against the Muslims and in pursuance of that agitation meetings were
held wherein sometimes fiery speeches were made which were not
only anti-Muslim, they were anti-socialist and also anti-Congress.
15.56 There was a collection of arms by certain individuals the
ostensible object of which was to help the Hindus agitating in the
neighbouring Hyderabad State. A bomb was even thrown in the
heart of the city. But even though the thrower of the bomb was
arrested and he made a confessional statement that N. D. Apte had
given him the bomb, the police could not proceed because the con-
fessional statement was withdrawn and even without its withdrawal
it was a piece of evidence of very little, if any, value. It also appears
that the police did not think this bomb throwing to be serious because
according to the District Superintendent of Police, Mr. Pravinsinhji
Vijaysinhji, it was not thrown on any individual, showing thereby
that unless it was directed against a person or persons, according to
the head of the District Police, it was not a serious matter.
15.57 Two speeches which have been brought to the notice of the'
Commission, one by Mr. G. V. Ketkar that Gandhism was enemy
No. 1 and the other by Dr. Parchure that Gandhi and Nehru will
soon reap the fruits of their sins — these speeches were made on two-
successive days in December, 1947 — show that the trend of speeches
of some of the Hindu Mahasabha workers was not free from preach-
ing violence or at least producing disaffection against the Congress
leaders which could well have led to violence.
15.58 The Government was not wholly ignorant and inactive in
regard to what was happening in Poona. That was as long back as
July 1947- It ordered lists of Hindu Mahasabha and R.S.S. leaders to
be compiled which lists showed that some of them were Savarkarites
and some of them were both Savarkarites as well as potentially dan-
gerous. The order passed by Government for special reports in
regard to these persons was subsequently withdrawn because it was
considered that the ordinary weekly reports were sufficient for the
purpose of apprising the Government of what was happening. The
discontinuance of the special reports even though "for the pre-
sent" could impair that watchfulness which a specific and special
order for special reports would have implied.
15.59 The Hindu Mahasabha Press particularly the Agrani was
writing in a rabid strain, so much so that a substantial security had
to be demanded from it. Yet it was not deterred from its propaganda
and it even adopted the subterfuge of discontinuing the "Agrani" and
starting it under the name of Hindu Rashtra with the same rabid
policy, much to the chagrin of the police, which is shown by the evi-
dence of Deputy Superintendent Angarkar, witness No. 68.
15.60 As the story of the happenings in Poona is unfolded rather
vividly by the statements of high ranking police officials like the
Inspector General of Police, Bombay, the Deputy Inspector General,
C.I.D., District Superintendent of Police and other subordinate police
officials, the statement of each witness is sometimes briefly and some-
times at great length discussed and analysed and at the end of each
witness a resume of what he has started has been given. This has been
.done to facilitate appreciating what each .«**»£ ^hfentS
points the evidence of each witness Jias Diaug Commis-
the portion of the Chapter deah ng wjthP oon a ma ^
sion has set out its conclusion wh ch in ^ its op ^ md the
KSSS^SS^^^l^S^^^S^ the Com—on.
15 61 The evidence of what one may term non-official witnesses
has been separately dealt with.
.Statements of witnesses in Poona
15.62 Commission will now take up the analysis of the evidence of
ItPooiia witnesses.
and there was anatogo ^^^^T^ led by Chitpawan
-the leaders did not agree with his non-violence-
1* fi4 Although the Hindu Mahasabha was not very much excited
:aboufpar A tittn U f was excited when the news of what was happening
in western Punjab came.
1<Sfi5 The CID must have reported the speeches made by Hindu
would certainly have recorded it.
15.66 He had no knowledge of any ^^^.^^vletofor
Kh P r about the danger to the life of Gandhiji, either by Ketkai or
Slukaka Kanitkar But he knew that the C.I.D. watched the move-
mSS of those persons from whom there was apprehension of
violence.
3 5 67 He read about the throwing of the bomb in the newspapers.
Nobody informed him about that fact. He could no t^m^V^
lal with any person in Poona nor could he say iT the Poona Folice
knew that Madanlal was living in Ahmednagar. Mr. Kamt, .did not
know professor Jain. Between the explosion of the bomb and toe
mSde? of the Mahatma he did not know what the conspirators were
and he had no reason to suspect Poona people being involved in it.
The tart time he came to know about this fact was when Mn Sanjevi
telephoned to him about the murder on January 30, 1948 m the
-evening.
15.68 After he got the information, he telephoned to Mr. Gurtu
A.D.I.G., C.I.D. and his reply was that he knew that Poona people
were political suspects and were against Mahatma Gandhi for his
270
giving 55 crores. Mr. Sanjevi had given some names to him. I [,<•
could not recollect those names but he had passed them on to
Mr. Gurtu and Mr. Gurtu said that he did know that they Wetfi
against Mahatma Gandhi. He might have given only one name and
Mr. Gurtu inferred the others.
15.69 The Poona Police were not associated in the investigation
from 20th to 30th January 1948 excepting that Mr. Rana was in Delhi
and had been given certain information and also a copy of Madanlal's
statement dated January 24, 1948 which was shown to him
(Mr. Kamte) by Mr. Rana a day or two after the murder.
15.70 He did not try to find out what was happening in Delhi about
the investigation of the bomb case. Generally it was the practice that
if there was anything worth the Provincial Police knowing it, the
D.I.B. used to inform the Inspector Generals" and the D.I.Gs., C.I.D.
15.71 Nagarvala did not give him any information in regard to
what the Minister had told him regarding Professor Jain which in
his opinion Nagarvala should have done. Nagarvala said to him that
the Minister had told him not to inform either him (Kamte) or the
Commissioner. He (Kamte) did not ask Nagarvala why that was so.
In normal course this matter should have been reported to him be-
cause important matters are normally conveyed to the superior
officers. After he got this information from Nagarvala, he asked the
Minister and he replied that he said that because he believed that he
(Kamte) was not in Bombay and Barucha was not very effective..
Mr. Kamte added that he might be wrong but his impression was;
that the Minister thought that he should get the credit for "bringing;
into light the offenders".
15.72 When asked why the Poona Police remained absolutely
ignorant about the conspiracy, he said the police could not be present
everywhere and certainly not in a jail where the conspiracy started.
He added that orders were sought for the arrest of Karkare but he
could not recollect why those orders were not passed or why Karkare
was not arrested.
15.73 Commission may here observe that Karkare was ordered to-
be detained but the order was made much too late and by that time.
Karkare had vanished from Ahmednagar as also had Madanlal
against whom orders were passed earlier.
15.74 Immediately after he got information about the murder he-
sent for Rana and asked him for the statement of Madanlal which
Rana showed him. Mr. Kamte then asked him why he had not taken
immediate action, come to Poona and informed Gurtu. His reply
was that he was waiting for Inspector Angarkar who was then on
leave. Mr. Kamte did not think that the Poona Police was sympathe-
tic towards the conspirators or the R.S.S.
15.75 Mr. Kamte was asked what a police officer should have done
if he had been given the information which was given by Professor
Jain. He replied —
"I would have asked the Branch concerned to register an
offence and to arrest the persons named in the information.
-.7 I
If it was merely an intention I wcjOdhavo «£?&££ £
sons. I would also have slat «^. c gf rB d gSm that they
^f^XZ^rG^^r^^ in a suspicious
manner."
have been informed.
should have got in touch with the C.I.D., Poona.
15.78 He (Kamte) first said that ^^^ncg^ the^teggj-
f t he conspirators was to kidnap Mahatma ^a ^
nothing about the %cg«^N^^ that he had a
dated 30th January 1948 Ex 8 I ten ivir_^ ^ ^^
SSS" MSHffi KiT^iB. tneor,.
In answer to another question he said: —
- The glance »^ £ *-— SfTnS
people in Poona who «*f *^ a ^™ about Madanlal's
55 crores to Pakistan. IfOrt hadj ear COMlusioI1 that
ST58 ^teopTe^hr^roonspl^ to — ,
Mahatma ji."
mt^:^ ^^^ r ^ r ^ <*■ Kjnte) any
information.
15 ,0 He did not know that ^^"g^** HOST'S
15 .81 Mr. Kamte was | recalled «"£-**«; ' ££te£,5S
ri?or%n H a e ^n n ?ft7rSn^YMahat 1 na GaardM,
information was sent to the D.I.Gs. of C.I.D. of all the Pi
concerned and if ramifications were all over India then ever
Inspector General and Deputy Inspector Generals, C.I.D. would be
informed. If the identity of the persons committing an offence wn:i
not known, sending of information to Inspector Generals of different
Provinces would be really futile because it would not help anybody.
But if there was a reasonable suspicion that the accused may escape
into other parts of India then it would be wise to send information
to all the Inspectors General.
15.82 He had been told as a police officer that the accused person
5n a case like a bomb throwing case belonged to the Province of
Bombay, he would at once have informed the D.I.G., C.I.D., the
Commissioner of Police, and the Inspector General of Police, Bombay
■and also of the bordering Provinces. If he had known that Un-
accused persons were not outsiders and were Delhiwalas, he would
have stationed his men at the railway stations, airports and other
terminals including the roads leading out of the town but he would
have only placed those men who were intelligent. His experience
was that accused persons do not usually try to flee at once but they
first try to hide and later seek an opportunity to go out of the place.
Had he known that the people in the conspiracy were from Bombay
he would have placed 20 or 25 persons from Bombay around
Mahatma Gandhi to see that the conspirators did not get anywhere
near him. Godse etc. were known to Poona C.I.D. There must have
been good reason why they were not shadowed. Once a man was
in a list called the Black List, he was shadowed for 24 hours. As the
names of Godse etc. were not in that List it means the C.I.D. did not
■know that they were dangerous.
15.83 As far as he knew there was a rule that information had
to be given to the District Magistrate of the commission of serious
offences, at least that would happen in Bombay. He had heard of
Mr. G. V. Ketkar of Poona but did not know him personally.
15.84 In cross-examination he said if the statement Ex. 1 had been
shown to him earlier, he would have got those persons mentioned
there shadowed and kept them under constant watch. If the state-
ment showed that there was a conspiracy to murder, he would have
asked the police to arrest them at once and had he been told that
one was an editor of the Hindu Rashtra, Poona and the other the
owner of Shastra Bhjindar, he would have been able to find out at once ! 1
through his subordinate staff as to the identity of those persons.
Before the murder he had not heard of Apte or Nathuram Godse
If he had arrested them, he might or might not have put shadow on
their close associates.
15.85 Hindu Mahasabha policy was extremely anti-Muslim. Mr.
Rana was not pro-Hindu Mahasabha.
"Q. Supposing action in Poona on the basis of Madanlarn
statement which had been brought by Mr. Rana to Poonn
even on the 27th or in any case before the actual assassina
tion of Mahatma Gandhi had led to the arrest of the
persons therein indicated, i.e., Badge, Godse, Apte and
Karkare, would it have resulted in the banning of the
Hindu Mahasabha and R.S.S.?
Ans. No."
Local police in Poona had not been informed of the statement of
Madanlal. Delhi Police should have asked them to arrest the accus-
ed indicated by Madanlal.
15 86 Mr Kamte was again recalled but his examination was in
regard to his correspondence with Mr. Rana. In cross-examination
by Mr Kotwal, Mr. Kamte said that had he been in place of Mr.
Sanievi he would have got into contact with the Inspector General
of Police, Bombay and if a request had been made by the DJIB., he
[ would have certainly sent Bombay men to Delhi. He added that
Poona people had no personal grudge against Gandhiji and it came
as a surprise to him when he heard about Gandhiji's murder.
15.87 in his letter to Mr. Sanjevi dated 20th April, 1948, Ex. 97,
Mr Kamte had complained about Rana's bungling. He said that his
intention was to make Rana realise the desirability of taking steps
[•immediately, he got a copy of Madanlal's statement and his desire
was that Rana should not commit a mistake like that again. It shows
that in the opinion of Mr. Kamte, Rana bungled in not making any
use of the statement of Madanlal which had been handed over to him
in Delhi on 25th January, 1948. But will there be another Gandhi
to be protected?
15.88 Mr. Kamte when recalled stated that as far as he knew the
' police in Poona had no knowledge about conspiracy to murder
I Mahatma Gandhi. If they had known about it, they would have
I'taken timely action. It would not be a matter of surprise that the
I police knew nothing of the conspiracy which must necessarily be
I formed in secret but the surprise is the failure of the police to work
[ out anything useful after it got information from two sources—
; (1) Madanlal's statements, the first one of the 20th and the second .
