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{{Short description|Ethical theory based on consequences}}

[[File:Demosthenes orator Louvre.jpg|thumb|right|Every advantage in the past is judged in the light of the final issue. — [[Demosthenes]]|283x283px]]

{{Philosophy sidebar}}

In [[Ethics|moral philosophy]], '''consequentialism''' is a class of [[normative ethics|normative]], [[Teleology|teleological]] ethical theories that holds that the [[wikt:consequence|consequences]] of one's [[Action (philosophy)|conduct]] are the ultimate basis for judgement about the [[Morality|rightness or wrongness]] of that conduct. Thus, from a consequentialist standpoint, a morally right act (including omission from acting) is one that will produce a good outcome. Consequentialism, along with [[eudaimonism]], falls under the broader category of '''teleological ethics''', a group of views which claim that the moral value of any act consists in its tendency to produce things of [[Intrinsic value (ethics)|intrinsic value]].<ref name=":0">"[https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/teleological-ethics Teleological Ethics]." ''[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''. via ''[[Encyclopedia.com]].'' 28 May 2020. Retrieved 2 July 2020.</ref> Consequentialists hold in general that an act is right ''[[if and only if]]'' the act (or in some views, the rule under which it falls) will produce, will probably produce, or is intended to produce, a greater balance of good over evil than any available alternative. Different consequentialist theories differ in how they define [[Value theory|moral goods]], with chief candidates including [[Hedonism|pleasure]], the [[Aponia|absence of pain]], the satisfaction of one's [[Preference utilitarianism|preferences]], and broader notions of the "[[Common good|general good]]".

Consequentialism is usually contrasted with [[deontological ethics]] (or ''deontology''): deontology, in which rules and moral duty are central, derives the rightness or wrongness of one's conduct from the character of the behaviour itself, rather than the outcomes of the conduct. It is also contrasted with both [[virtue ethics]], which focuses on the character of the [[Agency (philosophy)|agent]] rather than on the nature or consequences of the act (or omission) itself, and [[pragmatic ethics]], which treats morality like [[science]]: advancing collectively as a society over the course of many lifetimes, such that any moral criterion is subject to revision.

Some argue that consequentialist theories (such as [[utilitarianism]]) and deontological theories (such as [[Kantian ethics]]) are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, [[T. M. Scanlon]] advances the idea that [[human rights]], which are commonly considered a "deontological" concept, can only be justified with reference to the consequences of having those rights.<ref name="Scheffler"/> Similarly, [[Robert Nozick]] argued for a theory that is mostly consequentialist, but incorporates inviolable "side-constraints" which restrict the sort of actions agents are permitted to do.<ref name="Scheffler"/> [[Derek Parfit]] argued that, in practice, when understood properly, rule consequentialism, Kantian deontology, and [[contractualism]] would all end up prescribing the same behavior.<ref>Parfit, Derek. 2011. ''On What Matters''. Oxford: Oxford University Press</ref>

==Etymology==
{{wikt|consequentialism|the end justifies the means}}
The term ''consequentialism'' was coined by [[G. E. M. Anscombe]] in her essay "[[Modern Moral Philosophy]]" in 1958.<ref name=":3">{{cite book |last=Seidel |first=Christian |title=Consequentialism: New Directions, New Problems |date=2018 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=9780190270124 |location=Oxford |page=2-3}}</ref><ref name="Anscombe">{{Cite journal|author-link=G. E. M. Anscombe |title=Modern Moral Philosophy |journal=Philosophy |volume=33 |pages=1–19 |url=http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/mleldrid/cmt/mmp.html |doi=10.1017/S0031819100037943 |year=1958 |author=Anscombe, G. E. M. |issue=124|s2cid=197875941 |doi-access=free }}</ref> However, the meaning of the word has changed over the time since Anscombe used it: in the sense she coined it, she had explicitly placed [[John Stuart Mill|J.S. Mill]] in the nonconsequentialist and [[W. D. Ross|W.D. Ross]] in the consequentialist camp, whereas, in the contemporary sense of the word, they would be classified the other way round.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4">{{Citation |last=Diamond |first=Cora |title=Consequentialism in Modern Moral Philosophy and in 'Modern Moral Philosophy' |date=1997 |work=Human Lives: Critical Essays on Consequentialist Bioethics |pages=13–38 |editor-last=Oderberg |editor-first=David S. |url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25098-1_2 |access-date=2024-03-21 |place=London |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan UK |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-1-349-25098-1_2 |isbn=978-1-349-25098-1 |editor2-last=Laing |editor2-first=Jacqueline A.}}</ref> This is due to changes in the meaning of the word, not due to changes in perceptions of W.D. Ross's and J.S. Mill's views.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" />

==Classification==
One common view is to classify consequentialism, together with [[virtue ethics]], under a broader label of "teleological ethics".<ref name="Britannica">{{Cite web |title=Teleological ethics |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/teleological-ethics |access-date=5 August 2020 |website=Encyclopedia Britannica}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> Proponents of teleological ethics (Greek: ''[[telos]]'', 'end, purpose' + ''[[logos]]'', 'science') argue that the moral value of any act consists in its tendency to produce things of [[Intrinsic value (ethics)|intrinsic value]],<ref name=":0" /> meaning that an act is right ''if and only if'' it, or the rule under which it falls, produces, will probably produce, or is intended to produce, a greater balance of good over evil than any alternative act. This concept is exemplified by the famous [[aphorism]], "the [[End (philosophy)|end]] justifies the [[Instrumental and intrinsic value|means]]," variously attributed to [[Machiavelli]] or [[Ovid]]<ref>Cfr. [[wikt:the end justifies the means|"the end justifies the means"]] in the Wiktionary.</ref> i.e. if a goal is morally important enough, any method of achieving it is acceptable.<ref>{{Cite web|title="The end justifies the means"|url=https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/end-justifies-the-means|website=Cambridge English Dictionary}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Mizzoni|first=John|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AsGbVvQA23oC&q=consequentialist&pg=PA97|title=Ethics: The Basics|date=2009-08-31|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|isbn=9781405189941|page=97 f., 104}}</ref>

