্রচলিত 'দেশপ্রেম ঈমানের অঙ্গ' হাদীসটিকে জাল বলে অভিহিত করেন, কারণ, খিলাফতের সাথে দেশপ্রেমের ধারণাটি সাংঘর্ষিক। এভাবেই একইসাথে মানব-রচিত আইন বা 'তাগূতী মতবাদের প্রতি ঘৃণা, অসৎ সরকারের প্রতি ক্ষোভ, জীবনের হতাশা এবং পরকালের প্রতিশ্রুতি-এই সবগুলো উপাদান এক একটি সম্ভাবনাকে ধ্বংস করে দিয়ে তৈরী করে এক একটি অনুভূতিহীন জঙ্গি যন্ত্র।
স্যামুয়েল পি হান্টিংটন তাঁর এ বইয়ে ঘৃণা ছড়াননি, বাস্তবতার একটি ছবি শুধু এঁকেছেন। পৃথিবীর কোন সভ্যতাই একে অপরকে সহ্য করতে পারেনা। টিভিতে হিন্দী অনুষ্ঠানের জোয়ারে আপনি যেমন বিরক্ত হন, আমেরিকায় জাপানী গাড়ীর আধিক্যে আমেরিকানরাও শঙ্কিত হয়। নিজের ভাষা, পরিচয়, সংস্কৃতি ইত্যাদিকে কেউই ছোট হতে দেখতে চায় না। পশ্চিম বহু বছর ধরে একক শক্তি হিসেবে পৃথিবীর ওপর ছড়ি ঘুরিয়ে যাচ্ছে এটি বহু সভ্যতার জন্যই শীরঃপীড়ার বিষয়। পশ্চিমকে টেনে ফেলে দেবার ইঁদুর দৌড়ে চীন অন্য আর বাকী সবার চেয়ে এগিয়ে আছে প্রযুক্তি এবং অর্থনৈতিক দিক দিয়ে। পশ্চিমের প্রতি ঘৃণাটা চীন আর মুসলিম বিশ্বের প্রায় একই পর্যায়ের, যদিও কারণগুলো ভিন্ন। শত্রুর শত্রু বন্ধু, এই নীতিতে চলে চীনের সাথে মুসলিম বিশ্ব একাট্টা হয়ে পশ্চিমের বিরুদ্ধে উঠে পড়ে লাগবে এই ভবিষৎবাণী হান্টিংটন করে গেছেন যার বাস্তব প্রয়োগ আজ আমাদের চারপাশেই দেখি। গেলো বছরের অক্টোবরে সৌদী আরব চীনের সাথে ২৮ বিলিয়ন ডলারের বাণিজ্যিক চুক্তি সম্পন্ন করে। পাকিস্তানে চীনের সমালোচনা কার্যত ট্যাবু, মালয়েশিয়ার সাথে ১০০ বিলিয়ন ডলারের বাণিজ্য... এমনকী চীন যে তার নিজের দেশের উইঘুর মুসলমানদের নিপীড়ন করে চলেছে, জাতিসংঘে সে ব্যাপারটি উত্থাপিত হলে যে ৩৭টি দেশ চীনের সমর্থনে এগিয়ে আসে, তাদের অর্ধেকই মুসলিম দেশ। এ দেশগুলোর কয়েকটিই মুসলমানদের কাছে ইসলামী বিশ্বের নেতা-স্বরূপ (ইরান, সৌদী-আরব, তুরস্ক, মিশর, পাকিস্তান, কাতার, সিরিয়া, কুয়েত, বাহরাইন, ওমান)। চীনকে সমর্থনকারী ইসলামী দেশগুলোর প্রতিটিরই অর্থনৈতিক এবং অন্যান্য জাগতিক প্রাপ্তির সুযোগ রয়েছে চীনের কাছে। আখিরাত বা পরকালের প্রাপ্তির যে বিষয়টি মুসলমানদের কাছে সবচেয়ে বড় পুরষ্কার, যা পৃথিবীর সমস্ত মুসলমানকে এক চাদরের নিচে নিয়ে আসার কথা বলে, পার্থিব লোভেই মুসলমান দেশগুলোর গনেশ উল্টে যাচ্ছে দেখা যায়।
হান্টিংটন তাঁর বইয়ে পশ্চিমকে সতর্ক হতে বলেছেন চীন ও মুসলিম বিশ্বের ঐক্য বাহিনীর বিরুদ্ধে। হান্টিংটন নিজে পশ্চিমা, আমেরিকান। তিনি তাঁর দেশের, তাঁর সভ্যতার রক্ষায় তাঁর দেশকে অস্ত্র এবং সামরিক শক্তি বাড়াতে বলবেন সেটাই স্বাভাবিক। হান্টিংটন তাঁর জীবদ্দশায়ই তাঁর ভবিষ্যৎবানী ফলতে দেখেছেন, ২০০১ সালের টুইন টাওয়ার হামলা এবং পরবর্তী ইরাক-যুদ্ধের মধ্য দিয়ে। হান্টিংটনকে বর্ণবিদ্ধেষী, যুদ্ধবাদী ইত্যাদি বলে গালমন্দ করে মুসলমানরা সাময়িকভাবে নিজেদের স্বান্তনা দিতে পারেন, কিন্তু তাতে নিজেদের পিছিয়ে পড়ার ধস ঠেকানো যাবেনা। মুসলমানরা যদ্দিন পর্যন্ত নিজেদের ধর্মের উগ্রবাদী বিষয়গুলো আমলে না আনছেন, এবং সংস্কারের প্রয়োজন অনুভব না করছেন, তদ্দিন পর্যন্ত তাঁরা বিশ্বের কাছে খলনায়ক হয়েই থাকবেন। হান্টিংটন নিজেই বলেছেন, বিশ্বের মোড়ল হয়ে ওঠার পেছনে পশ্চিম যত না উন্নত বিজ্ঞান বা প্রযুক্তির সহায়তা পেয়েছে, তার চেয়ে ঢের বেশী ভূমিকা রেখেছে পশ্চিমের সংঘবদ্ধভাবে আক্রমণ বা জুলুম করবার ক্ষমতা। এতদস্বত্ত্বেও, মানবিকতার মূল্যটা এ মূহুর্তে আর সব অঞ্চলের চেয়ে পশ্চিম-ই সবচেয়ে বেশী দেয়। মুসলমান দেশগুলোর নিজেদের ভেতরই ঐক্যের ভীষণ অভাব আছে, দ্বিমত আছে কে বেশী মুসলমান তা নিয়ে। যে ৫০টির মতো মুসলমান দেশ রয়েছে পৃথিবীতে, সেগুলোতে ৭০-এর ওপর 'ফেরকা' বা ইসলামী আদর্শের ব্যখ্যা রয়েছে, যার কোনটির সাথেই কোনটির মিল নেই, এবং প্রতিটি মতবাদের অনুসারীরা অপরদের ভ্রান্ত বলে রায় দিয়ে চলেছেন। জ্ঞান-বিজ্ঞান চর্চায়ও তাঁদেরই আজ সবচেয়ে করুণ দশা। এখন পর্যন্ত যে একমাত্র মুসলমান বিজ্ঞানী পদার্থবিজ্ঞানে নোবেল পুরষ্কার পেয়েছেন, সেই আব্দুস সালাম আহমাদী মুসলমান বলে পাকিস্তানের মুসলমান সমাজ তাঁর মুসলিম পরিচয়টিকে অস্বীকার করেছে। তাঁর কবরের ফলকে লেখা ছিলো 'In 1979 became the first Muslim Nobel Laureate', সেখানে 'Muslim' কথাটি মুছে দেয়া হয়েছে, ফলকটি আজও 'In 1979 became first Nobel Laureate'-এই অর্থহীন বাক্যটি বহন করে চলেছে। সম্মিলিত উদ্দেশ্যে একজোট হয়ে পৃথিবী শাসন মুসলমানদের কম্মো নয়। তাঁরা যাদের কাঁধে চেপে পশ্চিমকে হঠাতে চাইছেন, সেই চীন কিংবা উত্তর কোরিয়া আমেরিকার জায়গায় এলে পৃথিবী আদৌ কতটা বাসযোগ্য থাকবে সেটি ভেবে দেখতে পারেন।
April 20, 2015
It is over 10 years since I read Samuel Huntington's full length expansion of his classic Foreign Affairs article. This was read during my final year at university, and back then, it was fashionable amongst many to refute, or outrightly mock Professor Huntington's disturbing piece of work. The work was derided amongst my fellow students, it was frequently derieded amongst academia, it is something of a fashion statement to deride Huntington's work. Why?
Could it be, perhaps, because of a deep, inbuilt feeling that we just know that he was right?
In the 10+ years since I read this monumental study, I have encountered very little in current events to refute his argument. Time has vindicated Huntington, and will continue to vindicate him.
Huntington identifies 9 civilizations, Western, Orthodox, Islamic, Latin American, African, Sinic, Hindu, Buddhist and Japanese.
The 2 civilizations that Huntington considers to be the most potentially antagonistic toward the West are Islamic and Sinic, however, as this book was completed in 2006, various conflicts had not yet played out between the West and the Orthodox World, and this is deserving of a special place as a potential faultline civilization.
Huntington considers the value systems of Sinic and Islamic culture as essentially incompatible with the West, and attempts to assimilate or reconcile Western values with these cultures is ultimately futile. Therefore, Huntington advocates a careful, cautious approach to foreign policy, wherein Western powers should try to mediate civilizational disputes, but not directly involve themselves with them.
Why do I think Huntington has been vindicated? The list is not exhaustive.
Firstly, attempts through that ill conceived 2003-? War in Iraq to democracize Iraq has proved a colossal failure. The Arab Spring led to an outright dead end for all countries involved except Tunisia, and Turkish membership of the EU remains a pipe dream.
However, while Huntington's work was written before the full democratization of South Korea and Taiwan, we have seen little progress in China toward any kind of accountable or open system, and China has recently given Hong Kong a half-baked, managed democracy.
If anything, the civilizational faultline that has become more pronounced is the Orthodox World. Russia and US relations are at the worst they have ever been since the end of the Cold War, and the continuing support of Putin's strongman leadership amongst the Russian population shows a general preference in Russia at least for strongman leadership, rather than a more pluralistic approach.
The situation in Ukraine is perhaps the Western-Orthodox divide being played out within a single, fragmented state, and is in many ways the result of naive Western attempts to push Western Institutions (NATO and the EU) into the Orthodox World.
A further example was the almost universal Western support (exception Spain) for the unilateral independence of Kosovo, and then the complete reverse of this foreign policy toward the Russian unification with Crimea.
This is not to distract oneself with current issues. Huntington's original work was written in response to the 1991 Gulf War, and the expanded book was based on events in the 90s, such as the Yugoslav wars, Chechnya, and the very nature of Sino-Western relations.
However, very little has transpired to prove Huntington wrong, and few would argue that his main policy proscription, that the West only mediate, not directly involve themselves with disputes involving other civilizations.
I think the dust will never settle on the debate over Huntington's thesis, but Huntington has convinced this reader at least.
Could it be, perhaps, because of a deep, inbuilt feeling that we just know that he was right?
In the 10+ years since I read this monumental study, I have encountered very little in current events to refute his argument. Time has vindicated Huntington, and will continue to vindicate him.
Huntington identifies 9 civilizations, Western, Orthodox, Islamic, Latin American, African, Sinic, Hindu, Buddhist and Japanese.
The 2 civilizations that Huntington considers to be the most potentially antagonistic toward the West are Islamic and Sinic, however, as this book was completed in 2006, various conflicts had not yet played out between the West and the Orthodox World, and this is deserving of a special place as a potential faultline civilization.
Huntington considers the value systems of Sinic and Islamic culture as essentially incompatible with the West, and attempts to assimilate or reconcile Western values with these cultures is ultimately futile. Therefore, Huntington advocates a careful, cautious approach to foreign policy, wherein Western powers should try to mediate civilizational disputes, but not directly involve themselves with them.
Why do I think Huntington has been vindicated? The list is not exhaustive.
Firstly, attempts through that ill conceived 2003-? War in Iraq to democracize Iraq has proved a colossal failure. The Arab Spring led to an outright dead end for all countries involved except Tunisia, and Turkish membership of the EU remains a pipe dream.
However, while Huntington's work was written before the full democratization of South Korea and Taiwan, we have seen little progress in China toward any kind of accountable or open system, and China has recently given Hong Kong a half-baked, managed democracy.
If anything, the civilizational faultline that has become more pronounced is the Orthodox World. Russia and US relations are at the worst they have ever been since the end of the Cold War, and the continuing support of Putin's strongman leadership amongst the Russian population shows a general preference in Russia at least for strongman leadership, rather than a more pluralistic approach.
The situation in Ukraine is perhaps the Western-Orthodox divide being played out within a single, fragmented state, and is in many ways the result of naive Western attempts to push Western Institutions (NATO and the EU) into the Orthodox World.
A further example was the almost universal Western support (exception Spain) for the unilateral independence of Kosovo, and then the complete reverse of this foreign policy toward the Russian unification with Crimea.
This is not to distract oneself with current issues. Huntington's original work was written in response to the 1991 Gulf War, and the expanded book was based on events in the 90s, such as the Yugoslav wars, Chechnya, and the very nature of Sino-Western relations.
However, very little has transpired to prove Huntington wrong, and few would argue that his main policy proscription, that the West only mediate, not directly involve themselves with disputes involving other civilizations.
I think the dust will never settle on the debate over Huntington's thesis, but Huntington has convinced this reader at least.
February 25, 2022
Ο Σάμιουελ Χάντιγκτον, Αμερικανός διεθνολόγος και εξ επαγγέλματος αντικομμουνιστής διανοούμενος, σε παλαιότερα άρθρα ή στο βιβλίο του που κυκλοφόρησε το 1998 και στην Ελλάδα υποστηρίζει ότι μετά την ανατροπή των καθεστώτων του υπαρκτού σοσιαλισμού, τις εξελίξεις δεν τις καθορίζει η ταξική πάλη, αλλά η σύγκρουση των πολιτισμών. Ως πολιτισμό ενός λαού, ορίζει την "ποιότητα", που καθορίζεται από την ιστορία, τη γλώσσα, τα ήθη και έθιμα και, κυρίως, τη θρησκεία.
Στο πρώτο του άρθρο, που δημοσιεύτηκε το 1993, ισχυρίζεται ότι "στη διάρκεια των αιώνων... οι διαφορές ανάμεσα σε πολιτισμούς έχουν γεννήσει τις πιο παρατεταμένες και τις πιο βίαιες αντιπαραθέσεις". Και στο βιβλίο του που εκδόθηκε αργότερα υποστηρίζει: "Ο ανταγωνισμός των μεγάλων δυνάμεων (υπερ-δυνάμεων) αντικαταστάθηκε από τη σύγκρουση των πολιτισμών. Σ' αυτόν τον καινούριο κόσμο, σημαντικότερες και πιο επικίνδυνες συγκρούσεις δε θα είναι μεταξύ κοινωνικών τάξεων, πλούσιων και φτωχών ή άλλων οικονομικών ομάδων, που ορίζονται διαφορετικά, αλλά μεταξύ λαών που ανήκουν σε διαφορετικές πολιτισμικές οντότητες" (σελ. 26).
Αυτή η θέση καταρχήν έχει καταρριφθεί με ιστορικούς όρους από το γεγονός πως οι δύο παγκόσμιοι πόλεμοι που ξέσπασαν κατά το πρώτο μισό του 20ού αιώνα, και οι οποίοι υπήρξαν εξαιρετικά πολυαίμακτοι, δεν διεξήχθησαν ανάμεσα σε λαούς με διαφορετικούς πολιτισμούς εφόσον συγκρούστηκαν και στις δυο περιπτώσεις η Βρετανία, οι ΗΠΑ, η Γαλλία και η Ρωσία ή ΕΣΣΔ απ' τη μια μεριά και η Γερμανία με τους εκάστοτε συμμάχους της από την άλλη. Δυνάμεις δηλαδή που αποτελούν στη γενική ολότητά του αυτό που αποκαλείται νεωτερικός ευρωπαϊκός πολιτισμός.
Αλλά μιας και ο Χάντινγκτον περιορίζεται στο βιβλίο του στις εξελίξεις μετά το 1990, προκύπτουν έυλογα κάποια βασικά ερωτήματα:
- Γιατί οι ΗΠΑ με τις χώρες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενωσης τάχτηκαν στο πλευρό του Κουβέιτ μετά την εισβολή του Ιράκ στη χώρα αυτή του Περσικού Κόλπου;
- Ποιοι είναι οι πολιτισμικοί λόγοι που η Τουρκία συγκρούεται με τους Κούρδους ενώ ταυτόχρονα δημιουργεί ανά διαστήματα ντε φάκτο συμμαχίες με το Ισραήλ στη Μέση Ανατολή;
- Γιατί στην Ισπανία υπάρχει σύγκρουση του κράτους με το αυτονομιστικό κίνημα των Βάσκων, οι οποίοι εμφορούνται χωρίς αμφιβολία πια από τον ίδιο πολιτισμό;
Οι πόλεμοι δεν έχουν ως βασική αιτία τη διαφορά πολιτισμών. Οι πόλεμοι, στο στάδιο του ιμπεριαλισμού, γίνονται για να διατηρηθούν οι ζώνες επιρροής ή για να ξαναμοιραστούν οι χώρες, με βάση το συσχετισμό δυνάμεων που αλλάζει, λόγω της επίδρασης του νόμου της ανισόμετρης ανάπτυξης. Οταν, βέβαια, λέμε ζώνες επιρροής, εννοούμε τις χώρες όπου τοποθετούνται τα πλεονάζοντα κεφάλαια των πολυεθνικών εταιριών, πωλούνται ακριβά τα βιομηχανικά προϊόντα και καταληστεύονται οι πλουτοπαραγωγικές πηγές (πετρέλαιο, φυσικό αέριο, χαλκός κλπ.).
Αυτή, λοιπόν, είναι η κύρια αιτία για τους πολέμους ανάμεσα στις ιμπεριαλιστικές χώρες, ενώ φυσικά δεν πρέπει να ξεχνάμε και τους εθνικοαπελευθερωτικούς πολέμους, όπως του βιετναμέζικου λαού ενάντια στις ΗΠΑ κλπ. Ουσιαστικά, οι πόλεμοι έχουν στη βάση τους ταξικό χαρακτήρα, δηλαδή γίνονται επειδή υπάρχει καπιταλισμός και αέναη συσσώρευση κεφαλαίου, οικονομικές τάξεις και πόλεμος όλων εναντίων όλων, μεγιστοποίηση του κέρδους και εκμετάλλευση της ανθρώπινης εργασίας. Ακόμη γιατί υπάρχουν πολυεθνικά τραστ και στρατιωτικοβιομηχανικά συμπλέγματα, καρτέλ και άλλοι θεσμικοί παίκτες που στοχεύουν στην καλύτερη δυνατή θέση μέσα στο καπιταλιστικό κοσμοσύστημα πάντα στο πλαίσιο του άγριου ανταγωνισμού που αυτό επιβάλλει. Ο πόλεμος είναι, σύμφωνα με τη κλασική ρήση του Κλαούζεβιτς, η συνέχιση της πολιτικής με άλλα μέ��α. Αντίστοιχα σε ένα δεύτερο επίπεδο μπορεί να ιδωθεί και ως η συνέχιση της ταξικής πάλης με βίαια μέσα. Φυσικά, την ταξική πάλη δεν την ανακάλυψαν ούτε ο Καρλ Μαρξ ούτε ο Λένιν. Την ανακάλυψαν οι αστοί ιστορικοί του Διαφωτισμού στην προσπάθειά τους να ανατρέξουν στο παρελθόν για να βρουν εκείνα τα ιστορικά παραδείγματα που θα λε��το��ργούσαν ως ιδεολογικά όπλα της αναδυόμενης αστικής τάξης στον αγώνα για πολιτική κυριαρχία απέναντι στην παρακμάζουσα αριστοκρατία και το Παλαιό Καθεστώς των τελών του 18ου αιώνα.
