Lebanese Civil War: Difference between revisions

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Lebanese Civil War (Phase I)
Date 1975 --- 1977 Location Lebanon Result ADF-enforced ceasefire De facto Syrian control over Lebanon
Belligerents
Lebanese Front Syria	LNM PLO Amal	Israel
Commanders and leaders
Bachir Gemayel Dany Chamoun	Kamal Jumblatt Yasser Arafat	Ariel Sharon

The Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) was a multifaceted civil war whose antecedents can be traced back to the conflicts and political compromises reached after the end of Lebanon's administration by the Ottoman Empire. The conflict became greatly exacerbated by Lebanon's changing demographic trends, the Palestinian refugee influx between 1948 and 1982, Christian and Muslim inter-religious strife, and the involvement of Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). After a short break in the fighting in 1976 due to Arab League mediation and Syrian intervention, Palestinian-Lebanese strife continued, with fighting primarily focused in south Lebanon, occupied first by the PLO, then occupied by Israel.

During the course of the fighting, alliances shifted rapidly and unpredictably. By the end of the war, nearly every party had allied with and subsequently betrayed every other party at least once. The 1980s were especially bleak: much of Beirut lay in ruins as a result of the 1976 Karantina massacre carried out by Lebanese Christian militias, the Syrian Army shelling of Christian neighborhoods in 1978 and 1981, and the Israeli invasion that evicted the PLO from the country. A number of atrocities and terrorist acts were committed by the Lebanese Christian Phalange as well as Palestinians and Israelis, all of whom participated in the war. These included the Damour massacre in which Palestinians massacred Christian inhabitants of the coastal town 20 miles south of Beirut, and the Sabra and Chatila massacre where Christian Phalange forces massacred civilians and refugees during three days, while the camps were under Israeli control. The war deteriorated ever further into sectarian carnage, and in the end Lebanon's effective independence counted among the casualties.

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The influx of Palestinian refugees between 1948 and 1970, the 1950s and 1960s reassertion of pan-Arab nationalism as espoused by Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, the founding of the PLO in 1965, the eviction or squashing of all armed Palestinian resistance movements in Syria, Jordan and Egypt, and the escalating assertion of Palestinian nationalism through armed struggle, unsettled the delicate political and demographic balance of the Lebanese communities. After its bloody eviction from Jordan by King Hussein during "Black September" in 1970, the PLO and all its affiliate movements settled in Beirut and the Lebanese north from which they vowed to continue liberating Palestine, in violation of every agreement made with the Lebanese authorities to regulate the activities of the Palestinian organizations. The Muslim community in Lebanon saw Monastir Palestinian movements (Sunni in their vast majority) as an opportunity to renege on the 1943 National Pact by using the Palestinian weapons to pressure their fellow Christian Lebanese into abrogating the National Pact. The latter is an extra-constitutional unwritten agreement that guarantees the division of power among the three largest communities: The Presidency to the Maronites, the position of Speaker of Parliament to the Shiites, and the Prime Minister to the Sunnis. These and other constitutionally guaranteed distributions of government posts had come under increasing pressure from Muslims, now emboldened by a resurgent pan-Arab nationalism and secular left wing groups acting at the behest of the Soviet-Communist Bloc in the 1960s, leading them to join forces as the Front for Progressive Parties and National Forces in 1969. The Muslim-leftist opposition coalition (later evolved into the Lebanese National Movement) called for the taking of a new census (the last one had been conducted in 1932) and the subsequent drafting of a new governmental structure that would reflect the shifts in the actual population balance. The Christian (especially Maronite) community saw this as an attack on the foundations of the State of Lebanon and a reneging on the National Pact. Furthermore, the Christians did not want to renegotiate the Pact or other rearrangements since they wanted to keep their domination on the Lebanese society.

Both sides were unable to reconcile their conflicts of interest and began forming militias for self-protection. As the situation escalated these militias grew stronger and soon surpassed the regular army. This rapidly undermined the authority of the central government. The government's ability to maintain order was also handicapped by the nature of the Lebanese Army. One of the smallest in the Middle East, it was composed based on a fixed ratio of religions. As members defected to sectarian militias, the army would eventually prove unable to contain the militant groups, rein in the PLO or monitor foreign infiltration. Since the government was Christian-dominated, especially the officers' ranks, trust among Muslims for central institutions, including the army, was low. The disintegration of the Lebanese Army was eventually initiated by Muslim deserters declaring that they would no longer take orders from the Maronite generals.

Throughout the war most or all militias operated with little regard for human rights, and the sectarian character of some battles, made non-combatant civilians a frequent target. As the war dragged on, the militias deteriorated ever further into mafia-style organizations with many commanders turning to crime as their main occupation rather than fighting. Finances for the war effort were obtained in one or all of three ways:

• Outside support, generally from one of the rival Arab governments, Iran or Israel, or a superpower like US, often with strings attached. Alliances would shift frequently.
• Preying on the population. Extortion, theft, bank robberies and random checkpoints at which "customs" would be collected, were commonplace on all sides. During cease-fires, most militias operated in their home areas as virtual mafia organizations.
• Smuggling. During the civil war, Lebanon turned into one of the world's largest narcotics producers, with much of the hashish production centered in the Bekaa valley. But much else was also smuggled, such as guns and supplies, all kinds of stolen goods, and regular trade - war or no war, Lebanon would not give up its role as the middleman in European-Arab business. Many battles were fought over Lebanon's ports, to gain smugglers access to the sea routes.

Most militias claimed that they were non-sectarian forces, but in fact they recruited mainly from the community or region of their chiefs.

Christian militias acquired arms from Romania and Bulgaria as well as from West Germany, Belgium and Israel,^[1] and drew supporters from the larger Christian population in the north of the country. They were generally right-wing in their political outlook, and all the major Christian militias were Maronite-dominated, and other Christian sects played a secondary role.