Teleological ethical theories are contrasted with [[deontological]] ethical theories, which hold that acts themselves are ''[[inherent]]ly'' good or bad, rather than good or bad because of extrinsic factors (such as the act's consequences or the moral character of the person who acts).<ref>Thomas, A. Jean. 2015. "[http://www.minerva.mic.ul.ie/Vol19/Deontology.pdf Deontology, Consequentialism and Moral Realism]." ''Minerva'' 19:1–24. {{ISSN|1393-614X}}.</ref>

==Forms of consequentialism==
===Utilitarianism===
{{Main|Utilitarianism}}
[[File:Jeremy Bentham by Henry William Pickersgill detail.jpg|thumb|[[Jeremy Bentham]], best known for his advocacy of [[utilitarianism]]]]

{{blockquote|Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think...| Jeremy Bentham, ''The Principles of Morals and Legislation'' (1789) Ch I, p 1
}}

In summary, [[Jeremy Bentham]] states that people are driven by their interests and their fears, but their interests take precedence over their fears; their interests are carried out in accordance with how people view the consequences that might be involved with their interests. ''[[Happiness]]'', in this account, is defined as the [[Maximization (psychology)|maximization]] of pleasure and the [[Minimisation (psychology)|minimization]] of pain. It can be argued that the existence of [[phenomenal consciousness]] and "[[qualia]]" is required for the experience of pleasure or pain to have an ethical significance.<ref>{{Cite journal |pmc=4001209 |pmid=24791144|year=2014 |last1=Levy |first1=N. |title=The Value of Consciousness |journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies |volume=21 |issue=1–2 |pages=127–138 }}</ref><ref>Shepherd, Joshua. 2018. [https://library.oapen.org/viewer/web/viewer.html?file=/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/30007/650113.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y ''Consciousness and Moral Status'']. Routledge. {{ISBN|9781315396347}}. {{Hdl|20.500.12657/30007}}.</ref>

Historically, ''[[hedonistic utilitarianism]]'' is the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist moral theory. This form of utilitarianism holds that what matters is to aggregate happiness; the happiness of everyone, and not the happiness of any particular person. [[John Stuart Mill]], in his exposition of hedonistic utilitarianism, proposed a hierarchy of pleasures, meaning that the pursuit of certain kinds of pleasure is more highly valued than the pursuit of other pleasures.<ref name="Mill">{{Cite book| title = Utilitarianism | year = 1998 | last = Mill | first = John Stuart | author-link = John Stuart Mill | publisher = Oxford University Press | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0-19-875163-2 | url = http://www.utilitarianism.com/mill1.htm}}</ref> However, some contemporary utilitarians, such as [[Peter Singer]], are concerned with maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, hence ''[[preference utilitarianism]]''. Other contemporary forms of utilitarianism mirror the forms of consequentialism outlined below.

===Rule consequentialism===
{{See also|Rule utilitarianism}}
In general, consequentialist theories focus on actions. However, this need not be the case. Rule consequentialism is a theory that is sometimes seen as an attempt to reconcile consequentialism with [[deontology]], or rules-based ethics<ref>{{cite news|last=D'Souza|first=Jeevan|title=On Measuring the Moral Value of Action|publisher=Philos, China|url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301688068}}</ref>—and in some cases, this is stated as a criticism of rule consequentialism.<ref>[[Bernard Williams|Williams, Bernard]]. 1993. "Utilitarianism." In ''Morality''. [[Cambridge University Press]].</ref> Like deontology, rule consequentialism holds that [[moral behavior]] involves following certain rules. However, rule consequentialism chooses rules based on the consequences that the selection of those rules has. Rule consequentialism exists in the forms of [[rule utilitarianism]] and [[rule egoism]].

Various theorists are split as to whether the rules are the only determinant of moral behavior or not. For example, [[Robert Nozick]] held that a certain set of minimal rules, which he calls "side-constraints," are necessary to ensure appropriate actions.<ref name="Scheffler"/> There are also differences as to how absolute these moral rules are. Thus, while Nozick's side-constraints are absolute restrictions on behavior, [[Amartya Sen]] proposes a theory that recognizes the importance of certain rules, but these rules are not absolute.<ref name="Scheffler"/> That is, they may be violated if strict adherence to the rule would lead to much more undesirable consequences.

One of the most common objections to rule-consequentialism is that it is incoherent, because it is based on the consequentialist principle that what we should be concerned with is maximizing the good, but then it tells us not to act to maximize the good, but to follow rules (even in cases where we know that breaking the rule could produce better results).

In ''Ideal Code, Real World'', [[Brad Hooker]] avoids this objection by not basing his form of rule-consequentialism on the ideal of maximizing the good. He writes:<ref>[[Brad Hooker|Hooker, Brad]]. 2000. ''Ideal Code, Real World''. [[Oxford University Press]]. p. 101.</ref>

<blockquote>[T]he best argument for rule-consequentialism is not that it derives from an overarching commitment to maximise the good. The best argument for rule-consequentialism is that it does a better job than its rivals of matching and tying together our moral convictions, as well as offering us help with our moral disagreements and uncertainties.</blockquote>

[[Derek Parfit]] described Hooker's book as the "best statement and defence, so far, of one of the most important moral theories."<ref>{{cite book |first=Brad |last=Hooker |title=Ideal Code, Real World |date=30 January 2003 |publisher= Oxford University Press, new edition 2002, back cover |isbn=978-0-19-925657-0 |url=https://www.amazon.co.uk/reader/0199256578/278-8451642-5085302?_encoding=UTF8&ref_=sib_rdr_bc&j=0&page=234#reader-page}}</ref>