( one of 24th January; and (2) information given by Professor Jain to
i Mr.- Morarji Desai and by him conveyed to Deputy Commissioner
Nagarvala at Bombay— and both of them remained bogged in sterile
I investigation and tangential theories showing either complacency or
paralysis.
15.89 The evidence of Mr. Kamte may be summed up thus: —
(1) The Hindu Mahasabha movement in Poona was there but
he could not say if it was a strong movement.
(2) The Hindu Rashtra Dal was led by Chitpawan Brahmins
but he did not know of any movement in Poona being anti-
Gandhi though the leaders of the Dal were no believers
of non-violence.
(?) The police would have reported the speech alleged to be
made by Godse about Gandhiji's living for 125 years if it
had been made.
f (4) He had no knowledge of information given to Mr. Kher
| i by Balukaka Kanitkar. But the C.I.D. did watch persona
'• likely to commit violence.
(5) He knew nothing of the information given by Jain to Mr.
Morarji Desai who should have conveyed it to him and not
to Nagarvala. Nagarvala also did not give him any infoj>
; mation.
(6) Sanjevi when informing him about Gandhiji's murder did
give him some names which he could not recoiled,
t but he passed them on to Mr. Gurtu who knew them to bl
'; ; anti-Gandhi. It is possible that Sanjevi might have given
I only one name and the others were worked out by Gurtu
(7) After the murder and after he heard MadanlaPs statement,
he asked Rana's explanation.
(8) He would have stationed Bombay Police around Gandhiji
to check on people from Maharashtra side if he knew that
V the conspirators were from Bombay.
(9) He had not seen precis of Madanlal's statement, Ex. 5.
(10) Nagarvala should have got into touch with Poona and
Ahmednagar. If Gurtu had known of Madanlal's state-
ment, he would have inferred conspiracy and who were in
it.
(11) He did not know of kidnapping theory which was a fantas-
tic theory in any case.
(12) He was never told of what Mi", Jedhe had said.
(13) The police in Poona had no | :e-knowledge of conspiracy
to murder. Had they known it they would have taken
timely action.
(14) Godse etc. were known to Poona C.I.D. but they were not
shadowed.
(15) Had he known of Madanlal's statement, the persons men-
tioned therein would have been shadowed and kept under
watch. From the mention of editor of the Hindu Rashtra
others could have been identified.
(16) From the mere fact that the conspirators were Godse and
others, the Hindu Mahasabha could not be banned.
(17) The Kamte-Rana correspondence shows that Mr. Rana
had bungled.
d H. Rana, wit. 3
15.90 Mr. U. H. Rana, D.I.G-, C.I.D., witness No. 3 when examined
en 7th February, 1967, stated that he was called by Mr. Sanjevi on
the day following the explosion and was told that Madanlal had given
certain information showing that his companions were from Bombay
side but it did not disclose where they belonged to. He had not stated
that they belong to Poona but he had mentioned Savarkar. Rana
275
was also told that Madanlal had said that one of them was .a
rSadhu with a beard and another was his servant named Shankar and
the third was an editor of a newspaper and he did not say where the
newspaper was published. Since Savarkar was mentioned, Mr. Rana
.-at once concluded that they must be Savarkantes.
15.91 Mr. Rana himself had no information about Annexur e V
((Ex. 5) or Ex. 5A.
15 92 When the Delhi Police officers returned from Bombay, and
'Sanjevi told him about their having been sent back, Rana told
rSanjevi that it must have been because of their remaining m Bombay
in uniform would have upset the arrangements and Sanjevi was
satisfied that everything was being done properly in Bombay. He
,-also deposed that he did not give a copy of the full statement Jix 1,
to Mr Morarji Desai and that the copy of the statement which he
"brought from Delhi was meant for Mr. Nagarvala and therefore he
did not take it back from him. He did not accept the statement of
"Mr Nagarvala that he, the witness, showed the statement to Nagar-
vala and then took it back. This in short is what he stated before
•the Commission when he appeared the first time.
15.93 When recalled at Baroda, Mr. Rana said that he could not
■recollect whether Shankar's name was mentioned on the 21st
■ January or after the murder.
15 94 During the time that he was D.I.G., C.I.D., Poona, he did not
hear the story of Godse and others going to Panchgani. Nothing of
-importance came to his notice about the activities of Nathuram Godse
or of Apte or of Badge or of their group, nor that they were directed
-towards violence. The police reporters whose duty it was to report
proceedings or the speeches of the meetings addressed by politicians
'did not make any such report. These persons were not on the Black
"List to be shadowed. Nor did he know that the Kesari group was a
militant group. He did not know that G. V. Ketkar, Bhagwan and
• others were connected with the Hindu Mahasabha.
15.95 He was then examined about Ahmednagar affairs. He did
not know that tfle Collector, Mr.. Khan, had written to Government
that bringing in of refugees would disturb the hitherto peaceful
• communal atmosphere of Ahmednagar but he knew that refugees used
to take out processions and shouted anti-Muslim slogans. He said
that it was not correct that he was present when a procession of
■refugees was taken out or a meeting was held by them at Ahmed-
nagar as stated by Madanlal. He said that he was not in Ahmed-
rnagar then.
15.96 He said that it was correct that the Razakar movement was
causing border incidents in Ahmednagar District. He could not
-remember any murder committed by the Razakars but they were
• committing robberies and dacoities.
15.97 He had no knowledge of Karkare and Madanlal having been
•ordered to be detained. When asked if he had seen the reports of
^Sub-Inspector Balkundi dated 4th January, 1948, Ex. 66, about
Karkare and Madanlal, he replied that he must have seen it because-
there was his endorsement dated January 14 on it. But it was not
within his province to recommend or not to recommend detention.
They were not persons with a provincial "reputation". He was not
camping at Ahmednagar in January but the A.D.I.G. (Crime) was.
15.98 He was away to Delhi from the 20th to 27th January and
therefore he could not have known of the happenings in Poona in his
absence.
15.99 Mr. Rana was then examined in regard to various bomb
incidents at Ahmednagar and he said that he had seen the reports
and sent Inspector Razak on 12th December 1947. If written reports
were sent in regard to Ahmednagar incidents and his initials are on
them, then he must have seen them. He was shown the report of
Inspector Razak about the activities of Madanlal etc. but he saidrthat
it did not come to his notice but it might have come to his office.
Nor did he know that Karkare was holding conferences with Apte
and Godse. According to what he knew, neither Godse nor Apte
were of provincial or inter-provincial importance. It was not report-
ed to him that Godse and Apte were meeting Karkare in Ahmed-
nagar.
15.100 He had not seen Ex. 67, the report of Sub-Inspector
Balkundi dated 29th January 1948 about the identity of Madanlal. If
the D.S.P. had received any information in regard to Madanlal in
the ordinary course he should have sent it to him. There were
violent activities in Poona and Ahmednagar but there was nothing
to show that they w„ere anti-Gandhi. They were anti-Muslim.
15.101 Mr. Rana had not seen the. report about recovery of arms
at the house of S. V. Ketkar nor had he seen the report dated January
26, 1948, of 'Inspector Razak about activities of various persons in
Ahmednagar (Ex. 58).
15.102 He had not seen Ex. 54 regarding activities of Hindu-
Rashtra Dal. It was not reported to him that the activities of Godse
and Apte were directed towards violence or that Godse and Apte
both belonged to Hindu Mahasabha;
15.103 Proceedings of meetings of Hindu Mahasabha in June and
July were not brought to his notice.
15.104 He had the list, Ex. 114, prepared but he could not say if
the names of Godse, Apte, Athawle and Ketkar were there or not.
Periodical reports were sent about the persons on the list but they
were discontinued after the orders of Government passed on his
recommendation.
15.105 He did not remember about the speeches of Mr. Jayaprakash
Narayan at Kirkee made in November 1947. (Exs. 122 and 122A).
But he must have seen a report of the speech of Dr. Parchure on 2nd
December 1947 (Ex. 131) wherein he said that Gandhi and Nehru will!
reap the fruit of their sins quite soon. He did not remember the
speeches made the following day at a meeting in Tilak Samarak;
277
Mandir by Professor Mate and G. V. Ketkar, Ex. 206, wherein the
latter said that Gandhiism-cum-false nationalism was enemy No. 1.
The practice was that if the speech was of sufficient importance it
was sent by the office to him and he in turn in his discretion sent it
to Government. If the speeches were of persons who were listed,
.then the speeches were reported in verbatim. He sent the report,
Ex. 131, of Dr. Parchure's speech in order to let Government know
about it. He added that from the information that he received from
C.I.D. both Provincial and of the Districts there was nothing to
indicate that there was any group or set of persons who were inclin-
ed or intended to murder Mahatma Gandhi or any other prominent
Congress leader.
15.106 When asked about the statement of Mr. Munshi about
the Poona school of thought led by Savarkar, he said it did exist but
Ahere was no information that its violence would be directed against
^Mahatma Gandhi nor did he know that the Kesari group was against
:Mahatma Gandhi.
15.107 The Provincial C.I.D. had no information of conspiracy to
murder Gandhiji before 20th January, 1948. He could not say any-
thing about its existence after the 20th January but if they had any
Information they must have reported to him.
15.108 Mr. Rana then described the system of classifying persons
as to their relative importance. The Provincial C.I.D. reported to
the Provincial Government and the Government of India whenever
they got any information relevant to all-India matters; the Provincial
C.I.D. reported directly to D.I.B.
15.109 Although be arrived at Delhi on the 20th evening, he learnt
.about the bomb explosion at Birla House the next morning. He did
not know that Madanlal had anything to do with Ahmednagar.
Mr. Sanjevi called him on 21st morning and asked him if he knew
about Madanlal. What passed between the two of them was con-
tained in his correspondence with Mr. Kamte, the then Inspector
'General of Police, Bombay.
15.110 Mr. Rana said: —
"I saw Mr. Sanjevi at about 9.30 a.m. or 10 a.m. H e said
that Madanlal had started talking and the latter stated that
he came from Bombay; met Savarkar; and also gave the name
of one Karkare and mentioned one Sadhu who had a servant.
Mr. Sanjevi did not give me the name of the Agrani or its
properietor or editor or the name of Hindu Rashtriya, its pro-
prietor or editor. I would like to repeat that he (Mr. Sanjevi)
did not mention the names "of either newspaper— Agrani and
Hindu Rashtriya — or their proprietors or editors."
15.111 He advised Mr. Sanjevi to send two police officers to
"Bombay and Poona because Savarkar lived in Bombay and Poona
•was the stronghold of the Hindu Mahasabha. He could not say if
;Sanjevi knew any name besides Karkare's.
m
15.112 He did not know what information Delhi Police officers:
carried to Bombay or whether they took a copy of Madanlal's state-
ment with them. No document was shown to him by Mr. Sanjevi
at the time. Before the statement of Madanlal dated 24th January
was given to him, he was not given a gist or any information about
the contents of the statement. The statement was given to him on
the evening of the 25th which he read in the train but he did not
discuss the contents with anyone. Nagarvala told him that he had
not sent the Delhi officers back but he had told them not to stay near
Sher-e-Punjab Hotel whose proprietor was a suspect.
15.113 In the statement of Madanlal which he brought to Bombay,
the name of the Agrani or the Hindu RasJitra was mentioned. There
was also mention of the editor and of the proprietor. There appears
to be some confusion in the witness's mind as the name Agrani is
not there. He did not telephone to Poona from Nagarvala's house
because Nagarvala told him that there was a big organisation and
they wanted to make simultaneous arrests and Nagarvala's informa-
tion was that they wanted to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi. Therefore
he did not inform his office in Poona to take any precautions in regard
to the editor of the Agrani. Besides, he was going to Poona next
morning and he thought he would take action when he reached there.
15.114 He did not think that the culprits would return immediate-
ly to put their design into operation. Sanjevi wa s also of the same
opinion more particularly because on e of them had been arrested.
15.115 He did not fly to Bombay because he did not like flying
and air journeys did not suit him. The statement was not sent by :
air by the D.I.B. because he did not think that the conspirators would
act so swiftly. Mt. Sanjevi had told him. that he should proceed
discreetly and cautiously so that they might make a clean sweep of
all the persons m the conspiracy. This was particularly so because
ext r W °P erations were deep-laid and quite wide in their
15.116 Mr. Nagarvala only knew the name of Karkare and no other
name Rana did not advise Mr. Sanjevi to get Maratha policemen-
into Birla House to be on watch or any other persons from Poona or
Bombay. He could not say if anybody else had advised him.
