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Appeasement: Chamberlain, Hitler, Churchill, and the Road to War
A major new history of the British appeasement of the Third Reich in the lead up to World War II
On a September day in 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain stepped off a plane and prepared to address the teeming crowd assembled on the airfield. Chamberlain had just returned from Munich, where he had averted the greatest crisis of the century. He had signed a peace agreement with Hitler, who could keep Czech territory but would never, he had sworn, take up arms against France and Great Britain. The cost had been high, but Chamberlain's eleventh-hour gamble had secured "peace for our time."
Less than a year later, Germany invaded Poland. In response, France and Britain declared war, and the deadliest conflict in human history began. Appeasement is a groundbreaking history of the disastrous years of indecision, treaty-making, and parliamentary infighting that enabled Hitler's domination of Europe. Drawing on deep archival research and new sources, Tim Bouverie has created an unforgettable portrait of the ministers, dukes, and debutantes who, through their actions and inaction, shaped the country's policy.
Appeasement takes readers inside 10 Downing Street during the tenure of Chamberlain, the beloved PM determined to avert war at any cost. It takes us into the backrooms of Parliament, where an unusual coalition of liberals and conservatives (including the indomitable Winston Churchill) were the first to realize that the only real choice was "war now or war later." And it takes us into the drawing rooms and dinner clubs of fading imperial Britain, where Hitler enjoyed surprising support among the ruling class and even members of the Royal Family.
Both sweeping and intimate, Appeasement is not only eye-opening history but a timeless lesson in the challenges of standing against authoritarianism--and the calamity that results from failing.
On a September day in 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain stepped off a plane and prepared to address the teeming crowd assembled on the airfield. Chamberlain had just returned from Munich, where he had averted the greatest crisis of the century. He had signed a peace agreement with Hitler, who could keep Czech territory but would never, he had sworn, take up arms against France and Great Britain. The cost had been high, but Chamberlain's eleventh-hour gamble had secured "peace for our time."
Less than a year later, Germany invaded Poland. In response, France and Britain declared war, and the deadliest conflict in human history began. Appeasement is a groundbreaking history of the disastrous years of indecision, treaty-making, and parliamentary infighting that enabled Hitler's domination of Europe. Drawing on deep archival research and new sources, Tim Bouverie has created an unforgettable portrait of the ministers, dukes, and debutantes who, through their actions and inaction, shaped the country's policy.
Appeasement takes readers inside 10 Downing Street during the tenure of Chamberlain, the beloved PM determined to avert war at any cost. It takes us into the backrooms of Parliament, where an unusual coalition of liberals and conservatives (including the indomitable Winston Churchill) were the first to realize that the only real choice was "war now or war later." And it takes us into the drawing rooms and dinner clubs of fading imperial Britain, where Hitler enjoyed surprising support among the ruling class and even members of the Royal Family.
Both sweeping and intimate, Appeasement is not only eye-opening history but a timeless lesson in the challenges of standing against authoritarianism--and the calamity that results from failing.
496 pages, Hardcover
First published June 4, 2019
About the author
Tim Bouverie
3 books56 followersTim Bouverie is the author of 'Appeasing Hitler: 'Chamberlain, Churchill and the Road to War' / 'Appeasement: Chamberlain, Hitler, Churchill and the Road to War' (UK/US).
Previously a political journalist for Channel 4 News, he covered all major political events between 2013 and 2017, including two general elections and the EU Referendum.
He regularly reviews history and politics books, and has written for the Spectator, Observer, Mail on Sunday and Daily Telegraph.
He has also for the last five years worked at the Chalke Valley History Festival as an interviewer.
He has a degree in history from Christ Church, Oxford.
Previously a political journalist for Channel 4 News, he covered all major political events between 2013 and 2017, including two general elections and the EU Referendum.
He regularly reviews history and politics books, and has written for the Spectator, Observer, Mail on Sunday and Daily Telegraph.
He has also for the last five years worked at the Chalke Valley History Festival as an interviewer.
He has a degree in history from Christ Church, Oxford.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 193 reviews
June 8, 2024
Getting it Wrong.
Appeasement was the catastrophic policy of the British government in the lead up to the Second World War. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and foreign secretary Edward Wood, 3rd Viscount Halifax along with so many others believed that they could contain Adolf Hitler and the Nazis. The same fatal mistake that Paul von Hindenburg and Franz von Papen thought when they brought Hitler into power in 1933. As Lord Huge Cecil pointed out it was like ‘scratching a crocodile’s head in the hope of making it purr.’ Of course we know it was an unmitigated disaster with all those involved being destroyed politically.
Author Tim Bouverie does an excellent job in pulling this complex story together in a compelling way. Bouverie understands his subject and appreciates the time, society and characters involved. He knows how 1930s politics worked and how they were dictated by the time. Of course a huge factor in this was the First World War and the fear of sending more young men to die. The economy was still delicate after this first world crisis. Some were appeasers and others were Nazi sympathisers. Perhaps what is also compelling is the weight the aristocracy still had on politics at the time, even though it had gone through huge decline. This included the Marquess of Londonderry and the Duke of Hamilton who Rudolph Hess famously flew to arrange peace talks with in 1941. If they had sympathetic leanings most woke up and smelt the coffee after Kristalnacht and the abuses of the Czechs after appeasement failed. The left were equally split with appeasement and aristocrats and conservatives also opposed it, Duff Cooper and Winston Churchill being the most famous here. The liberal party was pacifist and those such as David Lloyd George thought that the impotent League of Nations had a positive influence.
The problem was that most people in Britain feared Stalin and Soviet Russia more than the Nazis at the time, this is a solid argument. Hitler was more of an unknown whereas Stalin had proved he was an unpredictable monster. As I have mentioned above, there was no wider public appetite for war, with so many young men being killed on the fields of France and Belgium 20 years before. Therefore Chamberlain and Halifax weee looking to prevent war at all costs. When Chamberlain came back from Munich in 1938, having sold the Czechs down the river, he considered a hero. Bouverie argues that this should have been over and done with when Hitler rearmed the Rhineland. It was the first obvious move, he limited resources whilst Britain was still the most powerful country in the world with its huge empire and large navy. France also had the largest army at that point, so they could have easily challenged and shot down the dictator. History could have turned out very different.
Perhaps the most important point of this book is the rejection of the myth that there was merit to the appeasement policy. In delaying war, this did give Britain chance to rearm, but it also gave this time to Germany. In fact Germany rearmed quicker than Britain, so this was a fallacy. By 1939 they had sacrificed the Czechs and their defences and Hitler had signed a non aggression pact with Stalin. Moreover the point of appeasement was to prevent war, not to delay it. So in all respects it failed and has gone down in history as a diplomatic disaster. Getting it wrong is an understatement to say the least. Hitler’s intentions were laid out in Mein Kampf. Therefore, it should have been understood he should have been intercepted at the first opportunity. This would have prevented the most deaths and would perhaps have been resonant with the nation. This is an excellent book which I throughly enjoyed. Although we can take lessons from history everything has to be put in context, so be wary of applying these actions to any other times and international crises.
Appeasement was the catastrophic policy of the British government in the lead up to the Second World War. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and foreign secretary Edward Wood, 3rd Viscount Halifax along with so many others believed that they could contain Adolf Hitler and the Nazis. The same fatal mistake that Paul von Hindenburg and Franz von Papen thought when they brought Hitler into power in 1933. As Lord Huge Cecil pointed out it was like ‘scratching a crocodile’s head in the hope of making it purr.’ Of course we know it was an unmitigated disaster with all those involved being destroyed politically.
Author Tim Bouverie does an excellent job in pulling this complex story together in a compelling way. Bouverie understands his subject and appreciates the time, society and characters involved. He knows how 1930s politics worked and how they were dictated by the time. Of course a huge factor in this was the First World War and the fear of sending more young men to die. The economy was still delicate after this first world crisis. Some were appeasers and others were Nazi sympathisers. Perhaps what is also compelling is the weight the aristocracy still had on politics at the time, even though it had gone through huge decline. This included the Marquess of Londonderry and the Duke of Hamilton who Rudolph Hess famously flew to arrange peace talks with in 1941. If they had sympathetic leanings most woke up and smelt the coffee after Kristalnacht and the abuses of the Czechs after appeasement failed. The left were equally split with appeasement and aristocrats and conservatives also opposed it, Duff Cooper and Winston Churchill being the most famous here. The liberal party was pacifist and those such as David Lloyd George thought that the impotent League of Nations had a positive influence.
The problem was that most people in Britain feared Stalin and Soviet Russia more than the Nazis at the time, this is a solid argument. Hitler was more of an unknown whereas Stalin had proved he was an unpredictable monster. As I have mentioned above, there was no wider public appetite for war, with so many young men being killed on the fields of France and Belgium 20 years before. Therefore Chamberlain and Halifax weee looking to prevent war at all costs. When Chamberlain came back from Munich in 1938, having sold the Czechs down the river, he considered a hero. Bouverie argues that this should have been over and done with when Hitler rearmed the Rhineland. It was the first obvious move, he limited resources whilst Britain was still the most powerful country in the world with its huge empire and large navy. France also had the largest army at that point, so they could have easily challenged and shot down the dictator. History could have turned out very different.
Perhaps the most important point of this book is the rejection of the myth that there was merit to the appeasement policy. In delaying war, this did give Britain chance to rearm, but it also gave this time to Germany. In fact Germany rearmed quicker than Britain, so this was a fallacy. By 1939 they had sacrificed the Czechs and their defences and Hitler had signed a non aggression pact with Stalin. Moreover the point of appeasement was to prevent war, not to delay it. So in all respects it failed and has gone down in history as a diplomatic disaster. Getting it wrong is an understatement to say the least. Hitler’s intentions were laid out in Mein Kampf. Therefore, it should have been understood he should have been intercepted at the first opportunity. This would have prevented the most deaths and would perhaps have been resonant with the nation. This is an excellent book which I throughly enjoyed. Although we can take lessons from history everything has to be put in context, so be wary of applying these actions to any other times and international crises.
May 2, 2019
Tim Bouverie has a background in journalism and, although this is his first book, I hope very much that it is not his last. In this title, Bouverie takes us from 1933, when Hitler became Chancellor, through to the Phoney War. He also uses many contemporary sources, to make the story feel more immediate, as well as covering not only the main players in events, but those who witnessed events – ambassadors, politicians, family members, translators and others, who all help to fill in the picture of what happened, through letters and diaries.
Of course, we all know about Munich, the ‘Peace for our Time,’ of Leo Amery’s stirring speech, the fall of Chamberlain, and of how England, and France, were unwilling to enter into a war. What this book does is to show just how unpopular war was, with the First World War still very much in the memory of many of those who feature in this book – as well as the public. In fact, Bouverie shows that the desire to avoid a second world war was very understandable. This story is told very much from a British perspective and through the turbulent years of British politics in this period.
It is fascinating to read of how many apologists there were for the rise of Hitler – from Nancy Astor and the Cliveden set, through Diana and Unity Mitford, members of the aristocracy and, to Hitler’s dismay, even a possible monarch (not much use to the Fuhrer after abdication), as well as many in the press, who did their best to try, not only to avoid war, but to suggest that greater ties should be made between England and Germany. There were, of course, those who were curious to meet this popular new leader. Bob Boothby, invited to meet Hitler while giving some lectures in Germany, was ushered into the great man’s presence, to be greeted with clicked heels, a thrown out arm and the shout of, “Hitler!” Not missing a beat, Boothby clicked his own heels and returned the salute, barking out, “Boothby!” It is doubtful whether the Fuhrer was amused.
Other politicians, such as Eden, were strongly against war. During WWI, all of the male members of Eden’s family were either killed, captured, or injured. Perhaps too eager to be positive, Eden was charmed by Hitler and thought him sincere – at least at first. However, in behaviour reminiscent of other, more current, political leaders, Hitler was soon leading Germany to flounce out of the League of Nations, ranting, as more than one of those mentioned in this pages suggest, ‘like a madman,’ (indeed Leo Amery thought him insane, after reading ‘Mein Kampf’), refusing to entertain visiting Britain, in case of demonstrations, and pushing boundaries, in the belief that France and Britain would not go to war despite his territorial claims and constant breaking of promises which, certainly, were of no value whatsoever.
In this age of political extremes, perhaps fascism seemed preferable to the rise of communism, but many of those – notably Churchill – warned of the danger from the sidelines. However, the attempts by the British to avoid war, often seem laughable. At one point, the Foreign Office even sent Hitler a questionnaire, asking which treaties he would respect. I imagine, they are still waiting for answer…
Although it is, of course, interesting to read of the fall of Chamberlain, I found the middle years – and less well documented – the most fascinating. It seemed that the Allies were ready to agree to any solution to avoid war. Czechoslovakia was a, ‘long way away,’ and it was hard not to sympathise with attempts to try to keep the peace, even if it was obvious that war was coming. This is an extremely readable account of how war broke out, despite many efforts to contain a threat which could not, ultimately, be restrained.
Of course, we all know about Munich, the ‘Peace for our Time,’ of Leo Amery’s stirring speech, the fall of Chamberlain, and of how England, and France, were unwilling to enter into a war. What this book does is to show just how unpopular war was, with the First World War still very much in the memory of many of those who feature in this book – as well as the public. In fact, Bouverie shows that the desire to avoid a second world war was very understandable. This story is told very much from a British perspective and through the turbulent years of British politics in this period.
It is fascinating to read of how many apologists there were for the rise of Hitler – from Nancy Astor and the Cliveden set, through Diana and Unity Mitford, members of the aristocracy and, to Hitler’s dismay, even a possible monarch (not much use to the Fuhrer after abdication), as well as many in the press, who did their best to try, not only to avoid war, but to suggest that greater ties should be made between England and Germany. There were, of course, those who were curious to meet this popular new leader. Bob Boothby, invited to meet Hitler while giving some lectures in Germany, was ushered into the great man’s presence, to be greeted with clicked heels, a thrown out arm and the shout of, “Hitler!” Not missing a beat, Boothby clicked his own heels and returned the salute, barking out, “Boothby!” It is doubtful whether the Fuhrer was amused.