The most powerful of the Christian militias was that of the Kataeb, or Phalange, under the leadership of Bachir Gemayel. The Phalange went on to help found the Lebanese Forces in 1977 which came under the leadership of Samir Geagea in 1986. A smaller faction was the nationalist Guardians of the Cedars. These militias quickly established strongholds in Christian-dominated East Beirut, also the site of many government buildings. In the north, the Marada Brigades served as the private militia of the Franjieh family and Zgharta.

The Shi'a militias were slow to form and join in the fighting. Initially, many Shi'a had been drawn to the Palestinian movement and the Lebanese Communist Party, but after 1970's Black September, there was a sudden influx of armed Palestinians to the Shi'a areas. The Palestinian movement quickly squandered its influence with the Shi'a, as radical factions ruled by the gun in much of Shi'a-inhabited southern Lebanon, where the refugee camps happened to be concentrated, and the mainstream PLO proved either unwilling or unable to rein them in.

The Palestinian radicals' secularism and behaviour had alienated the traditionalist Shi'a community, but simultaneously presented a model for revolutionary politics that appealed to the young of Lebanon's poorest and most downtrodden community. After many years without their own independent political organizations, there suddenly arose Musa Sadr's Amal Movement in 1974-75. Its moderate Islamist ideology immediately attracted the urban poor, and Amal's armed ranks grew rapidly. Later, in the early 1980s, a hardline faction would break away to join with Shi'a groups fighting Israel to form the Hezbollah guerrillas, who to this day remain the most powerful militia of Lebanon.

The Lebanese Alawites, followers of a sect of Shia Islam, were represented by the Red Knights Militia of the Arab Democratic Party, which was pro-Syrian due to the Alawites being dominant in Syria, and mainly acted in Northern Lebanon around Tripoli.

Some Sunni factions received support from Libya and Iraq, and a number of minor militias existed, the more prominent with Nasserist or otherwise pan-Arab and Arab nationalist leanings, but also a few Islamist ones, such as the Tawhid Movement. The main Sunni-led organization was the al-Murabitun. To compensate for weakness on the battlefield, the Sunni leadership turned early in the war to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was dominated by Palestinian Sunnis, although it also had a Christian (mainly Greek Orthodox) minority.

The small Druze sect, strategically and dangerously seated on the Chouf in central Lebanon, had no natural allies, and so were compelled to put much effort into building alliances. Under the leadership of the Jumblatt family, first Kamal Jumblatt (the LNM leader) and then his son Walid , the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) served as an effective Druze militia, building excellent ties to the Soviet Union mainly, with Israel upon its invasion to Lebanon and with Syria upon the withdrawal of Israel to the south of the country. However, many Druze in Lebanon at the time were members of the non-religious party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.

Although several Lebanese militias claimed to be secular, most were little more than vehicles for sectarian interests. Still, there existed a number of non-religious groups, primarily but not exclusively of the left and/or Pan-Arab right.

Examples of this was the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) and the more radical and independent Communist Action Organization (COA). Another notable example was the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), which promoted the concept of Greater Syria, in contrast to Pan-Arab or Lebanese nationalism. The SSNP was generally aligned with the Syrian government, although it did not ideologically approve of Hafez al-Assad's Ba'thist regime, and up to this day, it still opposes the Syrian Government's regime.

Two competing Baath party factions were also involved in the early stages of the war: a nationalist one known as "pro-Iraqi" headed by Abdul-Majeed Al-Rafei (Sunni) and Nicola Y. Firzli (Greek Orthodox Christian), and a Marxist one known as "pro-Syrian" headed by Assem Qanso (Shiite).

The Palestinian movement relocated most of its fighting strength to Lebanon at the end of 1970 after being expelled from Jordan in the events known as Black September. The umbrella organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—by itself undoubtedly Lebanon's most potent fighting force—was little more than a loose confederation, and its leader, Yassir Arafat, proved unable to control rival factions. This undermined both the PLO's operative strength and the sympathy of the Lebanese for the PLO, as the organization's image in Lebanon was increasingly marred by radical factions whose "Communist revolutionary order" rarely turned out to be anything other than protection rackets. In the end, the PLO was held together more by shared interests and Arafat's continual attempts at intra-organizational mediation, than by any coherent organizational structure.

The PLO mainstream was represented by Arafat's powerful Fatah, which waged guerrilla warfare and had a socialist doctrine. Among the most important Palestinian combatants were the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and its splinter, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Lesser roles were played by the fractious Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) and another split-off from the PFLP, the Syrian-aligned Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC). To complicate things, the Ba'thist systems of Syria and Iraq both set up Palestinian puppet organizations within the PLO. The as-Sa'iqa was a Syrian-controlled militia, paralleled by the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) under Iraqi command. The Syrian government could also count on the Syrian brigades of the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), formally but not functionally the PLO's regular army. Some PLA units sent by Egypt were under PLO (Arafatist) control, but never played the same dominant role as the heavily armed Syrian-backed factions.

In 1974, a stone was added to Arafat's burden with the near-formal breakup of the PLO. A controversial proposal (the Ten Point Program) that aimed to make way for a two-state solution had been advanced by Arafat and Fatah in the Palestinian National Council (PNC). Under furious accusations of treason, many of the PLO's hard line anti-Israel factions simply walked out of the organization. With Iraqi, and later Syrian and Libyan, backing, they formed the Rejectionist Front, espousing a no-compromise line towards Israel. The defectors included the PFLP, the PFLP-GC, the PLF, as-Sa'iqa, ALF and several others, and discontent mounted also within Fatah. Arafat would eventually manage to patch up the differences, but this would come back to haunt him throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, and the split effectively prevented organizational unity in crucial stages of PLO's involvement in the Lebanese civil war.