Ο βασικός λόγος λοιπόν που ο Χάντινγκτον καταπιάστηκε με το θέμα της σύγκρουσης πολιτισμών δεν είναι σε καμία περίπτωση η αντικειμενική παρατήρηση του φαινομένου και η ανάλυσή του για την καλύτερη κατανόηση της λειτουργίας του κόσμου μετά την κατάρρευση του υπαρκτού σοσιαλισμού στη Σοβιετική Ένωση και στο υπόλοιπο ανατολικό μπλοκ, αλλά η δικαιολόγηση της διατήρησης του ΝΑΤΟ ως στρατιωτικής συμμαχίας μετά από αυτή την κοσμογονική αλλαγή. Το ΝΑΤΟ μετά το 1991 δεν είχε κανένα ουσιαστικό λόγο ύπαρξης και έτσι εφευρέθηκε ο κίνδυνος του "δυτικού πολιτισμού" - όπως γράφει - από τον ορθόδοξο πολιτισμό, τον ισλαμικό, το σινικό, τον ινδουιστικό, τον ιαπωνικό κλπ. Φυσικά, δεν μπορεί να ξεφύγει από την προσοχή του προσεκτικού αναγνώστη το γεγονός ότι η ορθόδοξη Ελλάδα και η μουσουλμανική Τουρκία που ήταν και είναι ακόμη εξέχοντα μέλη της Βορειοατλαντικής συμμαχίας δείχνουν με τη συμμετοχή τους σε αυτή να καταρρίπτουν εν τοις πράγμασι τη σοβαρότητα και την αξιοπιστία της θεωρίας του, γι' αυτό ο Χάντινγκτον μέχρι τα τελευταία του υπήρξε φανατικός θιασώτης της εκδίωξής τους από αυτή.
Στο πρώτο του άρθρο, που δημοσιεύτηκε το 1993, ισχυρίζεται ότι "στη διάρκεια των αιώνων... οι διαφορές ανάμεσα σε πολιτισμούς έχουν γεννήσει τις πιο παρατεταμένες και τις πιο βίαιες αντιπαραθέσεις". Και στο βιβλίο του που εκδόθηκε αργότερα υποστηρίζει: "Ο ανταγωνισμός των μεγάλων δυνάμεων (υπερ-δυνάμεων) αντικαταστάθηκε από τη σύγκρουση των πολιτισμών. Σ' αυτόν τον καινούριο κόσμο, σημαντικότερες και πιο επικίνδυνες συγκρούσεις δε θα είναι μεταξύ κοινωνικών τάξεων, πλούσιων και φτωχών ή άλλων οικονομικών ομάδων, που ορίζονται διαφορετικά, αλλά μεταξύ λαών που ανήκουν σε διαφορετικές πολιτισμικές οντότητες" (σελ. 26).
Αυτή η θέση καταρχήν έχει καταρριφθεί με ιστορικούς όρους από το γεγονός πως οι δύο παγκόσμιοι πόλεμοι που ξέσπασαν κατά το πρώτο μισό του 20ού αιώνα, και οι οποίοι υπήρξαν εξαιρετικά πολυαίμακτοι, δεν διεξήχθησαν ανάμεσα σε λαούς με διαφορετικούς πολιτισμούς εφόσον συγκρούστηκαν και στις δυο περιπτώσεις η Βρετανία, οι ΗΠΑ, η Γαλλία και η Ρωσία ή ΕΣΣΔ απ' τη μια μεριά και η Γερμανία με τους εκάστοτε συμμάχους της από την άλλη. Δυνάμεις δηλαδή που αποτελούν στη γενική ολότητά του αυτό που αποκαλείται νεωτερικός ευρωπαϊκός πολιτισμός.
Αλλά μιας και ο Χάντινγκτον περιορίζεται στο βιβλίο του στις εξελίξεις μετά το 1990, προκύπτουν έυλογα κάποια βασικά ερωτήματα:
- Γιατί οι ΗΠΑ με τις χώρες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ενωσης τάχτηκαν στο πλευρό του Κουβέιτ μετά την εισβολή του Ιράκ στη χώρα αυτή του Περσικού Κόλπου;
- Ποιοι είναι οι πολιτισμικοί λόγοι που η Τουρκία συγκρούεται με τους Κούρδους ενώ ταυτόχρονα δημιουργεί ανά διαστήματα ντε φάκτο συμμαχίες με το Ισραήλ στη Μέση Ανατολή;
- Γιατί στην Ισπανία υπάρχει σύγκρουση του κράτους με το αυτονομιστικό κίνημα των Βάσκων, οι οποίοι εμφορούνται χωρίς αμφιβολία πια από τον ίδιο πολιτισμό;
Οι πόλεμοι δεν έχουν ως βασική αιτία τη διαφορά πολιτισμών. Οι πόλεμοι, στο στάδιο του ιμπεριαλισμού, γίνονται για να διατηρηθούν οι ζώνες επιρροής ή για να ξαναμοιραστούν οι χώρες, με βάση το συσχετισμό δυνάμεων που αλλάζει, λόγω της επίδρασης του νόμου της ανισόμετρης ανάπτυξης. Οταν, βέβαια, λέμε ζώνες επιρροής, εννοούμε τις χώρες όπου τοποθετούνται τα πλεονάζοντα κεφάλαια των πολυεθνικών εταιριών, πωλούνται ακριβά τα βιομηχανικά προϊόντα και καταληστεύονται οι πλουτοπαραγωγικές πηγές (πετρέλαιο, φυσικό αέριο, χαλκός κλπ.).
Αυτή, λοιπόν, είναι η κύρια αιτία για τους πολέμους ανάμεσα στις ιμπεριαλιστικές χώρες, ενώ φυσικά δεν πρέπει να ξεχνάμε και τους εθνικοαπελευθερωτικούς πολέμους, όπως του βιετναμέζικου λαού ενάντια στις ΗΠΑ κλπ. Ουσιαστικά, οι πόλεμοι έχουν στη βάση τους ταξικό χαρακτήρα, δηλαδή γίνονται επειδή υπάρχει καπιταλισμός και αέναη συσσώρευση κεφαλαίου, οικονομικές τάξεις και πόλεμος όλων εναντίων όλων, μεγιστοποίηση του κέρδους και εκμετάλλευση της ανθρώπινης εργασίας. Ακόμη γιατί υπάρχουν πολυεθνικά τραστ και στρατιωτικοβιομηχανικά συμπλέγματα, καρτέλ και άλλοι θεσμικοί παίκτες που στοχεύουν στην καλύτερη δυνατή θέση μέσα στο καπιταλιστικό κοσμοσύστημα πάντα στο πλαίσιο του άγριου ανταγωνισμού που αυτό επιβάλλει. Ο πόλεμος είναι, σύμφωνα με τη κλασική ρήση του Κλαούζεβιτς, η συνέχιση της πολιτικής με άλλα μέ��α. Αντίστοιχα σε ένα δεύτερο επίπεδο μπορεί να ιδωθεί και ως η συνέχιση της ταξικής πάλης με βίαια μέσα. Φυσικά, την ταξική πάλη δεν την ανακάλυψαν ούτε ο Καρλ Μαρξ ούτε ο Λένιν. Την ανακάλυψαν οι αστοί ιστορικοί του Διαφωτισμού στην προσπάθειά τους να ανατρέξουν στο παρελθόν για να βρουν εκείνα τα ιστορικά παραδείγματα που θα λε��το��ργούσαν ως ιδεολογικά όπλα της αναδυόμενης αστικής τάξης στον αγώνα για πολιτική κυριαρχία απέναντι στην παρακμάζουσα αριστοκρατία και το Παλαιό Καθεστώς των τελών του 18ου αιώνα.
Ο βασικός λόγος λοιπόν που ο Χάντινγκτον καταπιάστηκε με το θέμα της σύγκρουσης πολιτισμών δεν είναι σε καμία περίπτωση η αντικειμενική παρατήρηση του φαινομένου και η ανάλυσή του για την καλύτερη κατανόηση της λειτουργίας του κόσμου μετά την κατάρρευση του υπαρκτού σοσιαλισμού στη Σοβιετική Ένωση και στο υπόλοιπο ανατολικό μπλοκ, αλλά η δικαιολόγηση της διατήρησης του ΝΑΤΟ ως στρατιωτικής συμμαχίας μετά από αυτή την κοσμογονική αλλαγή. Το ΝΑΤΟ μετά το 1991 δεν είχε κανένα ουσιαστικό λόγο ύπαρξης και έτσι εφευρέθηκε ο κίνδυνος του "δυτικού πολιτισμού" - όπως γράφει - από τον ορθόδοξο πολιτισμό, τον ισλαμικό, το σινικό, τον ινδουιστικό, τον ιαπωνικό κλπ. Φυσικά, δεν μπορεί να ξεφύγει από την προσοχή του προσεκτικού αναγνώστη το γεγονός ότι η ορθόδοξη Ελλάδα και η μουσουλμανική Τουρκία που ήταν και είναι ακόμη εξέχοντα μέλη της Βορειοατλαντικής συμμαχίας δείχνουν με τη συμμετοχή τους σε αυτή να καταρρίπτουν εν τοις πράγμασι τη σοβαρότητα και την αξιοπιστία της θεωρίας του, γι' αυτό ο Χάντινγκτον μέχρι τα τελευταία του υπήρξε φανατικός θιασώτης της εκδίωξής τους από αυτή.
December 6, 2015
تقييمى للكتاب كان من المفترض ان يكون أقل من ذلك بسبب غرور الكاتب وتعاليه المستفز بتفوق الحضارة الغربية وقيادتها للعالم بالرغم من اعترافه بأن قيادة وريادة العالم كانت وقتاً طويلاً بعيدة عن الغرب وحضارته
لكن رأيت ان المتفوق مادياً عبر التاريخ هو من يكتب التاريخ حسب رؤيته وتقديره ولذلك فليكتب كما يشاء هنتجتون ونأخذ من الكتاب ما ينفعنا ونترك ما يضرنا.
يرى الكاتب ان ضعف الحضارة العربية والاسلامية وأفول وهجها يعود فى الاساس لتشرذم طوائف المسلمين وتشتت جهودهم وتفرقهم تحت أعلام وولاءات مختلفة والبعد عن القيم الاسلامية ويدلل على ذلك بكثرة الفتوحات الاسلامية ايام الامويين والعباسيين.
ولكن الكاتب يشطح فى هذا الجانب ويدعى ان طوائف الاسلاميين هم الاكثر دموية على مر التاريخ وصدام الحضارة الاسلامية مع نظيراتها من الحضارات المعاصرة لها وفيما بينهم ويتناسى فى هذا الصدد قتل الملايين فى الحروب المسيحية والبوذية والصينية وغيرها.
لكن رأيت ان المتفوق مادياً عبر التاريخ هو من يكتب التاريخ حسب رؤيته وتقديره ولذلك فليكتب كما يشاء هنتجتون ونأخذ من الكتاب ما ينفعنا ونترك ما يضرنا.
يرى الكاتب ان ضعف الحضارة العربية والاسلامية وأفول وهجها يعود فى الاساس لتشرذم طوائف المسلمين وتشتت جهودهم وتفرقهم تحت أعلام وولاءات مختلفة والبعد عن القيم الاسلامية ويدلل على ذلك بكثرة الفتوحات الاسلامية ايام الامويين والعباسيين.
ولكن الكاتب يشطح فى هذا الجانب ويدعى ان طوائف الاسلاميين هم الاكثر دموية على مر التاريخ وصدام الحضارة الاسلامية مع نظيراتها من الحضارات المعاصرة لها وفيما بينهم ويتناسى فى هذا الصدد قتل الملايين فى الحروب المسيحية والبوذية والصينية وغيرها.
March 22, 2014
كتاب يجب أن يقرأه كل مهتم بشؤون أمته ومعاركها.. وهو كتاب قوي ومهم ومفيد.
فيه تدليس كبير في أشياء كثيرة، خصوصا فيما يتعلق بمحاولته صناعة وحدة ثقافية غربية تحت قيادة أمريكية فهو يتجاوز كل الفروق ويسميها "علاقات قربى ث��افية" بينما إذا وجد أقل من هذه الفروق بين قوم يريد لهم أن يكونوا مختلفين لجعلها فورا من "عوامل التمزق" التي تستحيل معها الوحدة.
عموما، جوانب تدليسه لا تهمنا كثيرا لأنها متعلقة بموقفه ورؤيته من قومه، بينما ما يهمنا هو نظرتهم إلينا وللصراع معنا.. فهو في هذا الجانب مهم للغاية.
والكتاب نفسه رد على نظرية فوكوياما "نهاية التاريخ" وهي النظرية التافهة المتهافتة التي يبدو أنه كتبها وهو يعاني من أحلام اليقظة، وقد أحسن فوكوياما إذ تراجع عنها بعد ذلك.
فيه تدليس كبير في أشياء كثيرة، خصوصا فيما يتعلق بمحاولته صناعة وحدة ثقافية غربية تحت قيادة أمريكية فهو يتجاوز كل الفروق ويسميها "علاقات قربى ث��افية" بينما إذا وجد أقل من هذه الفروق بين قوم يريد لهم أن يكونوا مختلفين لجعلها فورا من "عوامل التمزق" التي تستحيل معها الوحدة.
عموما، جوانب تدليسه لا تهمنا كثيرا لأنها متعلقة بموقفه ورؤيته من قومه، بينما ما يهمنا هو نظرتهم إلينا وللصراع معنا.. فهو في هذا الجانب مهم للغاية.
والكتاب نفسه رد على نظرية فوكوياما "نهاية التاريخ" وهي النظرية التافهة المتهافتة التي يبدو أنه كتبها وهو يعاني من أحلام اليقظة، وقد أحسن فوكوياما إذ تراجع عنها بعد ذلك.