Other politicians, such as Eden, were strongly against war. During WWI, all of the male members of Eden’s family were either killed, captured, or injured. Perhaps too eager to be positive, Eden was charmed by Hitler and thought him sincere – at least at first. However, in behaviour reminiscent of other, more current, political leaders, Hitler was soon leading Germany to flounce out of the League of Nations, ranting, as more than one of those mentioned in this pages suggest, ‘like a madman,’ (indeed Leo Amery thought him insane, after reading ‘Mein Kampf’), refusing to entertain visiting Britain, in case of demonstrations, and pushing boundaries, in the belief that France and Britain would not go to war despite his territorial claims and constant breaking of promises which, certainly, were of no value whatsoever.
In this age of political extremes, perhaps fascism seemed preferable to the rise of communism, but many of those – notably Churchill – warned of the danger from the sidelines. However, the attempts by the British to avoid war, often seem laughable. At one point, the Foreign Office even sent Hitler a questionnaire, asking which treaties he would respect. I imagine, they are still waiting for answer…
Although it is, of course, interesting to read of the fall of Chamberlain, I found the middle years – and less well documented – the most fascinating. It seemed that the Allies were ready to agree to any solution to avoid war. Czechoslovakia was a, ‘long way away,’ and it was hard not to sympathise with attempts to try to keep the peace, even if it was obvious that war was coming. This is an extremely readable account of how war broke out, despite many efforts to contain a threat which could not, ultimately, be restrained.
August 22, 2019
British historian Basil Liddell Hart stated it concisely......" On each successive international issue the Government has had persuasive argument for dishonoring our obligations - but the fact remains that each surrender has led to a worse one, and to a worsening of our situation as well as that of civilization". This is basically the crux of the appeasement policy of PM Neville Chamberlain which will forever taint Chamberlain's reputation.
Chamberlain's hope was that the League of Nations would step in when Hitler occupied the Rhineland but the League had been effectively destroyed when it refused to assist Abyssinia (Ethiopia) when Italy conquered that small, helpless country. This left Britain and France to deal with Hitler themselves. Czechoslovakia was next and as German troops gathered on the Czech border, Hitler invited Chamberlain to meet with him in Munich to discuss the situation (The Czechs were not invited). What transpired from the meeting, the Munich Agreement guaranteed the Germany had no further "demands" for additional conquests and Chamberlain returned to London saying that it was "peace for our time". But Hitler told his ambassador to Britain "Oh, don't take it all so seriously......That piece of paper is of no significance whatsoever." Three days later, Germany invaded the rump of Czechoslovakia. And the rest is history.
The author covers the months when Britain and France wavered as Hitler planned to take over all of Europe by turning next on Poland, a country which was guaranteed the protection of Britain and France by the Munich Agreement. The reader is provided an inside look at the machinations of the British government that severed party liaisons and separated old friends into the the appeasement and anti-appeasement camps. And Winston Churchill waited in the wings.
I cannot think of a better book that explains and dissects the actions of Chamberlain and the Government and the quote from the Czech President pretty much sums up the world changing situation. "If you have sacrificed my nation to preserve the peace of the world, I will be the first to applaud you.. But if not, gentlemen, God help your souls".
Very highly recommended.
Chamberlain's hope was that the League of Nations would step in when Hitler occupied the Rhineland but the League had been effectively destroyed when it refused to assist Abyssinia (Ethiopia) when Italy conquered that small, helpless country. This left Britain and France to deal with Hitler themselves. Czechoslovakia was next and as German troops gathered on the Czech border, Hitler invited Chamberlain to meet with him in Munich to discuss the situation (The Czechs were not invited). What transpired from the meeting, the Munich Agreement guaranteed the Germany had no further "demands" for additional conquests and Chamberlain returned to London saying that it was "peace for our time". But Hitler told his ambassador to Britain "Oh, don't take it all so seriously......That piece of paper is of no significance whatsoever." Three days later, Germany invaded the rump of Czechoslovakia. And the rest is history.
The author covers the months when Britain and France wavered as Hitler planned to take over all of Europe by turning next on Poland, a country which was guaranteed the protection of Britain and France by the Munich Agreement. The reader is provided an inside look at the machinations of the British government that severed party liaisons and separated old friends into the the appeasement and anti-appeasement camps. And Winston Churchill waited in the wings.
I cannot think of a better book that explains and dissects the actions of Chamberlain and the Government and the quote from the Czech President pretty much sums up the world changing situation. "If you have sacrificed my nation to preserve the peace of the world, I will be the first to applaud you.. But if not, gentlemen, God help your souls".
Very highly recommended.
June 12, 2019
Tim Bouverie has written a new history of Appeasement - the particular case of English relations with Germany from Hitler’s rise to power until the outbreak of WW2. When I saw this book, my first reaction was to wonder why a new history was needed. Perhaps because the word in its reference to dealings with dictators has come to expand in scope and thus lose much of its meaning. OK, I get that. Mr. Bouverie helps to clarify the original situation and in doing so provides a detailed look at the diplomacy in Europe from 1933-1941. The timeline fits nicely into some recent movies about Dunkirk and Churchill.
So, does that mean that Mr. Bouverie is presenting a revisionist history of Appeasement and Chamberlain? Hardly. Appeasement remains the strategy that we love to hate and the ultimate in foreign policy disasters to which democracies are prone. But Mr. Bouverie has provided a very rich story that does not appear to lack in necessary detail. He is also balanced and reasonable in that he spreads the blame around and spares nobody from the run-up to WW2. This is not an oversimplified story but the overall meaning is quite clear and the reality of Appeasement has only grown clearer over the past 70 years.
The book is well written and fun to read. (I never thought I would say that about a study of interwar diplomatic history.). As to how Appeasement arguments/criticisms apply to other situations and other dictators, there is likely room for more books to explore what is what. As a starting point for further work, this history is an exceptional start.
So, does that mean that Mr. Bouverie is presenting a revisionist history of Appeasement and Chamberlain? Hardly. Appeasement remains the strategy that we love to hate and the ultimate in foreign policy disasters to which democracies are prone. But Mr. Bouverie has provided a very rich story that does not appear to lack in necessary detail. He is also balanced and reasonable in that he spreads the blame around and spares nobody from the run-up to WW2. This is not an oversimplified story but the overall meaning is quite clear and the reality of Appeasement has only grown clearer over the past 70 years.
The book is well written and fun to read. (I never thought I would say that about a study of interwar diplomatic history.). As to how Appeasement arguments/criticisms apply to other situations and other dictators, there is likely room for more books to explore what is what. As a starting point for further work, this history is an exceptional start.
October 5, 2019
In 1961 the controversial British historian, A.J.P. Taylor published THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR arguing that the war was caused by the appeasement policies pursued by England and France toward Nazi Germany. He further purported that Adolf Hitler was more of a traditional European statesman who easily could have been stopped in March 1936 at the Rhineland bridges had England and France had the will to do so. This book created a firestorm in academic circles and over the years numerous historians have challenged Taylor’s conclusions. Among the first was J.W. Wheeler-Bennett’s MUNICH: PROLOGUE TO TRAGEDY followed later by Telford Taylor’s MUNICH: THE PRICE OF PEACE, Lynne Olson’s TROUBLESOME YOUNG MEN: THE REBELS WHO HELPED SAVE ENGLAND, David Faber’s MUNICH THE 1938 APPEASEMENT CRISIS, and last year a fictional account was written by Robert Harris. These books among many others lay out the counter argument to Taylor that even though Anglo-Franco appeasement was responsible for the war, Hitler would have stopped at nothing to achieve at a minimum domination of Europe.
The latest entry into this debate is Tim Bouverie’s APPEASEMENT: CHAMBERLAIN, HITLER, CHURCHILL, AND THE ROAD TO WAR. Bouverie, a former British journalist offers a fresh approach in analyzing London’s foreign policy throughout the 1930s leading to the Second World War. The author excoriates British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his apologists who argue that he had little choice because of England’s lack of military preparation and fear of inflicting further damage to an already depressed economy. Bouverie concludes that Chamberlain had decided even before he became Prime Minister that an accommodation with Hitler needed to be made in order to prevent revisiting the carnage of World War I. With England’s position growing untenable in the Pacific due Japanese expansionism a rapprochement with Germany was a necessity. Chamberlain would proceed to try to make deals with Benito Mussolini to pressure the Fuhrer, but in reality as his own writings and correspondence reflect he was bent on giving in to Hitler as shown in his reaction to the Anschluss with Austria, the drum beat by Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia for autonomy, the dismemberment of the only democracy in central Europe at the Munich Conference and thereafter, and finally over Danzig. It was clear that the policies of Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, who Bouverie calls the “evangelicals of appeasement” would give away almost anything to achieve an Anglo-German Pact.
Bouverie does an excellent job developing the pacifist movement in England and the attitude of British elites toward Germany. To the author’s credit he not only focuses on the major players in English politics during the period but others like Baron Lord Rothermere, his brother Lord Northcliffe, and Geoffrey Dawson who greatly impacted British public opinion through their newspaper empires. In addition, Sir Robert Cecil, an ardent advocate of the League of Nations and the Peace Ballot in favor of collective security, Ernest Jenner, a banker, the historian Arnold Toynbee, former Labor leader George Lansbury, all whom received audiences with Hitler among others that the author discusses. These individuals were able to mold public opinion and create further pressure on Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin who was replaced by Chamberlain.
Bouverie’s narrative is grounded in social and political history and makes exhaustive use personal papers, documentary collections, and the press. He explains that England’s response to Hitler derives from a number of critical works such as John Maynard Keynes’ THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE written in 1919 which pointed out the deficiencies in the Versailles Treaty. Many in power in England saw the rise of Hitler as a manifestation of legitimate German grievances concerning the treaty, thus ameliorating Hitler’s “Diktat of Versailles” became a rallying cry for appeasers. Those individuals include the British Ambassador to Germany, Neville Henderson; Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, and Sir Horace Wilson, the government’s Chief Industrial Advisor and Chamberlain’s alter ego. Bouverie presents an incisive narrative concerning the raucous debate in British politics centering around rearmament, especially since Hitler was rearming Germany right under the nose of France and England undoing that clause of the treaty. England would face reality and in 1934 agreed to a naval treaty with Germany allowing the Nazis a navy 35% of that of Great Britain (though at the time the treaty was signed Germany had already passed that threshold).
The author takes the reader through each major crisis that predated World War II. Beginning with attempts at an Anglo-German Treaty recognizing Germany’s eastern borders and League membership; the German occupation of the Rhineland in March, 1936; the Anschluss with Austria in March, 1938; machinations against Czechoslovakia leading to the Munich Conference in September, 1938; the seizure of all of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and the final crisis in Danzig that resulted in the invasion of Poland and the “Phony War” that followed. In each instance Bouverie provides insights into the thought patterns of English politicians and why they did little or nothing to stop Hitler. The author also explores the opposition to the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments, in particular Winston Churchill who found the warnings he had offered about Hitler since 1933 coming home to roost. But it is clear that the “evangelical appeasers” faced no serious opposition or obstacles in Parliament.
One of Bouverie’s best chapters deals with “Hitler’s Wonderland” reflecting British attitudes toward Germany in light of the Nuremburg Party rallies and the 1936 Olympics that took place in Berlin. British elites like King Edward VIII, Charles Vane Tempest-Stewart, and the 7th Marquis of Londonderry all visited Germany a number of times and became the United Kingdom’s leading Hitler apologists.
Bouverie provides fascinating portraits of the periods leading characters. His most important was his analysis of Chamberlain describing his intellectual self-assurance, a trait that would not allow him to consider the opinions and findings of others. His arrogance would alienate Laborite’s as well as people in his own party. This would prove a disaster as he tried to form governmental coalitions in 1939 and 1940. In his defense Bouverie points out that Chamberlain had been a social reformer, but events did not allow him to pursue that interest. As the former Chancellor of the Exchequer he realized England could not afford an arms race, so he tried to engage his countries enemies. Chamberlain realized he could not rely on the United States, in large part because of his low opinion of Washington, believed that “careful diplomacy” would in the end be successful. Bouverie is careful to point out that Chamberlain did not invent appeasement as British governments had been practicing it since the early 1920s, but it is Chamberlain who seems to have earned the mantle of the “great appeaser” because of Munich and beyond due to his innate stubbornness in dealing with those who disagreed with him.
Bouverie’s narrative allows the reader to eavesdrop on many interesting conversations and events. Particularly fascinating was a lunch thrown by German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop at the German Embassy on March 11, 1938 with British politicians in attendance at the same time that Hitler demanded the resignation of Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg or suffer an invasion. Also interesting is the verbal give and take between Chamberlain’s Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, a pro-German appeaser and his predecessor Anthony Eden who resigned over English recognition of Mussolini’s seizure of Abyssinia. The give and take in the English cabinet after the Anschluss fearing Hitler’s next move is important as the evidence that Bouverie presents makes it clear that no one in Chamberlain’s government wanted to risk war over Czechoslovakia a country they believed had little to do with British national security. Lastly, Bouverie’s discussion of conversations between Henderson and German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop as negotiations proceeded in August 1939 is priceless.
When war finally came, Bouverie notes that following the conquest of Poland, England and France declared war on Germany, but this was a rare case when war was declared but it was not fought until Hitler’s blitzkrieg entered France and the low countries in May 1940. Finally, Tory anti-appeasement rebels will begin an all-out effort to get rid of Chamberlain in and Bouverie’s coverage of probably the most important parliamentary debate in English history is exemplary as it finally brought Winston Churchill to power.