Due to major Arab political pressure, the Cairo Agreement brokered by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1969, the Lebanese were forced to allow a foreign force (the PLO) to conduct military operations against Israel from inside their own territory. Although initially very reluctant to sign, the Lebanese government saw this accord as its last hope of regaining control of the country whereby it was agreed that attacks would be carried out in co-ordination with the Lebanese army. The PLO were granted full control over the refugee camps, but soon much of southern Lebanon fell under their effective rule and rarely was the accord abided by. As fighters poured in from Jordan after the Black September destruction of the PLO's apparatus there, the PLO's presence became overbearing to many of inhabitants of these areas. The radical factions operated as a law unto themselves, and quickly alienated conservative Shi'a villagers. Much the same way that the PLO had lost its welcome in Jordan, Muslim support for the Palestinians began to erode in Lebanon.

A significant left-wing opposition also started to evolve within Fatah, as radical veteran fighters from Jordan began pouring into its ranks, to the worry of Arafat himself. Still, Arafat set about building a "state-within-the-state" in southern Lebanon, to create a secure base area for the PLO, headquartered in the Bekaa Valley and West Beirut. Gradually the Lebanese authorities were being pushed into irrelevancy. Harsh Israeli retribution after Palestinian raids from what was now termed "Fatahland" did nothing to endear the civilian Shi'a and Christian population to the Palestinian guerrillas.

The PLO was welcomed, however, by the Sunnis - who thought of them as a natural ally in sectarian terms - and by the Druze. A personal friendship developed between Arafat and the charismatic Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, who not only headed the PSP, but who had also set up a Lebanese National Movement (LNM). Many of the Rejectionist Front organizations joined the leftist LNM straightway, and indeed portions of the Fatah left followed. But Arafat was unwilling to commit the Palestinians to what he regarded as an intra-Lebanese conflict, fearing it would bog the movement down in Lebanon and unnecessarily alienate potential supporters among the Christians and their foreign allies.

Between 1968 and 1975, there was a gradual buildup in the assertion by Yasser Arafat's PLO of its right to fight Israel from the Lebanese south, in spite of Lebanese sovereignty. A sample of the incidents includes: Palestinian roadblocks in the city of Beirut killing innocent Lebanese civilians; kidnapping by PLO militants of Lebanese gendarmes; kidnapping of Christians and the dumping of the mutilated bodies on roadsides; Syria's backing of the PLO included punishing Lebanon by closing the borders between the two countries, which choked the Lebanese economy; incursions by Palestinian contingents of the Syrian Army such as the Palestine Liberation Army, the Al-Saiqa commandos, the Yarmouk Brigades, etc. into Lebanese territory and carrying out massacres against Christian villages in the north and the east; ineffective attacks by PLO militants against the Israeli north were often met with massive and deadly reprisals by Israel against the civilian population; the assassination of the Israeli ambassador in London (not in Lebanon) led to Israel bombing Beirut Airport and destroying the entire fleet of the Lebanese national air carrier - MEA, Lebanese army air force bombing the Palestinian camps, etc. After these incidents, several accords were signed between the Lebanese State and the PLO (examples: The Cairo Accord of 1969 and the Melkart Accord of 1972), only to be violated by the PLO, then backed by Syria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt.

In the spring of 1975, this build-up erupted in an all-out conflict, with the PLO pitted against the Christian Phalange, and the ever-weaker national government wavering between the need to maintain order and catering to its constituency. In March 1975, a demonstration by Lebanese fishermen against a planned fishing company was subverted by the PLO and its Sunni Muslim backers in the city of Sidon. The Lebanese army tried to maintain order, and a clash ensued in which a leading Sunni Muslim politician, Maaruf Saad, was killed. On the morning of Sunday April 13, 1975, unidentified gunmen in a speeding car fired on a church that was being inaugurated in the Christian East Beirut suburb of Ain El Rummaneh with the Phalange leader Pierre Gemayel attending. The shooting killing 4 people including Gemayel's two body guards. Hours later, a defiant PLO bus carrying PLO fighters brandishing their weapons drove by the same spot of the shooting earlier in the day. The mobilized and tense Phalangists led by Gemayels ambushed the bus and killed 27 Palestinians. The route taken by the bus was unusual, since PLO militants typically took the peripheral boulevards around Ain El Rummaneh as they commuted between the Palestinian camps in Muslim West Beirut (Sabra-Shatila) and the Palestinian camps in Christian East Beirut (Tal Zaatar, Jisr al-Basha, and Dbayyeh). Their foray into Ain El- Rummaneh on that day after the attempted assassination on the life of Pierre Gemayel was widely seen as a deliberate provocation. By the evening of April 13, 1975, citywide clashes had erupted in what became known as "round 1", to be followed by several rounds interspersed with ceasefires and mediation attempts.

On December 6, 1975, a day later known as Black Saturday, the killings of four Christian civilians on a mountain road led the Phalanges to quickly and temporarily set up roadblocks throughout Beirut at which identification cards were inspected for religious affiliation. Many Palestinians or Muslims passing through the roadblocks were killed immediately. Additionally, Phalange members took hostages and attacked Muslims in East Beirut. Pro-Muslim and Palestinian militias retaliated with force, increasing the total death count to between 200 and 600 civilians and militiamen. After this point, all-out fighting began between the militias.