15.117 Mr. Rana was asked a specific question whether the culprits
were known to the Poona C.I.D. as being persons who were likely
to take part in violent activities. He replied:—
"I can now say that amongst them Apte, Godse, Karkare
Athawle and Badge were the potential mischief makers who
were taking part in violent activities."
15.118 He was then asked if the sending of Bombay Police would
have averted the catastrophe.. He replied that there were too many
assumptions in the question, that the same persons would commit the
ottence, they would select the same place or the men sent there woula
be able to identify them He said that upto the 24th January he did
not know that Madanlal had named any other persons excepting
270
L Karkare and Savarkar. He was not told that Madanlal had made
a statement to the police on the midnight of 20th January 1948
Sanjevi did tell him that Madanlal had other associates on Bombay
side and one of them was a Sadhu wearing a beard but he did not
say that amongst them one was a manager or editor of the Rashtnya
newspaper nor did Sanjevi say that Madanlal had given descriptions
of six companions as his co-conspirators.
15 119 Mr. Sanjevi did not tell on the 21st nor on the 24th that
one of the persons described by Madanlal was the editor ot the
Agrani.
15.120 Then he referred to his correspondence with Mr. Kamte.
.15 121 He did not leave Madanlal's statement with Nagarvala
because (1) Nagarvala already had the information from Home
" Minister (2) He had been informed about Karkare and Savarkar,
'. (3) Nagarvala had nothing to do with Poona, and (4). He himself
' was. going to Poona the following day and he' would take action
himself.
15 122 If the Delhi Police officers had gone to Poona, Police there
would have taken action. He said whatever Delhi Police may say,
the names of the Agrani and the Hindu Rashtriya were not mention-
ed uptil the statement of Madanlal dated 24th. From the fact that
the officers returned from Bombay it can be inferred that either
the Bombay Police had all the necessary clues or the officers them-
selves did not go to Poona. Whatever explanation he had to give he
gave in his letters to Mr. Kamte. He said that in those days it was
difficult to talk on the telephone because telephone operators were
not above suspicion.
15.123 He said even with the Bombay Police round about Birla
House, it would have been possible to stop the catastrophe only if
Gandhiji had allowed the people going to his meetings to be searched
or screened. Constituted as Mahatma was, used to mixing with the
crowds, it was difficult to protect him in those conditions against a
" ' i murderous z.
15.124 He was in Delhi screening information regarding complicity
of different persons in the conspiracy and also about' Godse having
been at different places. There was no truth in the allegation made
against the ruling houses at Gwalior, Alwar, or Bharatpur. That was
the result of his investigations. Mr. G. K. Handoo did come and see
him at Gwalior and told him that his information was that Bakshi
Ram knew something about the conspiracy of murdering Mahatma
Gandhi by Godse and he could, if he liked, meet him. Rana advised
him to write to the D.I.B. who would give directions. His (Mr.
Rana's) attention was drawn to his letter, Ex. 208, dated April 3, 1948
to Mr. Sanjevi in which he said that Bakshi Ram might be referring
to some other conspiracy. He said that he did write that and the
D.I.B. agreed with him as his endorsment shows.
15.125 Sending Madanlal to Bombay did not occur to anyone. He
wanted Inspector Angarkar because Nagarvala wanted Badge to be
identified and Angarkar knew everyone and their associates. He
did not read the Hindu Rashtra.
15.126 He talked to Nagarvala about the steps he (Nagarvala)
was taking in the investigation but he did not tell him anything of
the descriptions allegedly given by Madanlal in his statement.
Nagarvala told him that the Delhi Police officers wanted his help in
arresting Karkare. He did not say that they had mentioned the
newspaper Agrani or Hindu Rashtra. The only name they had and
which they mentioned to Mr. Nagarvala was "Kirkree".
15.127 The witness was shown Ex. 5A. . He said he had never
seen it before and what was contained in document would not be
sufficient to identify any of the accused persons. He was speaking
about himself. But with the portion within the red pencil line it
could have been of some assistance.
15.128 He went to see the Home Minister on the 28th morning.
His object was to find out who his informant was which Nagarvala
had not been able to get. If the identity had been given, it is 'possible
that they might have been able to find out something more. He
reached Delhi after the murder on February 2. He did not know
anything about Sathe who was mentioned by Mrs. Barve.
15.129 !In cross-examination he said that when he went to Mr.
Sanjevi on the 21st there were some other police officers one of whom
was Rikhikesh and the other was Bhatia who were investigating
officers in the bomb case. Neither of' them had a statement of
Madanlal with them and the talk was oral, no document was referred
to and nobody mentioned the editor of Agrani or Hindu Rashtra or
any newspaper nor was he asked by Mr. Sanjevi to find out about
the editor of a newspaper. He was told that Madanlal had men-
tioned three persons— Karkare and a Sadhu and his servant, and the
other companions were Marathas from Bombay side. As soon as
Marathas of Bombay were mentioned, he (Rana) ' suspected Savarkar
and his group. He mentioned Bombay to Sanjevi because Savarkar
resided there and Poona because it was the stronghold of Hindu
Mahasabhaite group. He had not heard that the officers going to
Bombay had taken a precis of Madanlal's statement. He was told
that Madanlal's statement was in Urdu; it wa s being translated to
help him and the Bombay Police in the investigation in Bombay.
15.130 Mr. Sanjevi knew that he (Rana) was to travel by train
and not by air and also when he would get to Bombay. He was to
go by a circuitous route from Delhi via Allahabad and from Allahabad
he went to Bombay by Allahabad Express reaching Bombay on the
evening of 27th. As far as he knew, Mr. Sanjevi did not use
telephone or wireless communications for conveying the gist of
Madanlal's statement to Bombay or to Poona.
15.131 From the fact that Mr. Sanjevi knew that he (Rana) was
travelling by train, he must be under the impression that because
one of the conspirators had been arrested, the others were not likely
281
to come back soon to commit any further offences. Mr. Sanjevi told
mm that it would b i L he took necessary action on reaching
Bombay and Poona and that he should proceed ca^ngy and
secretlv and round up the whole lot m one sweep. On the 25th
fanfevl told him that one of the conspirators was , an editor of a
newspaper, but he did not mention the name of the person <h the
place of publication of the paper.
15.132 On his attention being drawn to his previous statonent
■dated 7th March 1967, Mr. Rana said that the previous statement was
made under 'misapprehension and his present statement was the
Correct thing. He had not then refreshed his memory by reading his
.correspondence with Mr. Kamte and he must have got mixed up
.about the dates.
15 133 Mr. Sanjevi did not tell him that the Delhi Police officers
had taken a copy of Madanlal's statement and the same had been
returned by Nagarvala.
15 134 When on January 27, 1948 he was staying with Nagarvala,
he asked him why he had sent back the Delhi officers, his reply was
that he had not sent them back; and told him what had actually
happened.
15 135 Mr. Rana said that it was absolutely incorrect that Mr.
Morarji Desai did not inform Mr. Nagarvala. Only Professor Jam s
identity had not been disclosed. If it had been disclosed it was
possible that the Police might have got some more information but
that is only a "might have".
15.136 Nagarvala also told him that he had made enquiries from
Ahmednagar and was told that Karkare was no longer there and he
had posted his men to be on the look-out for Karkare in Bombay and
he also wanted some Police officers from Poona to identify Badge,
a known trafficker in illicit arms. Nagarvala told him that his theory
was that the attempt was to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi. He had con-
cluded this on the basis of the information he had from his informers.
Nagarvala told him that there were 20 principals and each one of
them had a lot of persons working under them and Nagarvala believ-
ed that information to be correct.
15.137 When Nagarvala was speaking "and I was listening to him
and asking him some questions also about it. I did not think this
theory to be fantastic; on the other hand I asked him to inform the
D.I.B. on telephone."
15.138 On 27th they spoke to the D.I.B. at about 7.30 p.m. He
(Rana) spoke to Sanjevi first and told him that Nagarvala denied
the sending of Police officers back and that he seemed to be proceed-
ing on the right lines but he did not mention the kidnapping theory
to Sanjevi but told him to take extra precautions at Birla House.
Then Nagarvala spoke to the D.I.B. and mentioned the kidnapping
theory. Nagarvala also stressed that necessary steps should be taken
to guard the residence of Mahatma Gandhi and protect his person.
Nagarvala also told him what steps he was taking. Nagarvala had
a diary in which he had names of suspects. He read the names out
to him (Eana). It was a small Policeman's notebook. Out of the
persons named in that pocket book Badge alone was involved in the
conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi. Those names did not
includ- any editor of a newspaper. Had Nagarvala known about the
editor he would have contacted Poona and got the suspect arrested;
at any rate that name would have been mentioned in the diary.
15.139 When Nagarvala mentioned the theory of kidnapping to
Sanjevi, Sanjevi did not deprecate it or show any disapproval because
if he had Nagarvala would have told him about it. Mr. Sanjevi
neither disapproved of the kidnapping theory nor did he suggest any
additional steps to be taken by the Bombay Police. Rana again em-
phasised that he impressed upon Sanjevi the necessity for greater
and stringent protective measures because of the theory of kidnap-
ping and a large number of persons being involved in it.
15.140 He did not expect the associates of Madanlal to be moving-
about openly. He expected that thsy would do so surreptitiously and
would be lying low. He did not telephone to Poona because it was
not expedient. He did not show the statement of Madanlal to the
Home Minister, tit was not correct that he did not show the state-
ment of Madanlal to anyone because he heard to show it to the
Home Minister. He also told the Home Minister that Nagarvala
was proceeding on right lines. The Minister did not give him (Rana)
the name of his informant.
15.141 When he went to Poona he asked for Angarkar but he was
ill. Then he asked for Deulkar but he also was not available being ;
away to Alibaug and he was called back immediately by wireless.
Rao Sahib Gurtu knew the names of all the culprits mentioned by
Madanlal. Other officers were available in Poona but h e (Rana)
only v/anted Angarkar or Deulkar because they were the only ones
who knew the names of the associates of Karkare and their hide-outs.
He did not ask anyone about the presence of those persons in Poona.
Subsequent enquiries showed that when he reached Poona, Apte and
Godse were not there and he himself did not know the whereabouts
of Badge. He learnt that Karkare was called Maharaj. After the
murder Sanjevi asked Kamte to send some Police Officers from
Bombay and they were sent by military plane on 31st January but
he did not know who they were. That was because there was a fear
that Central Cabinet Ministers would also be attacked. When Rana
was sent back to Delhi to supervise the investigation he stayed with
Sanjevi and on the morning of the third day they had a talk with
each other but Sanjevi did not tell him that Nagarvala had proceeded
on wrong lines.
15.142 The evidence of Mr. Rana can be divided into 3 parts
(1) dealing with his statement, regarding what happened in Bombay
or Poona and matters connected therewith; (2) dealing with Delhi
investigation; and (3) his investigation in Indian States.
15.143 Mr. Rana's evidence regarding Bombay shows that: —
(1) The name of Shankar was not given to him on the 21st
January and what he stated earlier was a mistake.
12) Nothing of importance was heard by him about the actlvi
ties of Apte, Godse or Badge nor that Apte and Godse were,
indulging in violent activities and their names were not.
on the Black List to be shadowed.
(3) He did not know that the Kesari group of Hindu Maha-
sabhaites was a militant group, nor that Savarkar group
would commit violence against Gandhiji. He could not .
think that Gandhiji would be murdered.
(4) He had no knowledge of activities of Karkare and
Madanlal or of the arms find at the house of S. V. Ketkar
at Ahmednagar.
(5) Razakars were causing border incidents.
(6) He had no knowledge about meetings of Rashtra Dal at:
Dadar in 1947.
(7) There were violent activities in Ahmednagar and in Poona
but they were anti-Moslem in nature.
(8) He got the list of Hindu Mahasabha workers compiled and
periodical reports were sent about those persons but they
were discontinued on his recommendation.
(9) He could not remember about the speeches made by Prof.
Mate and G. V. Ketkar at the meeting of the 3rd December
1947 where G. V. Ketkar said their enemy No. 1 was false
nationalism-cum-Gandhiism. He sent Ex. 131 the report
of the speech of Dr. Parchure to Government.
(10) There were no reports in Poona about conspiracy to
murder Mahatma Gandhi. The reports from districts did
not show that there was a group or a party which was
conspiring to kill the Mahatma. If there had been any
such party it would have been reported to him.
(11) Inspector Angarkar was required at Bombay because Mr.
Nagarvala wanted somebody to identify Badge, a trafficker
in arms.
(12) Mr. Nagarvala told him that Karkare was no longer in
Ahmednagar. (See 19 below).
(13) He also told him about the kidnapping theory with which >
he agreed because he did not think it to be fantastic.