Bouverie’s effort is very timely as Lynne Olson points out in her New York Times article, “Failure to Lead” (July 21, 2019). Olson commends Bouverie for providing historical evidence as what will occur when a politician who has no knowledge of foreign policy, like Chamberlain imagines himself to be an expert and bypasses other branches of government to further his aims. In addition, when one focuses only on negotiations with dictators and leaves their allies in the lurch…...sound familiar?
The latest entry into this debate is Tim Bouverie’s APPEASEMENT: CHAMBERLAIN, HITLER, CHURCHILL, AND THE ROAD TO WAR. Bouverie, a former British journalist offers a fresh approach in analyzing London’s foreign policy throughout the 1930s leading to the Second World War. The author excoriates British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his apologists who argue that he had little choice because of England’s lack of military preparation and fear of inflicting further damage to an already depressed economy. Bouverie concludes that Chamberlain had decided even before he became Prime Minister that an accommodation with Hitler needed to be made in order to prevent revisiting the carnage of World War I. With England’s position growing untenable in the Pacific due Japanese expansionism a rapprochement with Germany was a necessity. Chamberlain would proceed to try to make deals with Benito Mussolini to pressure the Fuhrer, but in reality as his own writings and correspondence reflect he was bent on giving in to Hitler as shown in his reaction to the Anschluss with Austria, the drum beat by Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia for autonomy, the dismemberment of the only democracy in central Europe at the Munich Conference and thereafter, and finally over Danzig. It was clear that the policies of Chamberlain and Lord Halifax, who Bouverie calls the “evangelicals of appeasement” would give away almost anything to achieve an Anglo-German Pact.
Bouverie does an excellent job developing the pacifist movement in England and the attitude of British elites toward Germany. To the author’s credit he not only focuses on the major players in English politics during the period but others like Baron Lord Rothermere, his brother Lord Northcliffe, and Geoffrey Dawson who greatly impacted British public opinion through their newspaper empires. In addition, Sir Robert Cecil, an ardent advocate of the League of Nations and the Peace Ballot in favor of collective security, Ernest Jenner, a banker, the historian Arnold Toynbee, former Labor leader George Lansbury, all whom received audiences with Hitler among others that the author discusses. These individuals were able to mold public opinion and create further pressure on Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin who was replaced by Chamberlain.
Bouverie’s narrative is grounded in social and political history and makes exhaustive use personal papers, documentary collections, and the press. He explains that England’s response to Hitler derives from a number of critical works such as John Maynard Keynes’ THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE written in 1919 which pointed out the deficiencies in the Versailles Treaty. Many in power in England saw the rise of Hitler as a manifestation of legitimate German grievances concerning the treaty, thus ameliorating Hitler’s “Diktat of Versailles” became a rallying cry for appeasers. Those individuals include the British Ambassador to Germany, Neville Henderson; Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, and Sir Horace Wilson, the government’s Chief Industrial Advisor and Chamberlain’s alter ego. Bouverie presents an incisive narrative concerning the raucous debate in British politics centering around rearmament, especially since Hitler was rearming Germany right under the nose of France and England undoing that clause of the treaty. England would face reality and in 1934 agreed to a naval treaty with Germany allowing the Nazis a navy 35% of that of Great Britain (though at the time the treaty was signed Germany had already passed that threshold).
The author takes the reader through each major crisis that predated World War II. Beginning with attempts at an Anglo-German Treaty recognizing Germany’s eastern borders and League membership; the German occupation of the Rhineland in March, 1936; the Anschluss with Austria in March, 1938; machinations against Czechoslovakia leading to the Munich Conference in September, 1938; the seizure of all of Czechoslovakia in March, 1939, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and the final crisis in Danzig that resulted in the invasion of Poland and the “Phony War” that followed. In each instance Bouverie provides insights into the thought patterns of English politicians and why they did little or nothing to stop Hitler. The author also explores the opposition to the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments, in particular Winston Churchill who found the warnings he had offered about Hitler since 1933 coming home to roost. But it is clear that the “evangelical appeasers” faced no serious opposition or obstacles in Parliament.
One of Bouverie’s best chapters deals with “Hitler’s Wonderland” reflecting British attitudes toward Germany in light of the Nuremburg Party rallies and the 1936 Olympics that took place in Berlin. British elites like King Edward VIII, Charles Vane Tempest-Stewart, and the 7th Marquis of Londonderry all visited Germany a number of times and became the United Kingdom’s leading Hitler apologists.
Bouverie provides fascinating portraits of the periods leading characters. His most important was his analysis of Chamberlain describing his intellectual self-assurance, a trait that would not allow him to consider the opinions and findings of others. His arrogance would alienate Laborite’s as well as people in his own party. This would prove a disaster as he tried to form governmental coalitions in 1939 and 1940. In his defense Bouverie points out that Chamberlain had been a social reformer, but events did not allow him to pursue that interest. As the former Chancellor of the Exchequer he realized England could not afford an arms race, so he tried to engage his countries enemies. Chamberlain realized he could not rely on the United States, in large part because of his low opinion of Washington, believed that “careful diplomacy” would in the end be successful. Bouverie is careful to point out that Chamberlain did not invent appeasement as British governments had been practicing it since the early 1920s, but it is Chamberlain who seems to have earned the mantle of the “great appeaser” because of Munich and beyond due to his innate stubbornness in dealing with those who disagreed with him.
Bouverie’s narrative allows the reader to eavesdrop on many interesting conversations and events. Particularly fascinating was a lunch thrown by German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop at the German Embassy on March 11, 1938 with British politicians in attendance at the same time that Hitler demanded the resignation of Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg or suffer an invasion. Also interesting is the verbal give and take between Chamberlain’s Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, a pro-German appeaser and his predecessor Anthony Eden who resigned over English recognition of Mussolini’s seizure of Abyssinia. The give and take in the English cabinet after the Anschluss fearing Hitler’s next move is important as the evidence that Bouverie presents makes it clear that no one in Chamberlain’s government wanted to risk war over Czechoslovakia a country they believed had little to do with British national security. Lastly, Bouverie’s discussion of conversations between Henderson and German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop as negotiations proceeded in August 1939 is priceless.
When war finally came, Bouverie notes that following the conquest of Poland, England and France declared war on Germany, but this was a rare case when war was declared but it was not fought until Hitler’s blitzkrieg entered France and the low countries in May 1940. Finally, Tory anti-appeasement rebels will begin an all-out effort to get rid of Chamberlain in and Bouverie’s coverage of probably the most important parliamentary debate in English history is exemplary as it finally brought Winston Churchill to power.
Bouverie’s effort is very timely as Lynne Olson points out in her New York Times article, “Failure to Lead” (July 21, 2019). Olson commends Bouverie for providing historical evidence as what will occur when a politician who has no knowledge of foreign policy, like Chamberlain imagines himself to be an expert and bypasses other branches of government to further his aims. In addition, when one focuses only on negotiations with dictators and leaves their allies in the lurch…...sound familiar?
April 14, 2019
A powerful and intriguing book by a new historian, with a new and well-researched look at a dark time in Europe's history. Mostly from the British point of view, it covers not just the infamous September 1938 Munich summit but the period from the accession of Hitler in January 1933 to the fall of Neville Chamberlain in May 1940. There's a host of vivid characters, drawn in a compelling manner: Chamberlain, Stanley Baldwin (the preceding PM), Duff Cooper, Anthony Eden, Hitler, Ribbentrop (ambassador to the UK, later German foreign minister), and, the Greek chorus of the story, Winston Churchill.
We're shown Munich in a progression of Western appeasement (or, often, diffidence) in the face of Italian and German provocations in foreign policy. It began, we're told, as a common policy from the 1920s, built on a number of peace treaties in the hope of averting another war. However, the 1930s would see increasingly brazen provocations, notably the 1935 Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the German march on the demilitarized Rhineland, the Italo-German presence in the Spanish civil war from 1936, the rearmament of ground and air units and, through these, the breach of longstanding and newer (often stopgap) accords with the Western powers.
The author shows us how the memory of the (First) World War would weigh on British and French leadership, and stresses their defeatism and aversion to another great war, but he also shows the shifts in their publics' mindset as Germany and Italy continued to defy the conventional wisdom. We learn, particularly, of defeatism among the British and French general staffs, which could not have helped the civilian leaders' confidence, and how propaganda (particularly fear of air attack) fed that mindset.
There were clues that the Germans and Italians were weaker than they proclaimed. The 1938 seizure of Austria was brazen enough, but the German army left broken-down vehicles all the way to Vienna. Certainly, the Germans were well aware (as Gen. Jodl would testify at Nuremberg) of their weaknesses on the ground and in the air; when the Sudetenland crisis with Czechoslovakia loomed in September 1938 the presence of 34 Czech divisions and 100 French should have counted for more. In short, instead the French and British, at Munich, surrendered the Czech Sudetenland (and with it, the border defenses) without their input. The British and French public seemed relieved at the time (Churchill was scorned for calling it the defeat it was) but were quickly repelled by the Kristallnacht pogrom of November 1938 and then the German seizure, in March 1939, of the rest of Czechoslovakia, in breach of the assurances at Munich.
Even then (no spoiler) it's astonishing to read of the continuing diffidence on the Allied side. Chamberlain planned to adjourn Parliament for August and September 1939 (!), and let British and French defense negotiations with the USSR drift, and drift, until Stalin struck a deal with Hitler instead. Even with the war under way in 1939, the Western powers would, in essence, abandon Poland as well, by keeping their armies motionless on the Western Front -- the well-named Phoney War.
We do find that some British figures, many in Chamberlain's own party, did begin to push back. We find that Churchill was not simply on the back bench but was serving on at least one Parliamentary subcommittee on defense technology, in fields like aircraft design and radar, that would be crucial.
In all, it's a thorough, gripping, indispensable and damning retelling of the run-up to World War II and the disasters waiting in 1940. Highest recommendation.
(Read in advance-reading copy via Amazon Vine).
We're shown Munich in a progression of Western appeasement (or, often, diffidence) in the face of Italian and German provocations in foreign policy. It began, we're told, as a common policy from the 1920s, built on a number of peace treaties in the hope of averting another war. However, the 1930s would see increasingly brazen provocations, notably the 1935 Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the German march on the demilitarized Rhineland, the Italo-German presence in the Spanish civil war from 1936, the rearmament of ground and air units and, through these, the breach of longstanding and newer (often stopgap) accords with the Western powers.
The author shows us how the memory of the (First) World War would weigh on British and French leadership, and stresses their defeatism and aversion to another great war, but he also shows the shifts in their publics' mindset as Germany and Italy continued to defy the conventional wisdom. We learn, particularly, of defeatism among the British and French general staffs, which could not have helped the civilian leaders' confidence, and how propaganda (particularly fear of air attack) fed that mindset.
There were clues that the Germans and Italians were weaker than they proclaimed. The 1938 seizure of Austria was brazen enough, but the German army left broken-down vehicles all the way to Vienna. Certainly, the Germans were well aware (as Gen. Jodl would testify at Nuremberg) of their weaknesses on the ground and in the air; when the Sudetenland crisis with Czechoslovakia loomed in September 1938 the presence of 34 Czech divisions and 100 French should have counted for more. In short, instead the French and British, at Munich, surrendered the Czech Sudetenland (and with it, the border defenses) without their input. The British and French public seemed relieved at the time (Churchill was scorned for calling it the defeat it was) but were quickly repelled by the Kristallnacht pogrom of November 1938 and then the German seizure, in March 1939, of the rest of Czechoslovakia, in breach of the assurances at Munich.
Even then (no spoiler) it's astonishing to read of the continuing diffidence on the Allied side. Chamberlain planned to adjourn Parliament for August and September 1939 (!), and let British and French defense negotiations with the USSR drift, and drift, until Stalin struck a deal with Hitler instead. Even with the war under way in 1939, the Western powers would, in essence, abandon Poland as well, by keeping their armies motionless on the Western Front -- the well-named Phoney War.
We do find that some British figures, many in Chamberlain's own party, did begin to push back. We find that Churchill was not simply on the back bench but was serving on at least one Parliamentary subcommittee on defense technology, in fields like aircraft design and radar, that would be crucial.
In all, it's a thorough, gripping, indispensable and damning retelling of the run-up to World War II and the disasters waiting in 1940. Highest recommendation.
(Read in advance-reading copy via Amazon Vine).
April 16, 2019
Appeasing Hitler – A terrific book that reminds us who the Guilty people were
When appeasement finally failed, my Grandfather and his countrymen found out what happens when politicians let the people down. He was with the 8th Engineers trying to stop the Nazi invasion of Poland alongside other soldiers, awaiting help that never came from their allies in Britain and France.
When Neville Chamberlain came back from Munich waving a piece of paper declaring ‘peace in our time,’ having already Czechoslovakia down river. It was stated that the disaster of Munich 1938 saved war for a year, as it meant rearmament could take place. A plausible argument if it were not for those who supported appeasement who repeated this line often and sometimes taken as a historical fact. Reading this book, you will find that in 1938, Germany also was not ready for war, and if the British and French had attacked Germany things may have been different. But we will never know.
In this excellent debut, historian Tim Bourverie, sets out his argument, in a fine and very readable book. Any student who manages to graduate with a degree in Modern History, will tell you most books on appeasement are as dry as a bone. This is one of the most engaging history books I have read in a very long time. What Bourverie has done is written a vivid, detailed and one of the most fascinating investigations on what should bring shame on all those politicians that took part in the machinations of the 1930s.
When ‘Cato’ published The Guilty Men, back in 1940 and drew up a list Guilty Men, Bourverie’s list is far longer. Showing that no stone has been left unturned, there are some surprising inclusions, and the lengths they would go to support appeasement and Germany. How the editors of both The Times and the Daily Mail were pro-Hitler and pro- appeasement. How the director-general of the BBC offered to fly the Swastika from the roof of Broadcasting House! I will also add Nancy Astor, the first female to take her seat in the House, was an avid fan of Nazi Germany along with the rest of her Cliveden Set.