January 31, 2016
Hypothesis
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future
Major Civilizations
Western (Christian) Civilization
Comprising the United States and Canada, Western and Central Europe, Australia and Oceania
Latin America and the former member states of the Soviet Union are included, or are instead their own separate civilizations, will be an important future consideration for those regions
The Orthodox World
The former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and Romania
The Buddhist Areas
Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand are identified as separate from other civilizations (but not constitute a major civilization in the sense of international affairs)
The Sinic Civilization
China, the Koreas, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. This group also includes the Chinese diaspora, especially in relation to Southeast Asia
Hindu Civilization
Located chiefly in India, Bhutan and Nepal, and culturally adhered to by the global Indian diaspora
Japan
Considered as a society and civilization unique to itself
The Muslim World
The Greater Middle East (excluding Israel), Africa, Albania, Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Maldives. Considered as a possible 8th civilization
Lone Countries
Ethiopia and Haiti are labeled as "Lone" countries
Israel
Considered a unique state with its own civilization (one similar to West)
The Caribbean World
Former British colonies in the Caribbean, constitutes a distinct entity
Cleft Countries
Because they contain very large groups of people identifying with separate civilizations. Examples include India ("cleft" between its Hindu majority and large Muslim minority), China, Ukraine, Sudan
Swing Civilizations
Russia and India are 'swing civilizations' and may favor either side
Russia, for example, clashes with the many Muslim ethnic groups on its southern border (such as Chechnya) but cooperates with Iran to avoid further Muslim-Orthodox violence in Southern Russia
Sino-Islamic Connection
"Sino-Islamic connection" is emerging in which China will cooperate more closely with Iran, Pakistan, and other states to augment its international position
Civilizational conflicts are "particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims", identifying the "bloody borders" between Islamic and non-Islamic civilizations
All-or-nothing Religions
Universal, "all-or-nothing" religions, in the sense that it is believed by both sides that only their faith is the correct one
Religions that perceive irreligious people who violate the base principles of those religions to be furthering their own pointless aims, which leads to violent interactions
Demographic Explosion
More recent factors contributing to a Western-Islamic clash are the Islamic Resurgence and demographic explosion in Islam, coupled with the values of Western universalism
Why Civilizations will Clash
Differences among civilizations are too basic in that civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition, and, most important, religion
These fundamental differences are the product of centuries, so they will not soon disappear
The world is becoming a smaller place
Differences and Commonalities
As a result, the interactions across the world are increasing, and they intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations
Identity Crisis
Religion has replaced this gap, which provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations
Return-to-the-roots Phenomenon
A return-to-the-roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations
Cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones
The West versus the Rest
World politics tends to be the conflict between Western and non-Western civilizations
Isolation
Non-Western countries can attempt to achieve isolation in order to preserve their own values and protect themselves from Western invasion. However, the costs of this action are high and only a few states can pursue it
Non-Western countries can make an effort to balance Western power through modernization
Cooperation
They can develop economic, military power and cooperate with other non-Western countries against the West while still preserving their own values and institutions
Fault line conflicts
Between adjacent states belonging to different civilizations or within states that are home to populations from different civilizations
Core state conflicts
Between the major states of different civilizations
Modernization vs. Westernization
Japan, China and the East Asian Tigers have modernized in many respects while maintaining traditional or authoritarian societies which distinguish them from the West. Some of these countries have clashed with the West and some have not
The West is distinguished from Orthodox Christian countries by the experience of the Renaissance, Reformation, the Enlightenment, overseas colonialism rather than contiguous expansion and colonialism, and a recent re-infusion of Classical culture through ancient Greece rather than through the continuous trajectory of the Byzantine Empire
Torn countries
Countries that are seeking to affiliate with another civilization as "torn countries." Turkey, whose political leadership has systematically tried to Westernize the country since the 1920s, is his chief example
Turkey's history, culture, and traditions are derived from Islamic civilization, but Turkey's elite, beginning with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who took power as first President of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, imposed western institutions and dress, embraced the Latin alphabet, joined NATO, and is seeking to join the European Union
Mexico, Australia and Russia are also considered to be torn
Requirement
Its political and economic elite must support the move. Second, the public must be willing to accept the redefinition. Third, the elites of the civilization that the torn country is trying to join must accept the country
Anyhow, no torn country has successfully redefined its civilizational identity
Contrast Theories
(1)
The world had reached the 'end of history' in a Hegelian sense
Human rights, liberal democracy, and capitalist free market economy had become the only remaining ideological alternative for nations in the post-Cold War world
The End of History by Francis Fukuyama
(2)
Division of "West" and "Islam" is not as per reality
Clash of civilizations thesis is an example of "the purest invidious racism, a sort of parody of Hitlerian science directed today against Arabs and Muslims
The Clash of Ignorance by Edward Said
(3)
Diversity is a feature of most cultures in the world. Western civilization is no exception
The practice of democracy that has won out in the modern West is largely a result of a consensus that has emerged since the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution
To attribute it to the West and then to contrast it with non-Western traditions would be a great mistake
Amartya Sen
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future
Major Civilizations
Western (Christian) Civilization
Comprising the United States and Canada, Western and Central Europe, Australia and Oceania
Latin America and the former member states of the Soviet Union are included, or are instead their own separate civilizations, will be an important future consideration for those regions
The Orthodox World
The former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece and Romania
The Buddhist Areas
Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Thailand are identified as separate from other civilizations (but not constitute a major civilization in the sense of international affairs)
The Sinic Civilization
China, the Koreas, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam. This group also includes the Chinese diaspora, especially in relation to Southeast Asia
Hindu Civilization
Located chiefly in India, Bhutan and Nepal, and culturally adhered to by the global Indian diaspora
Japan
Considered as a society and civilization unique to itself
The Muslim World
The Greater Middle East (excluding Israel), Africa, Albania, Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Maldives. Considered as a possible 8th civilization
Lone Countries
Ethiopia and Haiti are labeled as "Lone" countries
Israel
Considered a unique state with its own civilization (one similar to West)
The Caribbean World
Former British colonies in the Caribbean, constitutes a distinct entity
Cleft Countries
Because they contain very large groups of people identifying with separate civilizations. Examples include India ("cleft" between its Hindu majority and large Muslim minority), China, Ukraine, Sudan
Swing Civilizations
Russia and India are 'swing civilizations' and may favor either side
Russia, for example, clashes with the many Muslim ethnic groups on its southern border (such as Chechnya) but cooperates with Iran to avoid further Muslim-Orthodox violence in Southern Russia
Sino-Islamic Connection
"Sino-Islamic connection" is emerging in which China will cooperate more closely with Iran, Pakistan, and other states to augment its international position
Civilizational conflicts are "particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims", identifying the "bloody borders" between Islamic and non-Islamic civilizations
All-or-nothing Religions
Universal, "all-or-nothing" religions, in the sense that it is believed by both sides that only their faith is the correct one
Religions that perceive irreligious people who violate the base principles of those religions to be furthering their own pointless aims, which leads to violent interactions
Demographic Explosion
More recent factors contributing to a Western-Islamic clash are the Islamic Resurgence and demographic explosion in Islam, coupled with the values of Western universalism
Why Civilizations will Clash
Differences among civilizations are too basic in that civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition, and, most important, religion
These fundamental differences are the product of centuries, so they will not soon disappear
The world is becoming a smaller place
Differences and Commonalities
As a result, the interactions across the world are increasing, and they intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations
Identity Crisis
Religion has replaced this gap, which provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations
Return-to-the-roots Phenomenon
A return-to-the-roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations
Cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones
The West versus the Rest
World politics tends to be the conflict between Western and non-Western civilizations
Isolation
Non-Western countries can attempt to achieve isolation in order to preserve their own values and protect themselves from Western invasion. However, the costs of this action are high and only a few states can pursue it
Non-Western countries can make an effort to balance Western power through modernization
Cooperation
They can develop economic, military power and cooperate with other non-Western countries against the West while still preserving their own values and institutions
Fault line conflicts
Between adjacent states belonging to different civilizations or within states that are home to populations from different civilizations
Core state conflicts
Between the major states of different civilizations
Modernization vs. Westernization
Japan, China and the East Asian Tigers have modernized in many respects while maintaining traditional or authoritarian societies which distinguish them from the West. Some of these countries have clashed with the West and some have not
The West is distinguished from Orthodox Christian countries by the experience of the Renaissance, Reformation, the Enlightenment, overseas colonialism rather than contiguous expansion and colonialism, and a recent re-infusion of Classical culture through ancient Greece rather than through the continuous trajectory of the Byzantine Empire
Torn countries
Countries that are seeking to affiliate with another civilization as "torn countries." Turkey, whose political leadership has systematically tried to Westernize the country since the 1920s, is his chief example
Turkey's history, culture, and traditions are derived from Islamic civilization, but Turkey's elite, beginning with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who took power as first President of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, imposed western institutions and dress, embraced the Latin alphabet, joined NATO, and is seeking to join the European Union
Mexico, Australia and Russia are also considered to be torn
Requirement
Its political and economic elite must support the move. Second, the public must be willing to accept the redefinition. Third, the elites of the civilization that the torn country is trying to join must accept the country
Anyhow, no torn country has successfully redefined its civilizational identity
Contrast Theories
(1)
The world had reached the 'end of history' in a Hegelian sense
Human rights, liberal democracy, and capitalist free market economy had become the only remaining ideological alternative for nations in the post-Cold War world
The End of History by Francis Fukuyama
(2)
Division of "West" and "Islam" is not as per reality
Clash of civilizations thesis is an example of "the purest invidious racism, a sort of parody of Hitlerian science directed today against Arabs and Muslims
The Clash of Ignorance by Edward Said
(3)
Diversity is a feature of most cultures in the world. Western civilization is no exception
The practice of democracy that has won out in the modern West is largely a result of a consensus that has emerged since the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution
To attribute it to the West and then to contrast it with non-Western traditions would be a great mistake
Amartya Sen
September 15, 2011
There is no doubt that this is a must-read if you are interested in global politics. That does not mean that I think the book is right. Quite the contrary, I think the book is dangerously oversimplifying the current situation in world politics and trying to shoe-horn world events into a seductively simple-looking world view that, although advertised as a new paradigm, looks suspiciously like the cold-war paradigm on steroids. Since the human mind often prefers such simple explanations over more complicated ones, and because they also tend to be rather convenient for power-hungry leaders and institutions, these ideas should be very critically examined.
As a whole the book seems well argued and an honest attempt at analysis. However, as soon as you start talking to people that are from and/or know more about particular regions and worlds such as the Islamic world, South America or Eastern Europe, I consistently find that they confirm that Huntington severely oversimplifies or even misrepresents the situation in that particular part of the world. I don't think that is a coincidence. So I would advice everybody who plans to pick up this book, to also make sure that you read afterwards some work that critically examines this book. For an idea of what the critique consists of, you might take a quick look on YouTube for a lecture by the late Edward Said under the title "The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations".
As a whole the book seems well argued and an honest attempt at analysis. However, as soon as you start talking to people that are from and/or know more about particular regions and worlds such as the Islamic world, South America or Eastern Europe, I consistently find that they confirm that Huntington severely oversimplifies or even misrepresents the situation in that particular part of the world. I don't think that is a coincidence. So I would advice everybody who plans to pick up this book, to also make sure that you read afterwards some work that critically examines this book. For an idea of what the critique consists of, you might take a quick look on YouTube for a lecture by the late Edward Said under the title "The Myth of the Clash of Civilizations".
August 4, 2024
Било каквото било, отсега нататък всичко ще е както си беше. Вместо между два политически полюса, светът ще жонглира между доста повече.
Студената война и нейният двуполюсен идеологически модел, навкарал във всеки полюс чести комбинации от орел, рак и щука, вече е в миналото, твърди Хънтингтън (с известна носталгия). Но да се запее одата на радостта е недалновидно - тук Хънтингтън пряко опонира на Фукуяма и неговия всепобеден либерализъм. Бъдещето е почти като миналото преди студената война, но без империите на Запада. Въпросът за идентичността излиза на преден план и е решаващият фактор за функционирането на един вече мултикултурен свят, групиран около ядрата на стари култури, по малко по-модерен начин.
След известно колебания, Хънтингтън си е харесал девет обособени цивилизации: западна, ислямска, православна, латиноамериканска, синоистка, будистка, африканска, индуистка, японска. Оттук нататък идеите отстъпват пред идентичностите. Разломите по границите на обособените цивилизации са и ще продължават да бъдат постоянен източник на конфликти, чието самостоятелно решение не е по силите на преките участници, а са нужни усилията на “ядрата”. Като САЩ (Запад), Русия (православие), Китай (синоистка). За исляма Хънтингтън не вижда държава-ядро, като приза си оспорват Турция, Иран и Саудитска Арабия.
Балансът отдавана не е в полза на Запада, за сметка на нарастващите ислямска (демографски растеж) и синоистка (икономически растеж) цивилизации. Светът на бъдещето ще е културно фрагментиран, универсални ценности няма да се прилагат, защито ще се прецеждат първо през културния филтър.
——
Изваждането на културния аспект като вододел между различните групи държави е незаобиколим стар фактор, пробуден след съня на идеологиите. Но дефиницията за култура и цивилизация на Хънтингтън не се отличава с голяма детайлност, а по-скоро се опира на история и реалполитика. Макар да отбягва да го изведе в прав текст, всъщност в основата на хънтингтъновата дефиниция за култура, цивилизация и съответно за основна гранична линия е добрата стара религия.
Част от изявленията на Хънтингтън ме оставиха раздвоена. С някои съм съгласна, а други изглеждат взети наготово за удобство директно от нафталина на англоезичните историци и политически анализатори. Като например имперското “указание” никоя държава-ядро да не се меси в територията на друга. Което значи - всички православни държави при Русия. Тук концепцията за православието е абсурдна, удобно огъната за политически цели, лишена от същностите си черти. Протестантството и католицизмът пък на свой ред са сложени под общ знаменател под името “Запад” (защото в САЩ ги има и двете, нали така). Ислямът се разглежда като монолитна цялост, а сунити, шиити и религиозни фундаменталисти са под общ знаменател (което - ако се гледа само степента на религиозен диктат върху целия обществен живот при различни течения - наистина е така и в Саудитска Арабия, и в Иран; но пък къде остават Афганистан и екстремистите? И умерените? Твърде опростено и всичко в кюпа…).
Като цяло Хънтингтън доста абсолютизира термина “цивилизация” и “култура”.
——
Твърде едрите, свръхопростени, изцяло американоцентрични и удобно “поогънати” обобщения не намаляват стойността на доста от посланията. Живеем в сложен свят, където старите държави са на лов за “преоткрити” идентичности. Незападните религии и най-вече ислямът придобиват все по-силно влияние, предимно като реакция срещу западните ценности на индивидуализъм и свобода и срещу западния модел за модернизация, считани за неморални. Разделителните линии стават все по-ясни, допирните точки съществуват, но не са “универсални” и взе повече се размиват. Културата на Запада не е универсална, но е уникална, обаче е често зле защитена и бореща се с нахлули и отказващи да се нагодят или поне допрат, чужди влияния или с пламнали стари вражди по нови разломни линии.
Все така валидни (а за мен - и отчасти образователни) са анализите за югославските войни, Кавказ (Чечня, Нагорни Карабах, Осетия и Ингушетия), Судан и куп други.
——
С течение на изложението Хънтингтън започва да говори все повече и единствено за САЩ, което прави доста “съвети” проблематични, и доста анализи - “удобни”. Последната глава направо може да се пропусне - опитът за прогнозиране през 1997 г., погледнат от дистанцията на 2024 г. е неточен и попада в капана на двойния аршин, (който Хънтингтън демонстрира на доста места) - пълно културно разнообразие навън, никакво културно разнообразие у дома. В главата за САЩ Хънтингтън сякаш е забравил цялата си богата култура, и го е ударил на тесногръда проповед.
——
Част от читателите обвиняват Хънтингтън в едностранчивост и свръхопростяване, с което съм доста съгласна. Друга част го определят като войнстващ ястреб, разпалващ изкуствени конфликти. С това не съм съгласна. Хънтингтън работи с действителността, която не е приятна, а и анализът в глобален мащаб няма как да не използва опро��тени модели. И е доста честен и крайно откровен.
——
Като цяло - важна книга, фокусираща много материал за размисъл, и в голямата си част - все още актуална.
3,5⭐️
****
▶️ Цитати:
🌐”Хората откриват своята нова, а всъщност често отдавнашна идентичност и маршируват под нови, а всъщност стари знамена, които ги водят към войни с нови, а често отдавнашни врагове."
🌐"За народите, които търсят своята идентичност и преоткриват етническата си принадлежност, врагьт е от първостепенно значение, а потенциално най-опасните враж��и възникват около разломите между основните цивилизации в света."
🌐"Хората използват политиката не само за да отстояват интересите си, но и за да определят своята идентичност.
Знаем кои сме само когато разберем кои не сме и често само когато знаем против кои сме."
🌐“Обстоятелството, че незападните хора дъвчат продуктите на “Макдоналдс”, не значи че те приемат "Магна Харта””
🌐"Незападните общества разглеждат като западно онова, което Западът смята за универсално."
🌐"В основни линии светьт става взе по-модерен и все по-малко западен."
🌐"Въпросът "На чия страна си?" вече е заменен от много по-фундаменталния въпрос "Кой си?""
🌐"...сблъсъкът на цивилизациите е всъщност племенен
конфликт в глобален мащаб."
🌐"В историята на всяка цивилизация историята свършва поне веднъж, а понякога и по-често."
🌐"Но обществата, които приемат, че тяхната история е приключила, са обикновено общества, чиято история навлиза в упадък."
Студената война и нейният двуполюсен идеологически модел, навкарал във всеки полюс чести комбинации от орел, рак и щука, вече е в миналото, твърди Хънтингтън (с известна носталгия). Но да се запее одата на радостта е недалновидно - тук Хънтингтън пряко опонира на Фукуяма и неговия всепобеден либерализъм. Бъдещето е почти като миналото преди студената война, но без империите на Запада. Въпросът за идентичността излиза на преден план и е решаващият фактор за функционирането на един вече мултикултурен свят, групиран около ядрата на стари култури, по малко по-модерен начин.
След известно колебания, Хънтингтън си е харесал девет обособени цивилизации: западна, ислямска, православна, латиноамериканска, синоистка, будистка, африканска, индуистка, японска. Оттук нататък идеите отстъпват пред идентичностите. Разломите по границите на обособените цивилизации са и ще продължават да бъдат постоянен източник на конфликти, чието самостоятелно решение не е по силите на преките участници, а са нужни усилията на “ядрата”. Като САЩ (Запад), Русия (православие), Китай (синоистка). За исляма Хънтингтън не вижда държава-ядро, като приза си оспорват Турция, Иран и Саудитска Арабия.
Балансът отдавана не е в полза на Запада, за сметка на нарастващите ислямска (демографски растеж) и синоистка (икономически растеж) цивилизации. Светът на бъдещето ще е културно фрагментиран, универсални ценности няма да се прилагат, защито ще се прецеждат първо през културния филтър.
——
Изваждането на културния аспект като вододел между различните групи държави е незаобиколим стар фактор, пробуден след съня на идеологиите. Но дефиницията за култура и цивилизация на Хънтингтън не се отличава с голяма детайлност, а по-скоро се опира на история и реалполитика. Макар да отбягва да го изведе в прав текст, всъщност в основата на хънтингтъновата дефиниция за култура, цивилизация и съответно за основна гранична линия е добрата стара религия.
Част от изявленията на Хънтингтън ме оставиха раздвоена. С някои съм съгласна, а други изглеждат взети наготово за удобство директно от нафталина на англоезичните историци и политически анализатори. Като например имперското “указание” никоя държава-ядро да не се меси в територията на друга. Което значи - всички православни държави при Русия. Тук концепцията за православието е абсурдна, удобно огъната за политически цели, лишена от същностите си черти. Протестантството и католицизмът пък на свой ред са сложени под общ знаменател под името “Запад” (защото в САЩ ги има и двете, нали така). Ислямът се разглежда като монолитна цялост, а сунити, шиити и религиозни фундаменталисти са под общ знаменател (което - ако се гледа само степента на религиозен диктат върху целия обществен живот при различни течения - наистина е така и в Саудитска Арабия, и в Иран; но пък къде остават Афганистан и екстремистите? И умерените? Твърде опростено и всичко в кюпа…).
Като цяло Хънтингтън доста абсолютизира термина “цивилизация” и “култура”.
——
Твърде едрите, свръхопростени, изцяло американоцентрични и удобно “поогънати” обобщения не намаляват стойността на доста от посланията. Живеем в сложен свят, където старите държави са на лов за “преоткрити” идентичности. Незападните религии и най-вече ислямът придобиват все по-силно влияние, предимно като реакция срещу западните ценности на индивидуализъм и свобода и срещу западния модел за модернизация, считани за неморални. Разделителните линии стават все по-ясни, допирните точки съществуват, но не са “универсални” и взе повече се размиват. Културата на Запада не е универсална, но е уникална, обаче е често зле защитена и бореща се с нахлули и отказващи да се нагодят или поне допрат, чужди влияния или с пламнали стари вражди по нови разломни линии.
Все така валидни (а за мен - и отчасти образователни) са анализите за югославските войни, Кавказ (Чечня, Нагорни Карабах, Осетия и Ингушетия), Судан и куп други.
——
С течение на изложението Хънтингтън започва да говори все повече и единствено за САЩ, което прави доста “съвети” проблематични, и доста анализи - “удобни”. Последната глава направо може да се пропусне - опитът за прогнозиране през 1997 г., погледнат от дистанцията на 2024 г. е неточен и попада в капана на двойния аршин, (който Хънтингтън демонстрира на доста места) - пълно културно разнообразие навън, никакво културно разнообразие у дома. В главата за САЩ Хънтингтън сякаш е забравил цялата си богата култура, и го е ударил на тесногръда проповед.
——
Част от читателите обвиняват Хънтингтън в едностранчивост и свръхопростяване, с което съм доста съгласна. Друга част го определят като войнстващ ястреб, разпалващ изкуствени конфликти. С това не съм съгласна. Хънтингтън работи с действителността, която не е приятна, а и анализът в глобален мащаб няма как да не използва опро��тени модели. И е доста честен и крайно откровен.
——
Като цяло - важна книга, фокусираща много материал за размисъл, и в голямата си част - все още актуална.
3,5⭐️
****
▶️ Цитати:
🌐”Хората откриват своята нова, а всъщност често отдавнашна идентичност и маршируват под нови, а всъщност стари знамена, които ги водят към войни с нови, а често отдавнашни врагове."
🌐"За народите, които търсят своята идентичност и преоткриват етническата си принадлежност, врагьт е от първостепенно значение, а потенциално най-опасните враж��и възникват около разломите между основните цивилизации в света."
🌐"Хората използват политиката не само за да отстояват интересите си, но и за да определят своята идентичност.
Знаем кои сме само когато разберем кои не сме и често само когато знаем против кои сме."
🌐“Обстоятелството, че незападните хора дъвчат продуктите на “Макдоналдс”, не значи че те приемат "Магна Харта””
🌐"Незападните общества разглеждат като западно онова, което Западът смята за универсално."
🌐"В основни линии светьт става взе по-модерен и все по-малко западен."
🌐"Въпросът "На чия страна си?" вече е заменен от много по-фундаменталния въпрос "Кой си?""
🌐"...сблъсъкът на цивилизациите е всъщност племенен
конфликт в глобален мащаб."
🌐"В историята на всяка цивилизация историята свършва поне веднъж, а понякога и по-често."
🌐"Но обществата, които приемат, че тяхната история е приключила, са обикновено общества, чиято история навлиза в упадък."
December 10, 2021
A learned critique of Huntington's derivative notions. There's no honest cultural understanding or analysis in Huntington, just shallow, political hysteria. It's an exercise in confirmation bias for the ignorant.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qkK4p...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qkK4p...