===State consequentialism===
{{Main|State consequentialism}}

{{blockquote|It is the business of the benevolent man to seek to promote what is beneficial to the world and to eliminate what is harmful, and to provide a model for the world. What benefits he will carry out; what does not benefit men he will leave alone ([[Chinese language|Chinese]]: 仁之事者, 必务求于天下之利, 除天下之害, 将以为法乎天下. 利人乎, 即为; 不利人乎, 即止).<ref name="Mozi">{{cite book|author1=Di Mo|author2=Xunzi|author3=Di Mo Xunzi Fei Han|author4=Professor Burton Watson|title=Basic Writings of Mo Tzu, Hsün Tzu, and Han Fei Tzu|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TotJdL_zx9YC&pg=PA110|year=1967|publisher=Columbia University Press|isbn=978-0-231-02515-7|page=110}}</ref>|[[Mozi]], ''Mozi'' (5th century BC) (Chapter 8: Against Music Part I)|title=|source=}}
''[[State consequentialism]]'', also known as ''Mohist consequentialism'',<ref name="readings">{{Cite book| title = Readings in classical Chinese philosophy | year = 2005 | last1 =Ivanhoe | first1 = P.J. | last2= Van Norden | first2= Bryan William |publisher = [[Hackett Publishing]] | isbn = 978-0-87220-780-6|page=60|quote="he advocated a form of state consequentialism, which sought to maximize three basic goods: the wealth, order, and population of the state}}</ref> is an [[ethical theory]] that evaluates the moral worth of an action based on how much it contributes to the welfare of a state.<ref name="readings"/> According to the ''[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]'', Mohist consequentialism, dating back to the 5th century BCE, is the "world's earliest form of consequentialism, a remarkably sophisticated version based on a plurality of [[intrinsic good]]s taken as constitutive of human welfare."<ref>Fraser, Chris. [2002] 2015. "[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mohism/ Mohism]." ''[[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]'', edited by [[Edward N. Zalta|E. N. Zalta]].</ref>

Unlike utilitarianism, which views [[utility]] as the sole moral good, "the basic goods in Mohist consequentialist thinking are...[[Social order|order]], [[material wealth]], and [[Population increase|increase in population]]."<ref name="Cambridge">{{Cite book| title = The Cambridge History of Ancient China | year = 1999 | last1 =Loewe | first1 = Michael | last2= Shaughnessy | first2= Edward L. |publisher = [[Cambridge University Press]] | isbn = 978-0-521-47030-8|page=[https://archive.org/details/cambridgehistory00loew/page/n791 761]| title-link = The Cambridge History of Ancient China }}</ref> The word "order" refers to Mozi's stance against [[war]]fare and [[violence]], which he viewed as pointless and a threat to social stability; "material wealth" of Mohist consequentialism refers to [[Maslow's hierarchy of needs|basic needs]], like shelter and clothing; and "increase in population" relates to the time of [[Mozi]], war and [[famine]] were common, and population growth was seen as a moral necessity for a [[Harmonious Society|harmonious society]].<ref name="Norden">{{Cite book| title = Introduction to Classical Chinese Philosophy | year = 2011 | last = Van Norden | first = Bryan W. | publisher = [[Hackett Publishing]] | isbn = 978-1-60384-468-0 | page = 52}}</ref> In ''[[The Cambridge History of Ancient China]]'', [[Stanford University|Stanford]] [[sinologist]] [[David S. Nivison|David Shepherd Nivison]] writes that the moral goods of Mohism "are interrelated: more basic wealth, then more [[reproduction]]; more people, then more production and wealth...if people have plenty, they would be good, [[Filial piety|filial]], kind, and so on unproblematically."<ref name="Cambridge"/>

The Mohists believed that morality is based on "promoting the benefit of [[All Under Heaven|all under heaven]] and eliminating harm to all under heaven." In contrast to [[Jeremy Bentham]]'s views, state consequentialism is not utilitarian because it is not [[Hedonism|hedonistic]] or [[Individualism|individualistic]]. The importance of outcomes that are good for the community outweigh the importance of individual pleasure and pain.<ref name="Handbook">{{cite book|author1=Jay L. Garfield|author2=William Edelglass|title=The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=F06FKmKKIXwC&pg=PA62|date=9 June 2011|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-532899-8|page=62|quote=The goods that serve as criteria of morality are collective or public, in contrast, for instance, to individual happiness or well-being}}.</ref> The term ''state consequentialism'' has also been applied to the political philosophy of the [[Confucian philosopher]] [[Xun Kuang|Xunzi]].<ref name="Chatterjee">{{cite book|author=Deen K. Chatterjee|title=Encyclopedia of Global Justice|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2swUg4ZKTgsC&pg=PA1170|date=6 October 2011|publisher=Springer|isbn=978-1-4020-9159-9|page=1170|quote=in this sense, one can interpret Xunzi's political philosophy as a form of state utilitarianism or state consequentialism}}</ref> On the other hand, [[Legalism (Chinese philosophy)|"legalist"]] [[Han Feizi|Han Fei]] "is motivated almost totally from the ruler's point of view."<ref>{{cite journal |first=Chad |last=Hansen |title=Fa (Standards: Laws) and Meaning Changes in Chinese Philosophy |journal=Philosophy East and West |volume=44 |issue=3 |year=1994 |pages=435–488 |jstor=1399736 |doi=10.2307/1399736 |url=http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/45241/1/3006.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221010/http://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/45241/1/3006.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-10 |url-status=live |hdl=10722/45241 }}</ref>

===Ethical egoism===
{{Main|Ethical egoism}}

Ethical egoism can be understood as a consequentialist theory according to which the consequences for the individual agent are taken to matter more than any other result. Thus, [[egoism]] will prescribe actions that may be beneficial, detrimental, or neutral to the welfare of others. Some, like [[Henry Sidgwick]], argue that a certain degree of egoism ''promotes'' the general welfare of society for two reasons: because individuals know how to please themselves best, and because if everyone were an austere altruist then general welfare would inevitably decrease.<ref name="Sidgwick">{{Cite book|title=The Method of Ethics |year=1907 |last=Sidgwick |first=Henry |author-link=Henry Sidgwick |publisher=Dover (1981) |location=NY |isbn=978-0-915145-28-7 |url=http://www.la.utexas.edu/methsidg/me/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071209092717/http://www.la.utexas.edu/methsidg/me/ |archive-date=December 9, 2007 }}</ref>