Bourverie also records the heroes, and not just Churchill, and how the Foreign Office was often in despair at Lord Halifax and the cohort around Chamberlain. What this book does remind us, that it is easy to point out the guilty when we look back at distance. People have forgotten that appeasement was a popular policy in the country as a whole. People could remember the Great War and what that had delivered on many families across the country. How appeasement did not start with Chamberlain, but that he was the most intransigent supporter of the policy.
What I do like is that Bourverie puts the case clearly against those who say that Chamberlain had allowed Britain to rearm, they only real thing he had managed was to unit the country in preparation for war. By 1939, Germany was in a more powerful position than it had been the year before, and Hitler got the war he wanted. Sometimes Bouverie offers to much hindsight, but I would argue that is his journalistic tendencies breaking through, as he grows as a historian, he will offer up less of the Monday Quarterback and more analysis.
This is an exceptional debut and will be on University reading lists very shortly, and an brilliant addition to the appeasement canon.
When appeasement finally failed, my Grandfather and his countrymen found out what happens when politicians let the people down. He was with the 8th Engineers trying to stop the Nazi invasion of Poland alongside other soldiers, awaiting help that never came from their allies in Britain and France.
When Neville Chamberlain came back from Munich waving a piece of paper declaring ‘peace in our time,’ having already Czechoslovakia down river. It was stated that the disaster of Munich 1938 saved war for a year, as it meant rearmament could take place. A plausible argument if it were not for those who supported appeasement who repeated this line often and sometimes taken as a historical fact. Reading this book, you will find that in 1938, Germany also was not ready for war, and if the British and French had attacked Germany things may have been different. But we will never know.
In this excellent debut, historian Tim Bourverie, sets out his argument, in a fine and very readable book. Any student who manages to graduate with a degree in Modern History, will tell you most books on appeasement are as dry as a bone. This is one of the most engaging history books I have read in a very long time. What Bourverie has done is written a vivid, detailed and one of the most fascinating investigations on what should bring shame on all those politicians that took part in the machinations of the 1930s.
When ‘Cato’ published The Guilty Men, back in 1940 and drew up a list Guilty Men, Bourverie’s list is far longer. Showing that no stone has been left unturned, there are some surprising inclusions, and the lengths they would go to support appeasement and Germany. How the editors of both The Times and the Daily Mail were pro-Hitler and pro- appeasement. How the director-general of the BBC offered to fly the Swastika from the roof of Broadcasting House! I will also add Nancy Astor, the first female to take her seat in the House, was an avid fan of Nazi Germany along with the rest of her Cliveden Set.
Bourverie also records the heroes, and not just Churchill, and how the Foreign Office was often in despair at Lord Halifax and the cohort around Chamberlain. What this book does remind us, that it is easy to point out the guilty when we look back at distance. People have forgotten that appeasement was a popular policy in the country as a whole. People could remember the Great War and what that had delivered on many families across the country. How appeasement did not start with Chamberlain, but that he was the most intransigent supporter of the policy.
What I do like is that Bourverie puts the case clearly against those who say that Chamberlain had allowed Britain to rearm, they only real thing he had managed was to unit the country in preparation for war. By 1939, Germany was in a more powerful position than it had been the year before, and Hitler got the war he wanted. Sometimes Bouverie offers to much hindsight, but I would argue that is his journalistic tendencies breaking through, as he grows as a historian, he will offer up less of the Monday Quarterback and more analysis.
This is an exceptional debut and will be on University reading lists very shortly, and an brilliant addition to the appeasement canon.
September 25, 2021
Chamberlain il considera pe Hitler "pe jumatate nebun".Tot timpul a cautat in cealalta jumatate a lui Hitler ratiunea sau intelegerea. Din pacate pentru Chamberlain (si pentru intreaga lume) cealalta jumatate s-a dovedit la fel de nebuna.
June 24, 2024
This is an excellent history of appeasement from a UK point of view but it is also a rather conventional and old fashioned history of the period. There was a lot of hype about this being a new evaluation and one that would attack established shibboleths but that had a marketing spin to it. It is useful to be reminded of how much the horrific legacy of WWI had on the events of the 1920s and 30s and how the general unease about the Versailles treaties lead large numbers of people to have more sympathy for German desire to revise the treaty rather than concerns of those like the French who worried about such revisions. But it is also useful to remember, and this not a point Mr. Bouverie gives much time at all to, how many of the people pronouncing authoritatively on the future of Germany and Europe and the UK's relationship to them were speaking with a degree of ignorance that should have made them blush and hold their tongues (of course politicians and others talking rot about foreign affairs are still with us).
I find Bouverie's account of Churchill utterly predictable he may point out flaws but more in the light of amazed at Churchill's genius then with a critical eye at what a damaging blowhard he was. A huge amount of the warnings he gave about Germany were wrong (rather like the alarms about the non existent missile gap Kennedy used as scare tactics in his political career). His successful frustration every move to provide some satisfaction to Indian nationalist before WWII has a huge responsibility for the horrors of the partition that came with independence.
Ultimately both Churchill and the appeasers were working not on a basis of antipathy or admiration of Hitler but about the preservation of British power. Churchill would have been as aggressively negative about Germany's resurrection as a military power if it had remained the Weimar republic. Churchill didn't defy the Nazis, he struggled to preserve Britain's pretty shaky imperial preeminence. That was what he cared about and in a different way that is what appeasers wanted as well. Churchill had as much interest or concern for Czechoslovakia as he had in Poland. He would have sacrificed the Czechs as he sacrificed the Poles but, to paraphrase Frederick II of Prussia on Marie Theresa and the partitions of Poland in the 18th century, 'he cried, when he betrayed; the more he cried, the more he betrayed.' What mattered was the preservation of Britain's honour and power. It wasn't so much what Munich did to Czechoslovakia that mattered but what it revealed about Britain.
The fact that after the defeat of the Nazis they were revealed as an absolutely repugnant regime gave a retrospective glow of moral purpose to the anti-appeasers that was without foundation. It is time for appeasement, like all the other actions of British governments in the 20th century right up until it's idiotic involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq, were seen as increasingly pointless attempts to preserve an ever more chimerical idea of British importance.
I find Bouverie's account of Churchill utterly predictable he may point out flaws but more in the light of amazed at Churchill's genius then with a critical eye at what a damaging blowhard he was. A huge amount of the warnings he gave about Germany were wrong (rather like the alarms about the non existent missile gap Kennedy used as scare tactics in his political career). His successful frustration every move to provide some satisfaction to Indian nationalist before WWII has a huge responsibility for the horrors of the partition that came with independence.
Ultimately both Churchill and the appeasers were working not on a basis of antipathy or admiration of Hitler but about the preservation of British power. Churchill would have been as aggressively negative about Germany's resurrection as a military power if it had remained the Weimar republic. Churchill didn't defy the Nazis, he struggled to preserve Britain's pretty shaky imperial preeminence. That was what he cared about and in a different way that is what appeasers wanted as well. Churchill had as much interest or concern for Czechoslovakia as he had in Poland. He would have sacrificed the Czechs as he sacrificed the Poles but, to paraphrase Frederick II of Prussia on Marie Theresa and the partitions of Poland in the 18th century, 'he cried, when he betrayed; the more he cried, the more he betrayed.' What mattered was the preservation of Britain's honour and power. It wasn't so much what Munich did to Czechoslovakia that mattered but what it revealed about Britain.
The fact that after the defeat of the Nazis they were revealed as an absolutely repugnant regime gave a retrospective glow of moral purpose to the anti-appeasers that was without foundation. It is time for appeasement, like all the other actions of British governments in the 20th century right up until it's idiotic involvements in Afghanistan and Iraq, were seen as increasingly pointless attempts to preserve an ever more chimerical idea of British importance.
August 8, 2020
Thoroughly average. I don't understand this kind of history. We have perspective, why not use it? This is a familiar story, and Bouverie tells it ABC like a journalist, not a historian. There may be a few new details, but there are no new insights. He does not even try.
> the publication of a number of high-profile political memoirs suggested that the catastrophe had been one tremendous bungle. 'The nations', wrote Lloyd George in his best-selling War Memoirs , 'slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war without any trace of apprehension or dismay.'5 The statesmen had failed in 1914 and the younger generation was not going to allow them to fail again. On 9 February 1933, students at the Oxford Union approved by 275 votes to 153 the motion that 'This House will in no circumstances fight for its King and Country'.
> The evils of the regime were plain to see and yet many within the British elite chose to embrace Nazi Germany on account of its achievements and its opposition to communism. In so doing they were wont to indulge in moral relativism or make invidious parallels, such as Lloyd George's comment that Hitler had not shown half the ferocity towards the Jews as Cromwell had towards the Irish Catholics. … 'People of the governing classes think only of their own fortunes, which means hatred of the Reds', lamented the Government MP a few weeks later. 'This creates a perfectly artificial but at present most effective secret bond between ourselves and Hitler. Our class interests, on both sides, cut across our national interests.'
> To understand Hitler and his dark ideology, enquirers might have studied Mein Kampf . Yet in Britain, as in France, that declaration of intent was little read and even less understood. To begin with, the first English translation did not appear until 1933 and had been so heavily pruned of incriminating material that it was a third shorter than the original.
> Mussolini. The independence of Austria was a major Italian interest and the Duce moved troops to the Brenner Pass as a warning to Germany that Italy was not going to stand by and allow the union of Germany with Austria, the so-called Anschluss. This had a lasting effect on Chamberlain, who would continue to view Mussolini as a check on Hitler right up to the outbreak of war
> Though less concerned over the fate of the League, both Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain were similarly convinced that war with Germany could have no positive outcome. France 'might succeed in crushing Germany with the aid of Russia', mused the Prime Minister, 'but it would probably only result in Germany going Bolshevik'.
> In retrospect, the remilitarisation of the Rhineland was seen as a watershed in the inter-war years: the last chance of stopping Hitler without a major war. This interpretation, propounded by Churchill in The Gathering Storm, was based on the knowledge that Hitler's bold stroke had been a massive gamble and that even limited action by the French Army would have been enough to drive the Germans out of the zone. Indeed, contrary to the hundreds of thousands of soldiers reported by General Gamelin, only three thousand German troops had crossed onto the western bank of the Rhine
> the remilitarisation of the Rhineland greatly restricted France's ability to come to the aid of her allies in eastern Europe – Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia, not to mention Austria – by launching an invasion of Germany through the undefended zone. The door to Germany had been closed and the French had been humiliated in the process. Conversely, Germany had grown considerably stronger and Hitler had scored a triumph in the face of scepticism from his own Generals.
> when Winston was born lots of fairies swooped down on his cradle with gifts – imagination, eloquence, industry, ability, and then came a fairy who said 'No one person has a right to so many gifts', picked him up and gave him such a shake and twist that with all these gifts he was denied judgement and wisdom. And that is why while we delight to listen to him in this House we do not take his advice.
> For Hitler, Munich was ostensibly a triumph. He got everything he had demanded at Godesberg – the only real difference being, as Churchill pointed out, that the occupation was now staggered, over ten days, rather than happening all at once. Of course, as we now know, Hitler wanted a localised war which would have allowed him to annex the whole of Czechoslovakia and almost immediately regretted the deal he had made. … the Munich Conference destroyed a plot by the German opposition to remove Hitler from office the moment he gave the orders to march. Whether this coup, which was in place by 15 September and was led by the Chief of the General Staff, General Franz Halder, would have succeeded is doubtful. What is beyond doubt is that it was dead the moment the Western Prime Ministers decided to board their aeroplanes.
> From the perspective of the Western Powers, the principal defence of the Munich Agreement has rested on the fact that neither Britain nor France were ready for war in 1938 and that Munich granted them an extra year in which to prepare – the so-called 'breathing space'. … Germany was in no position to launch the Battle of Britain in 1938. Not only – as the events of 1939 and 1940 were to prove – did she first need to defeat her immediate neighbours and secure airfields along the Channel coast before she could turn her attention to Britain, but in 1938 the Luftwaffe was not equipped for a long-range strategic bombing campaign. Of course, not all of this was known to the Western leaders, many of whom were deceived by German propaganda. … the Germans were not ready for a major war in 1938 and would have been placed in an extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, position if Britain, France and the Soviet Union had joined forces in defence of Czechoslovakia … while the Western Powers made considerable progress in the 'extra year', the Germans made more, considerably outstripping the British and French on land and, to a lesser extent, in the air. … war for Czechoslovakia in 1938 would have split public opinion in both Britain and France, while it is unlikely that Britain would have enjoyed the support (at least initially) of the Dominions, all of which had made their opposition to war clear.
> Against this, however, must be weighed the effects of losing the opportunity of binding the Soviet Union into a 'Grand Alliance' against Nazi Germany (as advocated by Churchill) which, if it had come to conflict, would have forced the Germans into a protracted two-front war from the very beginning. There were, of course, good reasons for distrusting Stalin (as Churchill was later to discover) but there were even better reasons for distrusting Hitler, whose word Chamberlain was prepared to accept … Crucially, Munich convinced Hitler that the Western Powers would never fight but continue to accept his demands. 'Chamberlain shook with fear when I uttered the word war . Don't tell me he is dangerous', the Führer was heard to scoff, shortly after the Agreement. Later, when stiffening his Generals before the Polish campaign he declared, 'Our enemies are small worms. I saw them in Munich.'
> had succeeded in tapping the telephones of a number of leading anti-appeasers, including Churchill's. 'They, of course, are totally unaware of my knowledge of their proceedings', boasted Chamberlain to his sister Ida. But 'I had continual information of their doings and sayings which for the nth time demonstrated how completely Winston can deceive himself.'