Christian East Beirut was ringed by heavily fortified Palestinian camps from which kidnappings and sniping against Lebanese civilians became a daily routine. Christian East Beirut became besieged by the PLO camps, with severe shortages of food and fuel. This unbearable situation was remedied by the Phalanges and their allied Christian militias as they besieged the Palestinian camps embedded in Christian East Beirut one at a time and brought them down. The first was on January 18, 1976 when the heavily fortified Karantina camp, located near the strategic Beirut Harbor, was sacked: About 1,000 PLO fighters and civilians were killed. The Palestinian PLO and al-Saika forces retaliated by attacking the isolated defenseless Christian town of Damour about 20 miles south of Beirut on the coast, in which 1,000 Christian civilians were butchered and 5,000 were sent fleeing north by boat, since all roads were blocked off. These two massacres prompted a mass exodus of Muslims and Christians, as people fearing retribution fled to areas under the control of their own sect. The ethnic and religious layout of the residential areas of the capital encouraged this process, and East and West Beirut were increasingly transformed into what was in effect Christian and Muslim Beirut. Also, the number of Christian leftists who had allied with the LNM, and Muslim conservatives with the government, dropped sharply, as the war gradually changed from an essentially Palestinian-Syrian versus Lebanese confrontation into a more sectarian conflict.

In June, 1976, with fighting throughout the country and the Maronites on the verge of defeat, President Suleiman Frangieh called for Syria intervention in Lebanon, on the grounds that the port of Beirut would be closed and that is how Syria received a large portion of their goods. Christian fears had been greatly exacerbated by the Damour massacre, and both sides felt the stakes had been raised above mere political power. Syria responded by ending its prior affiliation with the Palestinian Rejectionist Front and began supporting the Maronite-dominated government. This technically put Syria on the same side as Israel, as Israel had already begun to supply Maronite forces with arms, tanks, and military advisers in May 1976.^[2] Syria had its own political and territorial interests in Lebanon, which harbored cells of the Islamists and anti-Ba'thist Muslim Brotherhood, and was also a possible route of attack for Israel.

At the President's request, Syrian troops entered Lebanon, occupying Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley, easily brushing aside the LNM and Palestinian defenses. A cease-fire was imposed,^[3] but it ultimately failed to stop the conflict, so Syria added to the pressure. With Damascus supplying arms, Christian forces managed to break through the defenses of the Tel al-Zaatar refugee camp in East Beirut, which had long been under siege. A massacre of about 2,000 Palestinians followed, which unleashed heavy criticism against Syria from the Arab world.

On October 19, 1976, the Battle of Aishiya took place, when a combined force of PLO and a Communist militia attacked Aishiya, an isolated Christian village in a mostly Muslim area. The Artillery Corps of the Israel Defence Forces fired 24 shells (66 kilograms of TNT each) from US-made 175-millimeter field artillery units at the attackers, repelling their first attempt. However, the PLO and Communists returned at night, when low visibility made Israeli artillery far less effective. The Christian population of the village fled. They returned in 1982.

In October 1976, Syria accepted the proposal of the Arab League summit in Riyadh. This gave Syria a mandate to keep 40,000 troops in Lebanon as the bulk of an Arab Deterrent Force charged with disentangling the combatants and restoring calm. Other Arab nations were also part of the ADF, but they lost interest relatively soon, and Syria was again left in sole control, now with the ADF as a diplomatic shield against international criticism. The Civil War was officially ended at this point, and an uneasy quiet settled over Beirut and most of the rest of Lebanon. In the south, however, the climate began to deteriorate as a consequence of the gradual return of PLO combatants, who had been required to vacate central Lebanon under the terms of the Riyadh Accords.

The nation was now effectively divided, with southern Lebanon and the western half of Beirut becoming bases for the PLO and Muslim-based militias, and the Christians in control of East Beirut and the Christian section of Mount Lebanon. The main confrontation line in divided Beirut was known as the Green Line.

In East Beirut, in 1977, Christian leaders of the National Liberal Party (NLP), the Kataeb Party and the Lebanese Renewal Party joined in the Lebanese Front, a political counterpart to the LNM. Their militias - the Tigers, Phalange and Guardians of the Cedars - entered a loose coalition known as the Lebanese Forces, to form a military wing for the Lebanese Front. From the very beginning, the Kataeb and Phalange, under the leadership of Bashir Gemayel, dominated the LF. Through absorbing or destroying smaller militias, he both consolidated control and strengthened the LF into the dominant Christian force.

In March the same year, Lebanese National Movement leader Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated. The murder was widely blamed on the Syrian government. While Jumblatt's role as leader of the Druze Progressive Socialist Party was filled surprisingly smoothly by his son, Walid Jumblatt, the LNM disintegrated after his death. Although the anti-government pact of leftists, Shi'a, Sunni, Palestinians and Druze would stick together for some time more, their wildly divergent interests tore at opposition unity. Sensing the opportunity, Hafez al-Assad immediately began splitting up both the Christian and Muslim coalitions in a game of divide and conquer.

PLO attacks from Lebanon into Israel in 1977 and 1978 escalated tensions between the countries. On 11 March 1978, eleven Fatah fighters landed on a beach in northern Israel and proceeded to hijack two buses full of passengers on the Haifa - Tel-Aviv road, shooting at passing vehicles. They killed 37 and wounded 76 Israelis before being killed in the firefight with the Israeli forces.^[4] Israel invaded Lebanon four days later in Operation Litani. The Israeli Army occupied most of the area south of the Litani River The UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 calling for immediate Israeli withdrawal and creating the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), charged with maintaining peace.

Israeli forces withdrew later in 1978, but retained control of the southern region by managing a 12-mile (19 km) wide "security zone" along the border. To hold these positions, Israel installed the South Lebanon Army (SLA), a Christian-Shi'a proxy militia under the leadership of Major Saad Haddad. Israel supplied the SLA with arms and resources, and posted "advisers" to strengthen and direct the militia. The Israeli Prime Minister, Likud's Menachem Begin, compared the plight of the Christian minority in southern Lebanon (then about 5% of the population in SLA territory) to that of European Jews during World War II.^[5]

Violent exchanges resumed between the PLO, Israel, and the SLA, with the PLO attacking SLA positions and firing rockets into northern Israel, Israel conducting air raids against PLO positions, and the SLA continuing its efforts to consolidate power in the border region.