(14) Both he and Mr. Nagarvala spoke to Mr. Sanjevi on the
telephone on the 27th and Mr. Nagarvala conveyed to him
his kidnapping theory which was not disapproved of by
Mr. Sanjevi.
(15) Mr. Nagarvala had some names with him and they did not
include the editor of a newspaper.
(16) He would not have imagined that the culprits would move
about openly as they did. He thought they would be in
hiding.
284
ill) He reached Bombay on the 27th January and as Ke had
fever he stayed the night with Nagarvala. He showed the
statement of Madanlal to Nagarvala but as it was a long
statement he took it back promising to send him a copy!
He first wanted to find out about the complaint of the Delhi
Police Officers and besides (i) Nagarvala had the! informa-
tion given by the Home Minister; (ii) Nagarvala had
nothing to do with Poona investigation; and (iii) he was
going to Poona the following day and he could look to
conspirators from Poona.
(18) If Mr. Morarji Desai had disclosed Jain's name, the Police
might have got more information but that was only "might
have".
(19) Nagarvala told him
(See 12 above).
Karkare was not in Ahmednagar.
(20) After the murder Poona police officers were flown to
Bombay to protect the Central Ministers.
15.144 About Delhi:—
(1) Mr. Rana was called by Mr. Sanjevi and whatever passed
between them was reported in his correspondence with
Mr. Kamte, the then I.G.P. Bombay, Exs. 30 to 33.
( - 2 ^ ( ^ r - Sa njevi did not mention the names of the 'Agrani' or
Hindu Rashtra' or their editor or proprietor Super-
intendents Bhatia and Rikhikesh saw him on the 21st but
they did not have the statement of Madanlal 'with them and
talk was oral.
(3) Mr. Rana advised sending of two officers to Bombay and
Foona but he does not know what information they carried
with them nor whether they carried Madanlal's statement
with them. He advised Bombay as Savarkar lived in
S°i? it? 2S? Poo ? a as " was stron ghold of the Mahasabha.
If Delhi Officers had gone to Poona the Police there would
have helped them.
(4) Gist of the statement of Madanlal dated 24th January was
not given to him. J
(5> w S^?i, fu y | tate T? nt of Madanlal to Mr. Nagarvala
it throu h Snd Mr ' Na § arvala did n °* r ead
(6) No one expected attack on the Mahatma to be repeated so
soon, neither Mr. Sanjevi nor he himself.
(?) SnfS n f ? Y t ° J B ,T b o y as flyin S did not suit Mm- He
went by tram and Mr. Sanjevi knew about it.
(9) Mr. Nagarvala knew the name of Karkare only.
(10) Mr. Rana did not advise Mr. Sanjevi to get Maratha Police-
at Birla House.
(11) He could not now say that Apte, Godse, Karkare, Athawle-
and Badge were taking part in violent activities But the
efficacy of sending Bombay Police was problematic. They
could only have been effective, if at all, if they had been ,
allowed to screen those attending the prayer meetings.
But Gandhiji did not allow it.
(12) The names of 'Agrani' and 'Hindu Rashtra' were not men- -
tionad till the 24th January, 1948 when Madanlal s fuller
statement was recorded. There is a mistake as to the
Agrani.
(13) It did not occur to any one to send Madanlal to Bombay.
(14) He had not seen Ex. 5-A or Ex. 5 before.
(15) He was told that Madanlal had mentioned three persons,,
{ } Karkare, a sadhu and a servant, and that the -other ^compa--
nions were Marathas from Bombay side. This made him
suspect Savarkar's group,
(16) Mr. Sanjevi did not use the telephone or wiresless com-
munication for conveying the gist of Madanlal's statement
to Bombay.
(17) Mr. Sanjevi told him that it would be sufficient if he took
necessary action on reaching Bombay and Poona but he
should proceed cautiously and secretly.
(18) He also told him on the 25th that one of the conspirators
was the editor of a newspaper but no names were men-
tioned.
(19) Godse, Apte, Karkare and Badge were not on the Black
List.
(20) There were violent activities in Poona and Ahmednagar
but they were not directed against Mahatma Gandhi.
(21) The bomb throwing in Ahmednagar and Poona was anti-
Muslim and anti-Razakar and not against Congress or
Mahatma Gandhi.
(22) He could never have imagined that Gandhiji would be
murdered.
(23) He would not have concluded from the alleged speech of
Godse about Gandhiji's living for 125 years that his inten-
tion was to murder Mahatma Gandhi.
(24) From the descriptions given in the fuller statement of
Madanlal he would not have been able to identity
persons. ' ' "' »
<25) He could not remember if he was told at Delhi that clothe*
marked 'N.V.G.' were found at Marina Hotel.
*(25A) The report of Ahmednagar Police about Madanlal and
Karkare had been seen by Mr. Rana but he made no um<*
of that information. If he had no recollection of it, h«
should at once have asked his office if there was any infor-
mation.
(26) If Delhi Police had gone to Poona, Poona Police would
have given them every assistance.
(1) There was no truth in the allegation that ruling house*
of Gwalior, Alwar and Bharatpur had ~any hand in the
conspiracy.
(2) Mr. Handoo did came to see him at Gwalior and told hir.
that Bakshi Ram knew something about the conspirac>
„ but he (Rana) advised him to write to the D.I.B. Ran'-
had written to the D.I.B. that Bakshi Ram must be refei
ring to another conspiracy and the D.II.B. agreed with hin
IRao Sahib Gurtu, wit. 22.
15.146 Rao Sahib Gurtu, witness No. 22, was the Assistant D.I.G.,
C.I.D. at Poona. He stated that the D.S.P. Ahmednagar made a
■reference towards the end of 1947 or thereabout about Madanlal
who had addressed a meeting of refugees which had resulted in
.disturbances but he cou d », - whether there was any report
.about his activities aft- . 3 witness also knew about Karkare
who was a prominent Hindu Mahasabha leader in Ahmednagar but
he could il 1 ;re of a violent nature. No such
report was made to him. He did not know that Karkare had a shop
for the sale of arms and ammunition and he remembered that a meet-
ing of Raosahib Patwardhan was disturbed but whether there was
any assault on him or not he could not say.
15.147 Reports used to come in about the communal activities of
the group consisting of Nathuram Godse, Karkare, Apte and Badge
■and several other persons whose names he could not recollect but
they went under the name of Hindu Sabha Movement Their 'pro-
paganda was against Gandhiji's policies towards Muslims but not for
doing harm to Mahatma Gandhi least of all murdering him. There
were reports that bombs were being prepared by some of the work-
ers of the Hindu Mahasabha Movement but not that they intended
-to Murder Mahatma Gandhi.
15.148 When the bomb was thrown at Birla House, he had a vague
suspicion that that might be the handi-work of the Hindu Mahasabha
and K.fa.b. group but he had no idea as to who exactly were involved
in it There was nothing in the C.I.D. record to direct their atten-
tion to Madanlal or the group with which he was connected nor that
he was connected with the Hindu Sabha workers in Poona. It did
not strike the C.I.D. police in Poona that he might be so connected
with any particular group of Hindu Mahasabha workers of P(Sn«
287
.any names alleged to have been given by Madanlal.
1H1AO The witness did not even know that Madanlal had made
15150 The activities of Karkare as far as the witness knew and
as far as wis known to the police were confined to addressxng meet-
'ines The^ reports showed that he was strongly opposed to Mahatma
Sdhi's nolicies and was propagating Hindu Mahasabha policies but
S witaefs had nS knowledge that one of their aims and objects was
to'murdS 5 top raXing C^ess leaders Mahatma Gandhi or
. Jawaharlal Nehru or Patel or anyone of that stature.
15151 Nathuram Godse, Apte and Badge were active members
of the Hindu Mahasabha but there was no actual incitement to
v olence by them although their propaganda tended towards valence
-without falling under anyone of the provisions of the Penal Code.
15.152 To this knowledge, there was no directive between January
20 and January 30 for investigation against Karkare, Apte the Goctses
ir Badg^ or anyone else who might have been considered dangerous
for the lives of Congress leaders. The warrant for the arrest of
Karkare was to be executed by the District Police and in the ordinary
• course the Poona C.H.D. would come to know about it as a piece ol
information. The witness did not know anything about the deten-
tion order of Madanlal nor had he seen it earlier. Whether the order
was passed on any recommendation by the Provincial C.I.J, the
-witness could not naturally recollect.
15153 The witness was shown an intercepted letter of Karkare
(Ex 43) which was addressed to various newspapers in Poona for
publication. He said he must have come to know about it as it bore
Ms endorsement. He knew about the orders for the detention of
Karkare but could not say why they were passed.
15 154 Activities of Godse were also being watched by the police
but it was not a continuous watch so as to prevent his eluding it.
No orders were issued for the arrest of anyone after Madanlal made
a statement containing names of his co-conspirators, if he did give
their names. If any names had been given to Poona Police, it would
have taken steps to apprehend them. He could not remember having
any talk with Nagarvala during the period January 20 to January 30
1948. If the witness had been told that one of the persons mentioned
•by Madanlal was the editor of the Agrani or the Hindu Rashtra, he
would have arrested him at once. When asked how he would have
arrested persons named by Madanlal when warrants on Karkare
•could not be effectively served, his reply was that that was being
.done by the District Police and not by the C.I.D.
288
15.155 In his cross-examination he stated that reports were sent
every week to amongst others, the D.I.B. by the DIG. compiled from
the reports received from the D.S.Ps. and that these reports contained
the names of Godse, Apte, Karkare, Savarkar and Dr. Parchure of
Gwalior. Although from August 15, 1947, a watch was kept by the
local police on certain Hindu Mahasabha and R.S.S. workers, the
watch was discontinued in November 1947 but the witness could not
give any reason but that must have been under Government's orders.
15.158 He stated that there were bomb incidents in Poona also
as they were in Ahmednagar. One of them was in the Poona City
Library in July 1947 in connection with which JUhawle and N. D.
Apte were arrested but what Athawle stated he could not remember.
When asked why the editor was not arrested, he could not say but
probably there was no evidence against him. The matter was being
investigated by the District Police and not the Provincial C.I.D.
15.157 It never occurred to witness that Madanlal arrested in
Delhi was the same person about whom a report had been made
earlier and this not even after seeing the account of the bomb in the
Times of India, Ex. 106, or the report of the Mahatma's speech in
the Bombay Chronicle, Ex. 108. Poona group was opposed to the
help Mahatma Gandhi had given to the Muslims and they strongly
disapproved of giving 55 crores. The witness was never shown a
copy of the statement of Madanlal brought by Mr. Rana. He had no
information about the conspiracy to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi. He
did, on being shown previous files, recollect about S. V. Ketkar's
statement that the arms belonged to Karkare.
15 158 In cross-examination by Mr. Chawla, the witness stated
that the Agram. was a very strong anti-Muslim paper and was attack-
ing the policy of Mahatma Gandhi; but he had no knowledge that
this group of people, connected with the Agrani, were collecting arms
to bring about a revolution. The reports in regard to Godse's
activities and that of his group were being sent to the D.I.G CI D
Mr. Rana, but really the Assistant D.I.G. looked into these matters.'
No names ware given to him by Mr. Rana. The Delhi Police never
contacted him and a month later he came to know that they had
come to Bombay and that they had been sent back from Bombay.
Witness did not know whether they wanted to see him or not.
15.159 Rao Sahib Gurtu was examined by the Commission at
Dharwar as he was not keeping good health but in spite of that he
appeared to be quite alert and made his statement without showing
any impairment of memory and without fumbling. "
_ 15.160 What emerges from his statement is this : that happenings
in Ahmednagar and in Poona including the activities of Karkare and
Madanlal at Ahmednagar and of Godse, Apte and Badge at Poona
were being reported to the Provincial C.I.D. but they could not dis-
cover that the activities were so blatantly and violently against
Mahatma Gandhi and the Congress that there was likelihood of any
harm being done to them and secondly, that as things appeared
then, the bomb incidents in Poona which were being investigated
by th6 BlUStBt POUM and the Provincial C.I.D. had no connection
with anti-Gandhi or anti-Congress activity.
Tbirdlv the Poona C.I.D. had no information about what Madan-
lal had stated or that he had named anybody who might have been
connected with Poona Hindu Mahasabha directly. But ii thenam
of Karkare had been given to the Provincial C.I.D. earlier and that
1S as far as fh T witness would go, it might have led to the activities
of Karkare's friends being enquired into by Poona Pohce or C.I.D.
Fourthly, if at any time, the name of the editor of the Agrani
had been mentioned, in all probability, this witness would have
seen to his apprehension.
