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  1. A defense of causalist continuism.Matheus Diesel Werberich - manuscript
    Traditionally, philosophers consider the question of whether episodic memory and imagination belong to the same kind (the (dis)continuism problem) as ultimately depending on the causality question - i.e., whether remembering requires a causal connection to the past event. In this framework, if memory is a simulation process (as claimed by simulationism) and does not require a causal connection, then it is sufficiently similar to imagination and, thus, continuism follows. On the other hand, if a causal connection is necessary for memory (...)
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  2. Imagination in Phenomenology: Variations and Modalities.Andreea Smaranda Aldea & Julia Jansen - forthcoming - Springer, Husserl Studies.
  3. Imagination, Creativity, and Aphantasia.Andrea Blomkvist - forthcoming - In Amy Kind & Julia Langkau, Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination and Creativity. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter focuses on the role of the imagination in creativity, using aphantasia as a case study. It first distinguishes between imagination and mental imagery, before giving an overview of what we know about aphantasia to date, focusing in particular on findings pertaining to creativity, imagination, and memory. It then turns to the role of the imagination in creativity, agreeing with philosophers that the imagination plays an essential role in creativity, which allows individuals to imagine a multitude of possibilities. This (...)
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  4. On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal Imagining.Alon Chasid - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy:1-33.
    This paper argues against the view, proposed in Langland-Hassan (2020), that attitudinal imaginings are reducible to basic folk-psychological attitudes such as judgments, beliefs, desires, decisions, or combinations thereof. The proposed reduction fails because attitudinal imaginings, though similar to basic attitudes in certain respects, function differently than basic attitudes. I demonstrate this by exploring two types of cases: spontaneous imaginings, and imaginings that arise in response to fiction, showing that in these cases, imaginings cannot be identified with basic attitudes. I conclude (...)
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  5. The Spoilers Puzzle.Alon Chasid - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Spoilers provide advance knowledge of crucial facts about how a work of fiction unfolds or ends. This is often the reason given for our dislike of spoilers. I begin by showing that on generally-accepted philosophical accounts of fiction and imagination, the phenomenon of spoilers is puzzling, and the lay explanation of our dislike of spoilers is inadequate. To resolve the puzzle, I first argue that imaginings are inherently constrained, or norm-governed. In imagining, we take on a (fictional) doxastic role: our (...)
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  6. Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination and Creativity.Amy Kind & Julia Langkau (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
    Philosophy has long either dismissed or paid only minimal attention to creativity, and even with the rise of research on imagination, the creative imagination has largely been ignored as well. The aim of this volume is to correct this neglect. By bringing together existing research in various sub-disciplines, we also aim to open up new avenues of research. The chapters in Part I provide some framing and history on the philosophical study of imagination and creativity, along with an overview of (...)
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  7. Summary of Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - Analysis.
    A summary of Explaining Imagination (OUP, 2020) for the author/critics symposium in Analysis.
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  8. Replies to Hill, Kim, Tuna, and Van Leeuwen.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Author replies to commentaries from Christopher Hill, Hannah Kim, Emine Hande Tuna, and Neil Van Leeuwen on Explaining Imagination (OUP, 2020) by Peter Langland-Hassan.
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  9. Imaginative Beliefs.Joshua Myers - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    I argue for the existence of imaginative beliefs: mental states that are imaginative in format and doxastic in attitude. I advance two arguments for this thesis. First, there are imaginings that play the functional roles of belief. Second, there are imaginings that play the epistemic roles of belief. These arguments supply both descriptive and normative grounds for positing imaginative beliefs. I also argue that this view fares better than alternatives that posit distinct imaginative and doxastic states to account for the (...)
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  10. Against imagination.Bence Nanay - forthcoming - In Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin, Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind (2nd Edition). Blackwell.