===Ethical altruism===
{{Main|Altruism (ethics)}}
Ethical altruism can be seen as a consequentialist theory which prescribes that an individual take actions that have the best consequences for everyone, not necessarily including themselves (similar to selflessness).<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Ethics |first1=James |last1=Fisher |first2=Bradley |last2=Dowdwen |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/ethics/ }}</ref> This was advocated by [[Auguste Comte]], who coined the term ''[[altruism]]'', and whose ethics can be summed up in the phrase "Live for others."<ref>{{cite web |last=Moran |first=Gabriel |title=Christian Religion and National Interests |date=2006 |url=https://www.nyu.edu/classes/gmoran/APRRE04.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060706031846/http://www.nyu.edu/classes/gmoran/APRRE04.pdf |archive-date=2006-07-06 |url-status=live }}{{reliable source|date=July 2018}}</ref>

===Two-level consequentialism===
The [[Two-level utilitarianism|two-level approach]] involves engaging in critical reasoning and considering all the possible ramifications of one's actions before making an ethical decision, but reverting to generally reliable moral rules when one is not in a position to stand back and examine the dilemma as a whole. In practice, this equates to adhering to rule consequentialism when one can only reason on an intuitive level, and to act consequentialism when in a position to stand back and reason on a more critical level.<ref name=":1" />

This position can be described as a reconciliation between ''act consequentialism''—in which the morality of an action is determined by that action's effects—and ''rule consequentialism''—in which moral behavior is derived from following rules that lead to positive outcomes.<ref name=":1" />

The two-level approach to consequentialism is most often associated with [[R. M. Hare]] and [[Peter Singer]].<ref name=":1">[[Walter Sinnott-Armstrong|Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter]]. [2003] 2019. "[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism/ Consequentialism]." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by [[Edward N. Zalta|E. N. Zalta]]. (Winter 2015 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, [[Stanford University]]. Retrieved 2019-02-01.</ref>

===Motive consequentialism===
Another consequentialist application view is motive consequentialism, which looks at whether the [[State of affairs (philosophy)|state of affairs]] that results from the motive to choose an action is better or at least as good as each alternative state of affairs that would have resulted from alternative actions. This version gives relevance to the motive of an act and links it to its consequences. An act can therefore not be wrong if the decision to act was based on a right motive. A possible inference is that one can not be blamed for mistaken judgments if the motivation was to do good.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Adams |first=R. M. |year=1976 |title=Motive Utilitarianism |journal=Journal of Philosophy |volume=73 |issue=14 |pages=467–81 |doi=10.2307/2025783 |jstor=2025783 }}</ref>

===Negative consequentialism===
{{See also|Negative consequentialism}}
Most consequentialist theories focus on ''promoting'' some sort of good consequences. However, negative utilitarianism lays out a consequentialist theory that focuses solely on minimizing bad consequences.

One major difference between these two approaches is the agent's responsibility. ''Positive'' consequentialism demands that we bring about good states of affairs, whereas ''negative'' consequentialism requires that we avoid bad ones. Stronger versions of negative consequentialism will require active intervention to prevent bad and ameliorate existing harm. In weaker versions, simple forbearance from acts tending to harm others is sufficient. An example of this is the [[Slippery slope|slippery-slope]] argument, which encourages others to avoid a specified act on the grounds that it may ultimately lead to undesirable consequences.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Haigh|first1=Matthew|last2=Wood|first2=Jeffrey S.|last3=Stewart|first3=Andrew J.|date=2016-07-01|title=Slippery slope arguments imply opposition to change|journal=Memory & Cognition|language=en|volume=44|issue=5|pages=819–836|doi=10.3758/s13421-016-0596-9|pmid=26886759|s2cid=25691758|issn=0090-502X|url=http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/26101/1/SSA_Manuscript.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180719090729/http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/26101/1/SSA_Manuscript.pdf |archive-date=2018-07-19 |url-status=live|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Often "negative" consequentialist theories assert that reducing suffering is more important than increasing pleasure. [[Karl Popper]], for example, claimed that "from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure."<ref>[[Karl Popper|Popper, Karl]]. 1945. ''[[The Open Society and Its Enemies]]'' 1. [[Routledge]]. pp. 284–85.</ref> (While Popper is not a consequentialist per se, this is taken as a classic statement of negative utilitarianism.) When considering a theory of [[justice]], negative consequentialists may use a statewide or global-reaching principle: the reduction of suffering (for the disadvantaged) is more valuable than increased pleasure (for the affluent or luxurious).

===Acts and omissions===
Since pure consequentialism holds that an action is to be judged solely by its result, most consequentialist theories hold that a deliberate action is no different from a deliberate decision not to act. This contrasts with the "''acts and omissions doctrine''", which is upheld by some medical ethicists and some religions: it asserts there is a significant moral distinction between acts and deliberate non-actions which lead to the same outcome. This contrast is brought out in issues such as [[voluntary euthanasia]].

=== Actualism and possibilism ===
{{About|actualism and possibilism in ethics|actualism and possibilism in metaphysics|Actualism|section=yes}}
The normative status of an action depends on its consequences according to consequentialism. The consequences of the actions of an agent may include other actions by this agent. '''Actualism and possibilism''' disagree on how later possible actions impact the normative status of the current action by the same agent. Actualists assert that it is only relevant what the agent ''would'' actually do later for assessing the value of an alternative. Possibilists, on the other hand, hold that we should also take into account what the agent ''could'' do, even if she would not do it.<ref name="Timmerman">{{cite encyclopedia |last1=Timmerman |first1=Travis |last2=Cohen |first2=Yishai |title=Actualism and Possibilism in Ethics |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/actualism-possibilism-ethics/ |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Cohen |first1=Yishai |last2=Timmerman |first2=Travis |title=Actualism Has Control Issues |journal=Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy |date=2016 |volume=10 |issue=3 |pages=1–18 |doi=10.26556/jesp.v10i3.104 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/COHAHC|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref name="Jackson">{{cite journal |last1=Timmerman |first1=Travis |last2=Swenson |first2=Philip |title=How to Be an Actualist and Blame People |journal=Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility |date=2019 |volume=6 |pages=216–240 |doi=10.1093/oso/9780198845539.003.0009 |isbn=9780198845539 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMHTB}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jackson |first1=Frank |last2=Pargetter |first2=Robert |title=Oughts, Options, and Actualism |journal=Philosophical Review |date=1986 |volume=95 |issue=2 |pages=233–255 |doi=10.2307/2185591 |jstor=2185591 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/JACOOA}}</ref>

