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1892

[edit]

I’m not satisfied with the introduction of the section. What’s written there is imprecise. However, it seems I can’t phrase it more precisely without contradicting the reconstruction found in most reliable sources.

The standard account of the events of 1892 is that

and this was the reason for the British veto.

The basis for this account appears to be Cromer himself:

It has been already statet that, save in respect ot one point, the Firman of 1892 was a reproduction of that of 1879. It will be as well to allude briefly to the exception.
The Firman of 1879 laid down that the Khedivate of Egypt was to be 'tel qu'il se trouve formé par ses anciennes limites et en comprenant les territoires qui y ont été annexés.' When the Firman of 1892 was in course of preparation, the British Ambassador at Constantinople was assured that it was identic with that of 1879. There was, however, reason to believe that this statement was incorrect. The Port had always been sensitive as regards European interference in or near the Hejdaz. [...] The result was that the Firman laid down the Egyptian frontier as drawn from Suez to El-Arish. The Peninsula of Sinai, which had been administered by the Khedives of Egypt for the last forty years, would thus have reverted to Turkey. [...] When, therefore, the Firman arrived, the British Government interposed and placed a veto on its promulgation. After a short delay, the Grand Vizier telegraphed ot the Khedive accepting a proposal, which had been offered to the Sultan some weeks previously, but which His Imperial Majesty had then refused to entertain. Under this arrangement, the frontier of Egypt was drawn from El-Arish to the head of the Gulf of Akaba.

This interpretation was also widely reported in newspapers in 1892: under the influence of the French and Russians, the Sultan allegedly intended, through "trickery," to strip the Egyptians of the Sinai: 1, 2, 3, 4 = 5, 6, 7, 8, 9

However, in reality, the Sinai had never been mentioned in any Firman. Bloomfield presents it more accurately: in the Firmans of 1841 and 1892, territories east of the Jifâr region were explicitly excluded from Egyptian territory by reference to the 1841 map. In the two Firmans preceding 1892, other territories were simply not mentioned, and thus the new element in the 1892 Firman was merely the renewed explicit reference to the borders defined in 1841 (the earlier firmans can be found here, and the 1892 firman here). Therefore, the new Firman did not actually alter the territorial status of the Sinai; Cromer’s account is completely "misleading" (Warburg 1979, p. 682). It is not the case that the 1892 firman altered the status quo of the Sinai Peninsula; rather, it reaffirmed the existing status quo – as did the telegram: "When, following British pressure, the Ottoman grand vizier sent a telegram to the Khedive recognizing the continued Egyptian administration in the interior of Sinai, he emphasized that this was not a new frontier, but a continuation of the administrative status quo." (ibid.); FBI 1985, p. 16: "[...] Mukhtar Pasha spoke with the Egyptian minister of foreign affairs and told him that the statement, 'The status [quo] of the Sinai Peninsula will remain unchanged,' which was mentioned in the grand vizier's telegram of 8 April 1892, meant that Sinai was an annexed province, that it is the property of the sultan and that it is quite distinct from Egypt's other territories."

It is clear and widely agreed upon that Cromer's telegram was a violent misinterpretation of the Ottoman telegram. However, only Bloomfield and Warburg seem to have adequately explained what the firman and Ottoman telegram originally signified, and thus, what it was that Cromer ultimately misinterpreted. However, neither of them explicitly challenges the mainstream narrative, which is why I cannot present it as a conflicting interpretation or even as a more plausible one. Therefore, I described it as imprecisely as it is on the article page.

I would also like to point out that there exists a small third line of interpretation: Biger, and earlier Stuhlmann 1916, p. 27, do not address the alternative phrasing of the firman at all, instead attributing the background of the 1892 crisis solely to the British withdrawal from the Midian forts. Biger, for instance, merely writes that "the British did not want to see Ottoman control over the [Suez] canal" (p. 29), and:

The discussion regarding the reconfirmation of the dynasty's rule renewed the engagement in the Egyptian control points in Sinai and Hijaz. The possession of the Hijaz forts was viewed as unnecessary, and the Egyptians returned them to Ottoman hands in 1892. The town of Aqaba was returned as well, and it was now governed from Hijaz. [...] This is why the British consul in Cairo, Evelyn Baring – later Lord Cromer – launched a series of military and diplomatic actions to achieve an official separation of the Ottomans from the canal. (p. 29f.)

After that, he moves directly to describing Cromer's misinterpretation of the Ottoman telegram.

