Unholy Alliance: Muslims and Communists

Futures, 1991

Through a wide-ranging tour de force of geopolitical analysis, this article identifies the interrelationships between Islamic resurgence and the decline of communism. The fall of the Afghan regime, Soviet intervention and subsequent withdrawal, the fall of the Shah of Iran and US relations with Iran-all in the context of changing East-West relations-are analysed to assess Islamic, communist and global political futures. Two normative revolutionary processes are seen as underpinning these developments-the de-Leninization of Marxism and the dis-Royalization of Islam. When the monarch was overthrown in Afghanistan in 1973, and was succeeded by a leftist regime, few people realized the global consequences of that event. The stage was being set for two momentous processes in world history, each of which went far beyond the borders of Afghanistan. One process was indeed the dis-royalization of Islam, of which the fall of the Afghan monarch was only a minor illustration. The other process was the de-Leninization of Marxism-which soon engulfed much of Eastern Europe and profoundly affected the USSR itself. In the events which led to this latter process Afghanistan came to play a surprisingly important role globally. Let us look more closely at these processes.

Journal of Turkish Historical Researches, 2018

From its foundation, the Soviet regime had oppressed the Muslims through eradicating Muslim institutions such as mosques, madrassahs and shrines and taking measures against Muslim scholars and imams. When World War II began, the Stalin needed the support of Muslim ulama to legitimize the war effort against Nazis and mobilize Muslim soldiers. Muslim ulama, along with the authorities of other religions, supported the Soviet war efforts in exchange for the recognition of the state. As a result of this arrangement, an accredited body of Muslim scholars emerged during the war and remained effective in the upcoming decades. This accredited body was institutionalized and utilized by the state to sustain a form of Islam and Muslim population that do not threaten the regime. While these Muftiates served multiple functions, they were far away from fulfilling the needs of the Muslim population. The Soviet Muslims continued to join Sufi shrines and tariqahs in an attempt to preserve their religious customs and lifestyle. This situation brought about an Islamic life squeezed in between official and unofficial institutions and state authorities.

Journal of Church and State, 2005

Middle East Report, No 221, 2001

There have been considerable publications examining how the philosophy of religion, and Islam in particular, has developed in connection to political trajectories in the twentieth century and how we, as scholars, understand the dynamics of modern and contemporary religious politics. Following the post-modernist revision of construction of social knowledge, many authors reflected upon our usage of concepts of politics and religion. This article does not pursue a comprehensive review of this literature, but rather positions the existing debate on Islam in Soviet Central Asia within the broader discussion and approbates certain hypotheses on the available historical data. The vision of the interconnectivity in colonial and post-colonial history 1 and the nuanced approach of histoire croisée 2 yet exist in ambivalent form in the field of Central Asian studies. This article aims to contribute to the development of studies on Islam in relation to late socialism by applying certain methodology offered by the above-mentioned scholarly concepts.

2007

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Die Welt des Islams, 2009

The article examines the growing radicalization of the Marxist anti-Islamic discourse in the USSR as a case-study of "Soviet Orientalism". To which of Marx's five socio-economic formations should Muslim society be assigned? During the relatively pluralistic period of the New Economic Policy (1921)(1922)(1923)(1924)(1925)(1926)(1927) Marxist scholars offered various answers. Many argued that Islam emerged from the trading community of Mecca and was trade-capitalist by nature (M. Reisner, E. Beliaev, L. Klimovich). Others held that Islam reflected the interests of the agri culturalists of Medina (M. Tomara), or of the Bedouin nomads (V. Ditiakin, S. Asfendiarov); and some even detected communist elements in Islam (Z. and D. Navshirvanov). All authors found support in the Qurʾān and works of Western Orientalists. By the late 1920s Marx' and Engels' scattered statements on Islam became central in the discourse, and in 1930 Liutsian Klimovich rejected the Qurʾān altogether by arguing that the book, as well as Muḥammad himself, were mere inventions of later times. By the end of the Cultural Revolution (1929)(1930)(1931) it was finally "established" that Islam was "feudal" in character, and critical studies of Islam became impossible for decades. The "feudal" interpretation legitimized the Soviet attack on Islam and Muslim societies at that time; but also many of the Marxist writers on Islam perished in Stalin's Terror. We suggest that the harsh polemics the authors directed against each other in the discourse contributed to their later repression. By lending itself to the interests of the totalitarian state, Soviet Marxist Islamology committed suicide-the ultimate form of "Orient alism".

Studies in Comparative Communism, 1986

TWO Muslim-inhabited regions of the Asian heartland have been confronted with the prospect of absorption by communist power. Of these, Turkestan, comprising of Soviet Central Asia and Chinese Central Asia, are at present integrated, to a greater or lesser degree, into the two large communist states of Asia. The second, Afghanistan, is engaged in a struggle with the Soviet Union that threatens to exterminate the whole of Afghan society. In the following article I propose to examine the methods used by the inhabitants of these areas to combat absorption into a communist system, concentrating in particular upon religious or religiously symbolic inspiration for resistance. The term 'jihad' (holy war) is widely used by Muslims to denote struggle against any non-Muslim opposition. Its use in confrontation with communism is particularly appropriate given the atheistic nature of communist ideology. In the same manner, the term 'mujahid' and its plural 'mujahidin' denotes someone engaged in a jihad. All these words are rooted in Arabic and form part of the religious language borrowed by Islamic societies and sanctified by the Koran. Therefore, they are common in both Iranian and Turkic linguistic areas, the two major language bases of the people under discussion.' Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan late in 1979 much attention has been concentrated on the remarkable resiliency of the resistance.2 Most writers have attempted to explain the success of the resistance by citing outraged nationalism based on the sense of territoriality felt by a backward, tribal population.3 Others blame the ineptitude of the successive communist regimes in Kabul which applied inappropriate, but modernizing or 'progressive', measures in an underdeveIoped country.4 Both interpretations are based on the imposition of Western models of political behavior on to 1. For a discussion of the concept ofjihad and its interpretations in the contemporary period by a representative of a society that has used the concept within and without the Muslim world, see Morteza Mut~hari,~~~: 7716 Ho& War of Zsiam and i#s Ltgib~ in &t f&ran, tr. by Mohammad SaIman Tawheedi (Albany, CA: Moslem Student Association (Persian Speaking Group), n.d.) 2. A diverse set of international authors have dwelt on this point, among them, Richard and Nancy Neweli, 7%~ Strt+&e fm Afghaniskm (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), Kuidip Nayar, R+J& on Afglzmisfan

2008

Khalid, Islam after Communism 135 pendence levels by the late 1990s. M oreover, due to growing incom e inequality, m ost G eorgians have not benefited from recent econom ic gains, condem ning m ore than half of the population to live below the national poverty line.13 It is therefore unlikely that social and econom ic hardships played only a secondary role during the Rose Revolution, as suggested in this volume. Interviews with ordinary citizens who participated in the dem onstrations might have highlighted deeply felt socio -econom ic concerns, w hich are still w idespread in post -2003 Georgia, severely eroding the popularity of President Saakashvili.