Fifthly Mr. Rana, on his return from Bombay, did not show the
confessional statement of Madanlal to this witness As to what he
™lThaw done may be a matter of conjecture but foresight re-
quSedS he should have been taken in confidence at an earlier
stage.
Sixthly there was no communication between this witness and
Mr Nagaivala and about what Mr. Nagarvala was doing this wit-
ness knew nothing.
Pravinsinh]i Vijaysinhii, wit. 38. -
15 161 Witness No. 38, Mr. Pravinsinhu Vijaysmhji was the D.b.F.
of Poona between July 1947 and May 1949 and subsequently rose
to beth" Inspector General of Police of Bombay, His deposition
Sow* that in the middle of 1947 communal violence in Poona
StT was runnin* very high because of the Partition and the
?eehngs against Muslin/had been worked up .and was mtengtai
because of the influx of refugees from the Pun 3 ab The prominent
B« Mahasabha workers then included Bhopatkar, Abhayankar,
^ySSVdse and G. V Ketkar but their ^activities were
confined to being anti-Muslim. There was no overt attack against
the Musi m League or against the Muslims; although they carried
on propaganda against the Congress because it agreed to the ,ai -
tSion and there was strong feeling against Mahatma Gandhi as oeing
the mS l architect of Partition. " there was no overt attack against
them.
T, 162 The trend of speeches of the Hindu Mahasabha workers
to know through his L.I.B. staff. Tho person mcharge of the L.I.B.
was Inspector Angarkar.
1K1fi , A+ +>,-. time there was no refugee camp in Poona City but
there -ferfnumber* of 'rSuge'eswho werl carrying on petty trades.
1S 164 Instructions had been issued for watching the activities of
the H ndu Xhasabha and R.S.S. workers. Their meetings were a -
tended by the reporters and the special police, stationed at the ^rail-
way stations and the bus stops, used to report about their arrivals
19—259 HA
spe£h tf NatK, iKf"? "W! L to ^ witMSS ab ° u * ■"» July
Is SSSSS? ^ssaysffss
£££££. help of tomy was -^«-S sS^^vS?
it had no knowledge about what Apte and Godse were Sg
15.168 Mr Rana gave no orders to the witness for arresting or
to JanLTf $£\!* e ^f^ 3 ° f any + °, ne after his retu r n a f r r oS D S elni
in January 1948 nor did he say anything about Madanlal nor did
it strike anyone that Madanlal had associates in Poona As the
situation became very tense after the murder of Mahatma Gandhf
the police did not direct its energies towards flndtog S whT the-
associates of Nathuram Godse were. S
AJ^ m J^ on ^ ectioa with the P°ona City Library bomb case
Apte and Athawle were arrested. Athawle made his confession but
SJ 1 ^ ? Wlthdra Tu al ° f the confession the case was withdrawn
The bomb was not thrown on any particular person but ts obS
was to create a scare. The fact that a bomb had Sen town was
not sufficient to warn the police to take stringent measures
_ 15 170 Coming to Hindu Rashtra Dal, the witness stated that a
St* W u\r Ued % Watch its activities and the activities of its
members but he could not remember who its members were
+ 15 "iJ- 1 - H x e did not know if Balukaka Kanitkar wrote anvthi no
to a Minister. After the bomb was thrown, thl witness ha d no,
291
information about Nathuram Godse and Apte having left Ftiona nor
before the bomb was thrown did he receive any mi formation con ,
cerning these two. This witness could not remember about the
speech made by Nathuram Godse or what was said by socialists lea
by Jayaprakash Narayan or Ashoka Mehta that Hindu Manasabha
workers were trying to kill Mahatma Gandhi.
15172 Mr. Vaidya in his cross-examination referred to Ex. 71
report of a meeting of 28th November 1947 where it is. stated that
Hindu Mahasabha leaders had been accused of t^^f £>»£
kill Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru and there was no demal of that
allegation; on the contrary, the allegation of the socialists vvasie-
peated as if it was a matter of pride of the Hindu Mahasabha work-
ers. The report of this meeting never came to the notice of thib-
witness.
15.173 It appears to the Commission that this question contains
an important error. There is no mention of murdering Gandhyji.
It only mentions Pt. Nehru. In the diary of 28th November 1947
sent to the D I G. C.I.D. by this witness, there was mention ot Jie
condemnation of 'the Hindu Mahasabha by the socialists but the
witness could not recollect anything about this.
15174 The DIG. C.I.D. on his return from Delhi wanted Angar-
kar who was not available and he did not want anybody else.
15175 In reply to Mr. Chawla the witness said that he had no
recollection of Godse 's name being mentioned in connection with
Poona bomb case, nor did he know anything of Karkare or Madanlal
in connection with the activities of Godse and Apte nor that Madan-
lal and Karkare were visiting Poona. As far as the wnness could
remember, Godse did not advocate violence in his. newspaper. Badge
had an arms store and had been convicted for possession ot illegal
arms before the witness took charge of Poona but he never came
to know that Nathuram Godse and Apte were collecting arms. But
there was a strong rumour that arms were being collected for Hyd-
erabad. The Hindu Mahasabha workers were very sympathetic to-
wards Hyderabad movement. But he could recollect nothing about,
the activities in the district of Ahmednagar brought out in the sec-
ret abstract.
15 176 As for the events essential for the purposes of this Inquiry,,
this witness is not of much assistance as he either does not know
anything about the main actors in the tragedy or has no recollection
of events. His evidence comes to this : —
(1) In 1947 there were communal riots in Poona intensified by
the arrival of refugees from Pakistan, Punjab.
(2) Activities of prominent Hindu Mahasabha workers were-
confined to being anti-Muslim and propaganda against:
Congress because of the Partition of which Mr. Gandhi
was considered to be the architect.
(3) Trend of speeches of Hindu Mahasabha leaders was not;
tending to violence and there was no indication of danger
to Gandhiji's life.
(4) He does not know why the Agrani was stopped <.
Rashtra started but it did not preach violence.
(5) He had no knowledge
Godse.
about the alleged July speech of
(6) No official help was asked for the Delhi bomb case.
(?) The police had no knowledge of the activities of Godse or
Apte or their advocating violence.
(8) Referring to the bomb throwing by Athawle he said mere-
ly because a bomb was thrown was not sufficient to be. a
warning to the police.
(9) He knew nothing about Balukaka Kanitkar's warning, if
any.
(10) He did not know who the members of the Rashtra Dal
were.
(11) Report of Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan's speech about accu-
sation against the Hindu Mahasabha members' intention
to kill Mahatma Gandhi did not come to him.
<G. S. Chaubal, wit. 31.
15.177 Deputy Superintendent G. S. Chaubal, witness No. 31, was
in the C.ID. (Special Branch) and wa s incharge of the headquarters
at Poona at the relevant 'i Me in 1947-48. His duties included gene-
ral supervision of the Intelligence Branch incharge of confidential
records. Amongst others he was dealing with communist affairs,
i.e., their activities in the whole Province but he was not incharge
of the intelligence regarding activities of the R.S.S. He knew Apte
and Godse only by sight.
15.178 His report in regard to what happened at Panchgani and
his statement in this regard is what has been stated by many others
that all that happened was that about 15 people led by N. D. Apte
held a black flag demonstration against Mahatma Gandhi and then
had to leave the place. According to the intelligence reports that
he got, there was nothing to show of the existence of a conspiracy
to murd v "i - m ^ndhi His report in regard to that incident
is Ex. 40 '. ed July , 1944=. He w .-, c » of tne organisation
called Hindu Rashtra Dal which was started by Nathuram Godse
.and others but he knew nothing about its activities as mentioned
in Ex. 34. He knew nothing about any contact which the Delhi
police might have had with Poona Police during the period 20th
January to 30th January 1948. He did not watch the activities of
Nathuram Godse and on the whole his testimony is not of much im-
portance to what, was happening in Poona.
.N. Y. Deulkar, wit. 6.
15.179 Another witness from Poona was Deputy Superintendent
of Police N. Y. Deulkar, witness No. 6, who was a Deputy Superin-
tendent of Police in the C.I.D. Branch of Poona. He did know N.
Y. Godse and his party who were opposed to the pro-Muslim policy
of the Government. They, including Godse, were making fiery spee-
ches at public meeting whicli were taken down in extenso by police
reporters. He also knew that Dr. Parchure of Gwalior protested,
against the pro-Muslim policy of Mahatma Gandhi. The leaders of
the Hindu Rashtra Dal were Godse and Apte and others and that
whenever these people made any speecic i id to be recorded
by police reporters. There were ho reports made to him "thac the
members of the Hindu Rashtra Dal were carrying on their activi-
ties prejudicial to the safety of the Central leaders or Congress
leaders or against the stability of the State." He did not know
Karkare or about his activities.
15.180 When asked about the nature of activities in Poona irom.
November 1947 to January 1948, his reply was that reports about
the speeches used to come to him and he sent them on to higher-
officers. When the activities of any individual had to be watched
it was done by the City Intelligence Branch. He could not remem-
ber whether N. V. Godse was under police surveillance but when the
reports were shown to him that Godse was under police surveillance
since 1944, his reply was "whether he was so from November 1947
to January 1948, I am not able to say". What he meant to say was
that the public activities of Godse were being reported but there 1
was no shadow put on him. This was in spite of the fiery speeches
which he had made. As "to what he (Godse) exactly said in his.
speeches, the witness could not say.
15.181 He could not say anything about the forfeiture of the. secu-
rity of the Agrani for objectionable writings in July 1947 as he (the
witness) was not in Poona at that time. Although he read the arti-
cles in the Agrani, he did not know that the Government was seri-
ously examining them because of their being dangerous. He did
not know anything about the starting of the Hindu Rashtra Dal by
N. V. Godse or its inauguration by V. D. Savarkar.
15.182 The movements of Godse were not watched when he left
Poona. Godse, Apte, Badge, Karkare and Shankar were from the
area falling within his (the witness's) jurisdici'on. Badge was di jl-
ing in arms but as far as the witness could say it was not illegal
trafficking. The witness was shown the C.I.D. file containing record
of Godse's activities but he could not say whether he had seen the
file at any time earlier. He was asked if he would recommend a
watch being kept on the pe„ sns msnt'on.c had 2 i th file
earlier. His reply was in tV •lffirmative The r^
Ex. 34, a note on" Hindu Rashtra Dal from, the police paper s show-
ing that the office-bearers of the Dal were Godse, Apte and others.
15.183 Deputy Superintendent Deulkar was recalled and he said
that there was an ; rri,.-,i - c -ichgani on July 22, 1944 at one
of the Mahatma Gandhi's meetings. Whatever happened wa§ cor-
rectly recorded in Ex. 129.. The person leading the party oh that
occasion was N. D. Apte. He had no information as to the" presence
of Nathuram Godse at that meeting nor about the recovery of the
knife although he was personally present at the meeting. ' Nobody
was arrested and, therefore, the statement that Nathuram Godse
was arrested and then let off, would be incorrect.
15.184 He said that when the bomb was thrown at Delhi, he was
not in Poona. He had been sent on an assignment to Janjira State.
After the murder he was called back by the D.I.G., C.I.D., Poona
but he did not come via Bombay. In cross-examination he was asked
about the speech made by Dr. Parchure on December 2, 1947, Ex.
131. He said he had not seen it before.
15.185 When he was going to Janjira, it was unlikely that he
visited the Special Branch, Bombay.
15.186 He did not know Badge by sight. To sum up :
(1) Deputy Superintendent of Police Deulkar knew that Godse
and his party were opposed to pro-Muslim policy of the
Government.
(2) Godse made fiery speeches which were taken down by
police reporters.
(3) There was no report made to witness about the members
of Kashtra Dal carrying on activities against the safety
of the Central Government Ministers or Congress leaders.
(4) He could not remember if Godse was under police sur-
veillance.
(5) He could not say anything about forfeiture of the secu-
rity of the- Agrani as that was before his coming to Poona.
(6) He has given what the avocations of Godse, Apte and
Badge were.
(7) He reported the Panchgani incident. Godse, was not there
but N. D. Apte was.
(8) It was unlikely that he went to Bombay Special Branch
on his way to Janjira.
G. P. Angarkar, wit. 68
15.187 Deputy Superintendent of Police G. P. Angarkar, witness
No. 68, was in the Intelligence Branch during the relevant period
July 1947 to end of January 1948. Police shorthand reporters sent
the proceedings of meetings to him and he sent them on to higher
officers. Amongst those whose speeches had to be reported were some
Hindu Sabha workers but there were no R'.S.S. workers in the list.
