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Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat
According to Robin Higham and Stephen J. Harris, "Flight has been part of the human dream for aeons, and its military application has likely been the dark side of that dream for almost as long." In the twentieth century, this dream and its dark side unfolded as the air forces of the world went to war, bringing destruction and reassessment with each failure.
Why Air Forces Fail examines the complex, often deep-seated, reasons for the catastrophic failures of the air forces of various nations. Higham and Harris divide the air forces into three categories of forces that never had a chance to win, such as Poland and France; forces that started out victorious but were ultimately defeated, such as Germany and Japan; and finally, those that were defeated in their early efforts yet rose to victory, such as the air forces of Britain and the United States.
The contributing authors examine the complex causes of defeats of the Russian, Polish, French, British, Italian, German, Argentine, and American air services. In all cases, the failures stemmed from deep, usually prewar factors that were shaped by the political, economic, military, and social circumstances in the countries. Defeat also stemmed from the anticipation of future wars, early wartime actions, and the precarious relationship between the doctrine of the military leadership and its execution in the field.
Anthony Christopher Cain's chapter on France's air force, l'Armée de l'Air, attributes France's loss to Germany in June 1940 to a lack of preparation and investment in the air force. One major problem was the failure to centralize planning or coordinate a strategy between land and air forces, which was compounded by aborted alliances between France and countries in eastern Europe, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the lack of incentives for design innovation in air technologies led to clashes between airplane manufacturers, laborers, and the government, a struggle that resulted in France's airplanes' being outnumbered by Germany's more than three to one by 1940.
Complemented by reading lists and suggestions for further research, Why Air Forces Fail provides groundbreaking studies of the causes of air force defeats.
Why Air Forces Fail examines the complex, often deep-seated, reasons for the catastrophic failures of the air forces of various nations. Higham and Harris divide the air forces into three categories of forces that never had a chance to win, such as Poland and France; forces that started out victorious but were ultimately defeated, such as Germany and Japan; and finally, those that were defeated in their early efforts yet rose to victory, such as the air forces of Britain and the United States.
The contributing authors examine the complex causes of defeats of the Russian, Polish, French, British, Italian, German, Argentine, and American air services. In all cases, the failures stemmed from deep, usually prewar factors that were shaped by the political, economic, military, and social circumstances in the countries. Defeat also stemmed from the anticipation of future wars, early wartime actions, and the precarious relationship between the doctrine of the military leadership and its execution in the field.
Anthony Christopher Cain's chapter on France's air force, l'Armée de l'Air, attributes France's loss to Germany in June 1940 to a lack of preparation and investment in the air force. One major problem was the failure to centralize planning or coordinate a strategy between land and air forces, which was compounded by aborted alliances between France and countries in eastern Europe, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia. In addition, the lack of incentives for design innovation in air technologies led to clashes between airplane manufacturers, laborers, and the government, a struggle that resulted in France's airplanes' being outnumbered by Germany's more than three to one by 1940.
Complemented by reading lists and suggestions for further research, Why Air Forces Fail provides groundbreaking studies of the causes of air force defeats.
416 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2006
About the author
Robin Higham
53 books6 followersRobin David Stewart Higham was a British-American historian, specializing in aerospace and military history, who also served as a pilot with the Royal Canadian Air Force during World War II.
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Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews
June 19, 2009
Air war conjures up images of high performance aircraft, ace pilots in deadly dogfights, and dogged bombers pressing through clouds of flak to destroy their targets. That's the exciting part. The truth that underlies the action can be a bit boring for the reader of military history. Robin Higham and Stephen Harris do an admirable job of slaying the dull bits as editors of "Why Air Forces Fail--the Anatomy of Defeat."
The book is a compilation of case studies by various scholars that examine the military histories of various air forces in WWI, WWII and the smaller conflicts that followed. Normally such compilation books tend to be grab bags of fascinating academic papers, not always presenting a coherent whole. Such volumes become secondary reading to more focused books on individual battles or campaigns. Higham and Harris avoid this pitfall, fielding an array of authors who look at air forces that clearly fail at war's start (dead ducks like Poland, 1939, France, 1940), air forces that win at first but lose in the long run (WWII Germany and Japan, the hares that fail to win the race), and air forces that suffer destruction but rebound to win (WWII USSR and USA, phoenixes arising from their ashes).
The one underlying truth that emerges from the many chapters is that the boring stuff matters: doctrine, training, and choosing aircraft designs. An air force is a bureaucracy as well as a technical agency. Who gets picked to run an air force will often make decisions that may strengthen or hinder the development of the force in the years leading up to war. Those decisions could leave an air force with obsolete planes at war's start, too few pilots, too few engines, or insufficient means to replace losses in airframes and air crews. When the fighting starts, those strengths or weaknesses become very apparent. Mundane things like the ability to repair aircraft close to the front and having enough mechanics to maintain aircraft and achieve high sortie rates have an profound effect on battle. The "dull stuff" is what gives an air force its depth.
The editors sum it up best in their conclusion: "Tactics is for amateurs; logistics (and infrastructure) is for professionals. This epigram, or some version of it, is a well-worn tool used to persuade neophytes that military history involves more than battlefields when guns are firing." Battle is easy to gauge: you have a winner and a loser. But that overlooks the importance of supply, repair, basing, design and testing, the editors stress. "Ignoring at least some of these complexities...was common to all the outright losers (dead ducks) in this study--and arguably, for all the phoenixes as well."
