Wikipedia

Ultraconservatism

Ultraconservatism refers to extreme conservative views in politics or religious practice.[1] In modern politics, ultraconservative usually refers to conservatives of the far-right on the political spectrum, comprising groups or individuals who are located to the right of those willing to temporarily agree with political moderates, and continuing further right to include fringe parties.[2]

Elements of ultraconservatism typically rely on cultural crisis; they frequently support anti-globalism – adopting stances of anti-immigration, nationalism, and sovereignty – use populism and political polarization, with in-group and out-group practices.[3][4][5][6] The primary economic ideology for most ultraconservatives is neoliberalism.[6] The use of conspiracy theories is also common amongst ultraconservatives.[4]

History by country

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Americas

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Brazil

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See also: Conservatism in Brazil

President Jair Bolsonaro was described as an ultraconservative during his tenure, often aligning his views with President Donald Trump.[5][7] Upon taking office, Bolsonaro nominated ultraconservative Damares Alves to head the Ministry of Human Rights and Citizenship.[7][8] His government would go on to be headed by elites who broadened extractivist activities in the Amazon rainforest, while having confrontations with the indigenous peoples in Brazil.[9]

United States

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See also: Conservatism in the United States

In the United States, ultraconservatism first appeared when right-wing politicians and businesses led the opposition to the New Deal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.[4] Beginning in the 1960s, during the Cold War, ultraconservatism began to rise to prominence, especially with the radical right organization, the John Birch Society.[10][11][12][13] At this time, ultraconservatives were anticommunist, and opposed to the civil rights movement, trade unions, and social programs.[10][11] Members of the John Birch Society believed that the civil rights movement would lead to the creation of a Soviet Negro Republic in the Southern United States.[11][12][14] In 1961, Jacob Javits would say that ultraconservatism "represents a danger to the Republican Party", as it was "moving the party farther to the right ... [which] would transform the Republican Party into a fringe party".[15] Beginning in the 1970s, ultraconservatives attempted to establish their principles into the government and culture of the United States, with the use of think tanks, political action committees, and lobbyists.[6] These groups were typically supported by wealthy individuals, including the Koch brothers, the families of Richard and Dick DeVos, the Walton family, and Richard Mellon Scaife.[6] Ultraconservatives would then "mark some groups, seemingly based on race, class, and immigration status", in an effort to polarize the public, saying that some groups were "parasitic" to the economy and took away resources from wealthy individuals who could improve the economy.[6]

Into the 21st century, the Second New Right, specifically during the tenure of George W. Bush, became more ultraconservative, with some elements of neofascism, adopting views supporting strict law and order, the defense of private property, and using nationalism to describe a mythical "past national glory".[16] Following the election of Barack Obama in 2008, ultraconservatives made alarmist statements about the United States debt ceiling, calling for cuts to social spending.[6] During the Obama administration, ultraconservatives would organize Americans into the Tea Party movement, and disseminate a message of "taking back our country" from Obama and creating the birther movement.[6]

Asia

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China

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See also: Carl Schmitt § China

During Xi Jinping's leadership, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has become more closely related to ultraconservative,[17] ultranationalist,[18][19] and is referred by some as having Han-centric elements.[20][21] Some of the CCP's politics are parallel to ideas by German ultraconservative Carl Schmitt.[22] The Beijing Daily is a mainland Chinese newspaper, referred to by some as "ultraconservative".[23]

Hong Kong

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See also: Conservatism in Hong Kong and Pro-Beijing camp (Hong Kong) § Pro-Beijing radicals

Hong Kong's shrinking autonomy and democratic backsliding are linked to the Xi Jinping's rule.[17] Some hardline pro-Beijing conservatives in Hong Kong have been referred to by critics as "ultraconservative".[24][25][26]

Japan

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See also: Conservatism in Japan

Japan's far-right nationalist organization Nippon Kaigi, has been described as "reactionary"[27] or "ultraconservative"[28][29][30] due to its support for the constitutional amendment of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, defense of the Empire of Japan, and denial of Japanese war crimes. Since 2006, all Japanese prime ministers from the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have been affiliated with the Nippon Kaigi.[31] Fumio Kishida, who is currently the prime minister of Japan, is also a member of Nippon Kaigi.