Amongst the former was Barrister Savarkar and L. B. Bhopatkar.
Savarkar was the President of Hindu Mahasabha, Nathuram. Godse
was a kind of a bodyguard of his but was not particularly prominent.
Apte was at one time a Government servant and an honorary re-
cruiting officer in the Indian Army in Ahmednagar. Badge had a
Shastra Bhandar which was raided several times. Reports were
sent to other districts also in regard to Badge when he sent any
arms to those districts. But he was not considered dangerous and,
therefore, his absence from Poona was not noticed.
15.188 Nathuram Godse's movements were not being watched but
Apte's were to some extent. He was dangerous because of his anti-
Muslim policy. The witness could not remember Godse making
a speech about Gandhiji's living 125 years. If such a speech had
been made, it would have been reported and brought to the notice
of the D.I.G., C.I.D.
295
15.189 After the "Agrani" stopped, it restarted under the name
■'Hindu Rashtra" and this was allowed in spite of police objection.
The Agrani was strongly anti-Congress but not particularly anti-
Gandhi. Security was taken from it because of its policy of violence
.and encouragement of communal tension.
15.190 In June 1947 a bomb wag thrown on what is known as
Shivaji Road by one Athawle and he disclosed that it had been given
to him by Apte. Both of them were arrested. Case against them
was sent up for trial but was withdrawn. The arrest was the result
of vigilance of the police but the Intelligence Branch was not res-
ponsible for prosecutions. It was in regard to this case that the
local D.S.P. remarked it was not serious as it was not meant to be
■thrown on any particular person.
15.191 From July to December there were a large number of
searches for arms. In one case a socialist leader Limaye was arrest-
ed and on a raid a number of weapons including automatic weapons
were found and five persons were arrested. In another search an
account book was found with an entry of Rs. 2,000 having been paid
to Apte and Badge for the purchase of a machinegun, thus showing
that these two persons were not so harmless. Cases were filed in
court but were later on withdrawn and some of the persons men-
tioned in the account book were not even arrested. Had the pro-
secution proceeded, Apte and Badge would have been in it. The
witness could not say under whose orders the cases were withdrawn.
That was in December. He himself was against the withdrawal of
cases because all his efforts were thereby rendered useless.
15.192 There was no such activity in Poona in the month of Jan-
■ury. When the bomb was thrown at Birla House and Madanlal's
name was mentioned, it did not convey anything to the police in
"Poona because they knew nothing about Madanlal.
15.193 Inspector Angarkar knew Apte and Badge but not Godse
-very well; but only as a police officer and not as a friend. Mr. Gartu
never asked him about Apte, Godse and Badge nor was he sent to
Bombay to help Mr. Nagarvala. If Deulkar was sent to Bombay
he would not know.
15.194 There were no reports in the Local Intelligence Branch
■about the activities of Nathuram Godse nor anything to show that
he was indulging in violent activities. There was no sympathy in
the Local Intelligence Branch for Godse and his party.
15.195 The witness had information about Hindu R'ashtra Dal
who were called Savarkarites. He used to watch the movements
of followers of Savarkar in a general way and they searched their
houses also. To his knowledge the activities of Hindu Mahasabha
in Poona were not directed against Mahatma Gandhi but were di-
rected against meeting the danger from Muslims.
15.196 The policy of the Agrani was anti-Gandhi and anti-Con-
-gress and the paper was pronouncedly a communalist paper. In
cross-examination the witness said that Savarkar and Bhopatkar
-were in the list of extreme political agitators.
QO in lhe witness had throughout served in Poena in the C I D
as well as m the District and whenever the officers needed him hev
took his help and found him useful." y
Maha'tm*'? 6 S Vark f r i teS o Were conde mning pro-Muslim policies of
d£jS personally ** C ° ngreSS bUt they Were not a § ainst Gan "
PnnnV^^w ^ , partition tnere was Hindu-Muslim tension in
Poona also. He could not say whether the recovery of arms had
anything to do with the Hindu Mahasabha. After the^arresfS Baba
W,«««n? I V P w^ e W u^ eSS ^ ame t0 know that tne weapons were
nf fhl w L t0 5 y 5 era u£ d - They came to know about the connection
found S ind " ^ aha 4 ab ^a wzth the arms when the account book was
found in a raid He did not know that Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan
also was interested in the movement of arms to Hyderabad In the
raid above-mentioned Apte and Godse were not arrested ' because
they were not in the house where the raid was conducted In the
account book above-mentioned, the names of Apte and Badge were
there but not of Godse. Apte and Badge were not arrested
15.200 The C.I.D. staff in Poon a wa s limited and they watched
S^?fff n and th + 6n tW ° and no P^othes Vicemen
were placed at the houses mentioned in the list, Ex. 115. Occasional
visits used to be paid to see about their whereabouts.
15.201 Ex. 121 dated 27th December 1947 shows that the collec-
tion of arms was for the people's struggle in the Hyderabad State.
15.202 The witness could not remember if Mr. Jayaprakash Nara-
™nt"if + e a Sta J em ^ t u at a meetin § that Hin du Mahasabha leaders
wanted to murder Mahatma Gandhi. Jawaharlal Nehru and other
Congress leaders.
t 1 5-2{3 During the period 20th January torfOth January 1948 the
Local Intelligence Branch was not asked to search for Karkare
He had not seen any such requisition. List of dangerous persons
who were to be watched was made by Government or by the C I D
they kept a watch also over persons whom they thought dangerous
and were not m the list. Badge was one of them. He was witched
because he was dealing in arms. One man stationed to watch his
movements was to watch the movements of others also H e used
to find out who visited him and where he himself went.
15.204 Badge had a distinguishable appearance. He had a lon«
beard and long hair His house was searched a number of times!
he was considered dangerous in the context of Hindu-Muslim ten-
sion.
15^205 Apte's house was searched about twice in 1947 and Nathu-
ram Godse s once. The offices of the Agrani were not searched.
15.2?6 If b" hM v™ w that the editor of the Agrani was in the
co^Tracv for bomb throwing at the Birla House, he would certainly
hav« arrested ^m ^H f he was not in Poona he would have tried
to find out his whe-eabouts and then tried to follow him. If he had
I
known that he had gone to Bombay he would have trailed him there.
He would have tried to trace him wherever he was and even follow-
ed him to New Delhi. If he had. known that Godse was one of the
association of Madanlal he would at once have connected Apte with
him because they were great friends. Athawle would also have
been considered as an associate.
15.207 Mr. Khadilkar, M.P, had stated before the Commission
that inspector An'garkar used to be "amongst them", i.e., he was
auite friendly with them and knew- everything and, therefore he
I did not make any report to the police about the danger to Mahatma
Gandhiji's life. Commission thought it necessary to examine Ins-
pector Argarkar on this point and examined him at his village
because of" his failing health. He said. "The relations between the
political workers belonging to the Congress Party and parties of
that kind and the police were not so cordial as to be called friendly
towards each other." He did not know anything about what Mr.
Khadilkar had stated to be within Angarkar's knowledge.
15.208 Because of the Partition, there was anti-Congress feeling..
The Congress people were taken as pro-Muslims and were accused
of trying to appease the Muslims. The Hindu Mahasabhaites wanted
the Muslims to go away to Pakistan.
15 209 There was no shadowing of these extreme Hindu Maha-
sabha workers nor of the Hindu Rashtra Dal but they did try to
find out what was going on amongst them by posting their men
at strategic places. The police reporters used to report any meeting
I' held in the town, i.e., those meetings about which they came to
I, know anything.
15.210 Mr. Khadilkar, as far as he could remember, was at that
1 time a sickly person suffering from lung or abdominal ulcers. He
was not an active worker. Be was not in the Congress. He was
in the Workers and Peasants Party.
15.211 The witness was specifically asked if there wa s anything
in the air showing intense feelings against Mahatma Gandhi. His
replv was that the situation was tense and even Congressmen were
against the Congress "1 nobody was happy in his mind. Nobody
knew what was happening or would happen and nobody was satis-
fied. Be was so pressed for time that he did not talk to Congress-
men or Hindu Mahasabhaites or the R.S.S. and that class of people
and even if the police wanted to talk to them they would not talk
to them. The Hindu Mahasabha was opposed to Mahatma Gandhi
because of his appeasement policy towards the Muslims. Apte was
dangerous at that time because of his anti-Muslim policy.
15 212 The witness did not know that Balukaka Kanitkar had
written anything to Mr. B, G. Kher. He knew G V. Ketkar only
• as a police officer would. From the activities of the Hindu Maha-
sabha or the R.S.S. or the Rashtra Dal he could not say that they
were poing to commit violence against Congress leaders, least of
all against'Manatma Gandhi. Their activities were directed against
the Muslims.
^™*™^°S^^1«F** independence, he
he met them in 1954 when SamZk t Sa&M^' " may be that
ts height. But it would not beXrect tc S t f T ment was at
ly with anyone. He was only doing!! poSdutii" ^^ friend "
no such information. KlladlIkar may say so but the witness had
to do his duty as best a s he could Sj" Q+ a ?° hce officer he had
they had a great deal ofwo?k ^sSTS^ W&S tense and
caused because of the aWi«« « H mdu-Mushrn tension was
Hindus in Pakistan and Hyderabad 5^ hj ¥ UsUms *&**
State Congress leaders had come to rjSe fn°T ° f ^Hyderabad
bands with Hindu MahasabhaK and soot, 1^ P u° na - The ^ J oined
hem to be more useful than the ConZ^ tS J eCaU f? the y found
tion of arms. It never rami £ k r i g S , in the matter of collec-
of arms was meant to he aeain,? ^^ th *t the collection
kill them. ^coOe^^^^^^^J^ and to
■^ 6 X^^ S ^^^ d ^ h A F^ Godse and such
karites were not again! M^haVa gSh 2S ^ G ^ ndhi - Savar "
policies. But he never thought that ?w w pei " S ° n but a § ainst his
Badge was preparing dag^^^JS Jf^Si^ ^
in ^cj^,^^^^^^^^? InSPS ? 0r A ^ ark - -ho,
•was a clever, clear-headed and a r, Tn? fr im P ort ? nt witness as he
Jemeanour in the w,t^bS^ 8 ggHLite Bi ^-3i^
themselves against the Rait * &SS %££"**
(3) There was intense feeline auaingf +v, n
policy of appeasement of fhe ^Muslims C ° ngreSS f ° r its
290
(6) According to the evidence of this witness there was noth-
ing to indicate that anybody in Poona was going to use
violence against the Congress leaders, least of all against
Mahatma Gandhi and certainly not to murder him.
(7) There was bomb throwing in Poona and a number of
searches were made which resulted in finding arms in the
houses of various people and even cases were started but
those cases were withdrawn much to the chagrin of the
police and this witness.
(8) Some prominent State Congress people from Hyderabad
had come and settled down in Poona and were associat-
ing with the Hindu Mahasabhaites and socialists because
they found them to be more useful than the Congress in
the matter of collection of arms which could be sent for
use in Hyderabad State.
(9) The witness never came to know that the collection of
arms was for the purpose of using against the Congress
leaders or to kill them.
(10) The collection of arms was on a large scale.
(11) This witness had no suspicion that Badge, Apte and Godse
and people of that class were going to commit the murder
of Mahatma Gandhi. He did not know Karkare. He did
know that the Savarkarites were against the policies of
Mahatma Gandhi but not against his person.
(12) Apte, Godse and Badge were not shadowed as they were
not of sufficient importance. The only persons from am-
ongst the Hindu Mahasabha who were watched and whose
speeches were taken down in verbatim were Savarkar and
Bhopatkar, but even they do not seem to have been sha-
dowed.
(13) The policy of the Agrani was anti-Gandhi and anti-Con-
gress and this was pronouncedly a communalist paper.
(14) The witness denied that he was friendly with the Congress
or any other party after Independence and that he knew
anything about what Mr. Khadilkar had stated regarding
the danger to Mahatma Gandhi's life and the atmosphere
being full of violence towards Mahatma Gandhi.
(15) Had he known that Godse was an associate of Madanlal,
he would have followed him wherever he went, whether
he was in Poona or Bombay or even Delhi.
K. M. Munshi, wit. 82
15.218 Mr. K. M. Munshi, an eminent Advocate, who has held
every kind of high office in the Government and became a well-
known Congress leader, stated in his deposition (witness No. 82)
that there was a group of political thought against Mahatma Gandhi,
compendiously known as the Kesari Group.