    The term ‘imagination’ may seem harmless. We talk about imagination all the time. Nonetheless, I will argue that we should treat it with suspicion. More precisely, I will argue that the explanatory power of the concept of imagination can be fully captured by a scientifically more respectable and more powerful concept, namely, the concept of mental imagery.
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  11. Against imagination.Bence Nanay - forthcoming - In Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin, Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind (2nd Edition). Blackwell.
    The term ‘imagination’ may seem harmless. We talk about imagination all the time. Nonetheless, I will argue that we should treat it with suspicion. More precisely, I will argue that the explanatory power of the concept of imagination can be fully captured by a scientifically more respectable and more powerful concept, namely, the concept of mental imagery.
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  12. Political Phantasies: Aristotle on Imagination and Collective Action.Avshalom M. Schwartz - forthcoming - American Journal of Political Science.
    This article provides a new account of the role of phantasia, imagination, in Aristotle's political thought. Phantasia plays a key role in Aristotle's psychology and is crucial for explaining any kind of movement and action. I argue that this insight holds for collective actions as well. By offering a reconsideration of the famous “Wisdom of the Multitude” passage, this article shows that the capacity of a multitude to act together is tied to its ability to share a collective phantasma: a (...)
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  13. Experimental philosophy of imagination and creativity.Michael T. Stuart - forthcoming - In Amy Kind & Julia Langkau, Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination and Creativity. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter presents and contextualizes empirical work done by philosophers on imagination and creativity. It also suggests new directions for future empirical research. It is argued that empirical work on these (and other topics) is not just beneficial but necessary for philosophy of imagination and creativity. Further, it is argued that this work must sometimes be done by philosophers, and it is also often best done by philosophers. Topics discussed include imaginative resistance, counterfactual imagination, scientific imagination, distinguishing imagination from other (...)
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  14. Recovering Fictional Content and Emotional Engagements with Fiction.Emine Hande Tuna - forthcoming - Analysis.
  15. The Prima Facie View of Perceptual Imagination.Andrea Rivadulla-Duró - 2025 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 12.
    Perception is said to have assertoric force: It inclines the perceiver to believe its content. In contrast, perceptual imagination is commonly taken to be non-assertoric: Imagining winning a piano contest does not incline the imaginer to believe they actually won. However, abundant evidence from clinical and experimental psychology shows that imagination influences attitudes and behavior in ways similar to perceptual experiences. To account for these phenomena, I propose that perceptual imaginings have implicit assertoric force and put forth a theory—the Prima (...)
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  16. Wie es wäre wenn es denn wäre. Zur utopischen Kraft der Imagination.Emmanuel Alloa - 2024 - In Serena Gregorio, Geist und Imagination. Zur Bedeutung der Vorstellungskraft für Denken und Handeln. Berlin: Suhrkamp. pp. 259-281.
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  17. Going ballistic: The dynamics of the imagination and the issue of intentionalism.Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    Do we have control over the content of our imaginings? More precisely: do we have control over what our imaginings are about? Intentionalists say yes. Until recently, intentionalism could be taken as the received view. Recently, authors like Munro & Strohminger (2021) have developed some arguments against it. Here, I tentatively join their ranks and develop a new way to think about the way in which imaginings develop their contents that also goes against intentionalism. My proposal makes use of what (...)
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  18. A normative aspect of imagining: taking on a (quasi-)doxastic role.Alon Chasid - 2024 - In Íngrid Vendrell Ferran & Christiana Werner, Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This chapter explores a noteworthy, as-yet-unanalysed normative aspect of imagining. It begins by examining cases where imaginings are deemed erroneous, showing that imaginings can “go wrong” not only by failing to represent that which the imaginer intends to imagine, or is asked to imagine by an external source (e.g. a work of fiction), but also when imaginings arise unbidden. That unintended, non-deliberate imaginings can be erroneous shows that there must be a norm or commitment that is inherent to imagining, a (...)