Japan's former prime minister Shinzo Abe, was often described as "ultraconservative" because he supported socially conservative and strong Japanese nationalist policies.[32][33] Bryan Mark Rigg referred to the LDP itself as "ultraconservative".[34]

Europe

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Ultraconservative has occasionally been used interchangeably with fascism, ultranationalism, and right-wing populism when describing the radical right in Europe.[35]

France

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The Ultra-royalists were an ultra-conservative faction from 1815 to 1830 under the Bourbon Restoration in France.[36] An Ultra was usually a member of the nobility of high society who strongly supported Roman Catholicism as the state and only legal religion of France, the Bourbon monarchy,[37] traditional hierarchy between classes and census suffrage against popular will and the interests of the bourgeoisie and their liberal and democratic tendencies.[38]

Action Française is a French ultraconservative monarchist political movement.[39] Its ideology was dominated by the precepts of Charles Maurras, following his adherence and his conversion of the movement's founders to royalism.[40] The movement supported a restoration of the House of Bourbon and, after the 1905 law on the separation of Church and State, the restoration of Roman Catholicism as the state religion—all as rallying points in distinction to the Third Republic of France which was considered corrupt and atheistic by many of its opponents.[41]

Germany

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See also: Conservatism in Germany

The Conservative Revolution (German: Konservative Revolution) was an ultraconservative movement in Germany prominent during the Weimar Republic—between World War I and the Nazi seizure of power—with intellectual exponents such as Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, and Ernst Jünger.[42] Plunged into what historian Fritz Stern has named a deep "cultural despair," uprooted as they felt within the rationalism and scientism of the modern world, theorists of the Conservative Revolution drew inspiration from various elements of the 19th century, including Friedrich Nietzsche's contempt for Christian ethics, democracy and egalitarianism;[43] the anti-modern and anti-rationalist tendencies of German Romanticism;[44] the vision of an organic and naturally-organized folk community cultivated by the Völkisch movement; the Prussian tradition of militaristic and authoritarian nationalism; and their own experience of comradeship and irrational violence on the front lines of World War I.[45] From the 1960–1970s onwards, the Conservative Revolution has largely influenced the European New Right, in particular the French Nouvelle Droite and the German Neue Rechte.[46][47][48]

Hungary

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In its first years, Jobbik held ultraconservative stances, promoting anti-communism and anti-globalism as some of its core tenets, though it became more successful as its views became more moderate.[49]