However, the peace pact between Israel and Egypt,made Syria change its mind, and support was withdrawn from the Christians and turned towards the Palestinians. Syria, meanwhile, clashed with the Phalange, a Maronite militia led by Bachir Gemayel, whose increasingly aggressive actions - such as his April 1981 attempt to capture the strategic city of Zahle in central Lebanon - were designed to thwart the Syrian goal of brushing aside Gemayel and installing Suleiman Frangieh as president. Consequently, the de facto alliance between Israel and Gemayel strengthened considerably. In April 1981, for instance, during fighting in Zahle, Gemayel called for Israeli assistance. Israeli Prime Minister Begin responded by sending Israeli fighter jets to the scene, which shot down two Syrian helicopters.^[6] This led to Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad's decision to place surface-to-air missiles on the hilly perimeter of Zahle.

On July 17, 1981, Israeli air craft bombed multi-story apartment buildings in Beirut that contained offices of PLO associated groups. The Lebanese delegate to the United Nations Security Council reported that 300 civilians had been killed, and 800 wounded. The bombing led to worldwide condemnation, and a temporary embargo on the export of U.S. aircraft to Israel.^[7]

In August, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin was re-elected, and in September, Begin and his defense minister Ariel Sharon began to lay plans for a second invasion of Lebanon for the purpose of driving out the PLO. Sharon's intention was to "destroy the PLO military infrastructure and, if possible, the PLO leadership itself; this would mean attacking West Beirut, where the PLO headquarters and command bunkers were located".^[8]

Sharon also wanted to ensure the presidency of Bashir Gemayel. In return for Israeli assistance, Sharon expected Gemayel, once installed as president, to sign a peace treaty with Israel, presumably stabilizing forever Israel's northern border. Begin brought Sharon's plan before the Knesset in December 1981; however, after strong objections were raised, Begin felt compelled to set the plan aside. But Sharon continued to press the issue. In January 1982, Sharon met with Gemayel on an Israeli vessel off the coast of Lebanon and discussed a plan "that would bring Israeli forces as far north as the edge of Beirut International Airport".^[9] In February, with Begin's input, Yehoshua Seguy, the chief of military intelligence, was sent to Washington to discuss the issue of Lebanon with Secretary of State Alexander Haig. In the meeting, Haig "stressed that there could be no assault without a major provocation from Lebanon".^[10]

Thus far, no major provocation had been launched from Lebanon. In fact, during the entire effective period of the cease-fire, August 1981 to May 1982, there was a total of one PLO rocket attack from Lebanese territory, in May The attack was a retaliation for Israel's May 9 bombing of PLO positions in Lebanon, which was itself a retaliation for the PLO bombing of a Jerusalem bus.^[11] This particular exchange highlights a central problem with the cease-fire from the Israeli perspective: it applied only to the border with Lebanon, meaning that PLO attacks from other locations, such as Jordan and the West Bank, could (and did) continue unabated, while an Israeli response directed against the PLO in Lebanon would technically be a violation of the cease-fire.

Arafat refused to condemn attacks occurring outside of Lebanon, on the grounds that the cease-fire was only relevant to the Lebanese theater.^[12] Arafat's interpretation underscored the fact that the cease-fire agreement did nothing to address ongoing violence between the PLO and Israel in other theaters. Israel thus continued to weather PLO attacks throughout the cease-fire period. At the same time, it violated the terms of the cease-fire by committing "2125 violations of Lebanese airspace and 652 violations of Lebanese territorial waters" from August 1981 to May 1982, including the above mentioned May 9 bombing and April 21 bombing of coastal PLO targets south of Beirut.^[13]

On 3 June 1982, the Abu Nidal Organization attempted to assassinate Israeli ambassador Shlomo Argov in London. Abu Nidal had assassinated numerous PLO diplomats, and attempted to kill both Arafat and Mahmud Abbas, and was in fact condemned to death by the PLO.^[14] Additionally, British intelligence reported that the attempt had likely been sponsored by Iraq, and Israeli intelligence agreed. However, Ariel Sharon and Menachem Begin, ordered a retaliatory aerial attack on PLO and PFLP targets in West Beirut that led to over 100 casualties.^[10]

The PLO responded by launching a counterattack from Lebanon with rockets and artillery, which also constituted a clear violation of the cease-fire. This was the immediate cause of Israel's subsequent decision to invade. Meanwhile, on 5 June, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution (UNSCR 508) calling for "all the parties to the conflict to cease immediately and simultaneously all military activities within Lebanon and across the Lebanese-Israeli border and no later than 0600 hours local time on Sunday, 6 June 1982."^[15]

Israel launched Operation Peace for Galilee on June 6, 1982, attacking PLO bases in Lebanon. Israeli forces quickly drove 25 miles (40 km) into Lebanon, moving into East Beirut with the tacit support of Maronite leaders and militia. When the Israeli cabinet convened to authorize the invasion, Sharon described it as a plan to advance 40 kilometers into Lebanon, demolish PLO strongholds, and establish an expanded security zone that would put northern Israel out of range of PLO rockets. In fact, Israeli chief of staff Rafael Eitan and Sharon had already ordered the invading forces to head straight for Beirut, in accord with Sharon's blueprint dating to September 1981. After the invasion had begun, the UN Security Council passed a further resolution on 6 June, 1982, UNSCR 509, which reaffirms UNSCR 508 and "demands that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon".^[16] Thus far the US had not used its veto. However, on 8 June, 1982, the US vetoed a proposed resolution that "reiterates [the] demand that Israel withdraw all its military forces forthwith and unconditionally to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon",^[17] thereby giving implicit assent to the Israeli invasion.

