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Devoid Elites
[edit]Devoid elites is a sociological term introduced by Prof. Dr. Michael Gerlich to describe a category of elites who, despite occupying positions of authority, lack substantive decision-making power. These individuals serve symbolic roles within broader power structures, providing legitimacy to dominant factions while having minimal autonomy or real influence. This concept has been particularly applied to analyse authoritarian regimes, transitional democracies, and fragile states. Devoid elites often contribute to the appearance of inclusivity in governance while enabling hyper-concentration of power among a few dominant figures.
Origins and Conceptual Framework
[edit]The term "devoid elites" emerged from Michael Gerlich’s analysis of post-Soviet political structures, particularly in Azerbaijan. Gerlich built on the framework established by Higley and Burton (2006) regarding elite configurations and the informal network theories of Janine Wedel (2017). He examined how peripheral elites often lack substantive decision-making roles and function instead as symbolic participants, consolidating the legitimacy of hyperagents, or highly centralised power-holders.[1]
About Prof. Dr. Michael Gerlich
[edit]Prof. Dr. Michael Gerlich is the Head of the Centre for Strategic Corporate Foresight and Sustainability at SBS Swiss Business School in Kloten, Switzerland. His doctoral dissertation, completed at ARU Cambridge focused on The Power and Elites in Post-Soviet Societies. He holds as well a MBA from Cambridge University. Prof. Dr. Gerlich lectures at SBS Swiss Business School, the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and ARU Cambridge, where his teaching and research cover elite theory, foresight methodologies, and power dynamics in transitional democracies.[2]
Theoretical Foundations
[edit]Imposed Unity Elites: A New Elite Configuration
[edit]Devoid elites fit best into the **“imposed unity elites”** configuration proposed by Gerlich. This new framework better explains the behaviour and organisation of systems with extensive devoid elites. Unlike consensually united or ideologically united elites, imposed unity elites are characterised by a superficial unity that lacks ideological cohesion or shared goals.
This elite configuration arises when centralised power structures impose the appearance of cooperation and harmony among elites, despite underlying fragmentation or dissent. Publicly, imposed unity elites appear united, but their relationships are marked by distrust and coercion. Devoid elites play a critical role in sustaining this system, serving as public representatives who legitimise the dominant faction's authority while lacking substantive influence.[1]
This concept challenges Higley and Burton's (2006) framework by introducing a configuration that exists in systems where elites are coerced into unity, making imposed unity elites a hallmark of fragile democracies and authoritarian regimes.
Higley and Burton's Framework of Elite Configurations
[edit]Higley and Burton (2006) categorised elites into three main configurations based on their cohesion and the nature of their interactions:
- Consensually United Elites: These elites work together to maintain democratic norms and political stability. While factions may compete for influence, their actions respect institutional rules. Examples include post-war Western European democracies.[3]
- Ideologically United Elites: Bound by a common ideology, these elites typically operate in authoritarian regimes, using shared values to suppress dissent and centralise power.[4]
- Disunited Elites: Characterised by rivalry and fragmentation, disunited elites undermine governance, creating fertile ground for authoritarian leaders to consolidate power.[5]
The **imposed unity elites** framework complements these configurations by addressing contexts where elites lack ideological alignment but appear united due to coercive pressures from dominant factions.[1]
Wedel’s Concepts of Informal Power Networks
[edit]Janine Wedel’s (2017) research focuses on how informal networks shape elite interactions in transitional democracies and authoritarian regimes:
- Clans and Hyperagents: Dominant figures within informal networks consolidate power, marginalising peripheral elites.[6]
- Flexians: Individuals who navigate between public and private sectors, often exploiting symbolic roles. Devoid elites often function as symbolic flexians.[7]
- Narrative Control: Hyperagents create narratives that justify their dominance, with devoid elites playing roles that reinforce these stories.
Case Studies
[edit]Azerbaijan
[edit]Azerbaijan’s post-Soviet political landscape illustrates the dynamics of devoid elites in clientelist systems. Dominant elites consolidate power while relegating others to symbolic roles, limiting institutional checks and balances.[1]
Turkey
[edit]In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s authoritarian consolidation involved the replacement of independent elites with loyalist devoid elites, maintaining a facade of pluralism while concentrating power.[8]
Hungary
[edit]Under Viktor Orbán, Hungary demonstrates the use of devoid elites to undermine democratic institutions. Loyalists occupy positions of influence without real authority, enabling Orbán to consolidate control.[9]
United States
[edit]The Trump administration saw the rise of devoid elites who lacked decision-making power but served to legitimise its policies. This mirrors trends in authoritarian and transitional democracies.[2]
Broader Applications
[edit]Similar dynamics of devoid elites can be observed in Poland, Brazil, and India, where dominant factions use peripheral elites to consolidate their power and create a veneer of inclusivity.[10][11][12]
Criticism and Debate
[edit]One could argue that the concept of devoid elites might oversimplify complex elite dynamics. While Gerlich’s framework provides valuable insights, critics might highlight the need for further empirical validation and application to diverse political systems.[13][14][15]
References
[edit]- ^ a b c d Gerlich, M. (2023). "Devoid Elites and the Need for a New Elite Configuration: An Analysis of Post-Soviet Societies on the Example of Azerbaijan." Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies, 10(4), 13–42. https://doi.org/10.29333/ejecs/1616
- ^ a b Gerlich, M. (2024). "U.S. Elite Fragmentation and Global Instability: Navigating the Road to Autocracy in the 21st Century." Open Journal of Social Sciences, 12(11), 352–363. https://doi.org/10.4236/jss.2024.1211025
- ^ Higley, J., & Burton, M. (2006). Elite Configurations and Political Stability in Democracies. Rowman & Littlefield.
- ^ Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2018). How Democracies Die. Crown.
- ^ Diamond, L. (2020). "Facing up to the Democratic Recession." Journal of Democracy, 31, 101–113.
- ^ Wedel, J. R. (2017). "Clans, Clout, and the Informal Networks of Power in Post-Soviet Societies." Anthropological Quarterly, 90(4), 945–968.
- ^ Magyar, B. (2016). Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary. CEU Press.
- ^ Esen, B., & Gumuscu, S. (2016). "Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey." Third World Quarterly, 37, 1581–1606. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1135732
- ^ Körösényi, A. (2020). "The Orbán Regime: Plebiscitary Leader Democracy in the Making." Politics in Central Europe, 16, 123–137.
- ^ Bogaards, M. (2021). "De-Democratization in Hungary: Diffusion and Domestic Drivers." Democratization, 28, 527–546.
- ^ Zakaria, F. (2021). "Populism and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy." Foreign Affairs, 100(2), 44–56.
- ^ Mounk, Y. (2022). "The Threat of Populism to Liberal Democracy." Journal of Democracy, 33(2), 34–47. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2022.0016
- ^ Mills, C. W. (1956). The Power Elite. Oxford University Press.
- ^ Kroese, D. P., Taimre, T., & Botev, Z. I. (2011). Handbook of Monte Carlo Methods. Wiley.
- ^ Curtis, S., Jones, C., & Norman, P. (2021). "Elite Cohesion and Stability in Democratic Transitions." Political Science Quarterly, 136(3), 519–540.