> apart from attacks on British shipping, the Luftwaffe left the British Isles unmolested between September 1939 and July 1940. In return, the RAF dropped leaflets rather than bombs on German cities, while the French made a token advance of five miles into the Saarland before pausing and retreating to the safety of the Maginot Line. In Poland, it was very different. … In the east, the Soviets reported 50,000 Polish fatalities but no wounded – a statistic implying mass executions such as those which occurred near the Katyn Forest between March and May 1940.9 Over the next six years an estimated 5.7 million Poles died or were murdered under German and (temporary) Soviet occupation – one-fifth of the pre-war population
> That Halifax, rather than Churchill, was the preference of most Conservative MPs, the Labour and Liberal parties, the Cabinet, the press, Chamberlain and the King, is well documented. Immensely esteemed and devoid of enemies, despite his thirty-year political career, the high priest of respectable Toryism, as opposed to the erratic author of the Dardanelles, appeared to almost everyone as the obvious choice. The problem was that Halifax did not want the job
> the publication of a number of high-profile political memoirs suggested that the catastrophe had been one tremendous bungle. 'The nations', wrote Lloyd George in his best-selling War Memoirs , 'slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war without any trace of apprehension or dismay.'5 The statesmen had failed in 1914 and the younger generation was not going to allow them to fail again. On 9 February 1933, students at the Oxford Union approved by 275 votes to 153 the motion that 'This House will in no circumstances fight for its King and Country'.
> The evils of the regime were plain to see and yet many within the British elite chose to embrace Nazi Germany on account of its achievements and its opposition to communism. In so doing they were wont to indulge in moral relativism or make invidious parallels, such as Lloyd George's comment that Hitler had not shown half the ferocity towards the Jews as Cromwell had towards the Irish Catholics. … 'People of the governing classes think only of their own fortunes, which means hatred of the Reds', lamented the Government MP a few weeks later. 'This creates a perfectly artificial but at present most effective secret bond between ourselves and Hitler. Our class interests, on both sides, cut across our national interests.'
> To understand Hitler and his dark ideology, enquirers might have studied Mein Kampf . Yet in Britain, as in France, that declaration of intent was little read and even less understood. To begin with, the first English translation did not appear until 1933 and had been so heavily pruned of incriminating material that it was a third shorter than the original.
> Mussolini. The independence of Austria was a major Italian interest and the Duce moved troops to the Brenner Pass as a warning to Germany that Italy was not going to stand by and allow the union of Germany with Austria, the so-called Anschluss. This had a lasting effect on Chamberlain, who would continue to view Mussolini as a check on Hitler right up to the outbreak of war
> Though less concerned over the fate of the League, both Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain were similarly convinced that war with Germany could have no positive outcome. France 'might succeed in crushing Germany with the aid of Russia', mused the Prime Minister, 'but it would probably only result in Germany going Bolshevik'.
> In retrospect, the remilitarisation of the Rhineland was seen as a watershed in the inter-war years: the last chance of stopping Hitler without a major war. This interpretation, propounded by Churchill in The Gathering Storm, was based on the knowledge that Hitler's bold stroke had been a massive gamble and that even limited action by the French Army would have been enough to drive the Germans out of the zone. Indeed, contrary to the hundreds of thousands of soldiers reported by General Gamelin, only three thousand German troops had crossed onto the western bank of the Rhine
> the remilitarisation of the Rhineland greatly restricted France's ability to come to the aid of her allies in eastern Europe – Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia, not to mention Austria – by launching an invasion of Germany through the undefended zone. The door to Germany had been closed and the French had been humiliated in the process. Conversely, Germany had grown considerably stronger and Hitler had scored a triumph in the face of scepticism from his own Generals.
> when Winston was born lots of fairies swooped down on his cradle with gifts – imagination, eloquence, industry, ability, and then came a fairy who said 'No one person has a right to so many gifts', picked him up and gave him such a shake and twist that with all these gifts he was denied judgement and wisdom. And that is why while we delight to listen to him in this House we do not take his advice.
> For Hitler, Munich was ostensibly a triumph. He got everything he had demanded at Godesberg – the only real difference being, as Churchill pointed out, that the occupation was now staggered, over ten days, rather than happening all at once. Of course, as we now know, Hitler wanted a localised war which would have allowed him to annex the whole of Czechoslovakia and almost immediately regretted the deal he had made. … the Munich Conference destroyed a plot by the German opposition to remove Hitler from office the moment he gave the orders to march. Whether this coup, which was in place by 15 September and was led by the Chief of the General Staff, General Franz Halder, would have succeeded is doubtful. What is beyond doubt is that it was dead the moment the Western Prime Ministers decided to board their aeroplanes.
> From the perspective of the Western Powers, the principal defence of the Munich Agreement has rested on the fact that neither Britain nor France were ready for war in 1938 and that Munich granted them an extra year in which to prepare – the so-called 'breathing space'. … Germany was in no position to launch the Battle of Britain in 1938. Not only – as the events of 1939 and 1940 were to prove – did she first need to defeat her immediate neighbours and secure airfields along the Channel coast before she could turn her attention to Britain, but in 1938 the Luftwaffe was not equipped for a long-range strategic bombing campaign. Of course, not all of this was known to the Western leaders, many of whom were deceived by German propaganda. … the Germans were not ready for a major war in 1938 and would have been placed in an extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, position if Britain, France and the Soviet Union had joined forces in defence of Czechoslovakia … while the Western Powers made considerable progress in the 'extra year', the Germans made more, considerably outstripping the British and French on land and, to a lesser extent, in the air. … war for Czechoslovakia in 1938 would have split public opinion in both Britain and France, while it is unlikely that Britain would have enjoyed the support (at least initially) of the Dominions, all of which had made their opposition to war clear.
> Against this, however, must be weighed the effects of losing the opportunity of binding the Soviet Union into a 'Grand Alliance' against Nazi Germany (as advocated by Churchill) which, if it had come to conflict, would have forced the Germans into a protracted two-front war from the very beginning. There were, of course, good reasons for distrusting Stalin (as Churchill was later to discover) but there were even better reasons for distrusting Hitler, whose word Chamberlain was prepared to accept … Crucially, Munich convinced Hitler that the Western Powers would never fight but continue to accept his demands. 'Chamberlain shook with fear when I uttered the word war . Don't tell me he is dangerous', the Führer was heard to scoff, shortly after the Agreement. Later, when stiffening his Generals before the Polish campaign he declared, 'Our enemies are small worms. I saw them in Munich.'
> had succeeded in tapping the telephones of a number of leading anti-appeasers, including Churchill's. 'They, of course, are totally unaware of my knowledge of their proceedings', boasted Chamberlain to his sister Ida. But 'I had continual information of their doings and sayings which for the nth time demonstrated how completely Winston can deceive himself.'
> apart from attacks on British shipping, the Luftwaffe left the British Isles unmolested between September 1939 and July 1940. In return, the RAF dropped leaflets rather than bombs on German cities, while the French made a token advance of five miles into the Saarland before pausing and retreating to the safety of the Maginot Line. In Poland, it was very different. … In the east, the Soviets reported 50,000 Polish fatalities but no wounded – a statistic implying mass executions such as those which occurred near the Katyn Forest between March and May 1940.9 Over the next six years an estimated 5.7 million Poles died or were murdered under German and (temporary) Soviet occupation – one-fifth of the pre-war population
> That Halifax, rather than Churchill, was the preference of most Conservative MPs, the Labour and Liberal parties, the Cabinet, the press, Chamberlain and the King, is well documented. Immensely esteemed and devoid of enemies, despite his thirty-year political career, the high priest of respectable Toryism, as opposed to the erratic author of the Dardanelles, appeared to almost everyone as the obvious choice. The problem was that Halifax did not want the job
March 16, 2023
Политиката (или липсата на такава) на умиротворяване на Хитлер от страна на западните демокрации е повод за спорове между интересуващите се от историята на Втората световна война и на предхождащия я междувоенен период и днес. Наскоро излезе нов филм от Нетфликс ("Munich: The Edge of War (2021)"), драматизиращ събитията около Мюнхенското споразумение, а от година вече в студиа и статии се коментира, дали не сме свидетели на същите дипломатически грешки от края на 30-те години в контекста на Руско-Украинската война, започнала през 2022 г.
Според повечето съвременници на събитията, подкрепени по-късно и голям брой историци, вината за неуспешното възпиране на Хитлер от страна на Великобритания принадлежи персонално на двойката премиер и външен министър на кралството в края на 30-те години - Невил Чембърлейн и лорд Халифакс. Боувари обаче е на мнение, че историческата истина за "умиротворяването" е далеч по нюансирана и следва да отразява ред политически, социални, военни и икономически особености на британската държава и общество в този период. В книгата си той се съсредоточава именно върху британската реакция на нацисткия експанзионизъм, посочвайки все пак, че в дипломатическото уравнение трябва да бъдат пресмятани и други важни геополитически фактори - Франция, СССР и др.
Фокусът на "Аppeasing Hitler" е Великобритания. За целите на анализа си Боувъри стъпва върху солидно количество архивни материали от публични и частни фондове, някои от които са представени за първи път. За разлика от почти цяла Европ�� (Франция и може би Чехословакия са другите две изключения), островната държава съумява да запази демократичните си институции и не залитва по посока на авторитаризма или диктатурата. Ако в Германия на Хитлер или СССР външната политика на практика съвпада с волята на фюрера или вожда, то във Великобритания много повече фактори влияят върху вземането на решения, начело с най-важния за една парламентарна демокрация - "общественото мнение".
Така, без да оневинява Чембърлейн и Халифакс, които на моменти поемат самостоятелно руля на външната политика, Боуври демонстрира "люшкането" на политическите настроения в страната що се отнася до намеренията и действията на Адолф Хитлер. До самото избухване на войната, а дори и след това (в периода на т. нар. "странна война"), нацисткият режим има своите приятели и доброжелатели в кралството. Освен това докато бомбите не почват да валят над Лондон британското общество е ултра-пацифистки ориентирано, причина за което е шокът, изживян по време на Първата световна война. Преобладаващото мнение за Версайската система от 1919 г. е, че тя е крайно несправедлива спрямо победените и способна да подпали реакционни настроения сред тях, които на свой ред да предизвикат нова война. Ето защо потъпкването на клаузите на Версайския догововор една по една от Хитлер след 1933 г. не буди особена тревога във Великобритания, а никак не са малко и тези, които приветстват решителността на енергичния германски лидер. Поставени в такъв общественополитически контекст, решенията, които взема правителството Чембърлейн, не изглеждат никак нелогични. Зад тях стои солидна обществена (активна или пасивна) подкрепа. И не трябва да се чудим особено много на факта, че същото това британско общество отсвирва още на първите редовни избори след падането на Хитлер големия политически съперник на Чембърлейн, човекът, който поема от него премиерския пост и се превръща в герой - Уинстън Чърчил.
Трябва също така да отбележа, че Тим Боувъри е още в 30-те си години, а първата му книга го нарежда сред водещите историци на международните отношения. Това, освен че демонстрира нивото на британската образователна система (спрямо нашата например), е и повод за надежда, че изпод перото му ще излязат още стойностни книги.
Според повечето съвременници на събитията, подкрепени по-късно и голям брой историци, вината за неуспешното възпиране на Хитлер от страна на Великобритания принадлежи персонално на двойката премиер и външен министър на кралството в края на 30-те години - Невил Чембърлейн и лорд Халифакс. Боувари обаче е на мнение, че историческата истина за "умиротворяването" е далеч по нюансирана и следва да отразява ред политически, социални, военни и икономически особености на британската държава и общество в този период. В книгата си той се съсредоточава именно върху британската реакция на нацисткия експанзионизъм, посочвайки все пак, че в дипломатическото уравнение трябва да бъдат пресмятани и други важни геополитически фактори - Франция, СССР и др.
Фокусът на "Аppeasing Hitler" е Великобритания. За целите на анализа си Боувъри стъпва върху солидно количество архивни материали от публични и частни фондове, някои от които са представени за първи път. За разлика от почти цяла Европ�� (Франция и може би Чехословакия са другите две изключения), островната държава съумява да запази демократичните си институции и не залитва по посока на авторитаризма или диктатурата. Ако в Германия на Хитлер или СССР външната политика на практика съвпада с волята на фюрера или вожда, то във Великобритания много повече фактори влияят върху вземането на решения, начело с най-важния за една парламентарна демокрация - "общественото мнение".
Така, без да оневинява Чембърлейн и Халифакс, които на моменти поемат самостоятелно руля на външната политика, Боуври демонстрира "люшкането" на политическите настроения в страната що се отнася до намеренията и действията на Адолф Хитлер. До самото избухване на войната, а дори и след това (в периода на т. нар. "странна война"), нацисткият режим има своите приятели и доброжелатели в кралството. Освен това докато бомбите не почват да валят над Лондон британското общество е ултра-пацифистки ориентирано, причина за което е шокът, изживян по време на Първата световна война. Преобладаващото мнение за Версайската система от 1919 г. е, че тя е крайно несправедлива спрямо победените и способна да подпали реакционни настроения сред тях, които на свой ред да предизвикат нова война. Ето защо потъпкването на клаузите на Версайския догововор една по една от Хитлер след 1933 г. не буди особена тревога във Великобритания, а никак не са малко и тези, които приветстват решителността на енергичния германски лидер. Поставени в такъв общественополитически контекст, решенията, които взема правителството Чембърлейн, не изглеждат никак нелогични. Зад тях стои солидна обществена (активна или пасивна) подкрепа. И не трябва да се чудим особено много на факта, че същото това британско общество отсвирва още на първите редовни избори след падането на Хитлер големия политически съперник на Чембърлейн, човекът, който поема от него премиерския пост и се превръща в герой - Уинстън Чърчил.
Трябва също така да отбележа, че Тим Боувъри е още в 30-те си години, а първата му книга го нарежда сред водещите историци на международните отношения. Това, освен че демонстрира нивото на британската образователна система (спрямо нашата например), е и повод за надежда, че изпод перото му ще излязат още стойностни книги.