15.219 This group was led by Savarkar who advocated violence
ever since he was a student and believed in political assassination
of t?n 2fh J" ° f £ atri ° tlsm for achieving freedom. This school
S-> Sf? a nu ™? er of , youri'gmen, highly patriotic, devoted to
ZS^^ to make any sacrifice required to liberate the
tI "1 f f 4° m i 0161811 ™i e and i1: was confined to Western India.
inose m Bengal were different.
15.220. As a result of the upsurge of Gandhian movement this
group oi terrorists became iso ■ cat se the masses began to
follow Gandhiji as he was a Mahatma. In spite of the doubts which
many people including Mr. Munshi himself entertained in regard to
bandhian movement, all active politicians had per-force to ioin him
wl° n ™ Ited in , the eclipse °* the terrorists school still further,
both in Poona and m Calcutta, but some of them, according to Mr
Juunshi, saw the wisdom of generating strength by joining the Civil
Disobedience Movement of Mahatma Gandhi.
., P;? 21 T ^ C LD - re P° r ^ at page 18 of LB. file No. 8/CA/48-II shows.
that the Kesari group were something different from what may be
called the Savarkar group. This document shows that when by
August 1943 something like Rs. 2.19,514/- were collected as purses to
V. V. Savarkar, the Kesari group became apprehensive that Savarkar
may ultimately eclipse Lokmanya Tilak. It is not necessary for
the Commission to go into these dissentions but it has thought fit
to point out this distinction because that distinction exists in official
papers.
15.222 As a consequence of this conflict in political methods and
the want oi faith in Gandhiji or Gandhian methods in the "Kesari"'
school of thought in Maharashtra personal prejudices against
Mahatma Gandhi resulted. But due to the flood of emotional pat-
riotism resulting from Gandhiji's "Quit India" Movement and the
inability of anybody to withstand its influence, nobody was pre-
pared to take the odium of anti-Gandhism. But Savarkar never
lowered his flag; he continued to believe in political assassination
as a permissive method for achieving Indian freedom; however he
remained quiscent and retreated into the background while ' the
country was being swept by the "Quit India 1 ' Movement ■ of Gan-
dhiji. There was in the Kesari school of thought a certain section of
peopie who genuinely believed that Hindus required a strong 'orga-
nisation to meet Muslim aggressiveness and were apprehensive of
the weak-kneed policy of the secularity group.
15.223 The witness further stated that Partition was inevitable ]
under the circumstances created in the country; but Gandhiii was
opposed to it resulting in strained relations with Jawaharlal Nehru
and Sardar Patel. Mr. Munshi was of the opinion that had India I
not been divided at that time, there would have been civil war at
all levels results , ?'•;- t p V9 ry town and also amongst
the Defence Services and the Police; but in North India the feel-
ing continued to exist amongst the Hindus in general that Mahatma
Gandhi was respon ible the Partition and he became very un-
popular because of his insistence on giving 55 crores to Pakistan.
The feeling of the Hindus throughout was that if the Mahatma had
not appeased the Muslims by conceding Pakistan, Hindus would
have been spared the miseries to which they were subjected
.'ill I
! 15.224 This is, in the opinion of the Commission, a fair and correct
assessment of the political thought at the time in the country as a
whole in general and in Maharashtra in particular and also in north-
ern Provinces of India. This has been discussed at this stage with the
happenings in Poona because Poona was the centre of the Kesari
group and of the activities of the extreme Hindu views which exist-
ed in the Maharashtrian districts round about Poona. The Com-
mission will have very much more to say and other evidence to
-discuss both oral and documentary in this connection. But it would
suffice to say that there was a strong anti-Gandhi feeling amongst
the Hindus particularly in Maharashtra of which the lead was in
the hands of the Kesari' group. In that ease, Savarkar was tried as
a member of the conspiracy but was acquitted. It has been stated
"before the Commission that the inspiration came from Savarkar
-and he even patted Madanial for what he was proposing to do.
Mrs. Sarla Barve, wit. 39
15. 225 Mrs. Barve, witness No. 39', in her written statement,
x. 72. said that her husband who was the District Magistrate of
Poona did come to know about the illegal activities of the Hindu
"Mahasabha members and that is why a watch was kept on their acti-
vities. She accused the authorities of not taking any proper notice.
The throwing of the bomb on the 20th January 1948 was, according to
her, a precursor of something very serious, e.g. murder. She also
stated therein that her husband did know something about the
impending trouble at Delhi and for that reason he telephoned Mr.
Morarji Desai and informed him about it.
15.226 She stated that two or three days before the murder of
Mahatma Gandhi a man called Sathe came to their house but as her
husband was not present he told her that some Poona people had
gene to Delhi to take the life of Mahatma Gandhi and that she re-
ted that story to her husband and that Baburao Sanas and
'Vasantrao Deshmukh, other Maratha goondas, had made prepara-
tions to burn down houses of Brahmins who were vitally afraid of
Maratha goondas. She asked a e where he lived and he said,
"Sadashiv Peth" and that he was a retired school teacher.
15.227 On the 27th January 1948, she found her husband rather
restless. He telephoned to Mr. Kamte, Inspector General of Police,
after asking her to go out of the room. A little while later she told
her husband what Sathe had told her which made her husband
""more restless, worried and serious and thereafter he was telephoning
most of the time. After the murder, her husband arranged for
military to come into the town and curfew was ordered and her
Tiusband slept for an hour or so and she accompanied her husband
Ton two or three occasions. The curfew order continued for about
a fortnight. She then deposed as to the Brahmins and non-Brahmins
•disturbances. She said that there was a definite plot to kill Mahatma
Gandhi.
15.228 She was examined as a witness (No. 39) and she again
rstated iibout Sathe and that she gave the information to Mr. Barve.
fo h CTeate t?oub!e!° nal kn ° wledge about the P ersons wh ° were going;
Gopal Godse., wit. 33
3 nH 15 S G ° pal Go ,1 Se V- Witness No - 33 > stated that Nathuram Godse
and Apte were collecting arms for Hyderabad trouble which had
nt nT Val ,T thG PfT™ 31 Government. They were boih study
Aote St Fww and / he threat ° f fast winced Nathuram and
Apte that Gandhi was trying to coerce the Government and this be--
^^S&SlSfgt** collection of arms and "*°» %,
Godse and Apte and others to blow up that National Assembly
th a t 15 'p a i^ the I thin + g tila i was T w ? r ^ i ng Nathuram and Apte was
tfnr, ?n^ a "T^ n + l tS T dll i g India s share of arms and ammuni-
tion. India, on the other hand, was sending to Pakistan her share of
STF^ inI i dia - Intention ofNatiSram, Apte a? d S oThe?s
trains never weSt " ^ bUt tt W3S ^ neceSSa ^ became tS
paid^fpaSsTan! Te/^et^^^ ~ »* g °^ to be
15,233 The witness has tried to show that there was no consoiracv
^r^™^ im but * is not *» this coL n mis c S ir; a gT.
„3 234 - As ^ as been , stated elsewhere, Gopal Godse denied Nathu-
ram s going to Panchgani in 1944 to murder Mahatma Gandhi
Nathuram was not satisfied with Gandhiji's policiesbut it wa?nof
19S e ld h wl a ^ thUram int ^ d l d t0 MU MahaSaGa^dhi 1 ^ "g"
witn ^^^SffiS^Si^ c ° uld ° nly ^ his ™^:
stoD 5 " 2 tnP S 5 ^? W6r t t xas P erated and they did want something to
'the last straw which broke the camel's back". J
n«if; 23 p If 3 StriC t, t W t tch had been ke Pt and Police from Ahmed-
the public was so much against Mahatma Gandhi g g
search^fofhim^S 011 ! 21s t. Januar y 1«8 the police did try to
searcn lor him at Delhi Junction and the train was delaveri hv
half an hour but they never found him Fwn p„„;. td r y ,^
15.238 The conspiracy was not to kidnap Mahatma Gandhi but:
to kill him. The bomb was exploded to create commotion and
divert the public and their attention and those of the conspirators
who were sitting amongst the congregation would have killed
Gandhi ji by means of revolvers but the revolvers were found to be
defective and the object was to be achieved by throwing hand-
grenades. But there was a big crowd and hand-grenades would have
killed others also. For that reason, Nathuram and Apte stopped:
the operation. i |
15.239 It was not correct that their party received money or arms
from the sardars of Gwalior or they or the ruler had any connec-
tion with them. That allegation was absolutely false because by
helping the conspirators they would not gain 'anything nor were
they going to get back their raj.
15.240 Even if the conspirators had been arrested, others would
have assassinated Gandhiji and nothing that the police could do
would have prevented them. The feelings were at their highest and
v nothing would have saved him.
15.241 Maulana Azad had a great deal of influence over Gandhiji's
§ pro-Muslim policies. Maulana Azad wanted Sardar Patel to leave
t so that he could induce Gandhiji to do many things for the benefit
', of Pakistan and Muslims in India. In his view, Gandhiji was mis-
Iled by Maulana Azad in the matter of giving 55 crores. That was a..
position of no return and the consequences that followed were in-
evitable.
t
'
f
P
1-=
n
15.242 He said that Mr. M. D. Pathak, Advocate of Bombay, also
took part in the demonstration against Gandhiji at Panchgani. He
could also depose that Nathuram never went to Panchgani nor was
there the incident of a dagger. In cross-examination he said there
[ was no plan to murder Pakistan leaders.
15.243 He stated that on the 21st morning before the train started
from the Delhi Junction, Madanlal was brought by uniformed
;• police. He (Gopal) and Karkare were at the platform but Madan-
lal did not point them out. The only Gwalior man he knew was Dr.
i Parchure. j
15.244 Nathuram and Apte used to go to Ahmednagar.
15.245 All the conspirators walked out of the prayer-meeting
, within five minutes of the ignition of the gun-cotton slab. There
were a number of policemen at the Birla House on the 20th and no-
li body tried to stop the taxi in which the conspirators escaped. The
taxi-driver also had a grievance against Mahatma Gandhi. He had
^ come to know that they were responsible for the bomb.
15.246 Other witnesses who have deposed to the state of affairs
and conditions in Poona are Messrs S. R. Bhagwat, witness No. 69,
I R. K •Khadilkar, M.P., witness No. 97, G. V. Ketkar, witness No. 1.
Besides, there are the statements of Balukaka Kanitkar, Ex. 81 re-
corded by the police and his writings, Ex. 11, his letter to H.E ' the
'Governor General of India and his writings in the Purushartha,
'S « ? ^ Ve I 36 ,? 11 discussed ^ different chapters wherein
they appropriately fall.
R. K. Khadilkar. wit. 97
t»ll5? 4 J ^ M £ § ^u K !^ ar ' Witness No " *• had stated that he h ad
talked to Mr. R. K. Khadilkar about what he observed and what he
heara and about what Godse had told him, the Commission thought
it necessary to examine Mr. Khadilkar who readily consented to
appear before the Commission and his statement on this matter is
very revealing.
15.248 When questioned about what Mr. Ketkar said about his
talking to him, Mr. Khadilkar's (witness No. 97) reply was that he
had no recollection of his travelling with Mr. Ketkar or Mr. Ketkar
informing him of what Godse had said.
15.249 When questioned about what Mr. G. V. Ketkar had stated,
his reply was that he was all the time under the impression that
the local police intelligence which was under Inspector Angarkar,
knew everything and he thought that they must have sent the
necessary information to the authorities in Bombay. He also stated
that after the first attempt, i.e., the incident of the bomb, the y had
come to Know that Balukaka Kanitkar had taken the precaution of
warning the authorities that there was a persistent rumour in
Foona that somewhere some conspiracy was hatching in order to
•do away with the Mahatma.
% 15.250 He has deposed that there were rumours even before the
prst attempt of January 20, 1943 of a conspiracy being hatched in
Poona to attack Gandhiji. The rumours were to thi effect that
something will happen to Gandhiji because he had succumbed to
the pressure of those who favoured Partition; he was responsible for
the giving away of 55 crores to Pakistan which was the proverbial
last straw and people were decrying him. and saying that "now
there was no escape for him".
15.251 One instance of this objection to Mahatmaji which might
i e fi n ! d a 1 not , so violent opposition was given by this witness. He
;said that when before the Partition of the country and that was in
August 1947, there was a proposal to hold a joint meeting of the
citizens on the occasion of the death anniversary of Lokmanya Tilak,
fu il 6 Mahatma > who was in Poona at the time was to be invited
to be the mam or rather the only speaker and Mr. Shankarrao Deo,
the Provincial Congress President, was approached to move in the
matter opposition came from the members of the Hindu Mahasabha
the militant people amongst whom led by Nathuram Godse said
that they would under no circumstances agree to such a joint meet-
ing and if it was held it would be disturbed. As there was this
violent opposition to the joint meeting, the proposal was given up.