July 12, 2018
في عام ١٩٩٦ ألف الكاتب صامويل هانتجتون كتابه " صدام الحضارات " بعد أن أثار
مقال كتبه في عام ١٩٩٣ بنفس العنوان جدلاً كبيراً، فأحب أن يناقش أفكاره بشكل أوسع بطرحه هـذا الكتاب،
وكالمقال فقد أثار الكتاب جدلاً أوسع في أنحاء العالم وخاصة بعد أحداث ١١ سبتمبر.
وتبدأ النسخة العربية بمقدمة المترجم والتي فند فيها أفكار الكتاب واعترض على طرحه
مما جعلني أشعر بعدم الرغبة في قراءته، فكنت أتمنى لو كان المترجم قد أجل تحليله لنهاية الكتاب
وترك للقاريء حري�� التحليل والاستنتاج.
أهم الأفكار التي طرحها صامويل هانتجتون في كتابه هي كالتالي:
١- يعرف الكاتب الحضارة بأنها الكيان الثقافي الأوسع الذي يضم الجماعات الثقافية وفيها يعرّف الناس أنفسهم بالنسب، الدين، اللغة، التاريخ، القيم، العادات، والمؤسسات الاجتماعية.
٢- أن الصدامات على مر التاريخ متغيرة بحسب الفئات المتصارعه فمثلا في الثورة الفرنسية كان الصراع بين الطبقات ثم تغير الصراع بين القوميات في الحربين العالميتين.
٣- بعد الحربين العالميتين تحول الصدام بين الأيدلوجيتين: الماركسية الشيوعية بقيادة الإتحاد السوفيتي من جهة والليبرالية الرأسمالية بقيادة أمريكا والغرب من جهة أخرى.
٤- بعد إنهيار الإتحاد السوفيتي وسقوط الشيوعية بدا وكأن الليبرالية الرأسمالية انتصرت وستكون هي المسيطرة على العالم، وذهب بعض الكتاب مثل ( فوكوياما ) في كتابه " نهاية التاريخ " إلى أن جميع دول العالم ستتبنى الأيدلوجية الليبرالية الرأسمالية.
٥- فند هانتجتون هذا التصور وغيره وتبنى تصوراً آخر مفاده أن الصدام سيستمر وسيتحول من صدام الأيدلوجيات إلى صدام الحضارات. وستحدث الحروب على خطوط التقسيم الحضاري.
٦- واعتبر أهم الحضارات التي قد يحدث بينها التصادم هي الحضارات الكبرى : الآسيوية والهندية والإسلامية والأرثوذكسية والغرب.
٧- وبما أن الكاتب غربي فقد أهتم بالحضارات التي تشكل تهديداً للغرب وقد تتصادم معه وهي : الحضارة الآسيوية بقيادة الصين والحضارة الإسلامية.
٨- استجابة القادة والمفكرون السياسيون في المجتمعات المختلفة للتحديث والتغريب كانت واحدة من بين ثلاث استجابات: إما رفض التحديث والتغريب أو تبنيهما معا أو تبني الأول ورفض الثاني.
٩- الحضارة الآسيوية تتقدم اقتصاديا وتسعى للتفوق على الغرب في هذا المجال مما يجعلها تتحرر من سيطرة الغرب وتأثيره الحضاري ومن ثم تعود لحضارتها التي تعتقد أنها أفضل من الحضارة الغربية بسبب هذا التفوق وكذلك ستسعى إلى زيادة قوتها العسكرية والتسلح وهذا ما يجعلها تشكل مركزا جديدا للعالم.
١٠- الحضارة الإسلامية تعاني من التخلف والتمزق وعدم وجود دول مركزية قوية تقودها في التحديات التي تواجهها، وتعاني من عدم وجود ديموقراطيات حقيقية، وبحسب الكاتب فالأمر يعود للثقافة الإسلامية، والغرب كذلك من مصلحته أن تبقى هذه الديكتاتوريات الصديقة خير من ظهور ديموقراطيات معادية، وتكمن خطورة الحضارة الإسلامية على الغرب في شعوبها التي تتميز بمعدلات نمو سكانية وديموغرافية عالية وهجرتها إلى الغرب وعدم اندماجها هنالك وكذلك الصحوة الإسلامية التي تجعل المسلمين يتوقون إلى التخلص من سيطرة الغرب.
١١- يستشهد الكاتب على رؤيته للصدام بين الحضارات بحروب البلقان التي حدثت بين الصرب والكروات والبوسنة وكيف أن كل حضارة ساعدت إخوانها ، فالألمان الكاثوليك ساعدوا الكروات، والروس الأرثوذوكس ساعدوا الصرب، بينما بعض الدول الإسلامية مثل تركيا وإيران والسعودية ساعدت البوسنيين.
١٢- يرى الكاتب أن الحضارة الغربية بلغت أوجها وأنها في طريقها للإنهيار في مواجهة الحضارة الأسيوية الصاعدة ومركزها الصين، ويرى أنه ينبغي للغرب الحفاظ على القيم الغربية وإن تقلص سيطرتها على العالم.
أتمنى لكم قراءة ممتعة.
مقال كتبه في عام ١٩٩٣ بنفس العنوان جدلاً كبيراً، فأحب أن يناقش أفكاره بشكل أوسع بطرحه هـذا الكتاب،
وكالمقال فقد أثار الكتاب جدلاً أوسع في أنحاء العالم وخاصة بعد أحداث ١١ سبتمبر.
وتبدأ النسخة العربية بمقدمة المترجم والتي فند فيها أفكار الكتاب واعترض على طرحه
مما جعلني أشعر بعدم الرغبة في قراءته، فكنت أتمنى لو كان المترجم قد أجل تحليله لنهاية الكتاب
وترك للقاريء حري�� التحليل والاستنتاج.
أهم الأفكار التي طرحها صامويل هانتجتون في كتابه هي كالتالي:
١- يعرف الكاتب الحضارة بأنها الكيان الثقافي الأوسع الذي يضم الجماعات الثقافية وفيها يعرّف الناس أنفسهم بالنسب، الدين، اللغة، التاريخ، القيم، العادات، والمؤسسات الاجتماعية.
٢- أن الصدامات على مر التاريخ متغيرة بحسب الفئات المتصارعه فمثلا في الثورة الفرنسية كان الصراع بين الطبقات ثم تغير الصراع بين القوميات في الحربين العالميتين.
٣- بعد الحربين العالميتين تحول الصدام بين الأيدلوجيتين: الماركسية الشيوعية بقيادة الإتحاد السوفيتي من جهة والليبرالية الرأسمالية بقيادة أمريكا والغرب من جهة أخرى.
٤- بعد إنهيار الإتحاد السوفيتي وسقوط الشيوعية بدا وكأن الليبرالية الرأسمالية انتصرت وستكون هي المسيطرة على العالم، وذهب بعض الكتاب مثل ( فوكوياما ) في كتابه " نهاية التاريخ " إلى أن جميع دول العالم ستتبنى الأيدلوجية الليبرالية الرأسمالية.
٥- فند هانتجتون هذا التصور وغيره وتبنى تصوراً آخر مفاده أن الصدام سيستمر وسيتحول من صدام الأيدلوجيات إلى صدام الحضارات. وستحدث الحروب على خطوط التقسيم الحضاري.
٦- واعتبر أهم الحضارات التي قد يحدث بينها التصادم هي الحضارات الكبرى : الآسيوية والهندية والإسلامية والأرثوذكسية والغرب.
٧- وبما أن الكاتب غربي فقد أهتم بالحضارات التي تشكل تهديداً للغرب وقد تتصادم معه وهي : الحضارة الآسيوية بقيادة الصين والحضارة الإسلامية.
٨- استجابة القادة والمفكرون السياسيون في المجتمعات المختلفة للتحديث والتغريب كانت واحدة من بين ثلاث استجابات: إما رفض التحديث والتغريب أو تبنيهما معا أو تبني الأول ورفض الثاني.
٩- الحضارة الآسيوية تتقدم اقتصاديا وتسعى للتفوق على الغرب في هذا المجال مما يجعلها تتحرر من سيطرة الغرب وتأثيره الحضاري ومن ثم تعود لحضارتها التي تعتقد أنها أفضل من الحضارة الغربية بسبب هذا التفوق وكذلك ستسعى إلى زيادة قوتها العسكرية والتسلح وهذا ما يجعلها تشكل مركزا جديدا للعالم.
١٠- الحضارة الإسلامية تعاني من التخلف والتمزق وعدم وجود دول مركزية قوية تقودها في التحديات التي تواجهها، وتعاني من عدم وجود ديموقراطيات حقيقية، وبحسب الكاتب فالأمر يعود للثقافة الإسلامية، والغرب كذلك من مصلحته أن تبقى هذه الديكتاتوريات الصديقة خير من ظهور ديموقراطيات معادية، وتكمن خطورة الحضارة الإسلامية على الغرب في شعوبها التي تتميز بمعدلات نمو سكانية وديموغرافية عالية وهجرتها إلى الغرب وعدم اندماجها هنالك وكذلك الصحوة الإسلامية التي تجعل المسلمين يتوقون إلى التخلص من سيطرة الغرب.
١١- يستشهد الكاتب على رؤيته للصدام بين الحضارات بحروب البلقان التي حدثت بين الصرب والكروات والبوسنة وكيف أن كل حضارة ساعدت إخوانها ، فالألمان الكاثوليك ساعدوا الكروات، والروس الأرثوذوكس ساعدوا الصرب، بينما بعض الدول الإسلامية مثل تركيا وإيران والسعودية ساعدت البوسنيين.
١٢- يرى الكاتب أن الحضارة الغربية بلغت أوجها وأنها في طريقها للإنهيار في مواجهة الحضارة الأسيوية الصاعدة ومركزها الصين، ويرى أنه ينبغي للغرب الحفاظ على القيم الغربية وإن تقلص سيطرتها على العالم.
أتمنى لكم قراءة ممتعة.
June 6, 2008
A pretty decent book. I enjoyed it and his thesis was intriguing though a little simplistic and not entirely original. We as westerners sure do have an obsession with breaking everything down into nice little neat packages so they can be better classified and studied. That is both the strength and weakness of this book. If only cultures and civilizations were so easy to just lump people together under one stereotype wow that would make the world much more predictable than it is. Alas the world is full of cultures, sub-cultures and counter-cultures within each civilization and so it is a little more complex. This also has deep implications when it comes to foreign policy, if you treat every culture as homogeneous I believe you are making a grave mistake, especially if those sub-cultures or counter-cultures could be possible allies or enemies. There are so many examples of this: Saudi Arabia - Wahhabis vs. House of Saud, both Muslim one ally other enemy. Iran: Religious right vs. Moderate to secular Iran, one hates us the other likes western culture. Iraq: Kurds -like us, Sunnis-mixed between hate and like, Shiite - Mix between like and hate. I give these examples since Huntington's thesis argues that Muslim culture is the most prone to violence and thus the most dangerous. But the list goes on and on including even the US with the basic division of conservative and liberal which is even blurry at times. I guess I don't like that Huntington is basically creating a similar myopic world view that the US had during the cold war when the world was easily divided into three camps and all the disastrous foreign policy that followed as a result. The world is not black and white. It is not meant to be so easily divided and doing so I believe is creating a dangerously false paradigm of the world.
February 1, 2022
Zapad je osvojio svet ne nadmoćnošću svojih ideja, vrednosti ili svoje religije, nego svojom nadmoćnošću u primeni organizovanog nasilja. Zapadnjaci često zaboravljaju ovu činjenicu; nezapadnjaci nikada.
Nakon raspada Sovjetskog Saveza, opšteg sloma komunizma i završetka hladnoratovskih sukoba, dalji razvoj svjetske istorije bio je u velikoj magli. Među zapadnim intelektualnim krugovima su se u odnosu na to pitanje formirala dva suprotstavljena tabora. Jedni su predviđali apsolutnu pobjedu liberalne demokratije i uspostavljanje unipolarnog svjetskog poretka koji bi se bazirao na političkim, ekonomskim i kulturnim dostignućima zapadne civilizacije. Kada govorimo o najreprezentativnijim predstavnicima ovog "kružoka" neizbježno je spomenuti američkog politikologa Fransisa Fukujamu, koji je, želeći da sublimira gore pomenute predikcije, skovao i danas često primjenjivanu sintagmu kraj istorije. Doduše, uvjerenje zapadnih intelektualaca u to da su zapadne vrijednosti jedine ispravne i da pored ili nakon njih ništa bolje ne može da nastane, pa čak ni da se zamisli, seže puno dalje u prošlost; ono je produkt francuske prosvjetiteljske misli, a pečat će mu dati Hegel simbolički proglašavajući zapadnu civilizaciju (tj. germanski narod) večernjom (posljednjom i najmudrijom), a sebe, uzgred i indirektno, posljednjim filozofom. Otprilike u isto vrijeme kada Fukujama privodi kraju svoje kapitalno djelo, Semjuel Hantington (predstavnik drugog tabora) započinje da piše knjigu u kojoj izlaže jednu potpuno drugačiju viziju - okončanjem hladnog rata završeno je samo jedno poglavlje istorije; ono ujedno predstavlja i uvod u novo doba, koje će biti obilježeno multikulturalnim sukobima.
Za razliku od mislilaca koji svoje koncepcije istorije zasnivaju na intuitivnom razotkrivanju zakona istorijskih kretanja, Hantingtonove pretenzije nisu toliko velike. Njegova vizija je više naučna, zasnovana na statističkim i činjeničnim pokazateljima, te potkrepljena brojnim izvorima. Čak i kada se bavi predikcijama, on to ne radi toliko na osnovu subjektivnog osjećaja, već prvenstveno na bazi prethodno pomenutih parametara. Služeći se Hegelovom terminologijom, za ovu knjigu bismo mogli reći da spada u domen reflektovane geopolitike, a ne filozofije geopolitike. U skladu sa svim tim, Hantingtonove prognoze uglavnom ne idu dalje od 20-30 godina unaprijed, što ukazuje na njegovu pozitivističku prizemljenost.
A o čemu sve promišlja ovaj mislilac? O svemu relevantnom na temu civilizacije i geopolitike u reflektovanom smislu - pojam i vrste civilizacija, njihova struktura i genealogija, sfere interesa velikih sila, analize međucivilizacijskih ratova, žarišne tačke i predikcije mogućih sukoba, i još puno toga. Međutim, iako napisana u naučnom duhu, za ovu knjigu se nikako ne može reći da je dosadna. Razloga za to je više, a jedan od glavnih je autorova lucidnost u analitičnosti. Zanimljiv je, između ostalog, Hantingtonov stav po kome je odnos modernizacije i pozapadnjačenja obrnuto proporcionalan - što više jedna kultura postaje moderna, to je ona manje zapadna i više tradicionalna; ili poglavlje u kome se bavi etiološkom analizom "pocijepanih" zemalja (Rusija, Turska, Meksiko, Australija), itd. Razumljivo, imajući u vidu demografsku i vjersku heterogenost jugoslovenske države, kao i vrijeme u kome je knjiga objavljena (1996.godina), ratu na našim prostorima i južnoslovenskim narodima uopšteno, posvećena je posebna pažnja. Jugoslovenski scenario Hantingtonu služi kao najvaljaniji dokaz u prilog tačnosti njegove glavne hipoteze. Tako je po njemu Jugoslavija bila mesto najsloženijih, najkonfuznijih i najpotpunijih ratova zbog neodgovarajuće granice, dok je pomoć koju su Sjedinjene Američke Države tokom rata pružale bosanskim muslimanima bila civilizacijska anomalija inače univerzalnog obrasca da srodnici podupiru srodnike. Budući da je za Hantingtona svaka država u kojoj žive dva naroda koja pripadaju različitim civilizacijama žarišna tačka mogućeg sukoba, možete zamisliti kako se onda u takvoj projekciji posmatra Bosna, zemlja u kojoj se direktno ukrštaju tri od četiri glavne civilizacije.
Drugi uzrok moje radosti čitanja je Hantingtonova informisanost - faktografski sladokusci će ovdje omastiti brkove - ali da ne bih dobio krivičnu prijavu zbog pretjeranog spojlovanja neću sa tim ulaziti u detalje.
I konačno, ono što me posebno obradovalo jeste autorova relativna nepristrasnost u odnosu na nezapadne civilizacije, što nije čest slučaj kod zapadnih mislilaca. To je jedan od razloga zbog kojih je ova knjiga odoljela zubu vremena i uprkos kritikama, kako u njegovoj matičnoj zemlji tako i van nje, stekla veliku popularnost na svim svjetskim meridijanima.
Koliko mi se jedna knjiga dopala mjerim, između ostalog, i po količini podvučenog teksta, a u ovom slučaju je to gotovo polovina knjige.
Postoje štiva koja svaki obrazovani čovjek jednostavno mora da pročita, a ovo je bez ikakve dileme jedan od takvih naslova. Uz to, mislim da je vrijeme u kome živimo idealno za prvi susret sa njim, što zbog boljeg razumijevanja aktuelnih geopolitičkih turbulencija (Ukrajina, Avganistan, Tajvan, formiranje anglosaksonskog nuklearnog saveza...), što zbog činjenice da se većina prognostičkih scenarija iznesenih u ovoj knjizi odnosi na period između 2020. i 2025. godine, tako da je baš zanimljivo pratiti u kojoj mjeri su se Hantingtonova predviđanja do sada obistinila i u kojoj mjeri će se tek obistiniti.
Nakon raspada Sovjetskog Saveza, opšteg sloma komunizma i završetka hladnoratovskih sukoba, dalji razvoj svjetske istorije bio je u velikoj magli. Među zapadnim intelektualnim krugovima su se u odnosu na to pitanje formirala dva suprotstavljena tabora. Jedni su predviđali apsolutnu pobjedu liberalne demokratije i uspostavljanje unipolarnog svjetskog poretka koji bi se bazirao na političkim, ekonomskim i kulturnim dostignućima zapadne civilizacije. Kada govorimo o najreprezentativnijim predstavnicima ovog "kružoka" neizbježno je spomenuti američkog politikologa Fransisa Fukujamu, koji je, želeći da sublimira gore pomenute predikcije, skovao i danas često primjenjivanu sintagmu kraj istorije. Doduše, uvjerenje zapadnih intelektualaca u to da su zapadne vrijednosti jedine ispravne i da pored ili nakon njih ništa bolje ne može da nastane, pa čak ni da se zamisli, seže puno dalje u prošlost; ono je produkt francuske prosvjetiteljske misli, a pečat će mu dati Hegel simbolički proglašavajući zapadnu civilizaciju (tj. germanski narod) večernjom (posljednjom i najmudrijom), a sebe, uzgred i indirektno, posljednjim filozofom. Otprilike u isto vrijeme kada Fukujama privodi kraju svoje kapitalno djelo, Semjuel Hantington (predstavnik drugog tabora) započinje da piše knjigu u kojoj izlaže jednu potpuno drugačiju viziju - okončanjem hladnog rata završeno je samo jedno poglavlje istorije; ono ujedno predstavlja i uvod u novo doba, koje će biti obilježeno multikulturalnim sukobima.