April 26, 2019
A comprehensive and eminently readable account of the failure of Britain's politicians and diplomats to prevent the domination of Europe by Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime.
This is a brilliant debut by former political journalist, Tim Bouverie, detailing the rise of Hitler from the early 1930's to the fall of France in the summer of 1940. He examines every aspect of Britain's repeated attempts to satisfy Hitler's growing demands to extend Germany's power in Central Europe.
As early as 1933, Britain's Ambassador to Germany, Sir Horace Rumbold, was warning of the dangers of Nazism and the possibility of another World War. Unlike most European politicians, Rumbold had read what Hitler planned for Europe in "Mein Kampf".
Several other major British politicians, including Winston Churchill, were to echo his fears, but far too many felt that the only way to stop Hitler was by means of appeasement. So it was that over the course of several years, governments led by Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, tolerated the worst excesses of Germany's Nazis and Italy's Fascists who also enjoyed great support from Britain's upper classes. The latter - aided by major British newspapers - were only too happy to foster closer Anglo-German ties and pressure Chamberlain and his ministers to work with the Nazis who were seen as a bulwark against the Soviet Union.
In all his dealings with Chamberlain and various British diplomats, Hitler got what he wanted and, even with hindsight, one can only despair at their failure to realise that Hitler's lust for power would never be satisfied. Although a history book, there are times when Tim Bouverie's book reads like a political thriller as time and again appeasers and anti-appeasers battle for supremacy within Britain's Houses of Parliament and throughout the corridors of power in Europe.
This book is a must for anyone interested in the history of the Second World War. Highly recommended.
This is a brilliant debut by former political journalist, Tim Bouverie, detailing the rise of Hitler from the early 1930's to the fall of France in the summer of 1940. He examines every aspect of Britain's repeated attempts to satisfy Hitler's growing demands to extend Germany's power in Central Europe.
As early as 1933, Britain's Ambassador to Germany, Sir Horace Rumbold, was warning of the dangers of Nazism and the possibility of another World War. Unlike most European politicians, Rumbold had read what Hitler planned for Europe in "Mein Kampf".
Several other major British politicians, including Winston Churchill, were to echo his fears, but far too many felt that the only way to stop Hitler was by means of appeasement. So it was that over the course of several years, governments led by Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, tolerated the worst excesses of Germany's Nazis and Italy's Fascists who also enjoyed great support from Britain's upper classes. The latter - aided by major British newspapers - were only too happy to foster closer Anglo-German ties and pressure Chamberlain and his ministers to work with the Nazis who were seen as a bulwark against the Soviet Union.
In all his dealings with Chamberlain and various British diplomats, Hitler got what he wanted and, even with hindsight, one can only despair at their failure to realise that Hitler's lust for power would never be satisfied. Although a history book, there are times when Tim Bouverie's book reads like a political thriller as time and again appeasers and anti-appeasers battle for supremacy within Britain's Houses of Parliament and throughout the corridors of power in Europe.
This book is a must for anyone interested in the history of the Second World War. Highly recommended.
November 16, 2022
"Drapanie krokodyla po głowie z nadzieją, że wreszcie zacznie mruczeć".
Czym była podyktowana polityka appeasementu? Pacyfizmem po I wojnie światowej? Realpolitik? Skrajnym egoizmem? Ukrytym rasizmem? Tęsknotą warstw wyższych za dyktaturą? Przyczyn zapewne jak to w życiu było wiele. Jedno po przeczytaniu książki jest dla mnie pewne. Rząd Wielkiej Brytanii zamiast nadać ton opinii publicznej, schronił się za nią. Pozwalając w ten sposób wybrzmieć hasłom "nie chcemy umierać za Gdańsk", a wcześniej
za Czechosłowację,
za Austrię,
za Abisynię,
za Mandżurię.
Konferencja w Monachium była obrzydliwa, ale nie tylko dlatego, że kupczono na niej innym panśtwem. Najbardziej wstrętna była radość opinii publicznej z tak osiągniętego "pokoju".
Obojętność w obliczu zła, jest jeszcze większym złem. Warto o tym pamiętać zwłaszcza dzisiaj.
Czym była podyktowana polityka appeasementu? Pacyfizmem po I wojnie światowej? Realpolitik? Skrajnym egoizmem? Ukrytym rasizmem? Tęsknotą warstw wyższych za dyktaturą? Przyczyn zapewne jak to w życiu było wiele. Jedno po przeczytaniu książki jest dla mnie pewne. Rząd Wielkiej Brytanii zamiast nadać ton opinii publicznej, schronił się za nią. Pozwalając w ten sposób wybrzmieć hasłom "nie chcemy umierać za Gdańsk", a wcześniej
za Czechosłowację,
za Austrię,
za Abisynię,
za Mandżurię.
Konferencja w Monachium była obrzydliwa, ale nie tylko dlatego, że kupczono na niej innym panśtwem. Najbardziej wstrętna była radość opinii publicznej z tak osiągniętego "pokoju".
Obojętność w obliczu zła, jest jeszcze większym złem. Warto o tym pamiętać zwłaszcza dzisiaj.
October 22, 2020
interesting book looking at events leading up to WW2 informative but was a bit journalistic though but will open up a debate on the appeasement years and what happened with Britains policy
August 16, 2023
Gullibility. In the final analysis, this book is about gullibility. Chamberlain and other British and French politicians were knowledgeable, skilled, experienced but despite their personal strengths they ended in a state of collective delusion when dealing with dictators. Viewing the same facts and the same behaviors, Chamberlain and Churchill came to opposite conclusions about the strategies to adopt when reacting to aggressions directed by Hitler and Mussolini.
The appeasers could not believe that Hitler really wanted to risk war to attain his goal of expanding German territory while Churchill was convinced that Hitler and his regime were not a normal government, entirely atypical with internal and external violence and aggressions being the defining characteristics of their regimes. German propaganda was aware that Churchill knew and understood who they really were and considered him their main British political adversary despite the fact that he was a simple MP during that period. The book very clearly exposes how this came about as there were multiple factors at play to be considered by political leaders of the period: state finances, public opinion, alliances, military preparedness.
The policy of appeasement was self defeating; Nazi Germany became stronger with each concession increasing the risks for France and Britain. Hitler became convinced that the leaders of democracies were weak and was emboldened with his plans for future aggressions.
The real question is about the role of the leaders in democracies when faced with unpopular decisions when public opinion is not favorable to being involved in a conflict. Chamberlain did not want to increase military preparedness because of the risk of provoking Hitler and the impact on state finances. He could not believe that his country was about to face an existential threat because reasonable men should be able to find reasonable solutions; but what happens if your enemy is not reasonable? This lack of imagination and the level of denial were staggering with dire consequences.
The appeasers could not believe that Hitler really wanted to risk war to attain his goal of expanding German territory while Churchill was convinced that Hitler and his regime were not a normal government, entirely atypical with internal and external violence and aggressions being the defining characteristics of their regimes. German propaganda was aware that Churchill knew and understood who they really were and considered him their main British political adversary despite the fact that he was a simple MP during that period. The book very clearly exposes how this came about as there were multiple factors at play to be considered by political leaders of the period: state finances, public opinion, alliances, military preparedness.
The policy of appeasement was self defeating; Nazi Germany became stronger with each concession increasing the risks for France and Britain. Hitler became convinced that the leaders of democracies were weak and was emboldened with his plans for future aggressions.
The real question is about the role of the leaders in democracies when faced with unpopular decisions when public opinion is not favorable to being involved in a conflict. Chamberlain did not want to increase military preparedness because of the risk of provoking Hitler and the impact on state finances. He could not believe that his country was about to face an existential threat because reasonable men should be able to find reasonable solutions; but what happens if your enemy is not reasonable? This lack of imagination and the level of denial were staggering with dire consequences.
June 9, 2020
I rather enjoyed this book, although I finished it sooner than expected after finding the last 150 pages or so were all just references and notes!
This period is a bit more modern than I’m normally interested in, but I feel that this book is different to the majority of other books written about this period due to the unique way it focuses on the build up to the war and the political appeasement movement rather than the war itself.
All in all, I enjoyed this book a lot more than I expected to, so would definitely recommend. 😃
This period is a bit more modern than I’m normally interested in, but I feel that this book is different to the majority of other books written about this period due to the unique way it focuses on the build up to the war and the political appeasement movement rather than the war itself.
All in all, I enjoyed this book a lot more than I expected to, so would definitely recommend. 😃
December 18, 2023
Step by step Tim Bouverie walks us through what, in hindsight, is the unfathomable policy of the English government to appease Hitler during the years 1933 and until the outbreak of war in September 1939.
Despite the somewhat burdensome inclusion of endless minor characters who took part in the implementation of this policy, whether formally or informally, and despite the known outcome of this policy, the book reads like a thriller.
Tim Bouverie methodically and linearly demonstrates how, through the inaction of England and France, the isolationist policy of the US, and the weakness of the League of nations, Hitler is allowed to build up Germany's military power and to de-facto begin his conquest of Europe throughout these years, well before the formal declaration of war. The spearhead for this inaction was Neville Chamberlain and his appeasement policy culminating in the Munich Conference of September 1938.
Following the flow of Tim Bouverie's narration of the period, bolstered by private behind-the-scenes correspondence and testimony on the mind-set of leaders on both sides, the inevitable course and outcome of the appeasement policy seems so evident, that it's difficult to understand how strong opposing voices, led by Churchill who predicted its inevitable outcome, were silenced.
And so Hitler, at the pace and force that suited him, implements the plan he had already outlined in his Mein Kampf, to become the most powerful force in Europe. He arms Germany in contravention of the Treaty of Versailles, he invades the demilitarized Rhineland, invades Austria and then Czechoslovakia, and to his surprise - nothing happens. The testimonies and correspondence are riveting. There was no pushback whatsoever, other than diplomatic outrage and further efforts at appeasement.
Bouverie also gives the background of the atmosphere in England upon which Chamberlain's policy prospered for so many years, enabling the catastrophic scale of WWII. It's interesting to realize how party politics and personal ambition were central to the generation and maintaining of this policy, despite Hitler's inexorable progression to the domination of Europe.
The book gives an in-depth view and analysis of these years in England in all its complexity and it's a fascinating read.
Despite the somewhat burdensome inclusion of endless minor characters who took part in the implementation of this policy, whether formally or informally, and despite the known outcome of this policy, the book reads like a thriller.
Tim Bouverie methodically and linearly demonstrates how, through the inaction of England and France, the isolationist policy of the US, and the weakness of the League of nations, Hitler is allowed to build up Germany's military power and to de-facto begin his conquest of Europe throughout these years, well before the formal declaration of war. The spearhead for this inaction was Neville Chamberlain and his appeasement policy culminating in the Munich Conference of September 1938.
Following the flow of Tim Bouverie's narration of the period, bolstered by private behind-the-scenes correspondence and testimony on the mind-set of leaders on both sides, the inevitable course and outcome of the appeasement policy seems so evident, that it's difficult to understand how strong opposing voices, led by Churchill who predicted its inevitable outcome, were silenced.
And so Hitler, at the pace and force that suited him, implements the plan he had already outlined in his Mein Kampf, to become the most powerful force in Europe. He arms Germany in contravention of the Treaty of Versailles, he invades the demilitarized Rhineland, invades Austria and then Czechoslovakia, and to his surprise - nothing happens. The testimonies and correspondence are riveting. There was no pushback whatsoever, other than diplomatic outrage and further efforts at appeasement.
Bouverie also gives the background of the atmosphere in England upon which Chamberlain's policy prospered for so many years, enabling the catastrophic scale of WWII. It's interesting to realize how party politics and personal ambition were central to the generation and maintaining of this policy, despite Hitler's inexorable progression to the domination of Europe.
The book gives an in-depth view and analysis of these years in England in all its complexity and it's a fascinating read.
March 20, 2023
Ensayo en el que, a través de fuentes primarias, secundarias, documentos oficiales, correspondencia privada y artículos periodísticos, Tim Bouverie hace un repaso muy detallado de los llamados años del apaciguamiento, en los que las potencias occidentales, y en especial el Imperio Británico, su gobierno y diplomacia, actuaron sobre bases encaminadas a evitar una guerra y no a frenar a los dictadores. El libro está escrito con agilidad, no se limita a describir los hechos, como hacen otros historiadores, sino que añade ciertas cualidades emocionales a los protagonistas del relato, lo que permite una mayor cercanía (o repulsión) al lector a la hora de entender lo que durante todos esos años ocurrió. El libro se lee con mucho interés y, hasta cierto punto, es adictivo. Un excelente relato.
February 25, 2020
If you feel you already know about the UK government’s policy of appeasing Hitler in the period just before the outbreak of war, then Tim Bouverie’s very comprehensive account, starting with Hitler coming to power in 1933, will almost certainly fill you in on a lot you don’t know. Through access to private letters and diaries, he not only follows the political machinations but also what many people outside of politics were thinking. While much of it was familiar to me, there were still some surprises. For example, the government acquiescing to Hitler’s request to get sections of the British press to tone down their negative portrayals of him, including putting pressure on the popular cartoonist, David Lowe.
September 25, 2019
This book will open your eyes to the events leading up to and following the failed Munich Pact, meant to "appease" Hitler from seeking territory through invasions by handing over the Sudetenland, which Hitler wanted because of its German population.
The story we all know is that Chamberlain did not have the courage to stand up to Hitler, but that is way too simple. The statesmen of the time had been through the destruction of World War I and would do whatever they could to avoid another war. Czechoslovakia was an artificial country, created by the Versailles agreement after WWI. The European powers were more threatened by communism than Nazism, seeing Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union (led by another dictator). Britain and France were not militarily prepared for another war -- although, it turns out, neither were the Germans.
In other words, it's not so simple as Chamberlain was a wimp. It made me wonder how we would stand up today in the same situation. That's not to say that Chamberlain was so wonderful. He was clearly the wrong man to bargain with Hitler, and there were many missteps along the way. And, well, we all know what happened.