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  19. A Powers Framework for Mental Action.Seth Goldwasser - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Mental actions are things we do with our minds. Consider inferring, deliberating, imagining, remembering, calculating, and so on. I introduce a non-reductive alternative to standard causalist accounts of mental action that understands such action in terms of dispositions for performing mental actions. I call this alternative the powers framework. On the powers framework, habitual and skillful mental actions are themselves infused with practical intelligence by being expressions of the agent’s rational tendencies and capacities, respectively. The intelligence exemplified in the performance (...)
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  20. Imagining as a Skillful Mental Action.Seth Goldwasser - 2024 - Synthese 204 (38):1-33.
    I provide a novel, non-reductive, action-first skill-based account of active imagining. I call it the Skillful Action Account of Imagining (the skillful action account for short). According to this account, to actively imagine something is to form a representation of that thing, where the agent’s forming that representation and selecting its content together constitute a means to the completion of some imaginative project. Completing imaginative projects stands to the active formation of the relevant representations as an end. The account thus (...)
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  21. Germaine de Staël’s Theory of the Passions.Eveline Groot - 2024 - In Ruth Edith Hagengruber, Teaching women philosophers, Ideas and Concepts from Women Philosophers’ Writings Over 2000 Years. Springer. pp. 93-112.
    Germaine de Staël’s theory of the impassioned nature of human beings, as set out in her work De l’influence des passions sur le bonheur des individus et des nations (1796), provides an insightful account of a sentimentalist theory in which human sensibility and emotionality are understood to be a core part of moral thought. In this work, Staël develops a psychological anthropology and moral theory that presents an interplay between the rational and the sentimental as one of its core aspects. (...)
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  22. The Profile of Imagining.Robert Hopkins - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    What is sensory imagining and what role does it play in our lives? How does visualizing a castle, running through a tune in one's head, or imagining the taste of fish ice cream relate to perceiving such things, or to remembering them? What are the connections between imagining and agency, and how does it relate to emotion and other affect? The Profile of Imagining offers a theory that answers these and many other questions. It argues that sensory imagining involves the (...)
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  23. Imagining what you intend.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    If we are free to imagine what we choose, this is likely because our intentions determine what we are imagining. However, in a recent article, Munro and Strohminger (2021) argue that, in some cases of imagistic imagining, our intentions do not determine what we are imagining. They offer examples where, intuitively, a person intends to imagine one thing but, due to the causal source of the image used, imagine another. This paper acknowledges the challenge posed by these cases while arguing (...)
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  24. The Unimaginability of Experience.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2024 - In Íngrid Vendrell Ferran & Christiana Werner, Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. Chapter 5.
    We do not normally speak of seeing experiences. Yet it is common to say that we have imagined an experience. Why the difference here? The deep affinities between sense perception and sensory imagination might have led one to expect that the limits of what we can sensorily imagine, using visual imagery, would align with what we can, in the right circumstances, see. We face a decision: either abandon this alignment of sensory imagination with perception, or conclude that we cannot, literally, (...)
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  25. (1 other version)On the Ambiguity of Images and Particularity of Imaginings.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2024 - Topoi 43 (4):1183-1191.
    It is often observed that images—including mental images—are in some sense representationally ambiguous. Some, including Jerry Fodor, have added that mental images only come to have determinate contents through the contribution of non-imagistic representations that accompany them. This paper agrees that a kind of ambiguity holds with respect to mental imagery, while arguing (pace Fodor) that this does not prevent imagery from having determinate contents in the absence of other, non-imagistic representations. Specifically, I argue that mental images can represent determinate (...)
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  26. Imagination, Creativity, and Artificial Intelligence.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2024 - In Amy Kind & Julia Langkau, Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination and Creativity. Oxford University Press.
    This chapter considers the potential of artificial intelligence (AI) to exhibit creativity and imagination, in light of recent advances in generative AI and the use of deep neural networks (DNNs). Reasons for doubting that AI exhibits genuine creativity or imagination are considered, including the claim that the creativity of an algorithm lies in its developer, that generative AI merely reproduces patterns in its training data, and that AI is lacking in a necessary feature for creativity or imagination, such as consciousness, (...)