Za razliku od mislilaca koji svoje koncepcije istorije zasnivaju na intuitivnom razotkrivanju zakona istorijskih kretanja, Hantingtonove pretenzije nisu toliko velike. Njegova vizija je više naučna, zasnovana na statističkim i činjeničnim pokazateljima, te potkrepljena brojnim izvorima. Čak i kada se bavi predikcijama, on to ne radi toliko na osnovu subjektivnog osjećaja, već prvenstveno na bazi prethodno pomenutih parametara. Služeći se Hegelovom terminologijom, za ovu knjigu bismo mogli reći da spada u domen reflektovane geopolitike, a ne filozofije geopolitike. U skladu sa svim tim, Hantingtonove prognoze uglavnom ne idu dalje od 20-30 godina unaprijed, što ukazuje na njegovu pozitivističku prizemljenost.
A o čemu sve promišlja ovaj mislilac? O svemu relevantnom na temu civilizacije i geopolitike u reflektovanom smislu - pojam i vrste civilizacija, njihova struktura i genealogija, sfere interesa velikih sila, analize međucivilizacijskih ratova, žarišne tačke i predikcije mogućih sukoba, i još puno toga. Međutim, iako napisana u naučnom duhu, za ovu knjigu se nikako ne može reći da je dosadna. Razloga za to je više, a jedan od glavnih je autorova lucidnost u analitičnosti. Zanimljiv je, između ostalog, Hantingtonov stav po kome je odnos modernizacije i pozapadnjačenja obrnuto proporcionalan - što više jedna kultura postaje moderna, to je ona manje zapadna i više tradicionalna; ili poglavlje u kome se bavi etiološkom analizom "pocijepanih" zemalja (Rusija, Turska, Meksiko, Australija), itd. Razumljivo, imajući u vidu demografsku i vjersku heterogenost jugoslovenske države, kao i vrijeme u kome je knjiga objavljena (1996.godina), ratu na našim prostorima i južnoslovenskim narodima uopšteno, posvećena je posebna pažnja. Jugoslovenski scenario Hantingtonu služi kao najvaljaniji dokaz u prilog tačnosti njegove glavne hipoteze. Tako je po njemu Jugoslavija bila mesto najsloženijih, najkonfuznijih i najpotpunijih ratova zbog neodgovarajuće granice, dok je pomoć koju su Sjedinjene Američke Države tokom rata pružale bosanskim muslimanima bila civilizacijska anomalija inače univerzalnog obrasca da srodnici podupiru srodnike. Budući da je za Hantingtona svaka država u kojoj žive dva naroda koja pripadaju različitim civilizacijama žarišna tačka mogućeg sukoba, možete zamisliti kako se onda u takvoj projekciji posmatra Bosna, zemlja u kojoj se direktno ukrštaju tri od četiri glavne civilizacije.
Drugi uzrok moje radosti čitanja je Hantingtonova informisanost - faktografski sladokusci će ovdje omastiti brkove - ali da ne bih dobio krivičnu prijavu zbog pretjeranog spojlovanja neću sa tim ulaziti u detalje.
I konačno, ono što me posebno obradovalo jeste autorova relativna nepristrasnost u odnosu na nezapadne civilizacije, što nije čest slučaj kod zapadnih mislilaca. To je jedan od razloga zbog kojih je ova knjiga odoljela zubu vremena i uprkos kritikama, kako u njegovoj matičnoj zemlji tako i van nje, stekla veliku popularnost na svim svjetskim meridijanima.
Koliko mi se jedna knjiga dopala mjerim, između ostalog, i po količini podvučenog teksta, a u ovom slučaju je to gotovo polovina knjige.
Postoje štiva koja svaki obrazovani čovjek jednostavno mora da pročita, a ovo je bez ikakve dileme jedan od takvih naslova. Uz to, mislim da je vrijeme u kome živimo idealno za prvi susret sa njim, što zbog boljeg razumijevanja aktuelnih geopolitičkih turbulencija (Ukrajina, Avganistan, Tajvan, formiranje anglosaksonskog nuklearnog saveza...), što zbog činjenice da se većina prognostičkih scenarija iznesenih u ovoj knjizi odnosi na period između 2020. i 2025. godine, tako da je baš zanimljivo pratiti u kojoj mjeri su se Hantingtonova predviđanja do sada obistinila i u kojoj mjeri će se tek obistiniti.
November 24, 2023
I really don’t sense the hostility and controversy mentioned by others in the book. He is a white Western guy who is proud and ready to defend their Western ideals. And, I am a non-Western Muslim guy who is also proud and ready to defend my ideals. Does that makes both of us xenophobic, fascist and warmongers? If it’s a yes, then everybody who stood up when their national anthem played or cheered for their team in football match are racists. Everybody tends to fall into one of the two extreme poles, but mankind is vast and rich enough to have both of the poles. He can be proud of his country yet that doesn’t prevent him from appreciating the culture of other people of other cultures.
His thesis is this; that the future international policies and conflicts would be on the civilizational level, instead of national or ideological. An apt example showing the application for his model is that of his prediction on the Ukraine-Russian conflict. He predicted that Ukraine would be a cleft country, a termed he bestowed on a nation torn between two civilizations. In the Ukrainian case, the cleft is between the Uniate western part of Ukraine and the Orthodox Eastern Ukraine. 15 years after the book is published, Putin declared that the “liberation” of Crimea is the wish of the Crimeans. But, the thing with human prediction is, it works for few, but not to many. At the end of the book, he offered few pages of fully-fledged intercivilizational war beginning with Chinese invasion into Vietnam. I think it is these pages that triggered the people to (unfairly) label him as a warmonger, scaremonger etc. Yet, the setting of the war would be at 2010 and at present, 2018, no such calamity is around the corner. Maybe, in the future, who knows?
Regarding his vocal description against other civilization especially of Islamic and Sinic civilization, we can replace the other civilization’s name with Western and it still fits.
If he really a Western idolizer he perhaps would affirm with no hesitation that Westernization is a prerequisite for modernization. Yet, he admits that there’s 5 responses towards influence of Western ideals (rejectionism, reformism, Kemalism, chimeras and post-modern West), and anybody can see that he recognizes the limitation of Kemalism and the pain the people went through in their divorce with the culture and values they hold. This book, after all, are an exposition arguing from civilizational approach. If he is to propose that Western ideals is the sole savior of humankind while retaining in the earlier parts that modernity was only known by the West as only a part of its history rather than its inherent characteristic, he would commit himself in gross contradiction. He ends the part with concluding that Westernization is not the prerequisite of modernization, as shown by Japan and the rest.
At the end of the book, he remarked quite frankly that the belief for Western universalism is “false, immoral and dangerous”. He declared admirably for Singapore’s standing up to their own cultures and values, enlisting the country’s White Paper as communalities, one of the three ways he prescribed for peace in the face of intercivilizational future conflicts, despite saying that actions akin to Singapore by other non-Western civilizations are a “revolt against the West”, perhaps misunderstanding that we should pay tribute and obedience eternally to our past invaders.
The chapter "le revanche de dieu" commenting on the phenomenon of religious revival in current times. The author realizes and takes into account that the phenomenon of religious revival was not a frantic fanatic movement, but really a response from a meaning-seeking urban population. He noted that the phenomenon’s bulk comes from the “second generation indigenous” where they are of urban, socially mobile, highly educated, middle classed population. Perhaps the strongest sentence came from him was “…In this sense, the revival of non-Western religions is the powerful manifestation of anti-Westernism in non-Western population…” Taken out of context, it is indeed perhaps a statement of annoyance toward the revolt against the West. But, earlier he differentiates that the religious revival rejects “modernism” (which composed of moral relativism, egotism and consumerism) instead of “modernity”. And he concludes with “[Religious revival] is a declaration of cultural independence from West, a proud statement that “We will be modern, but we won’t be you” My friends, I haven’t heard of a statement so welcoming and positive towards the phenomenon of religious revival. He looked beyond usual prejudice with the words of “jihad” or “evangelicalism”; he also looked at the phenomenon from the existentialism point of view.
However, there are precise points where he started to turn, rather unfairly to Muslims. Of course, by adopting a bird’s eyes view in handling differences between cultures and people, he sees the Islamic bloc as a single unit, where Islamic doctrines are sufficient enough to move the people in said bloc in unison. Persuasive events are offered such as the unity of the Muslim world against the West in the Gulf War. Yet, as the forest looked like more or less the same color of green, he failed to see that even in what he called as the “Islamic civilization”, there possess a spectrum of attitudes in living their lives. People in Malaysia, for an instance, are much more moderate, while their counterparts in tribal Afghanistan are much more strict-even beyond necessary-, even in interpreting the same verse of the Quran. He mentioning, “…a concept of nonviolence is absent from Muslim practice and doctrines…” are rather too self-serving in explaining why Muslims are having problems in living peacefully with their neighbors. He himself said that Islam is a way of life and so Muslims should therefore engaging their everyday lives with Islamic practice and doctrines. If his former statement is really true, wouldn’t everywhere in the “Islamic civilization” would be anarchy and chaos? His frequent mentions of riots and violence occurring between Muslim Malays and Chinese in Malaysia sounded like it really is frequent. Yet, there’s only a single open and bloody confrontation occurs in the country and yet, it is not from religious clashes but from what the author oft repeat; “cultural fault lines”. This perhaps is due from the author’s loose application of the terms religion and cultural, sometimes they are different and yet sometimes they are of the same, somewhere in this book.
In conclusion, perhaps his ideas came to others as “simplistic”, but I think “simplicity” is the sole reason for any model or theory. We derive theories in order to make an order from all of these entropy and anarchy. While there’s so many opinions are against him such as “a prophet for the Trump era” etc., I couldn’t deny this book as a classic study and a good start in providing a taste on international affairs, perhaps an application for Arnold Toynbee or Oswald Spengler’s philosophy of history. Whether it really applies to reality, well, doesn’t human arrogance never managed to bring heaven back down, but only piling the Tower of Babel higher and higher?
His thesis is this; that the future international policies and conflicts would be on the civilizational level, instead of national or ideological. An apt example showing the application for his model is that of his prediction on the Ukraine-Russian conflict. He predicted that Ukraine would be a cleft country, a termed he bestowed on a nation torn between two civilizations. In the Ukrainian case, the cleft is between the Uniate western part of Ukraine and the Orthodox Eastern Ukraine. 15 years after the book is published, Putin declared that the “liberation” of Crimea is the wish of the Crimeans. But, the thing with human prediction is, it works for few, but not to many. At the end of the book, he offered few pages of fully-fledged intercivilizational war beginning with Chinese invasion into Vietnam. I think it is these pages that triggered the people to (unfairly) label him as a warmonger, scaremonger etc. Yet, the setting of the war would be at 2010 and at present, 2018, no such calamity is around the corner. Maybe, in the future, who knows?
Regarding his vocal description against other civilization especially of Islamic and Sinic civilization, we can replace the other civilization’s name with Western and it still fits.
If he really a Western idolizer he perhaps would affirm with no hesitation that Westernization is a prerequisite for modernization. Yet, he admits that there’s 5 responses towards influence of Western ideals (rejectionism, reformism, Kemalism, chimeras and post-modern West), and anybody can see that he recognizes the limitation of Kemalism and the pain the people went through in their divorce with the culture and values they hold. This book, after all, are an exposition arguing from civilizational approach. If he is to propose that Western ideals is the sole savior of humankind while retaining in the earlier parts that modernity was only known by the West as only a part of its history rather than its inherent characteristic, he would commit himself in gross contradiction. He ends the part with concluding that Westernization is not the prerequisite of modernization, as shown by Japan and the rest.
At the end of the book, he remarked quite frankly that the belief for Western universalism is “false, immoral and dangerous”. He declared admirably for Singapore’s standing up to their own cultures and values, enlisting the country’s White Paper as communalities, one of the three ways he prescribed for peace in the face of intercivilizational future conflicts, despite saying that actions akin to Singapore by other non-Western civilizations are a “revolt against the West”, perhaps misunderstanding that we should pay tribute and obedience eternally to our past invaders.
The chapter "le revanche de dieu" commenting on the phenomenon of religious revival in current times. The author realizes and takes into account that the phenomenon of religious revival was not a frantic fanatic movement, but really a response from a meaning-seeking urban population. He noted that the phenomenon’s bulk comes from the “second generation indigenous” where they are of urban, socially mobile, highly educated, middle classed population. Perhaps the strongest sentence came from him was “…In this sense, the revival of non-Western religions is the powerful manifestation of anti-Westernism in non-Western population…” Taken out of context, it is indeed perhaps a statement of annoyance toward the revolt against the West. But, earlier he differentiates that the religious revival rejects “modernism” (which composed of moral relativism, egotism and consumerism) instead of “modernity”. And he concludes with “[Religious revival] is a declaration of cultural independence from West, a proud statement that “We will be modern, but we won’t be you” My friends, I haven’t heard of a statement so welcoming and positive towards the phenomenon of religious revival. He looked beyond usual prejudice with the words of “jihad” or “evangelicalism”; he also looked at the phenomenon from the existentialism point of view.
However, there are precise points where he started to turn, rather unfairly to Muslims. Of course, by adopting a bird’s eyes view in handling differences between cultures and people, he sees the Islamic bloc as a single unit, where Islamic doctrines are sufficient enough to move the people in said bloc in unison. Persuasive events are offered such as the unity of the Muslim world against the West in the Gulf War. Yet, as the forest looked like more or less the same color of green, he failed to see that even in what he called as the “Islamic civilization”, there possess a spectrum of attitudes in living their lives. People in Malaysia, for an instance, are much more moderate, while their counterparts in tribal Afghanistan are much more strict-even beyond necessary-, even in interpreting the same verse of the Quran. He mentioning, “…a concept of nonviolence is absent from Muslim practice and doctrines…” are rather too self-serving in explaining why Muslims are having problems in living peacefully with their neighbors. He himself said that Islam is a way of life and so Muslims should therefore engaging their everyday lives with Islamic practice and doctrines. If his former statement is really true, wouldn’t everywhere in the “Islamic civilization” would be anarchy and chaos? His frequent mentions of riots and violence occurring between Muslim Malays and Chinese in Malaysia sounded like it really is frequent. Yet, there’s only a single open and bloody confrontation occurs in the country and yet, it is not from religious clashes but from what the author oft repeat; “cultural fault lines”. This perhaps is due from the author’s loose application of the terms religion and cultural, sometimes they are different and yet sometimes they are of the same, somewhere in this book.
In conclusion, perhaps his ideas came to others as “simplistic”, but I think “simplicity” is the sole reason for any model or theory. We derive theories in order to make an order from all of these entropy and anarchy. While there’s so many opinions are against him such as “a prophet for the Trump era” etc., I couldn’t deny this book as a classic study and a good start in providing a taste on international affairs, perhaps an application for Arnold Toynbee or Oswald Spengler’s philosophy of history. Whether it really applies to reality, well, doesn’t human arrogance never managed to bring heaven back down, but only piling the Tower of Babel higher and higher?
October 13, 2020
Throughout human History, humans engaged in power struggles, over territories, resources or simply prestige. This is an undeniable simple fact about humans. Today’s world is no different. For any major power, supposed to defend and expand its influence on a global scale, a relative degree of understanding is necessary before to take action, a sort of theoretical model. Just as the Cold War model was the framework for the 20th century, which political scientists and leaders used to make sense of the different alignments of major and minor actors; to understand the post Soviet Union world, and the shifts of loyalties and rising new powers, we need to construct a different framework. An intellectual tool as this comes of course with huge limitations; it is a mere representation simplifying a complex set of relationships, evolving in an environment with parameters that can randomly change overnight. One should not be surprised if its predictions fail or some inexplicable abnormalities appear. Yet it is the best humans can do, and the only way they can intervene in a system way bigger than them.
The model that Huntington is presenting revolves around the concept of civilization, defined as a shared Religion, Language, values, way of life and History… The 20th century was the stage for an ideological struggle between communism and capitalism. The formation of huge empires according to these ideologies occulted the deep cultural differences between most peoples. The Soviet Union was the best example of this, containing a vast array of cultures: central Asia Muslims, orthodox Slavs, and western European Catholics… Communism was also viewed very positively by Arab socialists and newly independent Africa. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its ideology brought all this differences back to the surface. The world is rearranging itself along cultural lines. The 20th century ideological struggle was just a brief pause in a History of power struggles based in most times on religious and ethnic grounds. Rather than having a homogeneous liberal democratic post-cold war world, as some “End of History” theorists predicted, peoples once subjugated to communism or western imperialism are looking back to their roots in search of their Identity. They don’t have to adhere to a pro-western liberal system of values, nor dig up some political theory in order to find a new ideology. They seek the familiar and the basic, and that is culture, religion and ethnicity… yesterday’s communists can easily be today’s Confucian Chinese or radical Islamists.
The west, thanks to its technological and military superiority, is still going to be the dominant civilization for years to come. Nevertheless, the height of its power was already achieved in the last decades of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th. Relatively to other civilizations, it is getting weaker and more unable to impose its hegemony. Economic growth stagnated and population aged, in contrast to the incredible growth of East Asia and demographic explosion of Islam. The west was neither so quick to accommodate to this new situation nor saw it coming. The collapse of the Soviet Union flew westerners in euphoria and hubris, thinking that the world will eventually adopt their system because it is the only viable one. The grandeur of their dreams of universalism and multiculturalism blinded them from seeing the cultural cleavages to come. They confused westernization with modernization, and thought that modernization will inevitably lead to democratization.
China on the other hand, was able to overcome the unsustainability of communist economies, and embarked on a rollercoaster ride of economic growth, leading the entire region with it. China is reasserting its historical status of East Asia hegemon, which impacts the stability of the region and the geopolitical interests of other major powers, especially the United States, Russia and Japan.
The other major civilization which is talked about more and more lately, is Islam. Huntington talks about an Islamic Resurgence, and compare it to the Protestant Reformation. Fundamentalists groups put aside, moderates and entire Muslim societies are becoming more and more islamisized and anti-western. Political elites, military and monarchical regimes understood this change. They adapted to it to an extent that holding a secular discourse today is considered political suicide. This reaffirmation of the Islamic identity is driven by the demographics of Muslim countries, recruited by religious organizations which exploit the absence of real socio economic opportunities, and aggravated by the eradication of secular opposition groups by existing authoritarian regimes. However, the absence of a core state as a hegemon to impose order among its different powers and mediate conflicts, and the raging competition between countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan to be acknowledged as the leaders of Islam, are the cause of much instability inside of this civilization, and with its neighbors.
This book was described by some as being a western imperialist propaganda, anti-islam, presenting a world of total war. It is judging a book by its cover or title, perhaps an extreme case of naïve idealism. Great powers are always looking to get more powerful. Muslims never talk about Arab conquests as imperialism; today it is only their weakness which prevents them from imperializing others. And as shown in the conflicts and wars discussed at length in the book, no civilizations spare any effort to help its kin and expand its influence. Although Huntington said in an interview that he does imagine a peaceful world where major powers have achieved some sort of equilibrium, I doubt that. Nevertheless, reading this book is essential to understanding the headlines of our news feed today.
The model that Huntington is presenting revolves around the concept of civilization, defined as a shared Religion, Language, values, way of life and History… The 20th century was the stage for an ideological struggle between communism and capitalism. The formation of huge empires according to these ideologies occulted the deep cultural differences between most peoples. The Soviet Union was the best example of this, containing a vast array of cultures: central Asia Muslims, orthodox Slavs, and western European Catholics… Communism was also viewed very positively by Arab socialists and newly independent Africa. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its ideology brought all this differences back to the surface. The world is rearranging itself along cultural lines. The 20th century ideological struggle was just a brief pause in a History of power struggles based in most times on religious and ethnic grounds. Rather than having a homogeneous liberal democratic post-cold war world, as some “End of History” theorists predicted, peoples once subjugated to communism or western imperialism are looking back to their roots in search of their Identity. They don’t have to adhere to a pro-western liberal system of values, nor dig up some political theory in order to find a new ideology. They seek the familiar and the basic, and that is culture, religion and ethnicity… yesterday’s communists can easily be today’s Confucian Chinese or radical Islamists.