By June 15, 1982, Israeli units were entrenched outside Beirut. The United States called for PLO withdrawal from Lebanon, and Sharon began to order bombing raids of West Beirut, targeting some 16,000 PLO fedayeen who had retreated into fortified positions. Meanwhile, Arafat attempted through negotiations to salvage politically what was clearly a disaster for the PLO, an attempt which eventually succeeded once the multinational force arrived to evacuate the PLO.

The fighting in Beirut killed more than 6,700 people of whom the vast majority were civilians. Combatants killed included 500 PLO, more than 400 Lebanese, over 100 Syrians and 88 Israelis. Fierce artillery duels between the IDF and the PLO, and PLO shelling of Christian neighborhoods of East Beirut at the outset gave way to escalating aerial IDF bombardment beginning on July 21, 1982.^[18][19] It is commonly estimated that during the entire campaign, approximately 20,000 were killed on all sides, including many civilians, and 30,000 were wounded^{[citation needed]}.

On 26 June, a UN Security Council resolution was proposed that "demands the immediate withdrawal of the Israeli forces engaged round Beirut, to a distance of 10 kilometers from the periphery of that city, as a first step towards the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, and the simultaneous withdrawal of the Palestinian armed forces from Beirut, which shall retire to the existing camps";^[20] the United States vetoed the resolution because it was "a transparent attempt to preserve the P.L.O. as a viable political force",^[21] an indication of Washington's support for Sharon's objective of destroying the PLO before it could negotiate a withdrawal agreement.

Finally, amid escalating violence and civilian casualties, Philip Habib was once again sent to restore order, which he accomplished on 12 August on the heels of IDF's intensive, day-long bombardment of West Beirut. The Habib-negotiated truce called for the withdrawal of both Israeli and PLO elements, as well as a multinational force composed of U.S. Marines along with French and Italian units that would ensure the departure of the PLO and protect defenseless civilians.

A multinational force landed in Beirut on August 20, 1982 to oversee the PLO withdrawal from Lebanon and U.S. mediation resulted in the evacuation of Syrian troops and PLO fighters from Beirut. The agreement also provided for the deployment of a multinational force composed of U.S. Marines along with French, Italian and British units. However, Israel reported that some 2,000 PLO militants were hiding in Palestinian refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut.

Bashir Gemayel was elected president under Israeli military control on 23 August. His presidency was unpopular, being voted by a slim margin with most of the Muslim MPs boycotting the session. Many, especially in the Muslim circles, feared his relationship with Israel. He was assassinated on 14 September.

See Sabra and Shatila massacre

After conferring with Phalange leaders, Sharon and Eitan bypassed the Israeli cabinet and sent Israeli troops into West Beirut, violating the Habib agreement; these troops helped transport approximately 200 Phalange personnel to the camps, which the Phalangists entered on 16 September at 6:00 P.M. The Phalangists remained in the camps until the morning of 19 September, killing an estimated 700-3,000 Palestinians, according to official Israeli statistics, "none apparently members of any PLO unit".^[22]

The Kahan Commission, set up by the Israeli government to investigate the circumstances of the massacre, held Sharon and Eitan indirectly responsible, concluding that the Israeli officials should have known what would happen if they sent 200 anti-Palestinian militants into Palestinian refugee camps. The Commission recommended that Sharon resign his post as Defense Minister, which he did, though he remained in the government as an influential Minister without Portfolio.^[23]

The massacres made the headlines all over the world, and calls were heard for the international community to assume responsibility for stabilizing Lebanon. As a result, the multinational forces that had begun exiting Lebanon after the PLO's evacuation returned as peace keepers. With U.S. backing, Amine Gemayel was chosen by the Lebanese parliament to succeed his brother as President and focused anew on securing the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces.

On May 17, 1983, Lebanon's Amine Gemayel, Israel, and the United States signed an agreement^[24] text on Israeli withdrawal that was conditioned on the departure of Syrian troops; reportedly after the US and Israel exerted severe pressure on Gemayel. The agreement stated that "the state of war between Israel and Lebanon has been terminated and no longer exists." Thus, the agreement in effect amounted to a peace agreement with Israel, and was additionally seen by many Lebanese Muslims as an attempt for Israel to gain a permanent hold on the Lebanese South.^[25] The May 17 Agreement was widely portrayed in the Arab world as an imposed surrender, and Amin Gemayel was accused of acting as a Quisling President; tensions in Lebanon hardened considerably. Syria strongly opposed the agreement and declined to discuss the withdrawal of its troops, effectively stalemating further progress.

In August 1983, Israel withdrew from the Chouf District (southeast of Beirut), thus removing the buffer between the Druze and the Christian militias and triggering another round of brutal fighting. By September, the Druze had gained control over most of the Chouf, and Israeli forces had pulled out from all but the southern security zone. The IDF would remain in this zone until 2000.

The virtual collapse of the Lebanese Army in February 1984, following the defection of many Muslim and Druze units to militias, was a major blow to the government. With the U.S. Marines looking ready to withdraw, Syria and Muslim groups stepped up pressure on Gemayel. On 5 March the Lebanese Government canceled the May 17 Agreement, and the Marines departed a few weeks later.

This period of chaos witnessed the beginning of attacks against U.S. and Western interests, such as the 18 April 1983 suicide attack at the U.S. Embassy in West Beirut, which killed 63. Following the bombing, the Reagan White House "ordered naval bombardments of Druze positions, which resulted in numerous casualties, mostly non-combatant," and the "reply to the American bombardments" was the suicide attack.^[26] Then, on 23 October, 1983, a devastating suicide bombing in Beirut targeted the headquarters of the U.S. and French forces, killing 241 American and 58 French servicemen.^[27] On January 18, 1984, American University of Beirut President Malcolm Kerr was murdered. After US forces withdrew in February 1984, anti-US attacks continued, including a second bombing of the U.S. embassy annex in East Beirut on 20 September 1984, which killed 9, including 2 U.S. servicemen. The situation became serious enough to compel the U.S. State Department to invalidate US passports for travel to Lebanon in 1987, a travel ban that was only lifted 10 years later in 1997.