For example, assume that Gifre has the choice between two alternatives, eating a cookie or not eating anything. Having eaten the first cookie, Gifre could stop eating cookies, which is the best alternative. But after having tasted one cookie, Gifre would freely decide to continue eating cookies until the whole bag is finished, which would result in a terrible stomach ache and would be the worst alternative. Not eating any cookies at all, on the other hand, would be the second-best alternative. Now the question is: should Gifre eat the first cookie or not? Actualists are only concerned with the actual consequences. According to them, Gifre should not eat any cookies at all since it is better than the alternative leading to a stomach ache. Possibilists, however, contend that the best possible course of action involves eating the first cookie and this is therefore what Gifre should do.<ref name="Portmore5">{{cite book |last1=Portmore |first1=Douglas W. |title=Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options |date=2019 |publisher=New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/POROFT |chapter=5. Rationalist Maximalism}}</ref>

One counterintuitive consequence of actualism is that agents can avoid moral obligations simply by having an imperfect [[moral character]].<ref name="Timmerman"/><ref name="Jackson"/> For example, a lazy person might justify rejecting a request to help a friend by arguing that, due to her lazy character, she would not have done the work anyway, even if she had accepted the request. By rejecting the offer right away, she managed at least not to waste anyone's time. Actualists might even consider her behavior praiseworthy since she did what, according to actualism, she ought to have done. This seems to be a very easy way to "get off the hook" that is avoided by possibilism. But possibilism has to face the objection that in some cases it sanctions and even recommends what actually leads to the worst outcome.<ref name="Timmerman"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Goldman |first1=Holly S. |title=Dated Rightness and Moral Imperfection |journal=Philosophical Review |date=1976 |volume=85 |issue=4 |pages=449–487 |doi=10.2307/2184275 |jstor=2184275 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/GOLDRA}}</ref>

Douglas W. Portmore has suggested that these and other problems of actualism and possibilism can be avoided by constraining what counts as a genuine alternative for the agent.<ref name="Portmore3">{{cite book |last1=Portmore |first1=Douglas W. |title=Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options |date=2019 |publisher=New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/POROFT |chapter=3. What's the Relevant Sort of Control?}}</ref> On his view, it is a requirement that the agent has rational control over the event in question. For example, eating only one cookie and stopping afterward only is an option for Gifre if she has the rational capacity to repress her temptation to continue eating. If the temptation is irrepressible then this course of action is not considered to be an option and is therefore not relevant when assessing what the best alternative is. Portmore suggests that, given this adjustment, we should prefer a view very closely associated with ''possibilism'' called ''maximalism''.<ref name="Portmore5"/>

==Issues==

===Action guidance===
One important characteristic of many [[Normative ethics|normative]] moral theories such as consequentialism is the ability to produce practical moral judgements. At the very least, any moral theory needs to define the standpoint from which the goodness of the consequences are to be determined. What is primarily at stake here is the ''[[moral responsibility|responsibility]]'' of the agent.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Stables |first1=Andrew |date=2016 |title=Responsibility beyond rationality: The case for rhizomatic consequentialism |journal=International Journal of Children's Spirituality  |volume=9 |issue=2 |pages=219–225|doi=10.1080/1364436042000234404 |s2cid=214650271 }}</ref>

====The ideal observer====
One common tactic among consequentialists, particularly those committed to an [[Altruism|altruistic]] (selfless) account of consequentialism, is to employ an ideal, neutral observer from which moral judgements can be made. [[John Rawls]], a critic of utilitarianism, argues that utilitarianism, in common with other forms of consequentialism, relies on the perspective of such an [[Ideal observer theory|ideal observer]].<ref name="Scheffler"/> The particular characteristics of this ideal observer can vary from an [[Omniscience|omniscient]] observer, who would grasp all the consequences of any action, to an ideally informed observer, who knows as much as could reasonably be expected, but not necessarily all the circumstances or all the possible consequences. Consequentialist theories that adopt this paradigm hold that right action is the action that will bring about the best consequences from this ideal observer's perspective.{{Citation needed|date=February 2012}}

====The real observer====
In practice, it is very difficult, and at times arguably impossible, to adopt the point of view of an [[Ideal observer theory|ideal observer]]. Individual [[Moral agency|moral agents]] do not know everything about their particular situations, and thus do not know all the possible consequences of their potential actions. For this reason, some theorists have argued that consequentialist theories can only require agents to choose the best action in line with what they know about the situation.<ref name="Mackie">{{Cite book|last=Mackie |first=J. L. |author-link=J. L. Mackie |orig-date=1977 |title=Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong |publisher=Penguin |location=London |isbn=978-0-14-013558-9 |year=1990}}</ref> However, if this approach is naïvely adopted, then moral agents who, for example, recklessly fail to reflect on their situation, and act in a way that brings about terrible results, could be said to be acting in a morally justifiable way. Acting in a situation without first informing oneself of the circumstances of the situation can lead to even the most well-intended actions yielding miserable consequences. As a result, it could be argued that there is a moral imperative for agents to inform themselves as much as possible about a situation before judging the appropriate course of action. This imperative, of course, is derived from consequential thinking: a better-informed agent is able to bring about better consequences.{{Citation needed|date=February 2012}}

===Consequences for whom===

Moral action always has consequences for certain people or things. Varieties of consequentialism can be differentiated by the beneficiary of the good consequences. That is, one might ask "Consequences for whom?"

====Agent-focused or agent-neutral====
A fundamental distinction can be drawn between theories which require that agents act for ends perhaps disconnected from their own interests and drives, and theories which permit that agents act for ends in which they have some personal interest or [[motivation]].  These are called "agent-neutral" and "agent-focused" theories respectively.