References

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  1. ^ Stevenson, Angus; Lindberg, Christine A., eds. (2015). "Ultraconservative". New Oxford American Dictionary (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acref/9780195392883.001.0001. ISBN 9780199891535.
  2. ^ Huntington 2021, p. 4, Ultraconservatives occupy a broad section of the right-wing continuum, wedged between conservative pragmatists, those willing to moderate their views and work with the political center, and fringe extremists. ... When viewed in this light, the far right shifts from the periphery to the core of the conservative typology..
  3. ^ Barreiros, Mencía Montoya (January 10, 2023). "¿Qué es el neoconservadurismo?". El Orden Mundial (in Spanish). Retrieved April 29, 2023.
  4. ^ a b c Huntington 2021, p. 4.
  5. ^ a b De Sá Guimarães, Feliciano; De Oliveira E Silva, Irma Dutra (March 2021). "Far-right populism and foreign policy identity: Jair Bolsonaro's ultra-conservatism and the new politics of alignment". International Affairs. 97 (2). Oxford University Press: 345–346. doi:10.1093/ia/iiaa220. ultraconservative governments. This deep conservative identity-set emphasizes three interrelated national role conceptions: (1) an anti-globalist role, composed of narratives in opposition to international institutions; (2) a nationalist role, composed of pro-sovereignty narratives; and (3) an anti-foe role, composed of friend/foe narratives.
  6. ^ a b c d e f g Nelson, Linda Williamson; Robison, Maynard T. (2013). "Which Americans Are More Equal and Why: The Linguistic Construction of Inequality in America". Race, Gender & Class. 20 (1/2): 294–306.
  7. ^ a b Polimédio, Chayenne (October 6, 2018). "Brazil's Fiery Far-Right Presidential Favorite Channels Trump". The Atlantic. Retrieved April 29, 2023.
  8. ^ Kirby, Jen (January 2, 2019). "What you need to know about Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil's new far-right president". Vox. Retrieved April 29, 2023.
  9. ^ Neto Manuel, Domingos; Moreira Luis Gustavo, Guerreiro (January 2023). "Bolsonaro, the Last Colonizer". Latin American Perspectives. 50 (1): 47–63. doi:10.1177/0094582X221147598. S2CID 255915580. Under the ultraconservative Bolsonaro government, the state has been taken over by elites with rural and extractive capital who plan on exploiting the Amazon rain forest at any cost and see indigenous peoples as an obstacle to their goal.
  10. ^ a b Gart, Jason H. (Autumn 2019). "The Defense Establishment in Cold War Arizona, 1945–1968". The Journal of Arizona History. 60 (3): 301–332. Ultraconservatism, which combined traditional anticommunist rhetoric with fresh acrimony toward civil rights legislation, welfare programs, organized labor, and taxation
  11. ^ a b c Stephens, Randall J. (December 30, 2021). "Tracing the origins of today's ultraconservatives". The Washington Post.
  12. ^ a b "Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 89th Congress, First Session" (PDF). United States Congress. August 10, 1965. a recent meeting in Chicago attended by the apostles of rightwing extremism and ultraconservatism, Mr. Robert Welch, ... founder and titular head of the John Birch Society, ... charged that the civil rights movement is being guided by Communists to dismember American society. He said that the Communist master plan calls for an in- dependent Negro-Soviet republic
  13. ^ Huntington 2021, p. 180.
  14. ^ Huntington 2021, p. 136.
  15. ^ "Javits Warns G.O.P.: Says Ultra-Conservatism Is a Danger to the Party". The New York Times. December 8, 1961. p. 26.
  16. ^ Giroux, Henry A. (2006). "The Emerging Authoritarianism in the United States: Political Culture under the Bush/Cheney Administration". Symplokē. 14 (1/2). University of Nebraska Press: 103. doi:10.1353/sym.2007.0021. S2CID 144244630.
  17. ^ a b Ching Kwan Lee; Ming Sing (November 15, 2019). Take Back Our Future: An Eventful Sociology of the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement. Cornell University Press. p. 155. ISBN 978-1-5017-4093-0.
  18. ^ "A new Twitter account shows how the Chinese Communist Party stirs up ultra-nationalism". The Economist. May 19, 2022.
  19. ^ Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom; Maura Elizabeth Cunningham (March 12, 2018). China in the 21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know?. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-065910-3.
  20. ^ Harris Mylonas; Maya Tudor (2023). Varieties of Nationalism: Communities, Narratives, Identities. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-96835-5.
  21. ^ Tina Burrett; Jeff Kingston (2023). Routledge Handbook of Trauma in East Asia. Taylor & Francis. p. 200. ISBN 978-1-000-85939-3.
  22. ^ Che, Chang (December 1, 2020). "The Nazi Inspiring China's Communists". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on December 1, 2020. Retrieved December 1, 2020.
  23. ^ Willy Wo-Lap Lam (March 12, 2015). Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping: Renaissance, Reform, Or Retrogression?. Taylor & Francis. p. 94. Added the ultraconservative Beijing Daily, "the fate of the CCP depends on whether it can defend the battlefield of ideology and thought."
  24. ^ Stephen Vines (2021). Defying the Dragon: Hong Kong and the World's Largest Dictatorship. Hurst Publishers. ... widely considered to be a stronghold of the ultra-conservative Heung Yee Kuk, the body representing Hong Kong's "indigenous" residents.
  25. ^ Edward Vickers (2004). In Search of an Identity: The Politics of History Teaching in Hong Kong, 1960s-2000. Routledge. p. 2. This assumes, of course, that it is possible to isolate a single, purely indigenous perspective on Chinese history and culture an assumption that some ostensibly 'progressive' Western scholars such as Pennycook appear to share with ultra-conservative pro-Beijing traditionalists.
  26. ^ Edward Friedman (May 26, 2019). The Politics Of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences. Taylor & Francis. p. 155. ISBN 978-1-000-30468-8. All four LDF candidates, as well as two from the ultraconservative New Hong Kong Alliance and one from the Civic Association, ...