During these years, Hezbollah emerged from a loose coalition of Shi'a groups resisting the Israeli occupation, and splintered from the main Shi'a movement, Nabih Berri's Amal Movement. The group found inspiration for its revolutionary Islamism in the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and gained early support from about 1,500 Iranian Pasdaran Guards. With Iranian assistance, and a large pool of disaffected Shi'a refugees from which to draw support, Hezbollah quickly grew into a strong fighting force.

Between 1985 and 1989, sectarian conflict worsened as various efforts at national reconciliation failed. Heavy fighting took place in the War of the Camps of 1985-86 as a Syrian-backed coalition headed by the Amal militia sought to rout the PLO from their Lebanese strongholds. Many Palestinians died, and the Sabra, Shatila, and Bourj al-Barajneh refugee camps were largely destroyed. (Fisk, 609)

Major combat returned to Beirut in 1987, when Palestinians, leftists, and Druze fighters allied against Amal, eventually drawing further Syrian intervention. Violent confrontation flared up again in Beirut in 1988 between Amal and Hezbollah. Hezbollah swiftly seized command of several Amal-held parts of the city, and for the first time emerged as a strong force in the capital.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Rashid Karami, head of a government of national unity set up after the failed peace efforts of 1984, was assassinated on June 1, 1987. The assassination was accused upon Samir Geagea in coordination with the Lebanese army, but would not be proven (proven in the later trials of Samir Geagea). President Gemayel's term of office expired in September 1988. Before stepping down, he appointed another Maronite Christian, Lebanese Armed Forces Commanding General Michel Aoun, as acting Prime Minister, contravening the National Pact. Conflict in this period was also exacerbated by increasing Iraqi involvement, as Saddam Hussein searched for proxy battlefields for the Iran–Iraq War. To counter Iran's influence through Amal and Hezbollah, Iraq backed Christian groups; Saddam Hussein helped Aoun and the Lebanese Forces led by samir Geagea between 1988-1990.^[28]

Muslim groups rejected the violation of the National Pact and pledged support to Selim al-Hoss, a Sunni who had succeeded Karami. Lebanon was thus divided between a Christian military government in East Beirut and a civilian government in West Beirut.

On March 14, 1989, Aoun launched what he termed a "war of liberation" against the Syrians and their Lebanese militia allies. As a result, Syrian pressure on his Lebanese Army and militia pockets in East Beirut grew. Still, Aoun persisted in the "war of liberation", denouncing the regime of Hafez al-Assad and claiming that he fought for Lebanon's independence. While he seems to have had significant Christian support for this, he was still perceived as a sectarian leader among others by the Muslim population, who distrusted his agenda. He was also plagued by the challenge to his legitimacy put forth by the Syrian-backed West Beirut government of Selim al-Hoss. Militarily, this war did not achieve its goal. Instead, it caused considerable damages to East Beirut and provoked massive emigration among the Christian population.

The Taif Agreement of 1989 marked the beginning of the end of the fighting. In January of that year, a committee appointed by the Arab League, chaired by Kuwait and including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco, began to formulate solutions to the conflict. This led to a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, where they agreed to the national reconciliation accord in October. The agreement provided a large role for Syria in Lebanese affairs. Returning to Lebanon, they ratified the agreement on November 4 and elected Rene Mouawad as President the following day. Military leader Michel Aoun in East Beirut refused to accept Mouawad, and denounced the Taif Agreement.

Mouawad was assassinated 16 days later in a car bombing in Beirut on 22 November as his motorcade returned from Lebanese independence day ceremonies. He was succeeded by Elias Hrawi (who remained in office until 1998). Aoun again refused to accept the election, and dissolved Parliament.

On January 16, 1990, General Aoun ordered all Lebanese media to cease using terms like "President" or "Minister" to describe Hrawi and other participants in the Taif government. The Lebanese Forces, which had grown into a rival power broker in the Christian parts of the capital, protested by suspending all its broadcasts. Tension with the LF grew, as Aoun feared that the militia was planning to link up with the Hrawi administration.

On January 31, 1990, Lebanese Army forces clashed with the LF, after Aoun had stated that it was in the national interest for the government to "unify the weapons" (i.e. that the LF must submit to his authority as acting head of state). This brought fierce fighting to East Beirut, and although the LF made initial advances, the intra-Christian warfare eventually sapped the militia of most of its fighting strength.

In August 1990, the Lebanese Parliament, which didn't heed Aoun's order to dissolve, and the new president agreed on constitutional amendments embodying some of the political reforms envisioned at Taif. The National Assembly expanded to 128 seats and was for the first time divided equally between Christians and Muslims.

As Saddam Hussein focused his attention on Kuwait, Iraqi supplies to Aoun dwindled.

On October 13, Syria launched a major operation involving its army, air force (for the first time since Zahle's siege in 1981) and Lebanese allies (mainly the Lebanese Army led by General Émile Lahoud) against Aoun's stronghold around the presidential palace, where hundreds of Aoun supporters were executed. It then cleared out the last Aounist pockets, cementing its hold on the capital. Aoun fled to the French Embassy in Beirut, and later into exile in Paris. He was not able to return until May 2005.

William Harris claims that the Syrian operation could not take place until Syria had reached an agreement with the United States, that in exchange for support against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War, it would convince Israel not to attack Syrian aircraft approaching Beirut. Aoun claimed in 1990 that the United States "has sold Lebanon to Syria" (Harris, p. 260).