'''Agent-neutral''' consequentialism ignores the specific value a state of affairs has for any particular agent. Thus, in an agent-neutral theory, an actor's personal goals do not count any more than anyone else's goals in evaluating what action the actor should take. '''Agent-focused''' consequentialism, on the other hand, focuses on the particular needs of the moral agent. Thus, in an agent-focused account, such as one that [[Peter Railton]] outlines, the agent might be concerned with the general welfare, but the agent is ''more'' concerned with the immediate welfare of herself and her friends and family.<ref name="Scheffler">{{Cite book | title = Consequentialism and Its Critics | year = 1988 | last = Scheffler | first = Samuel | publisher = Oxford University Press | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0-19-875073-4 | url-access = registration | url = https://archive.org/details/consequentia_xxxx_1988_000_9240564 }}</ref>

These two approaches could be reconciled by acknowledging the tension between an agent's interests as an individual and as a member of various groups, and seeking to somehow optimize among all of these interests.{{Citation needed|date=October 2012}} For example, it may be meaningful to speak of an action as being good for someone as an individual, but bad for them as a citizen of their town.

====Human-centered?====
Many consequentialist theories may seem primarily concerned with human beings and their relationships with other human beings. However, some philosophers argue that we should not limit our ethical consideration to the interests of human beings alone. [[Jeremy Bentham]], who is regarded as the founder of [[utilitarianism]], argues that animals can experience pleasure and pain, thus demanding that 'non-human animals' should be a serious object of moral concern.<ref name="Bentham">{{Cite book|title=An Introduction to the Principles of Moral Legislation |year=1996 |last=Bentham |first=Jeremy |author-link=Jeremy Bentham |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=Oxford |isbn=978-0-19-820516-6 |url=http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/bentham/ipml/ipml.toc.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080105091421/http://www.la.utexas.edu/research/poltheory/bentham/ipml/ipml.toc.html |archive-date=January 5, 2008 }}</ref>

More recently, [[Peter Singer]] has argued that it is unreasonable that we do not give equal consideration to the interests of animals as to those of human beings when we choose the way we are to treat them.<ref name="Singer">{{Cite book| title = Unsanctifying Human Life | last = Singer | first = Peter | author-link = Peter Singer | editor = Helga Kuhse| year = 2002 | publisher = Blackwell | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0-631-22507-2}}</ref> Such equal consideration does not necessarily imply identical treatment of humans and non-humans, any more than it necessarily implies identical treatment of all humans.

===Value of consequences===
One way to divide various consequentialisms is by the types of consequences that are taken to matter most, that is, which consequences count as good states of affairs. According to [[utilitarianism]], a good action is one that results in an increase in [[pleasure]], and the best action is one that results in the most pleasure for the greatest number. Closely related is [[eudaimonia|eudaimonic]] consequentialism, according to which a full, flourishing life, which may or may not be the same as enjoying a great deal of pleasure, is the ultimate aim. Similarly, one might adopt an aesthetic consequentialism, in which the ultimate aim is to produce beauty. However, one might fix on non-psychological goods as the relevant effect. Thus, one might pursue an increase in [[Equality of outcome|material equality]] or [[Freedom (political)|political liberty]] instead of something like the more ephemeral "pleasure". Other theories adopt a package of several goods, all to be promoted equally. As the consequentialist approach contains an inherent assumption that the outcomes of a moral decision can be quantified in terms of "goodness" or "badness," or at least put [[Order theory|in order of increasing preference]], it is an especially suited moral theory for a [[Probability|probabilistic]] and [[Decision theory|decision theoretical]] approach.<ref>Simmons, H. J. 1986. "[https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/5782/1/fulltext.pdf The quantification of 'happinenss' in utilitarianism]" ([[Ph.D. thesis]]). Hamilton, ON: [[McMaster University]].</ref><ref>[[Robert Audi|Audi, Robert]]. 2007. "Can Utilitarianism Be Distributive? Maximization and Distribution as Criteria in Managerial Decisions." ''[[Business Ethics Quarterly]]'' 17(4):593–611.</ref>

===Virtue ethics===
Consequentialism can also be contrasted with [[arete (moral virtue)|aretaic]] moral theories such as [[virtue ethics]]. Whereas consequentialist theories posit that consequences of action should be the primary focus of our thinking about ethics, virtue ethics insists that it is the character rather than the consequences of actions that should be the focal point. Some virtue ethicists hold that consequentialist theories totally disregard the development and importance of moral character. For example, [[Philippa Foot]] argues that consequences in themselves have no ethical content, unless it has been provided by a virtue such as benevolence.<ref name="Scheffler"/>

However, consequentialism and virtue ethics need not be entirely antagonistic. [[Iain King]] has developed an approach that reconciles the two schools.<ref>[[Iain King|King, Iain]]. 2008. ''[[How to Make Good Decisions and Be Right All the Time|How to Make Good Decisions and Be Right All the Time: Solving the Riddle of Right and Wrong]],'' London: [[Continuum Books|Continuum]].{{page needed|date=August 2018}}</ref><ref name="24 and Philosophy King">{{cite web|title=24 and Philosophy|author=Chandler Brett|url=http://andphilosophy.com/2014/07/16/24-and-philosophy|publisher=Blackwell|date=2014-07-16|access-date=2019-12-27}}</ref><ref name=MedicalEthics>{{cite book|first=Eldo|last=Frezzo |title=Medical Ethics: A Reference Guide|publisher= Routledge | date=2018-10-25|isbn=978-1138581074|page=5}}</ref><ref name=Zuckerman>{{cite book|first=Phil|last= Zuckerman |title=What it Means to be Moral|publisher= Counterpoint | date=2019-09-10  |isbn=978-1640092747|page=21}}</ref> Other consequentialists consider effects on the character of people involved in an action when assessing consequence. Similarly, a consequentialist theory may aim at the maximization of a particular virtue or set of virtues. Finally, following Foot's lead, one might adopt a sort of consequentialism that argues that virtuous activity ultimately produces the best consequences.{{Clarify|What issue in consequentialism is being discussed here?|date=February 2012}}
[[File:Max Weber 1894.jpg|thumb|Max Weber]]

===Ultimate end===
The ''[[ultimate end]]'' is a concept in the moral philosophy of [[Max Weber]], in which individuals act in a faithful, rather than rational, manner.<ref name=":2" />

