Santosky v. Kramer: Difference between revisions

Santosky v. Kramer
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 10, 1981 Decided March 24, 1982
Full case name	Santosky v. Kramer
Docket no.	80-5889
Citations	455 U.S. 745 (more)
Holding
New York State's standard of fair preponderance of the evidence for the revocation of parental rights violates the due process clause of the 14th amendment. Before revoking parental rights, the State must satisfy a burden of at least clear and convincing evidence. Holding of the lower court reversed.
Court membership
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger Associate Justices William J. Brennan Jr. · Byron White Thurgood Marshall · Harry Blackmun Lewis F. Powell Jr. · William Rehnquist John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor
Case opinions
Majority	Blackmun, joined by Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Stevens
Dissent	Rehnquist, joined by Burger, White, O'Connor

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), is a Supreme Court case involving the burden of proof for the revocation of parental rights. The Department of Social Services sought to revoke petitioner's parental rights to their three children. Under section 622 of the New York State Family Court Act, the State may revoke parental rights to a natural child if, after a fair preponderance of the evidence, a court finds "permanent neglect". New York State Family Court found such neglect utilizing the "fair perponderance" standard. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the burden of proof used. The Supreme Court vacated stating that states seeking to irrevocably sever parental rights must surpass a burden of clear and convincing evidence.

The Supreme Court has previously held that citizens have certain natural rights not enumerated in the Constitution, but that the government still cannot infringe. This doctrine, arising from the "liberty clause" of the 14th amendment, is known as substantive due process and has been invoked in cases such as Dred Scott v. Sanford and Skinner v. Oklahoma. ^[1] The right to privacy was found to be fundamental under this doctrine, and a number of rights to choice came out of it such as in Roe v. Wade where the court found a right to have an abortion and in Meyer v. Nebraska where the court found a parental right to raise their children as they wish.^[1] In Griswold v. Connecticut the Court extended this doctrine to the right to family. Substantive due process was further expanded to encompass children with In re Gault establishing that children have a right to procedural due process when the state attempts to take custody of them.

Procedural due process, arising from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, is minimally the right to notice and a hearing, but has been held to include in some circumstances rights to counsel and rights to confrontation.^[2] The Court in Mathews v. Eldridge established a framework for balancing state interests against the procedural due process rights of an individual. At issue in Santosky is whether the burden of proof is sufficient to satisfy the obligations of the due process clause.

The Ulster County Department of Social Services received reports from neighbors and physicians of Tina Santosky regarding her injuries: a broken femur, bruises, and cuts.^[3] Suspecting child abuse, respondent Kramer, Commissioner of the Ulster County Department of Social Services, initiated parental neglect proceedings and removed Tina Santosky from the custody of her parents, petitioners John II and Annie Santosky, in November 1973. 10 months later, petitioners' second child, John II, was removed after he was found to be suffering from malnutrition.^[3][4] On that same day, Annie Santosky gave birth to Jed, petitioners' third child. Three days after Jed's birth, he was removed from their custody and placed in a foster home.^[4]

About four years later, Kramer petitioned the Ulster County Family Court to revoke parental rights. Under section 622 of the New York State Family Court Act, Kramer need only satisfy a "fair preponderance of the evidence" burden and show that permanent neglect is more likely than not. The Santoskys challenged the constitutionality of this burden, but the Family Court rejected their challenge and found permanent neglect under the fair preponderance burden.^[4]

The Santoskys appealed, and the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Family Court. Their next appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was dismissed as lacking a substantial constitutional question. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.^[4]

At oral argument, Martin Guggenheim argued for the petitioners that the burden of proof under New York law was unconstitutional stating "[T]he Constitution requires that the finder of fact be reasonably convinced that the result of permanent destruction of the family is appropriate before the state may force such an irrevocable and fundamental deprivation of liberty on an individual."^[5] Respondents argued that raising the burden of proof would not have affected the outcome of the case, and that "if the Court should raise the burden, it would frustrate a specific intent of the legislature."^[5]

The Court found that natural parents have a right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the burden of proof used in by New York State is not stringent enough to satisfy the constitutional requirements of the due process clause. In striking down New York's burden, the Court utilized the Mathews test to determine what burden of proof was due.^[6]

The Mathews test employed comprises of three considerations: the private interests affected, the risk posed by erroneous judgement, and the government interest affected. The Court found that private interests were substantially affected by the law noting that "When the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it" and that such a termination was irreversible.^[7] In analyzing the second factor, the Court stated that the interests of the parents and the child in their natural relationship are not distinct and thus the balancing factors are between the parents and the State. The Court then found that the "fair preponderance" burden did not fairly allocate risk and that a higher burden would be practically and symbolically important. The Court found that while the State had an interest, a higher burden would have little impact on the ability for the State to achieve its goal. Following from this review, the Court held that "the State [must] support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence."^[7][6]

The dissent, delivered by Rehnquist, opposed the ruling of the Court on two main points: matters of family law should be left to the states, and that the Court's analysis was too narrow. While the dissent agreed with the Court's determination that parents have a due process right, they disagreed in the application of Mathews v. Eldridge. Quoting that case, the dissent clarified stating, "substantial weight must be given to the good faith judgments of the individuals [administering a program] . . . that the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration of the . . . claims of individuals."^[8] They further argued that, by focusing narrowly on only the burden of proof in the statute, the Court failed to take into account the fairness of New York's scheme as a whole.^[6]

The ruling has been criticized for its intrusion into state affairs and its basis in previous rulings. Prior to Santosky, the realm of family life had been left to the states. Because of this, Santosky's direct intervention into the affairs of state interests was seen as contrary to United States v. Yazell which held that federal courts should only overturn state statutes when those statutes cannot adequately serve a clear and substantial federal interest.^[1][9] Further, the Court had previously held, a year prior, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services that due process does not require the state to appoint an attorney for parents engaged in a termination proceeding. In Lassiter the Court took into account the procedural safeguards of the statute, while in Santosky, the Court did not. ^[1]

By the early 1990s, all states previously using the "fair preponderance" standard have adapted to using the "clear and convincing" standard in termination proceedings.^[10] New York, among other states, did not apply the elevated burden of proof to the fact-finding phase of the proceedings, but rather only to the termination proceedings. The Colorado Supreme Court, conducting its own Mathews test, found that such a burden need not be applied to the fact-finding portion of the case.^[1][11] In the 1990s, California, a state previously using the clear and convincing standard, lowered its burden in termination proceedings. The constitutionality of this scheme was challenged and brought before the California Supreme Court in 1993. The court specifically rejected Santosky, citing substantial differences between California's procedures and New York's in Santosky, and upheld the constitutionality of the statute.^[10][12]

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