The west, thanks to its technological and military superiority, is still going to be the dominant civilization for years to come. Nevertheless, the height of its power was already achieved in the last decades of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th. Relatively to other civilizations, it is getting weaker and more unable to impose its hegemony. Economic growth stagnated and population aged, in contrast to the incredible growth of East Asia and demographic explosion of Islam. The west was neither so quick to accommodate to this new situation nor saw it coming. The collapse of the Soviet Union flew westerners in euphoria and hubris, thinking that the world will eventually adopt their system because it is the only viable one. The grandeur of their dreams of universalism and multiculturalism blinded them from seeing the cultural cleavages to come. They confused westernization with modernization, and thought that modernization will inevitably lead to democratization.
China on the other hand, was able to overcome the unsustainability of communist economies, and embarked on a rollercoaster ride of economic growth, leading the entire region with it. China is reasserting its historical status of East Asia hegemon, which impacts the stability of the region and the geopolitical interests of other major powers, especially the United States, Russia and Japan.
The other major civilization which is talked about more and more lately, is Islam. Huntington talks about an Islamic Resurgence, and compare it to the Protestant Reformation. Fundamentalists groups put aside, moderates and entire Muslim societies are becoming more and more islamisized and anti-western. Political elites, military and monarchical regimes understood this change. They adapted to it to an extent that holding a secular discourse today is considered political suicide. This reaffirmation of the Islamic identity is driven by the demographics of Muslim countries, recruited by religious organizations which exploit the absence of real socio economic opportunities, and aggravated by the eradication of secular opposition groups by existing authoritarian regimes. However, the absence of a core state as a hegemon to impose order among its different powers and mediate conflicts, and the raging competition between countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan to be acknowledged as the leaders of Islam, are the cause of much instability inside of this civilization, and with its neighbors.
This book was described by some as being a western imperialist propaganda, anti-islam, presenting a world of total war. It is judging a book by its cover or title, perhaps an extreme case of naïve idealism. Great powers are always looking to get more powerful. Muslims never talk about Arab conquests as imperialism; today it is only their weakness which prevents them from imperializing others. And as shown in the conflicts and wars discussed at length in the book, no civilizations spare any effort to help its kin and expand its influence. Although Huntington said in an interview that he does imagine a peaceful world where major powers have achieved some sort of equilibrium, I doubt that. Nevertheless, reading this book is essential to understanding the headlines of our news feed today.
September 17, 2017
با پایان یافتن جنگ سرد در اواخر قرن بیستم و شروع آنچه که به "نظام نوین جهانی" معروف است دو نظریه در روابط بینالملل مطرح شد. عدهای از آن به مثابه پایان تاریخ یاد کردند و با نگاهی خوشبینانه به توفق نظام لیبرال دموکراسی بر سراسر کره خاکی و پایان تضادهای ایدئولوژیک اذعان داشتند و نظریه پرداز آن نیز فرانسیس فوکویاما بود. عدهای نیز برخلاف دسته اول، و چه بسا در پاسخ به دسته اول، نگاه خوشبینانهای به این موضوع نداشتند و از یک هشدار خبر میدادند. ساموئل هانتینگتون نظریهپرداز دسته دوم بود. دانشمند علوم سیاسی و استاد دانشگاه هاروارد با چاپ مقاله خود با نام برخورد تمدنها در نشریه فارین افیرز به تحلیل و تبیین دوران روابط غرب با سایرین پس از اتمام جنگ سرد پرداخت.
وی تمدنهای زنده جهان را به هفت یا هشت تمدن بزرگ تقسیم کرد: غربی، کنفوسیوسی، ژاپنی، اسلامی، هندو، اسلاو، ارتدوکس، آمریکای لاتین و در حاشیه هم تمدن آفریقایی و خطوط گسل میان این تمدنها را منشا درگیریهای جهان آتی و جایگزین دولت-ملتها دانست. او کانون اصلی جنگهای آینده را بین تمدن غرب و اتحاد دو تمدن اسلامی و کنفوسیوسی میدانست.
عدهای به کلی ن��فی نظریه وی شدند و از اساس آن را رد کردند. عدهای بدون چون و چرا آن را پذیرفتند و عدهای نیز با بحث و نظر حول آن در مجامع و محافل گوناگون به تحلیل و تبیین این نظریه پرداختند. بدون شک هیچ نظریهای در حوزه علوم اجتماعی نظریهای جهانشمول نبوده و نخواهد بود. تفاوت و اهمیت نظریه هانتینگتون به زمان شناسی و هوشمندی او در ارائه نظریهاش درست در هنگام وجود یک خلا فکری و نظری در حوزه روابط بینالملل برمیگردد.
نظریه وی که نظریهای سیاستساز شد این روزها با رشد گروههای بنیادگرای اسلامی در خاورمیانه و تقابل این گروهها با غرب اهمیتش بیش از پیش در افکار عمومی و محافل دانشگاهی مطرح شده است. تصمیمات مقامات آمریکایی و غربی هنوز که هنوزه مستقیم و غیرمستقیم تحت تاثیر نظریه برخورد تمدنها است و از آنجایی که کشور ما ایران نیز بنابر نظریه هانتینگتون، به درست یا غلط، در تمدن اسلامی دسته بندی شده این نظریه برای ما از اهمیت ویژه ای برخوردار است.
درمورد کتاب:
کتاب از 3 فصل تشکیل شده است
فصل اول پیش درآمدی بر نظریه و معرفی شخص هانتینگتون است.
فصل دوم ترجمه اصلی مقاله و نظریه است و نیز مصاحبههایی با هانتینگتون در باب نظریهاش.
فصل سوم نیز به مقالات، نظرات و انتقادات دیگر اندیشمندان و سیاستمداران جهان از جمله برژینسکی، سیدحسین نصر، فوکویوما، تافلر، ادوارد سعید و دیگران در باب نظریه برخورد تمدنها میپردازد.
وی تمدنهای زنده جهان را به هفت یا هشت تمدن بزرگ تقسیم کرد: غربی، کنفوسیوسی، ژاپنی، اسلامی، هندو، اسلاو، ارتدوکس، آمریکای لاتین و در حاشیه هم تمدن آفریقایی و خطوط گسل میان این تمدنها را منشا درگیریهای جهان آتی و جایگزین دولت-ملتها دانست. او کانون اصلی جنگهای آینده را بین تمدن غرب و اتحاد دو تمدن اسلامی و کنفوسیوسی میدانست.
عدهای به کلی ن��فی نظریه وی شدند و از اساس آن را رد کردند. عدهای بدون چون و چرا آن را پذیرفتند و عدهای نیز با بحث و نظر حول آن در مجامع و محافل گوناگون به تحلیل و تبیین این نظریه پرداختند. بدون شک هیچ نظریهای در حوزه علوم اجتماعی نظریهای جهانشمول نبوده و نخواهد بود. تفاوت و اهمیت نظریه هانتینگتون به زمان شناسی و هوشمندی او در ارائه نظریهاش درست در هنگام وجود یک خلا فکری و نظری در حوزه روابط بینالملل برمیگردد.
نظریه وی که نظریهای سیاستساز شد این روزها با رشد گروههای بنیادگرای اسلامی در خاورمیانه و تقابل این گروهها با غرب اهمیتش بیش از پیش در افکار عمومی و محافل دانشگاهی مطرح شده است. تصمیمات مقامات آمریکایی و غربی هنوز که هنوزه مستقیم و غیرمستقیم تحت تاثیر نظریه برخورد تمدنها است و از آنجایی که کشور ما ایران نیز بنابر نظریه هانتینگتون، به درست یا غلط، در تمدن اسلامی دسته بندی شده این نظریه برای ما از اهمیت ویژه ای برخوردار است.
درمورد کتاب:
کتاب از 3 فصل تشکیل شده است
فصل اول پیش درآمدی بر نظریه و معرفی شخص هانتینگتون است.
فصل دوم ترجمه اصلی مقاله و نظریه است و نیز مصاحبههایی با هانتینگتون در باب نظریهاش.
فصل سوم نیز به مقالات، نظرات و انتقادات دیگر اندیشمندان و سیاستمداران جهان از جمله برژینسکی، سیدحسین نصر، فوکویوما، تافلر، ادوارد سعید و دیگران در باب نظریه برخورد تمدنها میپردازد.
February 20, 2016
Schematic rip-off of Toynbee. An embarrassment. Gained popularity in the early 2000s because greaseballs thought it authorized killing moslems.
February 19, 2018
should have picked up Huntingdon's work earlier. It is awesome. He argues (or at least the structure of his thought necessarily suggests such) that the utopian vision of liberal democracy (whether right or left-wing) has failed miserably and that societies will revert back to their original civilizational paradigms.
By that he doesn't mean that societies will simply turn back the clock. Rather, the civilizations from which nation-states emerged have a stronger pull upon the states that some post-Enlightenment view of "democratic capitalism." In short, "people and culture" trump artificial ideology.
Huntingdon lists several civilizations:
Sinic/Hindu: China, Southeast Asia, and India. I realize that India could legitimately be a separate civilization (and I believe it is), but I'm listing it under China for several reasons: to keep the list from multiplying unnecessarily and because India will probably ally itself with China in the near future.
Islamic: Most of the Middle East and all of northern Africa. Malaysia and Indonesia are also Islamic, but they will be subsumed under China in terms of influence. One caveat: I do not believe the Islamic civilization can be delineated the way Huntingdon portrays it.
African: Subcontinent; northern Africa is distinct from area below Sudan.
Western: originating from Western Christendom (post AD 800-1204), but largely trashing that heritage today. Nevertheless, maintains the skeleton of Charlemagne and Christendom, especially seen in the form of the European Union and NATO.
Orthodox/Slavic: Russia is the de facto leader of this civilization, given her wealth, size, and influence. Includes eastern Ukraine, Belarus, most of the Balkans. Interestingly, I would identify much of Western Europe pre 600 AD as "Orthodox." Inheritor of Byzantium. Religious differences notwithstanding, this civilization is able to make strong ties/alliances with Middle East. Syria is 30% Orthodox anyway. Likely to form some kind of coalition with Middle Eastern countries and China to offset NATO/EU's march of mutual destruction.
Latin America
However, I disagree with Huntingdon on the Middle East. I think the Middle East is in an identity crisis between Fundamentalism and Nationalism. Islamic countries like Syria and Turkey, for all of their problems, lean closer to nationalism than "jihadism." Likewise, I maintain that Iran is more nationalist than fundamentalist, though it is very much the latter, too (cf Primakov's Russia and the Arabs).
Samuel Huntingdon's Clash of Civilizations. It was truly the work of a genius. Huntingdon is too pro-D.C. and very naive concerning the purity of NATO's motives, but other than that he is prescient on about every major issue (He wrote this book in 1996).
Civilizations assume the reality of objective cultures, but they are not identical to culture(s). I can't remember exactly how SH defines civilization. There is an extended discussion on pp. 40-44. Frankly, I don't think his definition, if any, is really that important. His book deals more with the empirical identity and clash of civilizations, rather than objectively defining them.
Civilizations have core states: states that have at least de facto leadership over smaller states in the civilization. For example, Russia is the core state of the Orthodox civilization (which includes Ukraine, Belarus, and the Balkans, though the latter are compromised by their membership in NATO; likewise, China is the core st ate of the East Asian civilization, excluding Japan).
Wars between actual core states of civilizations are quite rare. However, fault line wars are quite common. These are wars/battles/century-long skirmishes between two smaller states of two different civilizations that border each other. The obvious example is the Balkans: Orthodox Serbia fought Muslim Bosnia, both of whom were at war with Catholic Croatia.
While ideologies (Marxism, democratic capitalism) are nice and make academics and news pundits feel good, civilization/culture has a more primal claim upon people groups/ethnicities/states and in the absence of one ideology (say, Marxism) a nation will more likely identify with prior civilizational loyalties rather than the opposing ideology. For example, an old joke in former Soviet Union: our leaders lied to us about communism, but they told us the truth about capitalism.
Pros of the book:
His analysis is top-notch. We are reading a world-class scholar. Unlike 99% of elites in America, he knows that simply waving the magic wand of democratic capitalism will not make the nations swoon and willing become colonies of New York--and Huntingdon was actually attacked for making this obvious point!
He calls the Islamic threat for what it is. He is notorious for his famous "The borders of Islam are bloody." I don't really know how people can objectively respond to this claim. Yeah, it might be mean and bigoted, but look at the major hot spots of the world today--what religion is causing most of the trouble? In 1996 (at the time of the writing) 49 of the world's 58 current conflicts had Islam involved. If it looks like a duck...
He gives an accurate (though extremely dated) analysis of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Of course, a lot of his musings are moot considering NATO's bombing of civilians in Belgrade in 1999. Still, per his thesis on civilizational clash on fault lines, he does a stellar performance. Catholic Germany supported Croatia, the entire Muslim world--along with Hillary Clinton and Sean Hannity--supported the Muslim Bosniaks, and Russia supported Serbia. (he also documents American double-standards and calls them for what they are: when Muslims massacre a village and kidnap teenage girls it is because they are noble freedom fighters w. When Serbs execute 8,000 men in the 28th Bosnian Muslim infantry, it is because they are evil and genocidal. Even more strange, American conservatives who are almost 100% anti-Islam never challenge this fact and actually support Muslims).
Along similar lines is the Turko-Armenian-Azeri wars of the 1990s. Armenia was an Orthodox state who was beset by Muslim Turkey and Muslim Azeribaijan. During the Cold War the Soviet leadership had Armenians serving in high-rank positions and being trained by elite special forces. When the USSR fell, the Armenian military, keeping the Motorized Rifle divisions of that region, had a fairly impressive, if small, military. Russian intervention in the 1990s kept her smaller sister Armenia from being overrun by Muslims.
And these are just two examples. Huntingdon ends with a fairly interesting scenario on what WW3 will look like and how it will start. A few qualms with the book: he actually thinks NATO is preserving Western civilization and evidently he ignores the fact that his best friend, Zbignew Brzezinski advocates using the War on Terror as a way to surround Russia with missiles and bases. Ironically, Huntingdon had argued that doing so would actually make America lose the next world war, which will be a clash between a Chinese or Islamic (or both) civilization.
Huntingdon didn't write many more books after this. He had a high standard of writing and actually threw away many top-notch manuscripts because they weren't good enough. Too bad, for he is definitely worth reading.
By that he doesn't mean that societies will simply turn back the clock. Rather, the civilizations from which nation-states emerged have a stronger pull upon the states that some post-Enlightenment view of "democratic capitalism." In short, "people and culture" trump artificial ideology.
Huntingdon lists several civilizations:
Sinic/Hindu: China, Southeast Asia, and India. I realize that India could legitimately be a separate civilization (and I believe it is), but I'm listing it under China for several reasons: to keep the list from multiplying unnecessarily and because India will probably ally itself with China in the near future.
Islamic: Most of the Middle East and all of northern Africa. Malaysia and Indonesia are also Islamic, but they will be subsumed under China in terms of influence. One caveat: I do not believe the Islamic civilization can be delineated the way Huntingdon portrays it.
African: Subcontinent; northern Africa is distinct from area below Sudan.
Western: originating from Western Christendom (post AD 800-1204), but largely trashing that heritage today. Nevertheless, maintains the skeleton of Charlemagne and Christendom, especially seen in the form of the European Union and NATO.
Orthodox/Slavic: Russia is the de facto leader of this civilization, given her wealth, size, and influence. Includes eastern Ukraine, Belarus, most of the Balkans. Interestingly, I would identify much of Western Europe pre 600 AD as "Orthodox." Inheritor of Byzantium. Religious differences notwithstanding, this civilization is able to make strong ties/alliances with Middle East. Syria is 30% Orthodox anyway. Likely to form some kind of coalition with Middle Eastern countries and China to offset NATO/EU's march of mutual destruction.
Latin America
However, I disagree with Huntingdon on the Middle East. I think the Middle East is in an identity crisis between Fundamentalism and Nationalism. Islamic countries like Syria and Turkey, for all of their problems, lean closer to nationalism than "jihadism." Likewise, I maintain that Iran is more nationalist than fundamentalist, though it is very much the latter, too (cf Primakov's Russia and the Arabs).
Samuel Huntingdon's Clash of Civilizations. It was truly the work of a genius. Huntingdon is too pro-D.C. and very naive concerning the purity of NATO's motives, but other than that he is prescient on about every major issue (He wrote this book in 1996).
Civilizations assume the reality of objective cultures, but they are not identical to culture(s). I can't remember exactly how SH defines civilization. There is an extended discussion on pp. 40-44. Frankly, I don't think his definition, if any, is really that important. His book deals more with the empirical identity and clash of civilizations, rather than objectively defining them.
Civilizations have core states: states that have at least de facto leadership over smaller states in the civilization. For example, Russia is the core state of the Orthodox civilization (which includes Ukraine, Belarus, and the Balkans, though the latter are compromised by their membership in NATO; likewise, China is the core st ate of the East Asian civilization, excluding Japan).
Wars between actual core states of civilizations are quite rare. However, fault line wars are quite common. These are wars/battles/century-long skirmishes between two smaller states of two different civilizations that border each other. The obvious example is the Balkans: Orthodox Serbia fought Muslim Bosnia, both of whom were at war with Catholic Croatia.
While ideologies (Marxism, democratic capitalism) are nice and make academics and news pundits feel good, civilization/culture has a more primal claim upon people groups/ethnicities/states and in the absence of one ideology (say, Marxism) a nation will more likely identify with prior civilizational loyalties rather than the opposing ideology. For example, an old joke in former Soviet Union: our leaders lied to us about communism, but they told us the truth about capitalism.
Pros of the book:
His analysis is top-notch. We are reading a world-class scholar. Unlike 99% of elites in America, he knows that simply waving the magic wand of democratic capitalism will not make the nations swoon and willing become colonies of New York--and Huntingdon was actually attacked for making this obvious point!
He calls the Islamic threat for what it is. He is notorious for his famous "The borders of Islam are bloody." I don't really know how people can objectively respond to this claim. Yeah, it might be mean and bigoted, but look at the major hot spots of the world today--what religion is causing most of the trouble? In 1996 (at the time of the writing) 49 of the world's 58 current conflicts had Islam involved. If it looks like a duck...
He gives an accurate (though extremely dated) analysis of the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Of course, a lot of his musings are moot considering NATO's bombing of civilians in Belgrade in 1999. Still, per his thesis on civilizational clash on fault lines, he does a stellar performance. Catholic Germany supported Croatia, the entire Muslim world--along with Hillary Clinton and Sean Hannity--supported the Muslim Bosniaks, and Russia supported Serbia. (he also documents American double-standards and calls them for what they are: when Muslims massacre a village and kidnap teenage girls it is because they are noble freedom fighters w. When Serbs execute 8,000 men in the 28th Bosnian Muslim infantry, it is because they are evil and genocidal. Even more strange, American conservatives who are almost 100% anti-Islam never challenge this fact and actually support Muslims).
