Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/News/September 2021/Op-ed
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Things fall apart: What I've learned about military procurement from writing Wikipedia articles |
- By Nick-D
The recent collapse of the $A90 billion project to purchase twelve Attack-class submarines for the Royal Australian Navy is a stark example of what can go wrong with military procurement processes. This was a critically important and very ambitious project that was meant to provide the backbone of the RAN for decades to come, but got bogged down due to a combination of project management, technical and political problems and was unceremoniously junked on 16 September in favour of an even more ambitious project to acquire nuclear attack submarines under the new AUKUS agreement. This is a particularly bad example of an Australian defence procurement fiasco, but it has key commonalities with others. Other countries have, of course, made similar mistakes with military history being littered with defence procurements that went badly wrong. At times these mistakes have influenced the outcomes of wars. Wikipedia has many articles on failed procurements, which are grouped under Category:Abandoned military projects by country.
I've developed several articles on cancelled or otherwise unsuccessful Australian defence procurements, such as Project Waler, the Australian light destroyer project, the LCM2000-class landing craft mechanised, the M113 upgrade project and the Vultee Vengeance. I've also worked on articles covering noteworthy procurement successes, such as those on the F/A-18 Hornets, C-17 Globemaster and the Ordnance QF 25-pounder Short.
Based on my work on these articles, I'd like to offer some observations about the projects that fail and those that succeed. I'll largely stick to Australia, but will at times branch out into other examples.
What goes wrong? |
At the outset, I want to acknowledge that any significant defence procurement process is really difficult. Even buying military hardware 'off the shelf' is a tricky business, as the correct selection of equipment needs to be made and the equipment then needs to be delivered, introduced into service and maintained. There are any number of defence procurement processes internationally that ended in expensive hardware gathering dust because it couldn't be used. Projects that require new technologies or production processes to be developed and implemented are much harder still. Many comparable projects in the private sector and other areas of government also end in failure. As a result, it's not surprising that many defence procurement processes don't work out. However, it is concerning that similar mistakes keep happening.
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Defence procurements can go wrong from the outset if faulty judgements are made about what the military needs. For instance, apparent success of dive bombers in the early months of World War II convinced the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), among other air forces, that it needed some. However, by the time Vultee Vengeances actually started to arrive in Australia in 1942 it was becoming clear that dedicated dive bombers were unnecessary as fighter bombers and light bombers were much more effective. The Vengeances ended up being removed from combat zones in New Guinea after a few weeks service as they were taking up room at airfields that was needed by more flexible types. Project Waler involved a similar misjudgement: the Australian Army wanted heavy infantry fighting vehicles in the 1980s, but it turned out that what it needed more was cheaper, lighter and more mobile types.
Another common thread in failed defence procurements is a lack of discipline about what can actually be delivered. Military services have a tendency to gold plate hardware - not unreasonably as the lives of their members are on the line. But this can lead to hardware becoming too expensive. The Australian light destroyer project failed, in part, because the team responsible for determining the capabilities the ships was not also responsible for keeping costs down. As a result, the RAN ended up with a very capable destroyer design that it couldn't afford and the project was cancelled. Similar mistakes were made with Project Waler.
Related to this, there can be a tendency to take on too many risks, especially regarding the combination of new technologies and new production processes. The German Type XXI submarine is a famous example: these highly advanced subs were meant to turn the tide for the German Navy in World War II, but the project ended in utter fiasco as the new technologies were immature and the inland shipyards selected to build the subs were unable to meet the necessary quality standards. More modestly, the Royal Australian Navy wasted $A1 billion on SH-2G(A) Super Seasprite helicopters in the 1990s and 2000s when it tried to convert a three-seat anti submarine helicopter into a two seat multi-purpose helicopter by using technologies to replace the third crew member. The over-complex helicopters ended up being un-airworthy. New Zealand later purchased the choppers and has successfully used them as three-seaters.