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  27. Taking the heterogeneity (and unity) of imagination seriously.Nathanael Stein - 2024 - Philosophers' Imprint 24 (23):1-16.
    It is a commonplace that imagination is heterogeneous: we need to draw a series of cross-cutting distinctions even to begin any serious general discussion of the range of activities we take to be typical instances. The nature of the heterogeneity being exhibited is usually left unclear, however, and thus so are its consequences both for our understanding of imagination and for assessing certain challenges such as reductionism. Here it is argued that we can accept heterogeneity while recognizing important forms of (...)
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  28. Ryle and Sartre against Hume’s Theory of the Imagination.Andreas Vrahimis - 2024 - In Galit Wellner, Geoffrey Dierckxsens & Marco Arienti, The Philosophy of Imagination: Technology, Art and Ethics. London: Bloomsbury.
  29. Subsunción de la imaginación a la razón. La locura en Descartes y Bolívar Echeverría.Mario Edmundo Chávez Tortolero - 2023 - In Carlos Oliva Mendoza & Omar Anguiano, Modernidad barroca y capitalismo. Debates sobre la obra de Bolívar Echeverría. Volumen 1. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México- Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. pp. 171-185.
    En este texto se ofrece una interpretación de la crítica de la Modernidad de Bolívar Echeverría a partir de la noción de subsunción de la imaginación a la razón, y de un reflexión sobre la locura. Para dar significado a la noción mencionada se ofrece un breve estudio del uso del concepto de imaginación en Descartes y Kant. Para ofrecer la reflexión sobre la locura se recurre a las ideas de Foucault, Derrida y Echeverría sobre el asunto. Finalmente, se presenta (...)
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  30. Imagination, Fiction, and Perspectival Displacement.Justin D'Ambrosio & Daniel Stoljar - 2023 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 3.
    The verb 'imagine' admits of perspectival modification: we can imagine things from above, from a distant point of view, or from the point of view of a Russian. But in such cases, there need be no person, either real or imagined, who is above or distant from what is imagined, or who has the point of view of a Russian. We call this the puzzle of perspectival displacement. This paper sets out the puzzle, shows how it does not just concern (...)
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  31. Husserl on the Normativity of Intentionality and Its Neutralization.Di Huang - 2023 - Husserl Studies 39 (2):121-142.
    In this paper, I explore Husserl’s view on the normativity of intentionality and its neutralization. Husserl reaches his mature, normative-transcendental conception of intentionality by way of critical engagement with Brentano’s position. As opposed to Brentano, Husserl does not conceive of the normativity of intentionality as deriving from the more basic character of polar opposition. Normativity comes first and it is an original, though not universal determination of intentionality which is expressed in the identificatory achievement of constitution. Even where it is (...)
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  32. (1 other version)Do Imaginings have a Goal?Marcus Hunt - 2023 - Axiomathes: Global Philosophy 33 (1):1-17.
    The paper investigates whether imaginative states about propositions can be assessed in terms of fittingness (also known as correctness, appropriateness, aptness). After characterizing propositional imaginings and explaining the idea of fittingness, I present some considerations in favour of the no conditions view: imagining seems to be the sort of action that cannot be done unfittingly, and imaginings have no external cognitive nor conative goals in light of which they could be unfitting. I then examine the local conditions view, that there (...)
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  33. Why We Need Imagination.Amy Kind - 2023 - In Brian McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen, Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, 2nd edition. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 570-587.
    Traditionally, imagination has been considered to be a primitive mental state type (or group of types), irreducible to other mental state types. In particular, it has been thought to be distinct from other mental states such as belief, perception, and memory, among others. Recently, however, the category of imagination has come under attack, with challenges emerging from a multitude of different directions. Some philosophers have argued that we should not recognize belief and imagination as distinct states but rather on a (...)