{{blockquote|We must be clear about the fact that all ethically oriented conduct may be guided by one of two fundamentally differing and irreconcilably opposed maxims: conduct can be oriented to an ''ethic of ultimate ends'' or to an ''ethic of responsibility''. [...] There is an abysmal contrast between conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of ultimate ends — that is in religious terms, "the Christian does rightly and leaves the results with the Lord" — and conduct that follows the maxim of an ethic of responsibility, in which case one has to give an account of the foreseeable results of one's action.|Max Weber, ''[[Politics as a Vocation]]'', 1918<ref>Originally a speech at Munich University, 1918. Published as "Politik als Beruf," (Munich: Duncker & Humblodt, 1919). Later in Max Weber, ''Gesammelte Politische Schriften'' (Munich, 1921), 396-450. In English: H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trans. and ed., in ''Max Weber: Essays in Sociology'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77-128.
</ref>}}

==Criticisms==
[[G. E. M. Anscombe]] objects to the consequentialism of Sidgwick on the grounds that the moral worth of an action is premised on the predictive capabilities of the individual, relieving them of the responsibility for the "badness" of an act should they "make out a case for not having foreseen" negative consequences.<ref name="Anscombe"/>

[[Immanuel Kant]] makes a similar argument against consequentialism in the case of the inquiring murder. The example asks whether or not it would be right to give false statement to an inquiring murderer in order to misdirect the individual away from the intended victim. He argues, in [[On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives]], that lying from "benevolent motives," here the motive to maximize the good consequences by protecting the intended victim, should then make the liar responsible for the consequences of the act. For example, it could be that by misdirecting the inquiring murder away from where one thought the intended victim was actually directed the murder to the intended victim.<ref>Kant, I.: 1898, ‘On a Supposed Right to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives’, In: T.K. Abbott (trans.), Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics. London: Longmans, Green and Co.</ref> That such an act is immoral mirrors Anscombe's objection to Sidgwick that his consequentialism would problematically absolve the consequentalist of moral responsibility when the consequentalist fails to foresee the true consequences of an act.

The [[Chaos theory|future amplification of the effects of small decisions]]<ref>Gregersen, Hal B., and Lee Sailer. 1993. "Chaos theory and its implications for social science research." ''[[Human Relations (journal)|Human Relations]]'' 46(7):777–802. {{doi|10.1177/001872679304600701}}. [https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1993-43681-001 Abstract].</ref> is an important factor that makes it more difficult to predict the ethical value of consequences,<ref>[[James Lenman|Lenman, James]]. 2000. "[https://www.jstor.org/stable/2672830?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents Consequentialism and Cluelessness]." ''[[Philosophy & Public Affairs]]'' 29(4):342–70.</ref> even though most would agree that only predictable consequences are charged with a [[moral responsibility]].<ref name=":2">[[Mohr Siebeck|Siebeck, Mohr]]. 2018. "Revisiting Max Weber's Ethic of Responsibility." ''Perspektiven Der Ethik'' 12. p. 67.</ref>

<!-- Image with inadequate rationale removed: [[File:BernardWilliams.jpg|thumb|left|[[Bernard Williams]]]] -->
[[Bernard Williams]] has argued that consequentialism is alienating because it requires moral agents to put too much distance between themselves and their own projects and commitments. Williams argues that consequentialism requires moral agents to take a strictly impersonal view of all actions, since it is only the consequences, and not who produces them, that are said to matter. Williams argues that this demands too much of moral agents—since (he claims) consequentialism demands that they be willing to sacrifice any and all personal projects and commitments in any given circumstance in order to pursue the most beneficent course of action possible. He argues further that consequentialism fails to make sense of intuitions that it can matter whether or not someone is personally the author of a particular consequence. For example, that participating in a crime can matter, even if the crime would have been committed anyway, or would even have been worse, without the agent's participation.<!-- This really needs a quick discussion of William's firing-squad example. Maybe I'll add this later; but I wouldn't mind if someone beat me to it, either. --><ref name="Williams1973">[[J. J. C. Smart|Smart, J. J. C.]], and [[Bernard Williams]]. 1973. ''Utilitarianism: For and Against''. [[Cambridge University Press]]. pp. 98 ff.</ref>

Some consequentialists—most notably [[Peter Railton]]—have attempted to develop a form of consequentialism that acknowledges and avoids the objections raised by Williams. Railton argues that Williams's criticisms can be avoided by adopting a form of consequentialism in which moral decisions are to be determined by the sort of life that they express. On his account, the agent should choose the sort of life that will, on the whole, produce the best overall effects.<ref name="Scheffler"/>

==Notable consequentialists==
{{See also|List of utilitarians}}
{{Div col|colwidth=20em}}
* [[Robert Merrihew Adams|R. M. Adams]] (born 1937)
* [[Jonathan Baron]] (born 1944)
* [[Jeremy Bentham]] (1748–1832)
* [[Richard B. Brandt]] (1910–1997)
* [[John Dewey]] (1857–1952)
* [[Julia Driver]] (1961- )
* [[Milton Friedman]] (1912–2006)
* [[David D. Friedman|David Friedman]] (born 1945)
* [[William Godwin]] (1756–1836)
* [[R. M. Hare]] (1919–2002)
* [[John Harsanyi]] (1920–2000)
* [[Brad Hooker]] (born 1957)
* [[Francis Hutcheson (philosopher)|Francis Hutcheson]] (1694–1746)
* [[Shelly Kagan]] (born 1963)
* [[Niccolò Machiavelli]] (1469–1527)
* [[James Mill]] (1773–1836)
* [[John Stuart Mill]] (1806–1873)
* [[G. E. Moore]] (1873–1958)
* [[Mozi]] (470–391 BCE)
* [[Philip Pettit]] (born 1945)
* [[Peter Railton]] (born 1950)
* [[Henry Sidgwick]] (1838–1900)
* [[Peter Singer]] (born 1946)
* [[J. J. C. Smart]] (1920–2012)
{{Div col end}}

==See also==
{{Div col|colwidth=20em}}
* [[Charvaka]]
* [[Demandingness objection]]
* [[Dharma-yuddha]]
* [[Effective altruism]]
* [[Instrumental and intrinsic value]]
* [[Lesser of two evils principle]]
* [[Mental reservation]]
* [[Mohism]]
* [[Omission bias]]
* [[Principle of double effect]]
* [[Situational ethics]]
* [[Utilitarianism]]
* [[Welfarism]]
{{Div col end}}

