A Sentimentalist Solution to the Moral Attitude Problem

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5 (2010)
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reprint Kauppinen, Antti (2010) "A Sentimentalist Solution to the Moral Attitude Problem". In Shafer-Landau, Russ, Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 5, pp. : Oxford University Press (2010)

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Antti Kauppinen
University of Helsinki

Citations of this work

Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.
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Moral and epistemic evaluations: A unified treatment.Bob Beddor - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):23-49.
The mark of the moral: Beyond the sentimentalist turn.Frank Hindriks & Hanno Sauer - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (4):569-591.

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