Along similar lines is the Turko-Armenian-Azeri wars of the 1990s. Armenia was an Orthodox state who was beset by Muslim Turkey and Muslim Azeribaijan. During the Cold War the Soviet leadership had Armenians serving in high-rank positions and being trained by elite special forces. When the USSR fell, the Armenian military, keeping the Motorized Rifle divisions of that region, had a fairly impressive, if small, military. Russian intervention in the 1990s kept her smaller sister Armenia from being overrun by Muslims.
And these are just two examples. Huntingdon ends with a fairly interesting scenario on what WW3 will look like and how it will start. A few qualms with the book: he actually thinks NATO is preserving Western civilization and evidently he ignores the fact that his best friend, Zbignew Brzezinski advocates using the War on Terror as a way to surround Russia with missiles and bases. Ironically, Huntingdon had argued that doing so would actually make America lose the next world war, which will be a clash between a Chinese or Islamic (or both) civilization.
Huntingdon didn't write many more books after this. He had a high standard of writing and actually threw away many top-notch manuscripts because they weren't good enough. Too bad, for he is definitely worth reading.
November 4, 2022
I don’t think there is a book I have postponed on reading as much as this one. I was familiar with it, with the FA article, with Huntington’s ideas, I have read excerpts at times, but never the book in full.
Huntington wanted this to be his grand theory of international relations, but it never came close. After 9/11 and then again after every terrorist attack motivated by Islamic fundamentalism (because in the book he seems to have something against the Islamic civilization, as he defines it, in particular), more recently because of fears about China’s role in the world and again after Russia’s invasion in Ukraine his ideas were dug up, recycled, rediscovered. But Huntington fails to acceptable explain the world. A theory is meant to be all-encompassing, a cloak under which every interaction between states takes place, but the civilizational model is just riddled with holes. When Huntington sees criticism, when he sees exceptions, a whole lot of them, he has explanations, to the point that his theory has to deal with more exceptions than a valid paradigm could possibly accommodate.
He argues that our conflicts (his conflicts of the future are ours of the present, since the book is from 1996) are explained by a civilization model, where every major civilization – eight of them – has a core, leading state (with exceptions, of course), preoccupied with redefining its role in world affairs. He disregards any cultural diversity in a civilization and pushes a confrontational model where everyone inside a civilization is working together and where every civilization is/will be working against one another. He speculates, based on few examples, ignoring most of the complexities of war, that all the wars of the future will be fought along the civilizational fault lines. If they do, I don’t think that’s because Huntington predicted it, but because almost all the wars, almost all the time, are fought along the fault lines between empires, kingdoms, alliances, states, groups, tribes etc. It is the way things work.
I have the luxury of reading this book 26 years after it was published. There is a lot of evidence now that Huntington was wrong. If there are cases where his model can be applied, those cases can be explained by other models as well. There are many more cases where his model was proved wrong, where states moved from one civilization to another, where conflict was avoided or when conflict was fought between economies, ideologies, regimes, not between civilizations. However, if Huntington will be right, I don’t think we will see it any time soon. Perhaps not in my lifetime. Despite his deterministic approach, states, actors, people, civilizations are able to learn to avoid clashes.
I am glad though that I can finally put this book behind me. It took me a very long time to pick it up and then an unexpectedly long time to actually finish it.
Huntington wanted this to be his grand theory of international relations, but it never came close. After 9/11 and then again after every terrorist attack motivated by Islamic fundamentalism (because in the book he seems to have something against the Islamic civilization, as he defines it, in particular), more recently because of fears about China’s role in the world and again after Russia’s invasion in Ukraine his ideas were dug up, recycled, rediscovered. But Huntington fails to acceptable explain the world. A theory is meant to be all-encompassing, a cloak under which every interaction between states takes place, but the civilizational model is just riddled with holes. When Huntington sees criticism, when he sees exceptions, a whole lot of them, he has explanations, to the point that his theory has to deal with more exceptions than a valid paradigm could possibly accommodate.
He argues that our conflicts (his conflicts of the future are ours of the present, since the book is from 1996) are explained by a civilization model, where every major civilization – eight of them – has a core, leading state (with exceptions, of course), preoccupied with redefining its role in world affairs. He disregards any cultural diversity in a civilization and pushes a confrontational model where everyone inside a civilization is working together and where every civilization is/will be working against one another. He speculates, based on few examples, ignoring most of the complexities of war, that all the wars of the future will be fought along the civilizational fault lines. If they do, I don’t think that’s because Huntington predicted it, but because almost all the wars, almost all the time, are fought along the fault lines between empires, kingdoms, alliances, states, groups, tribes etc. It is the way things work.
I have the luxury of reading this book 26 years after it was published. There is a lot of evidence now that Huntington was wrong. If there are cases where his model can be applied, those cases can be explained by other models as well. There are many more cases where his model was proved wrong, where states moved from one civilization to another, where conflict was avoided or when conflict was fought between economies, ideologies, regimes, not between civilizations. However, if Huntington will be right, I don’t think we will see it any time soon. Perhaps not in my lifetime. Despite his deterministic approach, states, actors, people, civilizations are able to learn to avoid clashes.
I am glad though that I can finally put this book behind me. It took me a very long time to pick it up and then an unexpectedly long time to actually finish it.
May 18, 2013
Huntington refers to the post-Cold War era in his hypothesis that cultural differences in our international society will lead to conflict. He comments on the importance of borders among nation states and perpetuates the realist notion that cultural differences can only lead to conflict. Instead of embracing the differences that unite us, he states that some actors are bound to be more powerful, hence conflict is inevitable. When referring to the “great cultural divisions” he brings as the principal example that of religious variance.
The reasoning behind his view on the current state of affairs is that fundamental cultural differences are “the product of centuries”, so they will not disappear any time soon. This statement incorrectly assumes that cultural values and traditions are innate and non-fluid. In extension, he claims that because of the rigidness of such values (that vary across different cultural groups) individuals will be less willing to shed their identity or their “civilization consciousness”. While this might be a valid point, it does not consequently account for his belief that there will be a power hierarchy, which will lead to conflict. The world does not inherently center around a constant quest for power.
Moreover, Huntington creates a divide among the West and what he considers to be the non-West. The notion of “the West and the Rest” is highly imperialistic and problematic. Ultimately, he divides our entire world into two categories, with the West being the predominant one. He commits a fallacy by such generalizations and this demonstrates his distorted definition of the concept of civilization. He states that divisions are natural without showing any actual evidence for this stream of consciousness. His imperialistic viewpoint ignores institutions other than religion that shape what he considers to be cultural identity. Additionally, he portrays an anti-Islamist attitude, which is conveyed through the notion that the simple “interaction between Islam and the West” can only be viewed as a clash of civilizations, due to the alleged attachment that Muslims have to their identity .
The reasoning behind his view on the current state of affairs is that fundamental cultural differences are “the product of centuries”, so they will not disappear any time soon. This statement incorrectly assumes that cultural values and traditions are innate and non-fluid. In extension, he claims that because of the rigidness of such values (that vary across different cultural groups) individuals will be less willing to shed their identity or their “civilization consciousness”. While this might be a valid point, it does not consequently account for his belief that there will be a power hierarchy, which will lead to conflict. The world does not inherently center around a constant quest for power.
Moreover, Huntington creates a divide among the West and what he considers to be the non-West. The notion of “the West and the Rest” is highly imperialistic and problematic. Ultimately, he divides our entire world into two categories, with the West being the predominant one. He commits a fallacy by such generalizations and this demonstrates his distorted definition of the concept of civilization. He states that divisions are natural without showing any actual evidence for this stream of consciousness. His imperialistic viewpoint ignores institutions other than religion that shape what he considers to be cultural identity. Additionally, he portrays an anti-Islamist attitude, which is conveyed through the notion that the simple “interaction between Islam and the West” can only be viewed as a clash of civilizations, due to the alleged attachment that Muslims have to their identity .
September 25, 2019
Fantastic read, I had previously read parts of this book a few years ago and decided it was time to read the whole thing and I was glad that I did, it didn't disappoint.
Huntington has a firm grasp on world politics and as such makes this book easier to read than some of its contemporaries. His theories propose that we are moving away from our historical religious divides and moving toward civilisational groups in new world order. These new civilisations are driven predominately by culture and cultural alliances and not so much religion based as before.
He talks about a few torn countries, Australia being one of them, and how we don't quite slot into a civilisation group mainly because of our historical roots now clashing with economic relationships and geographical positioning, maybe that will be a good thing if is Theory of World War 111 that he proposes in the conclusion of the book every eventuates. It's definitely a thought provoking read.
Huntington has a firm grasp on world politics and as such makes this book easier to read than some of its contemporaries. His theories propose that we are moving away from our historical religious divides and moving toward civilisational groups in new world order. These new civilisations are driven predominately by culture and cultural alliances and not so much religion based as before.
He talks about a few torn countries, Australia being one of them, and how we don't quite slot into a civilisation group mainly because of our historical roots now clashing with economic relationships and geographical positioning, maybe that will be a good thing if is Theory of World War 111 that he proposes in the conclusion of the book every eventuates. It's definitely a thought provoking read.
May 14, 2016
This is one of those books that everyone dumps on but few people have actually read or considered fairly. It's also the kind of book that area specialists love to tear apart, but to fairly consider his argument you have to be willing to accept a certain level of generalization. Granted, there is a lot to criticize here, but also a lot to learn. If anything, it's a vital book for understanding how a lot of people think about the world. It is a "big book" in the sense that it tries to explain the grand sweep of history, and it does that job reasonably well until the disastrous conclusion.
The core of the argument is that the world is divided into 7 or 8 civilizations that developed largely in isolation from each other (sustained intercivilizational exchange didn't really get going until about 1500, with some exceptions). According to Huntington, these civilizations have very different values, ways of organizing, governments, traditions, and religions. He sees their claims as largely incompatible and argues that efforts to change civilizations from within (Ataturk or Peter the Great) have really just created torn states with identity crises (Is Russia European? Is Turkey?). An inherent aspect of identity is defining the other, or what you are not, and civilizations do this as well. Add all the realist explanations for war (balance of power stuff, resource competition, security dilemma) to civilizational tension (which politicians can manipulate to rally support for violence), and you get a high potential for violence. Huntington argues in the 1990's that this potential is increasing because the era of Western dominance is coming to an end. Other civilizations were rising in economic power, population, and military strength and asserting their civilizations as equal to or better than the West. Microcosms of this process were happening along civilizational fault lines, where 2 civilizations come together on the border of two states or within a state. His discussion of conflicts in places like the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Ukraine, and elsewhere adds some credence to these claims.
I think Huntington's argument explains a lot about politics in the last 25 years and even a ways before that. We've seen a resurgence of civilizational pride and self-assertion as countries like China and entities like Islam become more powerful, shake off Western control, and assert the unique qualities . The history of human rights bears this out well: early postwar declarations of universal human rights (which Huntington says emerged mainly from Western civilization) garnered support from all over the world. Since decolonization, the Islamic Resurgence, and the rise of China, we've seen way more criticism of the universality of human rights and assertions that cultural differences must be respected. The challenge to the West is real, and civilizational factors are clearly a huge part of it. Huntington's case that geopolitical conflicts also fall along civilizational lines frequently is also pretty compelling. He shows, for example, how the vast majority of the Islamic world did not support Desert Storm because they saw it as a new version of Western imperialism. Another example: support for the major parties in the Balkan Wars fell along strongly civilizational lines (RU-Serbs, EU-Croats, Islamic world-Bosnian Muslims).
Lastly, his explanation of the Islamic resurgence is one of the most complete I've come across. Islamic societies, like many others, experienced rapid urbanization and in the mid-late 20th century. This cast a huge generation of people out of their web of traditional social relationships, making many of them latch on to the broader identity of Islam. These societies also experienced much Western domination, and many of their leaders (the Shah, the Baathists, the technocrats, post-colonial nationalists like Nasser) tried to emulate Western models and culture even as they asserted national autonomy. However, unlike many Asian societies, the modernization process (movements like Arab nationalism, for example) in Islamic societies was mostly a failure, leaving Islam as a more credible alternative. Combine these dynamics and you got the reassertion of a traditionalist Islamic identity that transcended nation and staunchly opposed Western influences and power. Some of this resurgent movement became violent. Thus, while I understand that politicians in the West can't say out loud that there is a clash of civilizations between the West and Islam, it seems that in the moment that genuine civilizational differences (not just geopolitical concerns) have driven violence between these entities.
Nevertheless, I found a bunch of problems with this book. I'll focus on 2. Africa and Latin America. Where are they? Why aren't they in this book for more than a few pages. What is the nature of these civilizations? I think Huntington left them out because he doesn't know a lot about them. It's kind of a lot to leave out.
There's also a huge problem with the idea civilizational clashes happening mainly on fault lines or between civilizations. For every conflict between civilizational groups in this book I could easily think of another that took place within civilizations that can't just be explained as competitions for leadership of the civilization. The Rwandan genocide? Somalia? Dozens of other wars within civilizations? The Vietnam War? Most other civil wars? Heck, what do World War I, II, and the Cold War say about the unity of Western Civilization or the consistency of its embrace of liberal values. Mark Mazower, among others, would say that in the first half of the 20th century liberal democracy was on the defensive throughout Europe. There were like 4 democracies in the world in the late 1930's. Nazism and communism firmly rejected most of the values Huntington describes as Western civilization's unique traits, and they both could have come to dominate the continent. Can this problem in Western civilization be squared with this argument? One suspects a desire in Huntington to emphasize the good aspects of Western civilization and gloss over the problems and dark periods. In a way, he's bolstering his own intellectual foe (Fukuyama) by implying that Western civilization (defined in the good way-human rights, democracy, etc) won the clash of civilizations within the Western world, which only could be said to have happened in the late 1980's: just years before this book was written! Moreover, there may be shades of ethnic or cultural differences in these conflicts, but they are very local and certainly are not civilizational differences.
The biggest problem, though, is the conclusion. Huntington calls for the West to embrace its unique values and bolster its role as the protector of the Western world while denying Fukuyama's universalism as well as multiculturalism. He basically gives the conservative spiel about what's wrong with Western civilization today: drugs, family breakdown, selfishness, disrespect for tradition, the rap music, and the multicultural challenge to the Western tradition. It's sad that he can't see the liberal Western tradition as compatible, with slight modifications, with so many of the other cultures that make up our society. Huntington clearly sees diversity as a weakness: I sort of envision him freaking out over drum circles in the Harvard quad or teaching non-white dude authors in English classes. I'm a little sympathetic to his argument about the relativist tendencies of some multiculturalists or post-modernists, but he mostly overlooks the fact that . He explicitly calls for the West to return to traditional, conservative Christian values in order to save itself so that it can face the clash of civilizations. Not coincidentally, he puts forth this program at the end of The Soldier and the State as the solution to the gap between the civilian world and the military. Thus, after a book of many great insights into the roots of conflict and difference in the world, Huntington reveals himself as little more than a narrow-minded ideological partisan in his conclusion. Disappointed!
Still, there are some strange gems of wisdom in this book. For example, Huntington argues that intervention in other civilizational areas only sparks more resentment and makes conflicts worse. I think the wars in IQ and AF have borne this out pretty clearly, as have dozens of other examples. He calls for each civilization respecting . He also has an interesting point about regional hegemony as a stabilizing factor (he calls states like China and the US core states). The fact that Islam lacks a core state that can exert moral legitimacy and political/military power over the region/identity seems to explain a lot of the turbulence it has experienced recently.
This is not an easy read at all, but anyone doing foreign policy history, international history, or who just wants to engage in one of the big ideas of the last quarter century should check this book out.
The core of the argument is that the world is divided into 7 or 8 civilizations that developed largely in isolation from each other (sustained intercivilizational exchange didn't really get going until about 1500, with some exceptions). According to Huntington, these civilizations have very different values, ways of organizing, governments, traditions, and religions. He sees their claims as largely incompatible and argues that efforts to change civilizations from within (Ataturk or Peter the Great) have really just created torn states with identity crises (Is Russia European? Is Turkey?). An inherent aspect of identity is defining the other, or what you are not, and civilizations do this as well. Add all the realist explanations for war (balance of power stuff, resource competition, security dilemma) to civilizational tension (which politicians can manipulate to rally support for violence), and you get a high potential for violence. Huntington argues in the 1990's that this potential is increasing because the era of Western dominance is coming to an end. Other civilizations were rising in economic power, population, and military strength and asserting their civilizations as equal to or better than the West. Microcosms of this process were happening along civilizational fault lines, where 2 civilizations come together on the border of two states or within a state. His discussion of conflicts in places like the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Ukraine, and elsewhere adds some credence to these claims.
I think Huntington's argument explains a lot about politics in the last 25 years and even a ways before that. We've seen a resurgence of civilizational pride and self-assertion as countries like China and entities like Islam become more powerful, shake off Western control, and assert the unique qualities . The history of human rights bears this out well: early postwar declarations of universal human rights (which Huntington says emerged mainly from Western civilization) garnered support from all over the world. Since decolonization, the Islamic Resurgence, and the rise of China, we've seen way more criticism of the universality of human rights and assertions that cultural differences must be respected. The challenge to the West is real, and civilizational factors are clearly a huge part of it. Huntington's case that geopolitical conflicts also fall along civilizational lines frequently is also pretty compelling. He shows, for example, how the vast majority of the Islamic world did not support Desert Storm because they saw it as a new version of Western imperialism. Another example: support for the major parties in the Balkan Wars fell along strongly civilizational lines (RU-Serbs, EU-Croats, Islamic world-Bosnian Muslims).
Lastly, his explanation of the Islamic resurgence is one of the most complete I've come across. Islamic societies, like many others, experienced rapid urbanization and in the mid-late 20th century. This cast a huge generation of people out of their web of traditional social relationships, making many of them latch on to the broader identity of Islam. These societies also experienced much Western domination, and many of their leaders (the Shah, the Baathists, the technocrats, post-colonial nationalists like Nasser) tried to emulate Western models and culture even as they asserted national autonomy. However, unlike many Asian societies, the modernization process (movements like Arab nationalism, for example) in Islamic societies was mostly a failure, leaving Islam as a more credible alternative. Combine these dynamics and you got the reassertion of a traditionalist Islamic identity that transcended nation and staunchly opposed Western influences and power. Some of this resurgent movement became violent. Thus, while I understand that politicians in the West can't say out loud that there is a clash of civilizations between the West and Islam, it seems that in the moment that genuine civilizational differences (not just geopolitical concerns) have driven violence between these entities.
Nevertheless, I found a bunch of problems with this book. I'll focus on 2. Africa and Latin America. Where are they? Why aren't they in this book for more than a few pages. What is the nature of these civilizations? I think Huntington left them out because he doesn't know a lot about them. It's kind of a lot to leave out.