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==
* {{Cite book| title = Consequentialism | year = 2002 | editor-last = Darwall | editor-first = Stephen| publisher = Blackwell | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0-631-23108-0 |ref=none}}
* {{Cite book| last = Goodman | first = Charles | title = Consequences of Compassion: An interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics | url = https://archive.org/details/consequencesofco0000good | url-access = registration | year = 2009 | publisher = Oxford University Press | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0-19-537519-0 |ref=none}}
* {{Cite journal |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |author1-link=Ted Honderich |title=Consequentialism, Moralities of Concern and Selfishness |url=https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/ted9.htm |doi=10.1017/S0031819100053432 |journal=Philosophy |volume=71 |issue=278 |date=October 1996 |page=499-520 |s2cid=146267944 |ref=none |access-date=2023-09-18}}
* {{Cite book| last = Portmore | first = Douglas W. | title = Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality | year = 2011 | publisher = Oxford University Press | location = New York | isbn = 978-0-19-979453-9 | url = https://sites.google.com/site/commonsenseconsequentialism/home  |ref=none}}
* {{cite encyclopedia |last= Price |first= Terry |editor-first=Ronald |editor-last=Hamowy |editor-link=Ronald Hamowy |encyclopedia=The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism |chapter-url= https://books.google.com/books?id=yxNgXs3TkJYC |year=2008 |publisher= [[SAGE Publishing|SAGE]]; [[Cato Institute]] |location= Thousand Oaks, CA |doi=10.4135/9781412965811.n60 |isbn= 978-1-4129-6580-4 |oclc=750831024| lccn = 2008009151 |pages= 91–93 |chapter= Consequentialism  |ref=none}}
* {{Cite book| last = Scheffler | first = Samuel | title = The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions | year = 1994 | publisher = Oxford University Press | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0-19-823511-8 |ref=none}}
* {{cite book |last1=Portmore |first1=Douglas W. |title=The Oxford handbook of consequentialism |date=2020 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |location=New York |isbn=9780190905323 |url=https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/34273}}

==External links==
{{Wikiquote|Consequentialism}}
{{Commons category}}
*{{cite IEP |url-id=conseque |title=Consequentialism}}
*{{cite SEP |url-id=consequentialism |title=Consequentialism |last=Sinnott-Armstrong |first=Walter}}
*{{cite SEP |url-id=consequentialism-rule |title=Rule Consequentialism |last=Hooker |first=Brad}}
*[https://ethicsunwrapped.utexas.edu/glossary/consequentialism University of Texas. Ethics Unwrapped – Consequentialism]

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Template:Pagetype (view source) (protected)
Template:Philosophy sidebar (edit)
Template:Philosophy sidebar/styles.css (edit)
Template:Philosophy topics (view source) (semi-protected)
Template:Plainlist/styles.css (view source) (protected)
Template:Portal-inline (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Reflist (view source) (protected)
Template:Reflist/styles.css (view source) (protected)
Template:Reliable source (edit)
Template:SDcat (view source) (protected)
Template:See also (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Short description (view source) (protected)
Template:Short description/lowercasecheck (view source) (protected)
Template:Side box (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Sidebar (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Sister project (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Sister project/styles.css (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Small (view source) (protected)
Template:Smaller (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Startflatlist (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Template link (view source) (protected)
Template:Tl (view source) (protected)
Template:Tooltip (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Tooltip/styles.css (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Trim (view source) (protected)
Template:Unreliable source? (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Wikiquote (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Wikt (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Wiktionary (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Yesno (view source) (protected)
Template:Yesno-no (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:Yesno-yes (view source) (template editor protected)
Template:\ (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:About (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Arguments (view source) (protected)
Module:Authority control (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Authority control/config (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Catalog lookup link (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Category handler (view source) (protected)
Module:Category handler/blacklist (view source) (protected)
Module:Category handler/config (view source) (protected)
Module:Category handler/data (view source) (protected)
Module:Category handler/shared (view source) (protected)
Module:Check for unknown parameters (view source) (protected)
Module:Check isxn (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Citation/CS1 (view source) (protected)
Module:Citation/CS1/COinS (view source) (protected)
Module:Citation/CS1/Configuration (view source) (protected)
Module:Citation/CS1/Date validation (view source) (protected)
Module:Citation/CS1/Identifiers (view source) (protected)
Module:Citation/CS1/Utilities (view source) (protected)
Module:Citation/CS1/Whitelist (view source) (protected)
Module:Citation/CS1/styles.css (view source) (protected)
Module:DecodeEncode (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Delink (view source) (protected)
Module:Disambiguation/templates (view source) (protected)
Module:EditAtWikidata (view source) (protected)
Module:Error (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Format link (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:GetParameters (view source) (protected)
Module:Hatnote (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Hatnote/styles.css (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Hatnote list (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Icon (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Icon/data (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:If empty (view source) (protected)
Module:Labelled list hatnote (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:List (view source) (protected)
Module:Namespace detect/config (view source) (protected)
Module:Namespace detect/data (view source) (protected)
Module:Navbar (view source) (protected)
Module:Navbar/configuration (view source) (protected)
Module:Navbar/styles.css (view source) (protected)
Module:Navbox (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Navbox/configuration (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Navbox/styles.css (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Navbox with collapsible groups (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Navbox with collapsible groups/configuration (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Pagetype (view source) (protected)
Module:Pagetype/config (view source) (protected)
Module:Pagetype/disambiguation (view source) (protected)
Module:Pagetype/rfd (view source) (protected)
Module:Pagetype/setindex (view source) (protected)
Module:Pagetype/softredirect (view source) (protected)
Module:Portal (view source) (protected)
Module:Portal-inline (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Portal/images/p (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:SDcat (view source) (protected)
Module:Separated entries (view source) (protected)
Module:Side box (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Side box/styles.css (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Sidebar (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Sidebar/configuration (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Sidebar/styles.css (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:String (view source) (protected)
Module:String2 (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:TableTools (view source) (protected)
Module:Unsubst (view source) (protected)
Module:WikidataIB (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:WikidataIB/nolinks (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:WikidataIB/titleformats (view source) (template editor protected)
Module:Wikitext Parsing (view source) (protected)
Module:Yesno (view source) (protected)

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