In March 1991, parliament passed an amnesty law that pardoned all political crimes prior to its enactment. The amnesty was not extended to crimes perpetrated against foreign diplomats or certain crimes referred by the cabinet to the Higher Judicial Council. In May 1991, the militias (with the important exception of Hezbollah) were dissolved, and the Lebanese Armed Forces began to slowly rebuild themselves as Lebanon's only major non-sectarian institution.

Some violence still occurred. In late December 1991 a car bomb (estimated to carry 220 pounds of TNT) exploded in the Muslim neighborhood of Basta. At least thirty people were killed, and 120 wounded, including former Prime Minister Shafik Wazzan, who was riding in a bulletproof car.

Since the end of the war, the Lebanese have conducted several elections, most of the militias have been weakened or disbanded, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have extended central government authority over about two-thirds of the country. Following the cease-fire which ended the July 12, 2006 Israeli-Lebanese conflict, the army has for the first time in over three decades moved to occupy and control the southern areas of Lebanon. Only Hezbollah retains its weapons, due to what it claims is legitimate resistance against Israel in the Shebaa Farms area.

Lebanon still bears deep scars from the civil war. In all, it is estimated that more than 100,000 people were killed, and another 100,000 permanently handicapped by injuries. Approximately 900,000 people, representing one-fifth of the pre-war population, were displaced from their homes. Perhaps a quarter of a million emigrated permanently. Thousands of land mines remain buried in the previously contested areas. Some Western hostages kidnapped during the mid-1980s (many claim by Hezbollah, though the movement denies this)^{[citation needed]} were held until June 1992.^[29] Lebanese victims of kidnapping and wartime "disappeared" number in the tens of thousands^{[citation needed]}.

Car bombs became a favored weapon of violent groups worldwide, following their frequent, and often effective, use during the war. In the 15 years of strife, there were at least 3,641 car bombs, which left 4,386 people dead and thousands more injured.^[30] Other favorite weapons were the AK-47 and RPGs.

The country made progress toward rebuilding its political institutions and regaining its national sovereignty after the end of the war, establishing a political system that gives Muslims a greater voice in the political process. Many critics, however, have charged that the arrangements institutionalized sectarian divisions in the government. Though the country repaired much of its infrustructure in the years after the civil war, some of these improvements were lost in the destruction of the 2006 Lebanon War.

• Lebanese civil war from April 13, 1975 to October 13, 1990 & War on Lebanon 2006 Full of Pictures
• “Another Battle of Beirut ” (Time Magazine, May 14, 1973)
• “The Palestinian Fedayeen” (Declassified CIA Report, 1971)
• Lebanese civil war
• The Lebanese civil war and the Taef agreement
• Full Lebanese War Photo System
• A 15-episode documentary about the Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990

• Al-Baath wa-Lubnân [Arabic only] ("The Baath and Lebanon"), NY Firzli, Beirut, Dar-al-Tali'a Books, 1973.
• The Iraq-Iran Conflict, NY Firzli, Paris, EMA, 1981. ISBN 2-86584-002-6
• Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-28716-2
• Bregman, Ahron and El-Tahri, Jihan (1998). The Fifty Years War: Israel and the Arabs. London: BBC Books. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14-026827-8
• The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976 Khazen Farid El (2000) (ISBN 0-674-08105-6)
• The Bullet Collection, a book by Patricia Sarrafian Ward, is an excellent account of human experience during the Lebanese Civil War.
• Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-92 O'Ballance Edgar (1998) (ISBN 0-312-21593-2)
• Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 Salibi Kamal S. (1976) (ISBN 0-88206-010-4)
• Death of a country: The civil war in Lebanon. Bulloch John (1977) (ISBN 0-297-77288-0)
• Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions (Princeton Series on the Middle East) Harris William W (1997) (ISBN 1-55876-115-2)
• The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians Noam Chomsky (1983, 1999) (ISBN 0-89608-601-1)
• History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine, Vol. 2 Hitti Philip K. (2002) (ISBN 1-931956-61-8)
• Lebanon: A Shattered Country: Myths and Realities of the Wars in Lebanon, Revised Edition Picard, Elizabeth (2002) (ISBN 0-8419-1415-X)
• Lebanon in Crisis: Participants and Issues (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East) Haley P. Edward, Snider Lewis W. (1979) (ISBN 0-8156-2210-4)
• Lebanon: Fire and Embers: A History of the Lebanese Civil War by Hiro, Dilip (1993) (ISBN 0-312-09724-7)
• Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War Fisk, Robert (2001) (ISBN 0-19-280130-9)
• Syria and the Lebanese Crisis Dawisha A. I. (1980) (ISBN 0-312-78203-9)
• Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process Deeb Marius (2003) (ISBN 1-4039-6248-0)
• The War for Lebanon, 1970-1985 Rabinovich Itamar (1985) (ISBN 0-8014-9313-7)
• Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, fourth edition, Charles D. Smith (2001) (ISBN 0-312-20828-6) (paperback)
• From Beirut to Jerusalem. Thomas Friedman.

• Harab libnan (TV-Series). Lebanon. 2001. {{cite AV media}}: Text "-->-Issawi, Omar" ignored (help)

• Lebanese groups unite over Syria-BBC News 13 December 2004
• Lebanon Facts-PBS Frontline Series May 2003
• Links and Resources-PBS Frontline May 2003
• Lebanon's Forgotten Civil War-Washington Post Foreign Service 20 December 1999
• Pictures of Battle Scared Beirut-Travel Adventures.
• Lebanese Civil War-Global Security.org

• Center for Lebanese Study-Oxford University
• Country Profile: Lebanon-BBC News
• Timeline: Lebanon A chronology of key events-BBC News 14 February 2005
• A detailed chronology on the Lebanese War-Cederland
• NOW Lebanon - Resources and documentation