A strong argument against this reconstruction is that contemporary newspapers make it abundantly clear that the critical issue was the phrasing of the firman; there are hundreds of articles on this topic. However, none of the historians have referenced these articles, which classifies this argument as original research. For this reason, I chose simply not to mention Biger's and Stuhlmacher's interpretation. I’m not fully satisfied with this approach either. DaWalda (talk) 12:35, 6 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

Alternative version

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I have nonetheless drafted an alternative version, but I believe that, for Wikipedia, Warburg and Bloomfield's criticism is overly emphasized here to the detriment of the mainstream narrative:

Stage 1 was a dispute over the wording and interpretation of a new investiture Firman around 1892. The origins of this conflict are somewhat unclear. What is known is that in 1891, the Sultan took initial steps to stabilize Bedouin territory in the Negev by attempting his first and only structured land registrations there.[1] In the following year, Egyptian forces were required to withdraw from pilgrimage forts at Aqaba and a few forts further southeast, which were then taken over by Ottoman forces.[2] Additionally, a small group of early Zionists, led by Paul Friedmann and with the consent of British occupation authorities,[3] attempted in the same year to establish a Jewish state called "Midian" in this area,[4][nb 1] although European settlement there was prohibited by Ottoman law.[8] Finally, it is known that shortly after the withdrawal of Egyptian troops from Midian, the Khedive of Egypt, Tewfik Pasha, passed away, and his successor, Abbas Helmy II, required confirmation in office through a new Ottoman Firman. Contemporary newspapers[9] and later Lord Cromer, the British Consul General in Cairo,[10] reported that the British had previously suggested to the Sultan that the Sinai Peninsula be formally incorporated into Egypt.

How these three events — the Ottoman expansion southward, the Zionist colonization attempt, and the attempted influence on the Ottoman territorial order — were connected to the following is unclear. Cromer claimed that the Sultan's annoyance over Friedmann’s endeavor was the trigger; however, Warburg considers Cromer’s account — particularly in this respect — to be misleading.[11] In any case, the Firman was subsequently worded differently from the previous investiture Firman of 1879. This became known in advance, prompting the designated Khedive to delay the public reading of the Firman. English-language newspapers then widely condemned what they saw as the Sultan’s alleged "trickery" to strip Egypt — and, by extension, Britain — of the Sinai Peninsula.[12][13][14][15]

Most historians[16][17][2][18] follow Cromer's account:[19] Cromer claimed that the Sultan omitted a passage from the 1879 Firman, thereby implicitly suggesting that the Sinai should revert to Ottoman administration. However, under British pressure, the Sultan subsequently clarified in a telegram that Egypt was now, after all, to continue administering the Sinai:

Your highness is well aware that His Majesty the Sultan had ordered the positioning of Egyptian policemen that will secure the pilgrimage in El-Waja, Muwalla, Daba and Aqaba, and in a few other places on the coast of Sinai, in the past. All of these points are absent from the map that marked Egypt's boundaries, which was given to Muhammad Ali. El-Waja was already returned to the province of Hijaz, and the other three points were added to it recently. The status quo in the Sinai Peninsula will prevail, and it will be governed by the [Khedive] just as has been governed in the days of your father and your grandfather.[20]

In this respect as well, Cromer's account is misleading. No prior Firman had ever mentioned the Sinai; rather, the 1841 Firman, with its attached map, had made it clear that the Sinai lay outside Egyptian territory.[21] The main difference between the 1879 Firman[22] and the 1892 Firman[23] was that the latter once again explicitly referenced the borders defined on the 1841 map, reiterated in the clarifying telegram, which further specified the Khedives' "governing role" as a mandate to station policemen, rather than a territorial claim.

Cromer chose to disregard this[24] and responded with a telegram of his own,[25] focusing instead on "maintaining the status quo," which he interpreted as a formal “definition of boundaries.”[26] He thereby declared Egypt’s territory as “bounded to the east by a line running in a south-easterly direction from a point a short distance to the east of El Arish, [...] to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba.”[27]

Thereafter, British-produced maps even excluded the head of the Gulf of Aqaba from Ottoman territory, marking everything southwest of this defined line as "Egyptian." While the Ottomans did not initially respond to this telegram in 1892, it was officially rejected only in 1906.[28][29] Consequently, Cromer's telegram is sometimes regarded as a British–Ottoman "agreement,"[30][31] while others view it as merely a "unilateral declaration" unaccepted by the Ottomans,[32][33] or as a misinterpretation on the British side.[34][35]