There's also a huge problem with the idea civilizational clashes happening mainly on fault lines or between civilizations. For every conflict between civilizational groups in this book I could easily think of another that took place within civilizations that can't just be explained as competitions for leadership of the civilization. The Rwandan genocide? Somalia? Dozens of other wars within civilizations? The Vietnam War? Most other civil wars? Heck, what do World War I, II, and the Cold War say about the unity of Western Civilization or the consistency of its embrace of liberal values. Mark Mazower, among others, would say that in the first half of the 20th century liberal democracy was on the defensive throughout Europe. There were like 4 democracies in the world in the late 1930's. Nazism and communism firmly rejected most of the values Huntington describes as Western civilization's unique traits, and they both could have come to dominate the continent. Can this problem in Western civilization be squared with this argument? One suspects a desire in Huntington to emphasize the good aspects of Western civilization and gloss over the problems and dark periods. In a way, he's bolstering his own intellectual foe (Fukuyama) by implying that Western civilization (defined in the good way-human rights, democracy, etc) won the clash of civilizations within the Western world, which only could be said to have happened in the late 1980's: just years before this book was written! Moreover, there may be shades of ethnic or cultural differences in these conflicts, but they are very local and certainly are not civilizational differences.
The biggest problem, though, is the conclusion. Huntington calls for the West to embrace its unique values and bolster its role as the protector of the Western world while denying Fukuyama's universalism as well as multiculturalism. He basically gives the conservative spiel about what's wrong with Western civilization today: drugs, family breakdown, selfishness, disrespect for tradition, the rap music, and the multicultural challenge to the Western tradition. It's sad that he can't see the liberal Western tradition as compatible, with slight modifications, with so many of the other cultures that make up our society. Huntington clearly sees diversity as a weakness: I sort of envision him freaking out over drum circles in the Harvard quad or teaching non-white dude authors in English classes. I'm a little sympathetic to his argument about the relativist tendencies of some multiculturalists or post-modernists, but he mostly overlooks the fact that . He explicitly calls for the West to return to traditional, conservative Christian values in order to save itself so that it can face the clash of civilizations. Not coincidentally, he puts forth this program at the end of The Soldier and the State as the solution to the gap between the civilian world and the military. Thus, after a book of many great insights into the roots of conflict and difference in the world, Huntington reveals himself as little more than a narrow-minded ideological partisan in his conclusion. Disappointed!
Still, there are some strange gems of wisdom in this book. For example, Huntington argues that intervention in other civilizational areas only sparks more resentment and makes conflicts worse. I think the wars in IQ and AF have borne this out pretty clearly, as have dozens of other examples. He calls for each civilization respecting . He also has an interesting point about regional hegemony as a stabilizing factor (he calls states like China and the US core states). The fact that Islam lacks a core state that can exert moral legitimacy and political/military power over the region/identity seems to explain a lot of the turbulence it has experienced recently.
This is not an easy read at all, but anyone doing foreign policy history, international history, or who just wants to engage in one of the big ideas of the last quarter century should check this book out.
April 4, 2016
الثورة -كما يتم تعريفها في قاموس شامبر الموسوعي للغة الإنجليزية- هي "تغيير شامل وجذري بعيد المدى في طرق التفكير وفعل الأشياء." نعم هي كذلك، فقد ثار الناس في العالم العربي ضد الأنظمة الفاسدة والراكدة لأنهم ينشدون التغيير الشامل الجذري بعيد المدى الذي وُصف في هذا التعريف. ثاروا لأنهم شعروا بالخيانة والغدر من قبل الأنظمة السياسية التي تتراوح من ممالك وهمية إلى جمهوريات استبدادية مزورة أو ما يعرف بـ "الجمهوريات الملكية" repubchies أو Jumilikiyate"، وهو مصطلح ابتدعه الناشط المصري الليبرالي سعد الدين ابراهيم لتصوير الاختراع العبقري للحكام العرب في أنظمة الحكم الذي يقوم على المزج بين النظامين الملكي والجمهوري. هكذا ثارت شعوب العالم العربي لأنهم وجدوا أنفسهم قد تركوا خارج مضمار سباق التاريخ الإنساني. ثاروا ليخبروا الآخرين أنه لا يوجد استثناء في تطلعات الإنسان للحرية والكرامة الإنسانية.
حجتي في هذا الصدد أن تفكير إدوارد سعيد عن الشرق الأوسط، الشرق القديم، يبد حقيقيا وتنبؤيا لدرجة كبيرة. حجة سعيد هي أن البشرية جمعاء تتشارك في نفس الطموح والأمل في الحرية. لقد ثبتت صحة الحرية والكرامة الإنسانية بواسطة تلك الثورات التي اخترقت الإمبراطورية الاستعمارية من موريتانيا غربا وحتى سلطنة عُمان شرقا. لقد كان اتساع وانتشار تلك الثورات هو الأمل الذي طال انتظاره بقرب حلول لحظة تاريخية بشر بها إدوارد سعيد.
لعل تلك الثورات هي أحسن إهداء لإدوارد سعيد بعد مرور سبع سنوات على رحيله. إن هي إلا لحظة تاريخية دقيقة نتذكر فيها دفاع إدوارد سعيد الحماسي عن تلك المنطقة وسكانها. بدون أدنى شك، فإن هذه الأحداث العظيمة هي الأكثر عفوية وردود بليغة على وصم العرب بالشيطنة، والتشهير، والتشويه، والتحريف الذي مورس على مر التاريخ وفي وقتنا المعاصر ضد العرب والمسلمين عن طريق خطابات المستشرقين القدامى والحاليين. ما علينا إلا أن نقر بأن تلك اللحظة في التاريخ العربي سوف تجبر آخر من تبقى من المستشرقين على قيد الحياة على الاختفاء لأن السحر والجمودية في التاريخ الشرقي لم تعد صالحة لكي يتخذوا منها مادة للبحث.
الاستشراق كظاهرة معرفية هو عمل غربي خالص خلق صورة غير صحيحة، اختزالية، ومشوهة عن الشرق وشعبه وترك جذورا متراكمة ثقافيا، وأكاديميا اعتمدت عليها معظم المؤسسات التي غزت العقل الغربي عن الشرق والشرقيين. ونواجه في الخطاب الاستشراقي دوما صورة عميقة الجذور تقول إن ثمة "فرقا وجوديا قائما بين الطبيعة الجوهرية للشرق والغرب، مع تفوق الغرب بشكل حاسم على نظيره الشرقي. ومن المفترض في هذا الخطاب الاستشراقي أن المجتمعات الغربية -وما يرتبط بها من ثقافات ولغات وعقليات- هي في الأساس متفوقة بطبيعتها عن تلك الشرقية على نحو ما يذهب إدوارد سعيد بقوله إن "جوهر الاستشراق هو التمييز المتأصل بين التفوق الغربي والدونية الشرقية...". كما يذهب روديارد كبلنغ في قوله المأثور "الشرق شرق، والغرب غرب، ولا يلتقيان". وفي مثل هذه الاتجاهات الدوغماتية يبقى الشرق فقيرا مجمدا وخصما أبديا للغرب، كما أن له وظائف متضاعفة في انتشارها عند قضايا الثقافة والهوية والسياسة.
وبسبب تلك الاختلافات الأساسية والجوهرية بين الكتلتين، ينبغي أن يكون هناك أيضا اختلافات معرفية ترى أن هذا النوع من الأدوات المفاهيمية، والفئات العلمية، والمفاهيم الاجتماعية، ووصف الفروق الأيديولوجية والسياسية وتوظيفها من أجل فهم المجتمعات الغربية والتعامل معها لا تزال قائمة، من حيث المبدأ، وغير ذات صلة، وغير قابلة للمقارنة مع تلك الشرقية". ولعل هذا التصنيف الوحيد والمحتقن هو المرجعية الأكثر خصوبة للتحزبات والنقاشات الجدالية كتلك التي ذكرتها في وقت سابق، والتي قدمها برنارد لويس، صمويل هنتنغتون، دانيال بايبس، وريتشارد بيرل.... الخ.
على نفس المنوال نجد اثنين من الأصوات الاستشراقية الحديثة التي أكدت على التصريحات المماثلة عن الاستبعاد والتمييز العنصري بين الهويتين، الغربية واللاغربية، أو الغرب في مقابل باقي العالم. وفي أحد الجدالات الاستشراقية الشهيرة نجد برنارد لويس يعلمنا أنه "في تفسير الظاهرة السياسية الإسلامية ليس دقيقا اللج��ء إلى تلك اللغة التي تفرق بين ما هو يميني ويساري، تقدمي ومحافظ، وغيرها من المصطلحات الغربية... فالأمر هنا أشبه بتحليل مباراة كريكيت بواسطة مراسل بيسبول". وفي تشبيه سخيف مشابه يمضي بنا مستشرق آخر من أمثال هـ. أ. ر. غب فيقول إن تطبيق "سيكولوجية وآليات المؤسسات السياسية الغربية لحالات آسيوية أو عربية لهو أقرب إلى أفلام كرتونية للأطفال كتلك التي تنتجها والت ديزني".
الموقف الثوري العربي واسع النطاق يمثل حالة من التساؤل والتشكك تجاه السلطة العتيقة التي تميز عالم ما بعد الحرب في كل من الشرق والغرب. فمن الناحية السياسية، يبدو هذا الموقف خارج نطاق التيار السائد�� وأن الأغلبية الصامتة التي جلبت هذا التغيير لا يمكن التنبؤ بأفعالها. ومن هذه الآليات الداخلية التي حققت نجاحا لم يحققه جورج بوش ومستشاروه من صقور المستشرقين المتسلحين بطائرات بي 52، و إف 16، وإف 15.
لكن هذه المهمة الحضارية المعاكسة لا تزال تحت التهديد إن لم تلق العناية الكافية من الرصد ويتم تطعيمها بالتفكير الحكيم والثاقب من قبل العقول الخلاقة كتلك التي كان يمتلكها مفكرون من أمثال إدوارد سعيد. وفي تلك اللحظة الفارقة في تاريخ العالم العربي، كان لدى سعيد الكثير الذي كان بوسعه أن يعلمنا إياه عن الملابسات التي سنجابهها في خضم الأحداث الجارية والمقبلة. ولعل أولى نقاط الدرس الذي كان سعيد سيقوله لنا هو أن نكسب التحدي وننجح في تلبية التزاماتنا بتحقيق تغيير حقيقي
ولكن ما الذي حدث ؟
نجحت التهديدات الحضارية المعاكسة فى قلب الطاولة علي حلم الثورات العربية , ولأن الجميع انشغل بما يراه أمامه دون محاولة رصد مسار الأفكار التي تنتشر , لم يكن لدينا من يهدي لنا الطريق من عقول خلاقة مثل إدوارد سعيد يقدم لنا الدراسات المعرفية الللازمة لنا فى تلك المرحلة
ما زالت الهجمة الحضارية لم تنتصر تماماٌ وربما كانت أفكار هنتجتون الأقرب الي التحقق ولكن الصراع بين الجماعات الجهادية الصاعدة بشكل عالمي والحضارة الغربية ليس الصراع المباشر الذي نشهده هذه الأيام
هناك الرأسمالية وهيمنتها علي العالم تصارع من اجل سد ثغراتها وعوراتها التي ظهرت
ولذا فان المعركة الحضارية الاساسية هي الحرب ضد الاستهلاكية وفكرة الهيمنة التي تتيحها المقومات الاخلاقية للرأسمالية التي تتخفي تحت لباس العولمة
وما زال السياق مفتوح وربما بعد عدة سنوات قد أعيد كتابة مراجعة أخري للكتاب لا أوضح فيها ان ادوارد سعيد قام بالرد علي فكرة صراع الحضارات التي طرحت هنا بل وقتها ربما سأنتصر تماماٌ لإدوارد سعيد .
June 10, 2020
Samuel masked by his academic credential want you to know that there will be clash because of our different culture. You know what, don't believe this fairy tale, these ideologiy is important for the survival of military contractor, it has nothing to do with us, ordinary citizen, we can, and we have already co-existed from the time immemorial. I suggest you read Edward Said's Orientalism instead.
March 26, 2022
Неслучайно основополагаща книга, която се радва на огромен международен интерес. Четенето ѝ носи много ползи най-вече защото обръща внимание на културата (и всичко, което тя представлява, огромен събирателен образ на множество лица) като фундамент за обществено-политическите отношения. Не пести похвали, но и не премълчава големите критики. Този труд е ужасно богат на истини, на примери, на логични и обосновани анализи, впрочем такива, които подготвят читателя много добре по отношение на кризите и международните положения, на които сме свидетели.
Но имам едно огромно същностно несъгласие: България не се вписва в модела на Хънтингтън. Естествено, всеки модел има издънки и outliers 😊 Този конкретно се опитва да ни вмени принадлежност към православната цивилизация, чиято държава ядро е Русия. Да, ама не. 😊 Геополитическите насилия и злощастия не означават принадлежност към дадена цивилизация, а ми се струва, че Хънтингтън гледа малко едностранчиво на процеса, който самият той обособява и анализира. PS. Също от гледна точка на 2022-ра година смятам, че има и малко прекалено подценяване на силата на световния икономически интегритет.
Горещо препоръчвам да с�� прочете от всички.
Но имам едно огромно същностно несъгласие: България не се вписва в модела на Хънтингтън. Естествено, всеки модел има издънки и outliers 😊 Този конкретно се опитва да ни вмени принадлежност към православната цивилизация, чиято държава ядро е Русия. Да, ама не. 😊 Геополитическите насилия и злощастия не означават принадлежност към дадена цивилизация, а ми се струва, че Хънтингтън гледа малко едностранчиво на процеса, който самият той обособява и анализира. PS. Също от гледна точка на 2022-ра година смятам, че има и малко прекалено подценяване на силата на световния икономически интегритет.
Горещо препоръчвам да с�� прочете от всички.
November 28, 2021
„За Запада от много по-голямо значение в сравнение с икономиката и демографията са проблемите на моралния упадък, културното самоунищожение и политическата разединеност:
1) нарастване на антисоциалното поведение като престъпност, употреба на наркотици и най-общо насилие;
2) упадък на семейството, включително увеличена честота на разводите, извънбрачните деца, бременността на малолетните и самотните родители;
3) упадък на социалния капитал, т.е. членството в доброволни асоциации и междуличностното доверие, свързано с подобно членство;
4) общо снижаване на трудовата етика и издигане в култ на личната задоволеност;
5) намаляваща ангажираност с обучение и с интелектуална дейност.
Бъдещото здраве на Запада и влиянието му над други общества зависи в значителна степен от успешното справяне с тези тенденции, които, естествено, стават причина за деклариране на нравствено превъзходство от страна на мюсюлманите и азиатците.“
1) нарастване на антисоциалното поведение като престъпност, употреба на наркотици и най-общо насилие;
2) упадък на семейството, включително увеличена честота на разводите, извънбрачните деца, бременността на малолетните и самотните родители;
3) упадък на социалния капитал, т.е. членството в доброволни асоциации и междуличностното доверие, свързано с подобно членство;
4) общо снижаване на трудовата етика и издигане в култ на личната задоволеност;
5) намаляваща ангажираност с обучение и с интелектуална дейност.
Бъдещото здраве на Запада и влиянието му над други общества зависи в значителна степен от успешното справяне с тези тенденции, които, естествено, стават причина за деклариране на нравствено превъзходство от страна на мюсюлманите и азиатците.“
March 10, 2010
Huntington challenged my thinking on several issues:
1. Culture at the macro, or "civilizational" level plays a fundamental role in global politics - including conflict. In fact, it plays a more enduring role than ideology.
2. Western culture isn't necessarily destined to become universal (I admit that I believed - and still do sometimes - otherwise), in fact, Western civilization is in fact in decline based on several measures such as population, wealth, political, and military influence.
3. Conflicts are less likely to be resolved when they are between civilizations that don't have a "core state." For example, Islamic culture currently lacks a "core state" and that, according to the author, will make it less likely that conflicts between elements of this culture will avoid armed conflict and when involved in armed conflict they will be less likely to resolve these conflicts.
These are just three of Mr. Huntington's ideas that challenged my assumptions and my "paradigm" about the world and armed conflict. I don't think the author gives enough credit to societies that really do seem to be functioning as cultural melting pots - like the United States - or even the experience of peoples who change on a civilizational level. He doesn't address how civilizational culture changes and develops - he mainly points out it's near primacy in conflict.
I was challenged by this book, therefore I loved it! The only reason I didn't give it 5 stars is that the author's premise begged some questions that he didn't address such as the one I already mentioned about how civilizations develop and change. What exactly is this process and can a civilization consciously change itself? He lifts up Kemal Attaturk's Turkey as an example of fundamental cultural shifts being nearly impossible. But, I want to know what role incremental change plays. What role in modern Hindu civilization did Western culture play? - re: the british colonization. Likewise, is Attaturk's Turkey really an example of failed civilizational realignment? or is it a positive example of incremental and fundamental reformation of a civilizational culture?
I have to believe that deep cultural values can change. I do believe that in fact, western culture is superior in many ways (but by no means all ways) to more traditional cultures. Especially when it comes to equality for women and minorities, rule of law, property rights, and other fundamental western civilizational ideals. However, I now realize that my belief isn't self evident to the rest of the world and that in fact, my civilizational culture isn't destined to be adopted by the world. I thoroughly enjoyed this book because of the insights provided, the challenge to my thinking it caused, and the burning questions it begs. Certainly Huntington's views are a valuable and have some demonstrable explanatory power. Just as certainly, he isn't the final word on the subject and his insights may help us form questions, shape policies, and frame issues in ways that will help us to navigate our way in a world where Western Civilization is no longer ascendent.
1. Culture at the macro, or "civilizational" level plays a fundamental role in global politics - including conflict. In fact, it plays a more enduring role than ideology.
2. Western culture isn't necessarily destined to become universal (I admit that I believed - and still do sometimes - otherwise), in fact, Western civilization is in fact in decline based on several measures such as population, wealth, political, and military influence.
3. Conflicts are less likely to be resolved when they are between civilizations that don't have a "core state." For example, Islamic culture currently lacks a "core state" and that, according to the author, will make it less likely that conflicts between elements of this culture will avoid armed conflict and when involved in armed conflict they will be less likely to resolve these conflicts.
These are just three of Mr. Huntington's ideas that challenged my assumptions and my "paradigm" about the world and armed conflict. I don't think the author gives enough credit to societies that really do seem to be functioning as cultural melting pots - like the United States - or even the experience of peoples who change on a civilizational level. He doesn't address how civilizational culture changes and develops - he mainly points out it's near primacy in conflict.
I was challenged by this book, therefore I loved it! The only reason I didn't give it 5 stars is that the author's premise begged some questions that he didn't address such as the one I already mentioned about how civilizations develop and change. What exactly is this process and can a civilization consciously change itself? He lifts up Kemal Attaturk's Turkey as an example of fundamental cultural shifts being nearly impossible. But, I want to know what role incremental change plays. What role in modern Hindu civilization did Western culture play? - re: the british colonization. Likewise, is Attaturk's Turkey really an example of failed civilizational realignment? or is it a positive example of incremental and fundamental reformation of a civilizational culture?
I have to believe that deep cultural values can change. I do believe that in fact, western culture is superior in many ways (but by no means all ways) to more traditional cultures. Especially when it comes to equality for women and minorities, rule of law, property rights, and other fundamental western civilizational ideals. However, I now realize that my belief isn't self evident to the rest of the world and that in fact, my civilizational culture isn't destined to be adopted by the world. I thoroughly enjoyed this book because of the insights provided, the challenge to my thinking it caused, and the burning questions it begs. Certainly Huntington's views are a valuable and have some demonstrable explanatory power. Just as certainly, he isn't the final word on the subject and his insights may help us form questions, shape policies, and frame issues in ways that will help us to navigate our way in a world where Western Civilization is no longer ascendent.
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