This was an excellent book. It started out a bit slow for me because of my limited understanding of British politics, but my interest increased once Chamberlain showed up. The book could have used more maps and a glossary of the main people involved. There were so many names that I often had to go to the index to remember who they were.
The story we all know is that Chamberlain did not have the courage to stand up to Hitler, but that is way too simple. The statesmen of the time had been through the destruction of World War I and would do whatever they could to avoid another war. Czechoslovakia was an artificial country, created by the Versailles agreement after WWI. The European powers were more threatened by communism than Nazism, seeing Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union (led by another dictator). Britain and France were not militarily prepared for another war -- although, it turns out, neither were the Germans.
In other words, it's not so simple as Chamberlain was a wimp. It made me wonder how we would stand up today in the same situation. That's not to say that Chamberlain was so wonderful. He was clearly the wrong man to bargain with Hitler, and there were many missteps along the way. And, well, we all know what happened.
This was an excellent book. It started out a bit slow for me because of my limited understanding of British politics, but my interest increased once Chamberlain showed up. The book could have used more maps and a glossary of the main people involved. There were so many names that I often had to go to the index to remember who they were.
January 4, 2022
This is a valuable addition to the large canon of work which seeks to explain the origins of the Second World War. It carefully explores the official initiatives to appease Nazi Germany. It also highlights the fruitless and damaging attempts by ‘amateur diplomats, mainly from the British upper classes who saw Nazism as a bulwark against Soviet communism, to appease Hitler by their own initiatives. Each sorry milestone on the road to war, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss, the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, are carefully analysed along with the failure of the democracies to take effective action. He overwhelming message however is that you cannot negotiate with evil and Hitler, his ideology and fellow travellers were unremittingly evil.
Perhaps it oversimplifies a highly complex chain of interlocking events but it seems to me to offer firm evidence of the dictum that ‘Clever people make the best fools’. Prominent British politicians of this era fell for the fatal belief that being clever is synonymous with having good judgement. It is not. Like so many clever people, Chamberlain and others were able to convince themselves of anything by forcing the available facts to fit their preconceived conclusions whilst ignoring anything which contradicted their chosen conclusions.
A superbly readable account of a tragic and shameful period of history.
Perhaps it oversimplifies a highly complex chain of interlocking events but it seems to me to offer firm evidence of the dictum that ‘Clever people make the best fools’. Prominent British politicians of this era fell for the fatal belief that being clever is synonymous with having good judgement. It is not. Like so many clever people, Chamberlain and others were able to convince themselves of anything by forcing the available facts to fit their preconceived conclusions whilst ignoring anything which contradicted their chosen conclusions.
A superbly readable account of a tragic and shameful period of history.
February 28, 2023
A fantastic narrative approach to Appeasement from Hitler's rise to power through to the end of the 'Phoney War', concentrating primarily on British policy (although with reference to other nations' attempts to pacify Hitler, specifically the French, the Soviet, and the Italian). It is well researched and strongly argued, but never loses its pace nor its ability to pull the reader in. An absolutely gripping read, told with both authority and passion.
July 8, 2019
I couldn’t stand the narrator of the audio book. He was all bombast and drama and it was painful to listen to. I may try again someday with the ebook.
June 17, 2022
Imaginemos un libro de ficción, o mejor, una película de Hollywood que nos plantee un argumento como el que se desarrolló en época de entre guerras en Europa. A más de uno le resultaría absurdo, pillado por los pelos, inverosímil. Y sin embargo ocurrió.
Bouverie nos narra con notable agilidad, se lee como una novela, las vicisitudes de la política y la diplomacia que llevaron al mundo a la Segunda Guerra Mundial y si no supiéramos que es historia real estaríamos esperando el giro dramático que salvara al mundo en el último momento, pero no hubo ese giro. Un libro que dados los tiempos que corremos deberían leer más de un político o dirigente occidental y cambiar Hitler por...
El único pero que le pongo al libro, aunque ya lo avisa el autor en la introducción, es que me hubiera gustado más información sobre otros gobiernos (francés, soviético, checo...) pero es un pero muy pequeño.
Bouverie nos narra con notable agilidad, se lee como una novela, las vicisitudes de la política y la diplomacia que llevaron al mundo a la Segunda Guerra Mundial y si no supiéramos que es historia real estaríamos esperando el giro dramático que salvara al mundo en el último momento, pero no hubo ese giro. Un libro que dados los tiempos que corremos deberían leer más de un político o dirigente occidental y cambiar Hitler por...
El único pero que le pongo al libro, aunque ya lo avisa el autor en la introducción, es que me hubiera gustado más información sobre otros gobiernos (francés, soviético, checo...) pero es un pero muy pequeño.
March 16, 2022
Talk about freakin boring but interesting kind of. This book is like a British history class on wwii. What is interesting is that what’s going on in the world today sounds like a lot of what happen leading into wwii. The appeasement of dictators is something that should not happen period.
May 29, 2019
This might be my last review of a book received through the discontinued Penguin Books First to Read program. I requested 29 since 2015 and was selected for 19 (I might read one more that I was not selected for, thus the "might") and I appreciate the opportunities.
Bouverie has composed an incredibly thorough relation of a narrow history of a particular time for a particular country, and particular players and their particularly disastrous choices of action. His political journalist chops are apparent...his research is extensive. For a reader not of his country, the insights were well received, including the acerbic observations throughout (on the future Edward VIII and his hands off opinion, Bouverie said "[l]acking intelligence and a sense of constitutional propriety, the Prince made his views clear ...") There are lessons here that are not being heeded in the country of this reader. I may draw crosshairs for finding parallels in a particular political party's appeasement of the heinous actions and comportment of the current (as of this writing) elected executive. There are other observations that parallel today; one being:
There is a lot here. A lot. I'll fast forward myself... Thanks to Bouverie, one can't help but feel for the bumbling of Chamberlain. When Germany invaded Czechoslovakia in 1939, Bouverie says
Bouverie snarks politely more than once, but (mostly) maintains his journalistic professionalism (I laughed at his comment on the British representative to the Soviet talks in 1939, Admiral the Honorable Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett-Ernle-Drax, as sounding "like a character from a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta."!) But he is hard on point in his conclusion
Very good history.
Bouverie has composed an incredibly thorough relation of a narrow history of a particular time for a particular country, and particular players and their particularly disastrous choices of action. His political journalist chops are apparent...his research is extensive. For a reader not of his country, the insights were well received, including the acerbic observations throughout (on the future Edward VIII and his hands off opinion, Bouverie said "[l]acking intelligence and a sense of constitutional propriety, the Prince made his views clear ...") There are lessons here that are not being heeded in the country of this reader. I may draw crosshairs for finding parallels in a particular political party's appeasement of the heinous actions and comportment of the current (as of this writing) elected executive. There are other observations that parallel today; one being:
I have the impression that the persons directing the policy of the Hitler Government are not normal. Many of us, indeed, have a feeling that we are living in a country where fanatics, hooligans and eccentrics have got the upper hand.Hitler laid out in plain text his intentions in his manifesto Mein Kampf, yet somehow the sign were ignored. (Obviously I wasn't there...and hindsight is always clearer.) Rumbold wrote to General Sir Ian Hamilton in 1938
- British Ambassador to Berlin [Sir Horace Rumbold] to the Foreign Secretary [Sir John Simon], June 30, 1933
The continued effort to exterminate the Jews [Bouverie inserts "four years before the Wannsee Conference at which the 'Final Soultion' was agreed"] is part of their policy I cannot understand and this is turning the world opinion against them with all its dangerous repercussions...Unheeded. Rumbold makes another appearance in the epigraph to chapter VII "Hitler's Wonderland":
I have rather come to the conclusion that he average Englishman - whilst full of common sense as regards to internal affairs - is often muddle-headed, sloppy and gullible when he considers foreign affairs.Huh. Fast forward to 2016 and since...little has changed save that maybe that common sense regarding internal affairs has waned (I speculate for Great Britain, but observe in the US.)
There is a lot here. A lot. I'll fast forward myself... Thanks to Bouverie, one can't help but feel for the bumbling of Chamberlain. When Germany invaded Czechoslovakia in 1939, Bouverie says
The consensus that appeasement was now dead was instantaneous. In one swift stroke, Hitler had broken his word - repudiating the claim that Sudetenland constituted his last territorial demand - and revealed that "lust for conquest" with which his critics had always charged him. There could be no further dealings with such a man and, as one Chamberlain loyalist noted in his diary, "we" should fight him as soon as "we are strong enough."The French knew they had to prepare for war, but "Chamberlain, by contrast, did not immediately grasp the transformative nature of the event."
Bouverie snarks politely more than once, but (mostly) maintains his journalistic professionalism (I laughed at his comment on the British representative to the Soviet talks in 1939, Admiral the Honorable Sir Reginald Aylmer Ranfurly Plunkett-Ernle-Drax, as sounding "like a character from a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta."!) But he is hard on point in his conclusion
The failure to perceive the true character of the Nazi regime and Adolf Hitler stands as the single greatest failure of British policy makers during this period, since it was from this that all subsequent failures - the failure to rearm sufficiently, the failure to build alliances (not the least with the Soviet Union), the failure to project British power and the failure to educate public opinion - stemmed. For defenders of appeasement, this is an exercise in ahistoricism.We are failing today to maintain alliances, failing to measure the threats of dictatorial nations, allowing immediate twitting distractions to sway eyes from other threats such as Daesh. Those who do not study history might be doomed to repeat it, but those who do are too often forced to watch those who don't.
Very good history.
November 13, 2021
The road to world war in the 1930s is scarcely virgin ground for historians, but Tim Bouverie's account is not only a model of clarity and narrative, it also has fresh information and insights.
His background as a journalist helps bring concision and storytelling skill. We can see the repeated mistakes being made by the British government as they concede ground to first Mussolini, and then Hitler.
But Bouverie also really places you in the heart of the action. His accounts of the diplomatic encounters really do put you in the room, and he brings both the main actors and the supporting cast to life.
You do then feel the tension building as war nears. The reader may know the destination but somehow you hope gainst hope that someone on the inside can work out that appeasement is a calamitous choice.
Bouverie is certainly not on the revisionist side. He is clear that appeasement, though perhaps well-intentioned, was never going to succeed, and that the signs were clear. He also provides persuasive evidence to trash the argument that it brought Britain time to prepare for conflict. Britain did add to its armoury between Munich and war, but Germany arguably became even more powerful.
Bouverie is good on the context too. Appeasement was perceived as popular with a public reluctant to live through another war; Chamberlain a hero when he returned from Munich. His glory was fleeting, but he was not defying the public mood.
The author is clear that Chamberlain's judgement was deeply flawed. Some of his intentions - notablt the desire to avoid the horror of war - were noble, but he was also a victim of vanity and arrogance.
He was far from alone though as Bouverie also includes accounts of figures both in and outside of government who were either prepared to tolerate Hitler, or actively admired him.
Chamberlain of course paid the political price, though as Bouverie explains, there was one final piece of partial redemption in 1940 when he chose to back Churchill rather than Foreign Secretary Halifax on whether or not to sue for peace.
This is Bouverie's first book, and a remarkably accomplished one, that left me keen to see where he'll turn his attention next.
His background as a journalist helps bring concision and storytelling skill. We can see the repeated mistakes being made by the British government as they concede ground to first Mussolini, and then Hitler.
But Bouverie also really places you in the heart of the action. His accounts of the diplomatic encounters really do put you in the room, and he brings both the main actors and the supporting cast to life.
You do then feel the tension building as war nears. The reader may know the destination but somehow you hope gainst hope that someone on the inside can work out that appeasement is a calamitous choice.
Bouverie is certainly not on the revisionist side. He is clear that appeasement, though perhaps well-intentioned, was never going to succeed, and that the signs were clear. He also provides persuasive evidence to trash the argument that it brought Britain time to prepare for conflict. Britain did add to its armoury between Munich and war, but Germany arguably became even more powerful.
Bouverie is good on the context too. Appeasement was perceived as popular with a public reluctant to live through another war; Chamberlain a hero when he returned from Munich. His glory was fleeting, but he was not defying the public mood.
The author is clear that Chamberlain's judgement was deeply flawed. Some of his intentions - notablt the desire to avoid the horror of war - were noble, but he was also a victim of vanity and arrogance.
He was far from alone though as Bouverie also includes accounts of figures both in and outside of government who were either prepared to tolerate Hitler, or actively admired him.
Chamberlain of course paid the political price, though as Bouverie explains, there was one final piece of partial redemption in 1940 when he chose to back Churchill rather than Foreign Secretary Halifax on whether or not to sue for peace.
This is Bouverie's first book, and a remarkably accomplished one, that left me keen to see where he'll turn his attention next.
April 9, 2020
A fascinating read on the years leading up to WW2 and how/why the war broke out and lasted for as long as it did.
Out of the atrocities of WW1 and the depression, it's interesting to read how so many British people were opposed to another war. In fact how many people, including politicians, press and the monarch were decidedly pro-German and impressed with Hitlers early years as leader.
Hitler was a mastermind in exploiting this. Disregarding the Treaty of Versailles, moving out of the League of Nations and targetting small countries such as Czechoslovakia who through Britain's arrogance and nonchalance was disregarded (most didn't know where it was, or as Bouverie notes, thought it sounded like a disease).
It's as captivating as it is frustrating to read. The signs, in hindsight, seem so obvious yet it's understandable why Britain had become so pacifist. I found myself rooting for Rumbold, Vansittart and Churchill who seemed the only ones to notice the obvious threat.
How Hitler raised a country out of a lost world war, rearmed, made allies and flounced the restrictions put in front of him whilst playing people off each other is astonishing and is highlighted so well by Bouverie.