  27. ^ Sohn, Yul; Pempel, T. J., eds. (2018). Japan and Asia's Contested Order: The Interplay of Security, Economics, and Identity. Springer Science+Business Media. p. 148. ISBN 9789811302565 – via Google Books. the reactionary group Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference)—has been waging war over its shared past with China and South Korea on battlegrounds ranging from Yasukuni Shrine to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
  28. ^ Mari Yamaguchi (November 9, 2019). "Japan emperor greets at celebration hosted by conservatives". AP News. Archived from the original on February 24, 2023. Retrieved February 24, 2023. Abe's key ultra-conservative supporter, Nippon Kaigi, or Japan Conference, was among the organizers Saturday.
  29. ^ McCurry, Justin (July 8, 2020). "Ultra-nationalist school linked to Japanese PM accused of hate speech". The Guardian. Archived from the original on March 15, 2017. Retrieved March 15, 2017. Abe and Kagoike, who has indicated he will resign as principal, both belong to Nippon Kaigi, an ultra-conservative lobby group whose members include more than a dozen cabinet ministers.
  30. ^ Martin Fritz / jtm (July 8, 2020). "Tokyo's new governor defies more than glass ceiling". Deutsche Welle. Archived from the original on August 4, 2016. Retrieved August 2, 2016. In 2008, she made an unsuccessful run at the LDP's chairmanship. Following her defeat, she worked to build an internal party network and became involved in a revisionist group of lawmakers that serves as the mouthpiece of the ultraconservative Nippon Kaigi ("Japan Conference") movement.
  31. ^ Sarah Kim (September 4, 2014). "Abe's reshuffle promotes right-wingers". Korea JoongAng Daily. Archived from the original on October 11, 2023. Retrieved December 13, 2023.
  32. ^ Jeff Kingston, ed. (2019). The Politics of Religion, Nationalism, and Identity in Asia. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 241. ISBN 9781442276888. In the 2012 election campaign that brought the ultraconservative Shinzo Abe back to power, the LDP expressed its opinion that no additional measures are required to protect the rights of gays and lesbians.
  33. ^ Debito Arudou, ed. (2021). Embedded Racism: Japan's Visible Minorities and Racial Discrimination. Rowman & Littlefield. p. VIII. ISBN 9781793653963. The ultraconservative Abe Shinzō government (2012–2020) became Japan's longest-running postwar administration, ...
  34. ^ Bryan Mark Rigg, ed. (2020). Flamethrower: Iwo Jima Medal of Honor Recipient and U.S. Marine Woody Williams and His Controversial Award, Japan's Holocaust and the Pacific War. Fidelis Historia. ISBN 9781734534115. This is especially the case with politicians in his current ruling party, The Liberal Democratic Party (which is really ultraconservative, not liberal).
  35. ^ Cerny, Karl H. (Spring 2000). "The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989". Perspectives on Political Science. 29 (2): 110. the ideological manifestations of the radical right after 1989 may be called ultranationalism, clericalism, fascism, ultraconservatism, or radical populism
  36. ^ Rothschild, Emma (1998). "Condorcet and Adam Smith on education and instruction". In Stevenson, Angus; Lindberg, Christine A. (eds.). Philosophers on Education. Routledge. p. 220. doi:10.1093/acref/9780195392883.001.0001. ISBN 9780415191319. In fact, the ideological claims of these Catholic 'ultraroyalists' seeped into public discourse on a regular basis as early as 1818 […] Like their counterparts in Germany or Austria, ultraconservatives were profoundly influenced by Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790).
  37. ^ Ultraroyalist. Dictionary of Politics and Government, 2004, p. 250.
  38. ^ "Ultra". Encyclopaedia Britannica. "The ultras represented the interests of the large landowners, the aristocracy, clericalists, and former émigrés. They were opposed to the egalitarian and secularizing principles of the Revolution, but they did not aim at restoring the ancien régime; rather, they were concerned with manipulating France's new constitutional machinery in order to regain the assured political and social predominance of the interests they represented".
  39. ^ Swart, K. W. (1964). The Sense of Decadence in Nineteenth-Century France. Springer. p. 19. The ultraconservatives of the Action Française felt greatly encouraged by the new nationalistic spirit and the increasing discredit of Leftist ideology.
  40. ^ Biographical notice on Maurras on the Académie française's website (in French)
  41. ^ Mayeur, Jean-Marie (1987). The Third Republic from Its Origins to the Great War, 1871–1914. Cambridge University Press. p. 298.
  42. ^ Mareš, Miroslav; Laryš, Martin; Holzer, Jan (2018). Militant Right-Wing Extremism in Putin's Russia. Routledge. right-wing ultra-conservative thinkers such as Oswald Spengler and Carl Schmitt
  43. ^ Woods, Roger (1996). The Conservative Revolution in the Weimar Republic. St. Martin's Press. p. 29. ISBN 0-333-65014-X.
  44. ^ Dupeux, Louis (1994). "La nouvelle droite "révolutionnaire-conservatrice" et son influence sous la république de Weimar". Revue d'Histoire Moderne & Contemporaine. 41 (3): 471–488. doi:10.3406/rhmc.1994.1732.
  45. ^ Breuer, Stefan (2010). Die radikale Rechte in Deutschland 1871-1945 : Eine politische Ideengeschichte. Reclam, Philipp. p. 21. ISBN 978-3-15-018776-0.
  46. ^ Pfahl-Traughber, Armin (1998). Konservative Revolution und Neue Rechte: Rechtsextremistische Intellektuelle gegen den demokratischen Verfassungsstaat. Springer-Verlag. pp. 223–232. ISBN 9783322973900.
  47. ^ Bar-On 2011, p. 340
  48. ^ François 2017
  49. ^ Polyakova, Alina; Shekhovtsov, Anton (Spring 2016). "On the Rise: Europe's Fringe Right". World Affairs. 179 (1): 70–80. doi:10.1177/0043820016662746. S2CID 151976322.

Bibliography

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