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  34. (1 other version)On the Ambiguity of Imagery and Particularity of Imaginings.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2023 - Topoi:1-9.
    It is often observed that images—including mental images—are in some sense representationally ambiguous. Some, including Jerry Fodor, have added that mental images only come to have determinate contents through the contribution of non-imagistic representations that accompany them. This paper agrees that a kind of ambiguity holds with respect to mental imagery, while arguing (pace Fodor) that this does not prevent imagery from having determinate contents in the absence of other, non-imagistic representations. Specifically, I argue that mental images can represent determinate (...)
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  35. Desire, imagination, and the perceptual analogy.Kael McCormack - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):234-253.
    According to the guise of the good, a desire for P represents P as good in some respect. ‘Perceptualism’ further claims that desires involve an awareness of value analogous to perception. Perceptualism explains why desires justify actions and how desires can end the regress of practical justification. However, perception paradigmatically represents the actual environment, while desires paradigmatically represent prospective states. An experience E is an awareness of O when the nature of E depends on the nature of O. How could (...)
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  36. The Epistemic Structure of the Imagination.Joshua Myers - 2023 - Dissertation, New York University
    The imagination is ubiquitous in our cognitive lives. You might imagine rotating a puzzle piece to determine whether it fits in an open space, or imagine what things are like from another person's perspective to figure out how they are feeling, or imagine a new rug in your living room to determine whether it matches the color of your sofa. These examples are mundane, but they point to a deep philosophical puzzle: how could merely imagining something give you any reason (...)
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  37. Per cacciar la malinconia delle femine: immaginazione e malattia d’amore nel Decameron di Boccaccio.Marilena Panarelli - 2023 - Noctua 10 (1):135-160.
    The conceptions of lovesickness and of its remedies that emerge in the Decameron result from a medical tradition that in previous centuries was assimilated by the Latin culture. The case of the Decameron is particularly interesting because this work was composed during the Black Death epidemic, between 1348 and 1354. Boccaccio’s Decameron seems to be situated in a tension between two diseases: the black plague, from which the brigata tries to escape, and lovesickness. It is quite significant that Boccaccio dedicated (...)
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  38. Imagination as a process.Nicholas Wiltsher - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (2):434-454.
    According to recent orthodoxy, imagination is best characterised in terms of distinctive imaginative states. But this view is ill-suited to characterisation of the full range of imaginative activities—creation, fantasy, conceiving, and so on. It would be better to characterise imagination in terms of a distinctive imaginative process, with the various imaginative activities as more determinate implementations of the determinable process.
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  39. Phenomenology of Phantasy and Emotion.Thiemo Breyer, Marco Cavallaro & Rodrigo Sandoval (eds.) - 2022 - Darmstadt: WBG.
  40. Memory, Imagination, and Skill.Amy Kind - 2022 - In Anja Berninger & Íngrid Vendrell Ferran, Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 193-2011.
    Among the many commonalities between memory and imagination is the fact that they can both be understood as skills. In this chapter, I aim to draw out some connections between the skill of memory and the skill of imagination in an effort to learn something about the nature of these activities and the connection between them. I start by considering the ways that one might work to cultivate these skills in the hope that we could learn something about imagination training (...)
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  41. Secret charades: reply to Hutto.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1183-1187.
    In reply to Daniel Hutto’s “Getting Real About Pretense,“ I defend my theory of pretense against his claim that it is subject to counterexamples by clarifying wherein the value of the analysis lies. Then I argue that the central challenge still facing Hutto’s “primacy of practice” approach, as well as other 4E approaches to pretense, is to explain the link between pretense and deception.
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  42. Adaptive Imagination: Toward a Mythopoetic Cognitive Science.Stephen Asma - 2021 - Evolutionary Studies in Imaginative Culture 5 (2):1-32.