Another problem is allowing the defence industry tail to wag the procurement dog, for instance by trying to use defence procurements as a way of bolstering local industry or creating jobs. Project Waler's confusing set of goals included helping to modernise the Australian manufacturing industry, with this requiring the Australian Government to pay a substantial premium for local construction. This contributed to costs blowing out, and aligned poorly with the shift to neo-liberal economic policies in Australia during the 1980s: combined, it made the project an easy and sensible target when costs needed to be cut.
And last, but not least, defence procurements can just be disastrously badly managed by the government and/or the companies involved. While a key goal for the LCM2000-class was for two of the type to be carried side by side on the decks of the RAN's amphibious ships the craft turned out to be too wide to be safely carried in this way - it would seem that no-one realised this when the requirements were set! Media reports suggest that the French company responsible for the Attack-class submarines promised more than it could deliver and failed to respond to concerns about its under-performance. The Australian M113 upgrade project failed mainly due to poor scoping and project management by the government, but initial under-performance by the company contracted to do the work didn't help. The Brewster SB2A Buccaneer is a spectacular example of a corporate failure: the US Navy seized the company in a desperate attempt to salvage the project but the aircraft remained so bad that many were used only as artillery targets.
What can go right? |
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Despite the gloom above, many (most?) defence procurements are successful and some troubled projects end up delivering well.
Investing at the outset on high quality planning and evaluation processes seems to pay off. The exhaustive process to determine the RAAF's requirements for new fighter aircraft in the 1970s proved very successful, with the F/A-18 Hornet clearly being the correct choice and the strategy used to build most of them in Australia working well. On a much larger scale, the US military has managed to mass produce some very successful designs in recent times, such as the excellent Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
For smallish countries like Australia, buying equipment off the shelf from overseas usually works out better than local production or acquiring specialised variants of international kit. The RAAF's Globemaster fleet was bought off the USAF's production line, and are to be maintained at a standard identical to American aircraft even down to using the same paint scheme! These aircraft were delivered on time and budget, and have been very successful. Singapore makes a point of buying its military aircraft off the shelf, and has a reputation for making excellent selections through a process that includes very competitive 'fly offs' between competing designs. Likewise, New Zealand's small defence department seems to have a better track record for procurement than Australia's large defence department, perhaps because no attempts are made made to build complicated equipment locally.
Settling for good-enough is also important. The QF 25-pounder Short was disliked by Australian gunners, but met the Army's needs and was able to be rapidly built in Australia and brought into service during World War II. The RAN's Anzac-class frigates are a generally middling design, but were able to be very successfully built in Australia (with NZ components) and have given good service and have been able to be upgraded over their careers. The British military seems to favour good but not cutting edge equipment for most of its requirements, generally with OK results.
And troubled projects can be turned around. The RAAF's F-111C strike aircraft were almost cancelled due to major technological problems but became one of the most important types the service has ever used. The RAN's Collins-class submarines were commonly known as "dud subs" after problems with the first boats became notorious, but after a lot of effort ended up as some of the best submarines of their type in the world. The American M2 Bradley was considered a scandal at various times during its development but has proven successful, and the B-29 Superfortress went from a dangerous lemon to a decisive weapon after intensive development work in 1944.
Implications for Wikipedia articles |
It's really interesting to write about defence procurement exercises. There's a large body of literature on the topic, and working on these articles usually leads you into fascinating debates around politics, defence policy and industrial capabilities. Policy nerds, like myself, will also find a lot to sink their teeth into, and there can be some low humour in accounts of utter fiascos.
Covering the realities of defence procurement is also important to ensure that our articles are well rounded. We need to avoid 'fanboy'-type articles about military technology, but should also not over-state problems. Discussing procurement issues can also help to explain quirks in the types of equipment military forces have gone to war with and help to explain the results of some campaigns.
All up, I really recommend working on articles covering defence procurement -- including, and perhaps especially, the disasters.
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