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==The standoff==
Before the truce, the 1st Infantry Division had received orders to secure the road junction at Safwan. However, because of a miscommunication and a false report of friendly artillery fire, the 1st Infantry Division fell short of its target by ten miles. As result, LTC Wilson, the 1/4 Cavalry commander, scrambled his troops with orders to secure Safwan by 1600 of March 1. Meanwhile, General Franks assumed full responsibility for the mishap.<ref>[[Rick Atkinson|Atkinson, Rick]] (1994). ''Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War''. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, pp. 6-7. ISBN
All troops of the squadron were alerted to move out at 0615 and head north. Above them, [[OH-58 Kiowa]] Warrior scout and [[AH-1 Cobra]] attack helicopters acted as guides. The lead units of the 1/4 Cavalry reached the airfield about an hour later. They were surprised when what they saw on maps as an uncompleted highway turned out to be the Safwan airfield. At first, the area seemed to be deserted, but overhead, helicopter crews reported the dug in tanks of an entire Iraqi brigade. Pope received the order not to fire unless fired upon and to continue forward. Without firing a shot, Alpha Troop occupied the airfield under the guns of the defending Iraqis. The enemy forces Pope found turned out to be a group of demoralized, starving, and ragged Iraqis. The Americans broke out their Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) and shared them with the Iraqi defenders. Soon after they started eating, an Iraqi colonel marched up, furious that his men accepted American food and demanding that the Americans depart. Pope informed him that it was the Iraqis who would have to leave the area. He exchanged maps with the colonel and the Iraqi retreated back to his own lines to inform his superiors.
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==Aftermath==
The incident was the result of the rigorous use of the chain of command for reports by the US General Headquarters instead of direct contact with division commanders on the ground.<ref>Swain, Richard M. (1999). ''Lucky War: Third Army in Desert Storm''. DIANE Publishing, pp. 299-300. ISBN
==References==
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