    A mythopoetic paradigm or perspective sees the world primarily as a dramatic story of competing personal intentions, rather than a system of objective impersonal laws. Asma argued that our contemporary imaginative cognition is evolutionarily conserved-it has structural and functional similarities to premodern Homo sapiens’s cognition. This article will outline the essential features of mythopoetic cognition or adaptive imagination, delineate the adaptive sociocultural advantages of mythopoetic cognition, explain the phylogenetic and ontogenetic mechanisms that give rise to human mythopoetic mind, show how (...)
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  43. Imagination is the Sixth Sense (phantasia).Stephen Asma & Paul Giamatti - 2021 - Aeon.
    Actor Paul Giamatti and philosopher Stephen Asma collaborate to describe the imagination (phantasia) as a form of embodied cognition. They explore the actor's ability to replicate embodied affective states and communicate those to audiences that are capable of catching (via emotional contagion) those affective states. The role of social affordances in imaginative work is explored. Finally, the role of imagination in political conspiracy thinking is considered.
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  44. Belief-Like Imagining and Correctness.Alon Chasid - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):147-160.
    This paper explores the sense in which correctness applies to belief-like imaginings. It begins by establishing that when we imagine, we ‘direct’ our imaginings at a certain imaginary world, taking the propositions we imagine to be assessed for truth in that world. It then examines the relation between belief-like imagining and positing truths in an imaginary world. Rejecting the claim that correctness, in the literal sense, is applicable to imaginings, it shows that the imaginer takes on, vis-à-vis the imaginary world, (...)
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  45. Not by Imaginings Alone: On How Imaginary Worlds Are Established.Alon Chasid - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (2):195-212.
    This article explores the relation between belief-like imaginings and the establishment of imaginary worlds (often called fictional worlds). After outlining the various assumptions my argument is premised on, I argue that belief-like imaginings, in themselves, do not render their content true in the imaginary world to which they pertain. I show that this claim applies not only to imaginative projects in which we are instructed or intend to imagine certain propositions, but also to spontaneous imaginative projects. After arguing that, like (...)
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  46. What Sort of Imagining Might Remembering Be?Peter Langland-Hassan - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (2):231-251.
    This essay unites current philosophical thinking on imagination with a burgeoning debate in the philosophy of memory over whether episodic remembering is simply a kind of imagining. So far, this debate has been hampered by a lack of clarity in the notion of imagining at issue. Several options are considered and constructive imagining is identified as the relevant kind. Next, a functionalist account of episodic remembering is defended as a means to establishing two key points: first, one need not defend (...)
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  47. Two irreducible classes of emotional experiences: Affective imaginings and affective perceptions.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):307-325.
  48. Attitudes and the (dis)continuity between memory and imagination.André Sant'Anna - 2021 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 64:73-93.
    The current dispute between causalists and simulationists in philosophy of memory has led to opposing attempts to characterize the relationship between memory and imagination. In a recent overview of this debate, Perrin and Michaelian have suggested that the dispute over the continuity between memory and imagination boils down to the question of whether a causal connection to a past event is necessary for remembering. By developing an argument based on an analogy to perception, I argue that this dispute should instead (...)
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  49. Imagination, expectation, and “thoughts entangled in metaphors”.Nathanael Stein - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9411-9431.
    George Eliot strikingly describes one of her characters as making a mistake because he has gotten his thoughts “entangled in metaphors,” saying that we all do the same. I argue that Eliot is here giving us more than an illuminating description, but drawing our attention to a distinctive kind of mistake—a form of irrationality, in fact—of which metaphor can be an ineliminable part of the correct explanation. Her fictional case helps illuminate both a neglected function of the imagination, and a (...)
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  50. (1 other version)Arnon Levy, Peter Godfrey-Smith (Eds.): The Scientific Imagination: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives: Oxford University Press: Oxford 2020, 344 pp., £55.00 (hardcover), ISBN 9780190212308. [REVIEW]Michael T. Stuart - 2021 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 52 (3):493-499.
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