It raises so many questions. Churchill's previous exploits meant that all faith was lost in him as a leader, what if this had not been the case and he served instead of the pro-appeasing Chamberlain? Had Britain been stronger in foreign policy and built a bond with France, and in turn, been more stringent with Germany over their post-WW1 capabilities. If stronger actions had been promised if Germany invaded the Czechs, then it's so easy to think how a 6-year atrocity could have been avoided.
These are just a small number of points that Bouverie highlights in what is a fantastic and ultimately readable narrative about 1933 up until Dunkirk.
Out of the atrocities of WW1 and the depression, it's interesting to read how so many British people were opposed to another war. In fact how many people, including politicians, press and the monarch were decidedly pro-German and impressed with Hitlers early years as leader.
Hitler was a mastermind in exploiting this. Disregarding the Treaty of Versailles, moving out of the League of Nations and targetting small countries such as Czechoslovakia who through Britain's arrogance and nonchalance was disregarded (most didn't know where it was, or as Bouverie notes, thought it sounded like a disease).
It's as captivating as it is frustrating to read. The signs, in hindsight, seem so obvious yet it's understandable why Britain had become so pacifist. I found myself rooting for Rumbold, Vansittart and Churchill who seemed the only ones to notice the obvious threat.
How Hitler raised a country out of a lost world war, rearmed, made allies and flounced the restrictions put in front of him whilst playing people off each other is astonishing and is highlighted so well by Bouverie.
It raises so many questions. Churchill's previous exploits meant that all faith was lost in him as a leader, what if this had not been the case and he served instead of the pro-appeasing Chamberlain? Had Britain been stronger in foreign policy and built a bond with France, and in turn, been more stringent with Germany over their post-WW1 capabilities. If stronger actions had been promised if Germany invaded the Czechs, then it's so easy to think how a 6-year atrocity could have been avoided.
These are just a small number of points that Bouverie highlights in what is a fantastic and ultimately readable narrative about 1933 up until Dunkirk.
November 9, 2023
Category: Non-fiction, history, international diplomacy
Page Count: 419 (Paperback Edition)
Year of Publication: 2019
Rating: 5/5
10-Word Summary: The diplomatic history of Neville Chamberlain’s failed policy of appeasement.
About Appeasement
Tim Bouverie wrote the authoritative book when it comes to Neville Chamberlain’s failed policy of appeasement in the 1930s. After getting through this masterpiece of a book, I had to stop and ask myself: “How did the British refrain from placing Chamberlain’s head on a spike?”
Appeasement begins with Adolf Hitler’s ascension as Chancellor of Germany in 1933. The British press didn’t know what to make of Hitler; The Times claimed he “was held to be the least dangerous solution of a problem bristling with dangers,” while The Economist, the Spectator, and the New Statesmen foolishly stated: “We shall not expect to see the Jews’ extermination, or the power of big finance overthrown.” (Pages 8-9) The French press was equally clueless, and reading all this gave me the realization that newspapers, in general, are terrible sources for geopolitical information, as journalists usually guess as to what a world leader is really up to, and their guesses do not constitute knowledge any more than the average person on the street who guesses correctly which side a six-sided die will fall on.
As for the policy of appeasement itself, Bouverie gives a wonderful explanation as to why it was the foreign policy of choice for Britain throughout the 1930s: The Allies believed that they were to blame for the rise of the Nazi Party; as a matter of fact, Nazism was “the natural, if violent, reaction to legitimate grievances stemming from Versailles.” (Page 48) At this point, the Treaty of Versailles had come to be viewed a treaty that was too harsh, hence the idea was that “the Treaty should be altered and Germany allowed to regain that place and status to which her size and history entitled her.” (Page 48) The only problem with this policy is that it assumed Hitler could be appeased, and few people saw Hitler for who he really was.
Mein Kampf
Anyone who reads Mein Kampf will be baffled at how open Hitler was in stating his foreign policy ambitions: He announces his desire to unite Germany with Austria, he announces his desire to expand Germany’s territory at the expense of Russia, who he refers to as a “culturally inferior” nation, and he announces that the French were the mortal enemy of the Germans. Hitler said the following about France:
Never suffer the rise of two continental powers in Europe. Regard any attempt to organize a second military power on German frontiers, even if only in the form of creating a state capable of military strength, as an attack on Germany, and in it see not only the right, but also the duty, to employ all means up to armed force to prevent the rise of such a state, or, if one has already risen, to smash it again. (Mein Kampf, Page 664; First Mariner Books Edition)
All of this begs the question: With Hitler’s foreign policy of territorial conquest out in the open, why did the British choose the policy of appeasement? If anything, one would think that the British leaders would favor to formulate some sort of Bismarck-style alliance system with France, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in an attempt to keep Hitler from conquest.
But Bouverie makes it clear that the British chose appeasement for the same reason we in the 2020s would chose appeasement if Adolf Hitler were around today: No one read Hitler’s book. And those that did read his book were of split opinion: Since Hitler was proclaiming that he was “a man of peace” early in his chancellorship, those that believed him dismissed his early writings as the “the moribund rantings of a young firebrand.” (Page 18) Even Neville Chamberlain, who had read excerpts of Mein Kampf, chose to ignore Hitler’s early writings, stating: “If I accepted the author’s conclusions I should despair.” (Page 418) This brings me to my final point and the main character of Bouverie’s book: Neville Chamberlain.
Neville Chamberlain
To be fair, I don’t want to put all the blame on Chamberlain, as Bouverie makes it clear that appeasement had already been the policy of choice for both the government and, more importantly, for the British people. Stanley Baldwin, who preceded Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister, admitted that even if he were to go back in time and try to convince the British populace that Germany was a threat and that Britain should focus on rearmament in the midst of an economy attempting to get out of the Great Depression, the effect would have been disastrous and have meant the loss of a General Election. (Pages 25-26) Indeed, it was Winston Churchill’s pursuit of rearmament that made him so unpopular in the 1930s until his eventual ascension to Prime Minister in 1940.
By the time Neville Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1935, his main goal was to balance the budget and cut expenses to get Britain out of the Great Depression; but he just so happened to take the job at the same time Hitler’s rearmament program was in full swing. Eerily, it was Chamberlain’s half-brother Austen Chamberlain who had reminded Neville after a dinner in 1936: “Neville, you must remember you don’t know anything about foreign affairs.” (Page 129) That statement turned out to be prophetic, as the rest of the book details how poorly Chamberlain handled the international situation. To make things worse, Chamberlain was hard-headed, always convinced that he was right. For example, his desire to appease Benito Mussolini’s aggression in Ethiopia would eventually lead to the resignation of his Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, all of which Bouverie brilliantly details in chapter ten. Chamberlain even went so far as to have secret channels of communication with Mussolini so as to not have to go through his secretary—an obvious sign that Chamberlain felt he could handle the international situation himself without the need to seek advice from any members of his cabinet. And when you couple Chamberlain’s stubbornness with the fact that he surrounded himself with “yes men” who were convinced that appeasing Hitler’s desires for German greatness was the right policy to pursue, what you get is a recipe for disaster.
Should You Read Appeasement?
The answer is a definite yes. Tim Bouverie’s first book is both a classic and a must-have for those who are interested in history—in particular the diplomatic history leading up to the Second World War—and the best source for explaining why Britain’s policy of appeasement failed to stop Adolf Hitler in his pursuit of empire. Bouverie does a wonderful job weaving the policy of appeasement in the 1930s into one dramatic narrative, and, if you can, read the book along with the audiobook narrated by John Sessions. Sessions did an amazing job narrating and deserves an equal amount of praise for his performance.
Page Count: 419 (Paperback Edition)
Year of Publication: 2019
Rating: 5/5
10-Word Summary: The diplomatic history of Neville Chamberlain’s failed policy of appeasement.
About Appeasement
Tim Bouverie wrote the authoritative book when it comes to Neville Chamberlain’s failed policy of appeasement in the 1930s. After getting through this masterpiece of a book, I had to stop and ask myself: “How did the British refrain from placing Chamberlain’s head on a spike?”
Appeasement begins with Adolf Hitler’s ascension as Chancellor of Germany in 1933. The British press didn’t know what to make of Hitler; The Times claimed he “was held to be the least dangerous solution of a problem bristling with dangers,” while The Economist, the Spectator, and the New Statesmen foolishly stated: “We shall not expect to see the Jews’ extermination, or the power of big finance overthrown.” (Pages 8-9) The French press was equally clueless, and reading all this gave me the realization that newspapers, in general, are terrible sources for geopolitical information, as journalists usually guess as to what a world leader is really up to, and their guesses do not constitute knowledge any more than the average person on the street who guesses correctly which side a six-sided die will fall on.
As for the policy of appeasement itself, Bouverie gives a wonderful explanation as to why it was the foreign policy of choice for Britain throughout the 1930s: The Allies believed that they were to blame for the rise of the Nazi Party; as a matter of fact, Nazism was “the natural, if violent, reaction to legitimate grievances stemming from Versailles.” (Page 48) At this point, the Treaty of Versailles had come to be viewed a treaty that was too harsh, hence the idea was that “the Treaty should be altered and Germany allowed to regain that place and status to which her size and history entitled her.” (Page 48) The only problem with this policy is that it assumed Hitler could be appeased, and few people saw Hitler for who he really was.
Mein Kampf
Anyone who reads Mein Kampf will be baffled at how open Hitler was in stating his foreign policy ambitions: He announces his desire to unite Germany with Austria, he announces his desire to expand Germany’s territory at the expense of Russia, who he refers to as a “culturally inferior” nation, and he announces that the French were the mortal enemy of the Germans. Hitler said the following about France:
Never suffer the rise of two continental powers in Europe. Regard any attempt to organize a second military power on German frontiers, even if only in the form of creating a state capable of military strength, as an attack on Germany, and in it see not only the right, but also the duty, to employ all means up to armed force to prevent the rise of such a state, or, if one has already risen, to smash it again. (Mein Kampf, Page 664; First Mariner Books Edition)
All of this begs the question: With Hitler’s foreign policy of territorial conquest out in the open, why did the British choose the policy of appeasement? If anything, one would think that the British leaders would favor to formulate some sort of Bismarck-style alliance system with France, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in an attempt to keep Hitler from conquest.
But Bouverie makes it clear that the British chose appeasement for the same reason we in the 2020s would chose appeasement if Adolf Hitler were around today: No one read Hitler’s book. And those that did read his book were of split opinion: Since Hitler was proclaiming that he was “a man of peace” early in his chancellorship, those that believed him dismissed his early writings as the “the moribund rantings of a young firebrand.” (Page 18) Even Neville Chamberlain, who had read excerpts of Mein Kampf, chose to ignore Hitler’s early writings, stating: “If I accepted the author’s conclusions I should despair.” (Page 418) This brings me to my final point and the main character of Bouverie’s book: Neville Chamberlain.
Neville Chamberlain
To be fair, I don’t want to put all the blame on Chamberlain, as Bouverie makes it clear that appeasement had already been the policy of choice for both the government and, more importantly, for the British people. Stanley Baldwin, who preceded Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister, admitted that even if he were to go back in time and try to convince the British populace that Germany was a threat and that Britain should focus on rearmament in the midst of an economy attempting to get out of the Great Depression, the effect would have been disastrous and have meant the loss of a General Election. (Pages 25-26) Indeed, it was Winston Churchill’s pursuit of rearmament that made him so unpopular in the 1930s until his eventual ascension to Prime Minister in 1940.
By the time Neville Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1935, his main goal was to balance the budget and cut expenses to get Britain out of the Great Depression; but he just so happened to take the job at the same time Hitler’s rearmament program was in full swing. Eerily, it was Chamberlain’s half-brother Austen Chamberlain who had reminded Neville after a dinner in 1936: “Neville, you must remember you don’t know anything about foreign affairs.” (Page 129) That statement turned out to be prophetic, as the rest of the book details how poorly Chamberlain handled the international situation. To make things worse, Chamberlain was hard-headed, always convinced that he was right. For example, his desire to appease Benito Mussolini’s aggression in Ethiopia would eventually lead to the resignation of his Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, all of which Bouverie brilliantly details in chapter ten. Chamberlain even went so far as to have secret channels of communication with Mussolini so as to not have to go through his secretary—an obvious sign that Chamberlain felt he could handle the international situation himself without the need to seek advice from any members of his cabinet. And when you couple Chamberlain’s stubbornness with the fact that he surrounded himself with “yes men” who were convinced that appeasing Hitler’s desires for German greatness was the right policy to pursue, what you get is a recipe for disaster.
Should You Read Appeasement?
The answer is a definite yes. Tim Bouverie’s first book is both a classic and a must-have for those who are interested in history—in particular the diplomatic history leading up to the Second World War—and the best source for explaining why Britain’s policy of appeasement failed to stop Adolf Hitler in his pursuit of empire. Bouverie does a wonderful job weaving the policy of appeasement in the 1930s into one dramatic narrative, and, if you can, read the book along with the audiobook narrated by John Sessions. Sessions did an amazing job narrating and deserves an equal amount of praise for his performance.
February 28, 2022
I got off to a slow start with this almost *two* years ago, but whipped through the second half this past weekend. It suddenly seemed freshly relevant.
The parallels between Putin now and the other fella in 1938 are stunning. Time and again Hitler expanded Germany's boundaries and was time and again forgiven/rewarded in the name of appeasement. By the time it was clear to those who would not see that appeasement only emboldened Hitler, the eventual war was more bloody and took longer than it should have.
The author concludes that had GB declared war a year sooner, it would have been a much briefer affair. The lesson I drew was that the current saga cannot conclude without deposing Putin.
The parallels between Putin now and the other fella in 1938 are stunning. Time and again Hitler expanded Germany's boundaries and was time and again forgiven/rewarded in the name of appeasement. By the time it was clear to those who would not see that appeasement only emboldened Hitler, the eventual war was more bloody and took longer than it should have.
The author concludes that had GB declared war a year sooner, it would have been a much briefer affair. The lesson I drew was that the current saga cannot conclude without deposing Putin.
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