  1. ^ This endeavor was motivated by the fact that Jewish immigration to and land purchases in central Palestine had been prohibited by Ottoman law since 1882.[5] This prohibition was partially influenced by Britain’s involvement in Palestine since the 1840s, when it assumed the role of protector of Jews seeking to immigrate there.[6][7]
  1. ^ Amara, Ahmad (2016). Governing Property: The Politics of Ottoman Land Law and State-Making in Southern Palestine, 1850-1917 (Thesis). New York University. pp. 128 f. ProQuest 1820076414.
  2. ^ a b Khalidi, Rashid I. (1980). British Policy towards Syria & Palestine 1906–1914: A Study of the Antecedents of the Hussein – McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes – Picot Agreement, and the Balfour Declaration. The Middle East Centre. p. 16.
  3. ^ Foreign Broadcast Information Service (1985). Near East/South Asia Report: Egypt: Historical Roots of the Taba Problem (PDF). p. 6.
  4. ^ See Schoeps, Julius H. (2023). Vom Selbstverständnis und den Befindlichkeiten deutscher Juden. Georg Olms Verlag. pp. 170–196.
  5. ^ Barin, Büşra (2014). The Ottoman Policy towards Jewish Immigration and Settlement in Palestine: 1882–1920 (PDF) (Dissertation). p. 35.
  6. ^ Barin, Büşra (2014). The Ottoman Policy towards Jewish Immigration and Settlement in Palestine: 1882–1920 (PDF) (Dissertation). pp. 32 f.
  7. ^ Caquet, P.E. (2016). The Orient, the Liberal Movement, and the Eastern Crisis of 1839–41 (PDF). Palgrave Macmillan. p. 167.
  8. ^ Cromer, Earl of (1916). Modern Egypt. Vol. II. The Macmillan Company. p. 267.
  9. ^ "The Khedive is said to have approached the powers with a request to officially appeal to the Sultan for the inclusion of the Sinai Peninsula within Egyptian territory." – Translated after "W.T." Hamburgischer Correspondent. 1892-04-07. Retrieved 2024-11-06.: "Der Khedive soll sich an die Mächte mit dem Ersuchen gewendet haben, sich bei dem Sultan für die Einbegreifung der Halbinsel Sinai in das ägyptische Territorium in offiziöser Weise zu verwenden."
  10. ^ Cromer, Earl of (1916). Modern Egypt. Vol. II. The Macmillan Company. p. 268–269.
  11. ^ Warburg, Gabriel R. (1979). "The Sinai Peninsula Borders, 1906–47". Journal of Contemporary History. 14 (4): 682. doi:10.1177/002200947901400406.
  12. ^ "General Summary". Home News for India, China and the Colonies. 1892-04-08.: "It is known, however, that the firman goes beyond what is sanctioned by usage, inasmuch as it raises the question of the boundary of the eastern portion of the Khedive's dominions. [...] However, the measure now taken of postponing the reading of the firman is calculated to defeat this piece of Turkish finesse."
  13. ^ "Summary of To-Day's News". Western Morning News. 1892-04-09.: "So his Imperial Majesty has sent a Firman to Cairo which [Lord Cromer] will not allow to be read. This is exactly what the Sultan always does. [...] What he now seeks to do is to limit the territories of the Khedive. [...] We want to work with him, and to enforce his authority. But we cannot fight against trickery, and the secret Firman, which is still unread, is the consequence of a trick."
  14. ^ "The Sultan's Firman". London Standard. 1892-04-11.: "Surprise was sprung upon the Ambassadors only when the Firman was at Cairo, and it was found that Egypt was shorn of the whole of the Peninsula of Sinai. The tone of Lord Salisbury's despatches to Sir Clare Ford plainly shewed that he would submit to no trickery of this sort."
  15. ^ "The Sultan's Firman". Melbourne Age Newspaper Archives. 1892-04-12.: "The allied powers are supporting the demand of the Marquis of Salisbury that the boundaries of Egypt should remain unchanged, and include the peninsula of Sinai. The allied powers are against permitting the Porte to alter the boundaries by trickery."
  16. ^ Kishtainy, Khalid (1970). Whither Israel? A Study of Zionist Expansionism. p. 17.
  17. ^ United Nations (1988). Reports of International Arbitral Awards: Case concerning the location of boundary markers in Taba between Egypt and Israel (PDF). p. 15.
  18. ^ Lewis, Bernard (1993). Islam in History. Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East. p. 160.
  19. ^ Cromer, Earl of (1916). Modern Egypt. Vol. II. The Macmillan Company. p. 268.
  20. ^ Apud Biger, Gideon (2004). The Boundaries of Modern Palestine, 1840–1947. Routledge. p. 30. ISBN 978-1-135-76652-8.
  21. ^ Bloomfield, Louis M. (1957). Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba in International Law. The Carswell Company. p. 112.
  22. ^ "Firman octroyé à S. A. Méhémet Thewfik pacha". Digithèque de matériaux juridiques et politiques. 1879-08-07. Retrieved 2024-11-07.
  23. ^ apud Stuhlmann, Franz (1916). Der Kampf um Arabien zwischen der Türkei und England. G. Westermann. p. 3*.