I couldn't agree more.
The book is a compilation of case studies by various scholars that examine the military histories of various air forces in WWI, WWII and the smaller conflicts that followed. Normally such compilation books tend to be grab bags of fascinating academic papers, not always presenting a coherent whole. Such volumes become secondary reading to more focused books on individual battles or campaigns. Higham and Harris avoid this pitfall, fielding an array of authors who look at air forces that clearly fail at war's start (dead ducks like Poland, 1939, France, 1940), air forces that win at first but lose in the long run (WWII Germany and Japan, the hares that fail to win the race), and air forces that suffer destruction but rebound to win (WWII USSR and USA, phoenixes arising from their ashes).
The one underlying truth that emerges from the many chapters is that the boring stuff matters: doctrine, training, and choosing aircraft designs. An air force is a bureaucracy as well as a technical agency. Who gets picked to run an air force will often make decisions that may strengthen or hinder the development of the force in the years leading up to war. Those decisions could leave an air force with obsolete planes at war's start, too few pilots, too few engines, or insufficient means to replace losses in airframes and air crews. When the fighting starts, those strengths or weaknesses become very apparent. Mundane things like the ability to repair aircraft close to the front and having enough mechanics to maintain aircraft and achieve high sortie rates have an profound effect on battle. The "dull stuff" is what gives an air force its depth.
The editors sum it up best in their conclusion: "Tactics is for amateurs; logistics (and infrastructure) is for professionals. This epigram, or some version of it, is a well-worn tool used to persuade neophytes that military history involves more than battlefields when guns are firing." Battle is easy to gauge: you have a winner and a loser. But that overlooks the importance of supply, repair, basing, design and testing, the editors stress. "Ignoring at least some of these complexities...was common to all the outright losers (dead ducks) in this study--and arguably, for all the phoenixes as well."
I couldn't agree more.
February 26, 2024
Solid contender for any list of books every Air Force officer should read.
One of the interesting things I read was the French Air Force failed to train sufficient personnel for their Air Force which was one of the problems that contributed to their failure to defend France from WWII Germany's invasion. This likely also contributed to French squadrons averaging one combat sortie a day when German squadrons averaged four to six.
One of the interesting things I read was the French Air Force failed to train sufficient personnel for their Air Force which was one of the problems that contributed to their failure to defend France from WWII Germany's invasion. This likely also contributed to French squadrons averaging one combat sortie a day when German squadrons averaged four to six.
February 21, 2019
Skip to the last chapter.
January 20, 2022
Hubris is the word that comes to mind when I think of the folly that any one kind of weapon of war is an end all/be all. Such is the case with airpower, particularly from its infancy and into the early 1980s. “Higham and Harris divide the air forces into three categories of defeat: forces that never had a chance to win, such as Poland and France; forces that started out victorious but were ultimately defeated, such as Germany and Japan; and finally, those that were defeated in their early efforts yet rose to victory, such as the air forces of Britain and the United States.
The contributing authors examine the complex causes of defeats of the Russian, Polish, French, British, Italian, German, Argentine, and American air services. In all cases, the failures stemmed from deep, usually prewar factors that were shaped by the political, economic, military, and social circumstances in the countries.
Complemented by reading lists and suggestions for further research, Why Air Forces Fail provides groundbreaking studies of the causes of air force defeats.”
The contributing authors examine the complex causes of defeats of the Russian, Polish, French, British, Italian, German, Argentine, and American air services. In all cases, the failures stemmed from deep, usually prewar factors that were shaped by the political, economic, military, and social circumstances in the countries.
Complemented by reading lists and suggestions for further research, Why Air Forces Fail provides groundbreaking studies of the causes of air force defeats.”
July 24, 2018
Though marred by editorial oversights, this collection of essays is thought-provoking and presents a diverse mix of well-known and oft-overlooked air forces.
December 21, 2019
A closer and academic look at the failure of several air forces and why they occurred. Not a book for general readers, it has very academic flavor to it.
June 17, 2021
Required reading for professional development, yet more engaging than I’d expected. Case studies on air forces across the world and the roots for their respective failures.
March 7, 2018
This book is a collection of several analysis form various authors. It coveted a wide time range of air war, including 1982 South Atlantic one.
Most of them concentrated on none hardware technical information, like how fast, how far or how high an airplane could reach. Instead, you would find many of them analyzed the background, development, logistic, maintenance or other supporting issues or events. It showed the readers other sides of air combats with more depth.
Most of them concentrated on none hardware technical information, like how fast, how far or how high an airplane could reach. Instead, you would find many of them analyzed the background, development, logistic, maintenance or other supporting issues or events. It showed the readers other sides of air combats with more depth.
September 20, 2009
Evaluates battles during World War II and beyond. Many countries' air forces are evaluated by tactics, leadership, and the planes themselves. Arrogance, underestimation, and poor leadership at the time of the battles seems to be a common theme.
Want to read
February 1, 2008Another one from the CSAF reading list.
April 7, 2013
A book that anyone interested in air power should read.
May 4, 2013
An essential read for any scholar of Air Warfare (or the problems of institutional warfighting.)
Displaying 1 - 12 of 12 reviews