Colour

In From an ontological point of view. New York: Oxford University Press (2003)
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Abstract

A broadly dispositionalist account of colour is sketched and defended in the context of a discussion of primary and secondary qualities. Secondary qualities are complex primary qualities picked out by reference to their effects on human observers. These effects, properly seen as mutual manifestations of dispositions present in light radiation and in observers, are colour experiences.

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