  24. ^ Warburg, Gabriel R. (1979). "The Sinai Peninsula Borders, 1906–47". Journal of Contemporary History. 14 (4): 682. doi:10.1177/002200947901400406.: "Cromer preferred to overlook the fact that the Suez-El-Arish line was the boundary laid down in the 1841 firman and restated in subsequent firmans, while the de facto administration [sic] of large sections of the peninsula had never been recognized as constituting a new boundary and was granted only as a security measure for the Egyptian pilgrimage to Mecca. When, following British pressure, the Ottoman grand vizier sent a telegram to the Khedive recognizing the continued Egyptian administration in the interior of Sinai, he emphasized that this was not a new frontier, but a continuation of the administrative status quo."
  25. ^ apud Stuhlmann, Franz (1916). Der Kampf um Arabien zwischen der Türkei und England. G. Westermann. p. 5*.
  26. ^ Suzanne N., Lalonde (2002). Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World. The Role of Uti Possidetis. McGill-Queen's University Press. p. 80. ISBN 978-0-773-52424-8.
  27. ^ United Nations (1988). Reports of International Arbitral Awards: Case concerning the location of boundary markers in Taba between Egypt and Israel (PDF). p. 14.
  28. ^ On 1906, cf. Bloomfield, Louis M. (1957). Egypt, Israel and the Gulf of Aqaba in International Law. The Carswell Company. p. 121.: "The Grand Vizier, in replying to the Khedive, maintained that the Gulf of Aqaba and the Sinai Peninsula were outside the territory mentioned in the Imperial Firman; that the [Sultan's] telegram of April 8th, 1892, only referred to the western side of the Sinai Peninsula; and that the interpretation of that telegram was a matter which was of concern only to the Ottoman Government."
  29. ^ On 1906, cf. also Foreign Broadcast Information Service (1985). Near East/South Asia Report: Egypt: Historical Roots of the Taba Problem (PDF). p. 14.: "[...] Mukhtar Pasha spoke with the Egyptian minister of foreign affairs and told him that the statement, 'The status [quo] of the Sinai Peninsula will remain unchanged,' which was mentioned in the grand vizier's telegram of 8 April 1892, meant that Sinai was an annexed province, that it is the property of the sultan and that it is quite distinct from Egypt's other territories."
  30. ^ E.g. Gooch, John (1974). The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c. 1900–1906. Routledge. p. 249.: "According to the terms of an agreement between the Khedive and the Sultan in 1892 it [= the Sinai Peninsula] lay under Egyptian jurisdiction."
  31. ^ E.g. Eliav, Mordechai (1997). Britain and the Holy Land, 1838–1914: Selected Documents from the British Consulate in Jerusalem. Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Press, The Magnes Press. p. 301 note 3.: "When Lord Cromer intervened in the dispute, the Turkish government was compelled to agree that the entire Sinai Peninsula would be administratively annexed to Egypt, albeit while remaining under Ottoman sovereignty."
  32. ^ E.g. CIA (1956). Intelligence Memorandum CIA/RR–GM–1: Frontiers in Sinai (PDF) (Report). p. 2.: "Most maps printed before 1892 showed the frontier beginning at Al 'Arish. In 1892, Britain's Lord Cromer modified Egypt's frontiers arbitrarily. He did not establish a formal boundary but instead confined himself to eliminating Turkish rule in Sinai. He published his interpretation of the boundary as being a line running just east of Al 'Arish on the Mediterranean to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. Turkey neither assented to nor rejected Lord Cromer's unilateral declaration."
  33. ^ Similarly, Khalidi, Rashid I. (1980). British Policy towards Syria & Palestine 1906–1914: A Study of the Antecedents of the Hussein – McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes – Picot Agreement, and the Balfour Declaration. The Middle East Centre. pp. 36–37. ISBN 978-0-903729-57-4.
  34. ^ E.g. Hirszowicz, L. (1972). "The Sultan and the Khedive, 1892–1908". Middle Eastern Studies. 8 (3): 297. doi:10.1080/00263207208700212.: "At that the matter rested in 1892. The Turkish government neither agreed nor voiced disagreement with Cromer's interpretation."
  35. ^ Warburg, Gabriel R. (1979). "The Sinai Peninsula Borders, 1906–47". Journal of Contemporary History. 14 (4): 682. doi:10.1177/002200947901400406.: "Cromer's claim that the Sultan thereby recognized the line leading from El-Arish to Aqaba as the Turco-Egyptian Frontier, had no foundation whatsoever. But Cromer's misinterpretation of the 1892 firman and of the grand vizier's explanatory telegram, served from then onwards as a basis for British claims in the Sinai."

DaWalda (talk) 01:36, 7 November 2024 (UTC)[reply]

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