15.252 The following passage from the statement of Mr Khadil-
kar is demonstrative of the atmosphere in Poona
"The atmosphere was highly tense and critical of Mahatmn I
Gandhi though there were no open threats. But the writings
in the Press and the trend of the public speeches made as also
of the private talk showed that people were very critical of
the Mahatma because according to them he had betrayed
India— they identified India with Hindus only— and would
continue to betray the country in future. At that time there
was a newspaper called the Hindu Rashtra which had taken
the place of the Agrcmi in which this feeling was ventilated
very clearly. There was another Hindu Mahasabha paper
called the Kal which was also highly critical— of course,
veiled criticism which showed a little bitterness."
15.253 The witness added that he was absolutely certain that
before the first attempt was made but after the Partition and the
giving of 55 crores, the atmosphere in Poona was highly poisonous
and antagonistic towards Mahatma Gandhi and people thought that
if he continued' to live he would barter away the country to appease
Pakistan, and the witness and people like him blamed the Govern-
ment for not taking proper precautions against the movement whim
was afoot in Poona; and they blamed the Bombay Government more
because they should have taken proper precautions. He repeated
that the Poona Police intelligence was "with them"; they were
sensing what was happening and what the atmosphere was and he
and h- : s friends could never imagine that they would not apprise
■the Government of what the true state of feelings was. After the
' giving of 55 crores the writings in the Press clearly demonstrated
the extreme indignation and resentment of the people against those
who had betrayed the country and it was not directed against the
Muslims. The attention of this witness was drawn to what Mr.
Dehejia, Secretary of the Bombay Home Department, had stated that
the violent propaganda in Poona was anti-Muslim. To this his reply
was that it was incorrect that the Muslims were the target of this
resentment or incitement to violence; it was more correct to say that
the sullenness and resentment was directed more against the Con-
gress and particularly against Mahatma Gandhi. He admitted that
, none of them, rushed to Bombay or to Delhi to warn the authorities
"but nonetheless they were anxious about the safety of the life of
the Mahatma.
15.254 He was again asked about the warning given by Balukaka
Kanitkar and he said that it was not that Balukaka had written
-during the period between the first attempt and the murder but only
that he had already warned the Government about the danger to
Congress leaders including Mahatma Gandhi. But he could not say
that there was anyone who had given this warning during this
period.
15.255 The witness has also said that for some time before the
• bomb was thrown, the atmosphere was surcharged with communal
fanaticism but that was directed against Gandhiji who was consi-
dered to be the prime mover towards appeasement of Muslims.
15.25 ft The witness has given two reasons for not getting into
.touch v ith the authorities — one, that Inspector Angarkar, head of the
20—259 HA.
Poona, who would i^l^^^alX^^^T^^ ™
Bombay; and the other is that Balukaka KaniffiS £ authon t ies in
the information to the Ministers n Km w o £ &d alr * ady sent
information given to the ^wfnl ® omha J- Perhaps, an earlier
the foul atmo § S pW;°an d eV eL?o the IrTJn^f ^ W6re SWare oi
at Bombay in S pite of Ms^^^^g^^^
S. J?. Bhagwat, wit. 69
to" Mr 25 M M r |3u Bhag *^' f itness Na 69 > iE » a letter Ex USA
the plot to murder M^&'S^i?*^^™^
^^too^^s^^to^™ saifl that Balukaka
Nathuram Godse were s^ng that Mat t^r^T &nd friends of
of Muslims and was not protect?^ the 2?r , Gandhl was ^ favour
therefore, be removed. He should ?oS ? U mter ? sts - He must,
where he could influercf the S!tf glVen any P lace or P^ion
*-££, that peopl f w? ; e <~ » ftSai J.
thing within about a week or so ah™ it TJ , + ~ ,, hear some -
e^-fe-^fSS^SSjS ofmonfhs 5 ^ ak ^ POke ^ th °
and he (Bhagwat) wrote to Mr r r #1 ™° T % the ass asslnation
Sardar P a tellec a L7hewl s nSerested fe ^r MorarjiDesai and
Gandhi's life. He thought it waf^ffln *e protection of Mahatmn
highest and it was not nSessary to S&t t0 ?? Ve Written to «»
of those letters but they had gt bum? **"* P ° IlC6 - Hs Bad co ^ 9
^™w £*£££££ SSS'SSS ab r + ? is and he «
stated but if he, i e BhaJZJlSl g bout what Mr - Bhagwat h ; « I
he must have done sf gWat > says h e wrote to him (Mr. Deli) th £ ,
307
15.263 This witness merely restates what Balukaka is alleged to
have written to Mr. B. G. Kher. Even Mr. Morarji Desai admits that
Balukaka did write something to Mr. B. G. Kher but no names were
mentioned and the statement of witness S. B. Bhagwat does not carry
the matter any further than what Balukaka wrote or said in his
E speeches.
15.264 The witness is rather vague about things. He says that he
sensed danger in the atmosphere from speeches made by Balukaka
and his friends whose names he does not remember but he says some
people told him that something would happen to Mahatma Gandhi
within a week. Was this statement made after the 20th January
1948 or before is not quite clear. Even on his own showing it is only
Balukaka's speech about which he wrote to Mr. Kher and Sardar
Patel. He does not seem to have said anything about what" he was
told by the friends of Balukaka. It is not quite clear why no infor-
mation was given to the police except that the highest and the
mightiest had been informed and so the people who were to do the
actual investigation were by-passed and remained ignorant of Mr.
Bhagwat's knowledge.
Conclusion t
15.265 Broadly speaking, there was a strong school of political
thought in Poona which was associated with the Hindu Mahasabha,
a part of it and yet ideologically different. This school has compen-
diously been called by Mr. K. M. Munshi as the Kesari group led
by Savarkar. By Mr. Kamte it was called a group of Chitpawan
Brahmins but it was not really anti-Gandhi. Even in this group
there were some people who were willing to resort to political assassi-
nation and there were others whose activities might have consisted
of strong anti-Muslim propaganda but they would not go so far as to
commit a murder of political opponents.
15.266 The evidence which has been led before this Commission,
particularly of officials, the Inspector General of Police, witness
No. 4 : N. M. Kamte. the Deputy Inspector General of Police of C.I.D.,
Bombay witness No. 3. U. H. Rana, the Assistant Deputy Inspector
General of Police Rao Sahib Gurtu. witness No. 22, the District
Superintendent of Police Mr. Pravinsinhji Vijaysinhji, witness No. 38,
the Deputy Superintendent of Police N. Y.*Deulkar, witness No 6
the Inspector of Police, C.I.D., G. P. Angarkar, witness No. 68, almost
unanimously shows that: —
(1) the Hindu Mahasabha was strong in Poona;
(2) there were bomb incidents; and
(3) there were collections of arms in regard to which a num-
ber of searches were carried out and persons arrested.
But all these activities were directed against Muslims in order to
drive them out of India and force them to go away to Pakistan or
these activities were being carried on for the purpose of aiding with
a supply of arms to Hindus across the borders of Hyderabad State
where a struggle was going on against the Nizam's rule and the
depreciations of the razakars. The evidence of these witnesses gives
no indication of these activities being directed against the Congress
or Mahatma Gandhi or other leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana
Azad etc. but emphasis their anti-Muslim and anti-razakar 1 character.
15.267 It is true that people like Godse and Apte were carrying on
propaganda against the Congress and even against Mahatma Gandhi
but that propaganda was against Gandhiism as they understood it,
i.e., it was directed against Muslim appeasement policy of Mahatma
Gandhi or giving away of 55 crores to Pakistan or the attitude of the
Congress leaders towards the atrocities which were committed or
were being committed on Hindus in western wing of Pakistan. All
this produced a commotion in Poona, particularly among the Hindu
Mahasabha circles and they were taking full advantage of those cir-
cumstances and were carrying on propaganda on the platform as well
as in the Press and using it for the collection of arms, throwing of
bombs etc. It might be that their propaganda was against the
Muslims in the first instance but as Mr. Morarji Desai has said, it was
ment to embarrass the Government also. And those of them who
were more hot-headed like Godse, Apte, etc., particularly Nathuram
Godse, who according to his brother Gopal Godse, witness No. 33,
had taken a deep interest in the affairs of the country were greatly
affected by the Partition and by the atrocities committed on Hindus.
15.268 Nathuram was also worrying about India's share of Defence
equipment and they were exasperated and wanted to stop the mas-
sacre of Hindus. The fast of Mahatma Gandhi had produced a
tremendous effect on him and was the "last straw which broke the
camel's back". Gopal Godse has gone even further and said that
even if Nathuram Godse, Apte and Karkare had been arrested, there
would have been others who would have taken their place and would
have finished Mahatma Gandhi Gandhi, showing though not saying so
that conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhi had larger ramifications
than police investigation showed or were brought out at the trial in
Judge Atma Charan's court.
15.269 The group which actually took part in the conspiracy to
murder was the most militant group among the Hindu Mahasabha
workers. They had formed a separate organisation called Hindu
Rashtra Dal which from the evidence produced before the Commis-
sion was perhaps more militant than the R.S.S. and had implicit faith
in the ideology preached by V. D. Savarkar which consisted of
"Tooth for Tooth and Eye for Eye".
15.270 Mr. K. M. Munshi, witness No. 82, stated that Mahatma
Gandhi had a tremendous influence so much so that any politician
of any note could not remain out of his influence but the Savarkarites
of Poona did not agree with him particularly in his non-violence.
This school of thought, according to him, consisted of youngm in
highly patriotic, devoted to the country, prepared to make anv
sacrifice required but as they were under the influence of Savarkar
who advocated violence and believed in political assassination, they
kept out of the Congress and were isolated when the masses began
to follow Mahatma Gandhi and as a result of this difference, conflict
.'Kill
in political methods and the want of faith in Gandhiji or Gandhian
methods, the school of thought known as the Kesari school had
personal prejudice against Mahatma Gandhi. Savarkar never lower-
ed his flag; he continued to believe in political assassination as a
permissive" method in achieving freedom. H e believed that Hindus
required a strong organisation to meet Muslim aggressiveness and
they were apprehensive that the weak-kneed policy of the secularity
group in the Congress would be dangerous to the solidarity of the
Hindus and would sap their strength. This class of people held
Mahatma Gandhi responsible for the Partition of India and his un-
popularity increased when at his instance 55 crores were given to
Pakistan. There was a feeling amongst the Hindus particularly of
this school that if the Mahatma had not adopted the policy of
appeasement of Muslims there might not have been any Partition and
; at least the Hindus would have been spared the miseries to which
they were subjected on Partition.
15.271 The documentary evidence relating to the state of affairs
in Poona which have been placed before the Commission, shows that
I there was intense communal activity which the speeches mad e at
Hindu Mahasabha public meetings proclaimed; but those documents,
whether relating to Anti-Pakistan Day or welcome to Daji Joshi who
had been convicted of murder of Jackson or about the importation
of Sikh refugees or reports of bomb throwing or collection o'f-arms,
all had an anti-Muslim base. These did not show any anti-Congress
leaning 'blatantly so proclaimed. But occasionally there were writ-
ings and speeches which had a different complexion, the speech of
Dr. Parchure in Hindi on December 2, 1947 which was particularly
directed against Mahatma Gandhi and Pt. Nehru and speeches
the following day where the president, Mr. G. V. Ketkar, described
Gandhiism-cum-false nationalism as enemy No. 1.
15.272 The Agrani and its successor the Hindu Rashtra were
writing violent articles and in two issues Ex. 233A and Ex. 233 the
tone was particularly inciting and that in spite of the return of
security to the Agrani on the Independence Day. These articles
showed that this paper was not reconciled to Gandhian philosophy
and was preaching Savarkar ideology.
15.273 To put it in seriatim the affairs in Poona might be sum-
marised as follows: —
(1) There was a tense atmosphere as there was a strong feeling .
against the Muslims which was aggravated by two factors
— (a) atrocities committed on Hindus in Pakistan and (b)
the atrocities committed by razakars in Hyderabad State.
(2) Arms and ammunition were being collected particularly by
members of the Hindu Mahasabha but as far as the evid-
ence of official witnesses is concerned this was meant for
use against the Muslims and for the protection of Hindus
against the Razakars in Hyderabad State.
(3) The feelings against the Congress were strong because of
its Muslim appeasement policy and the feelings against
Mahatma Gandhi were no different but these people were
z s is%^ im personally but oniy ■**£ £s p*°-
(4) hS e i£°t d Z and Badge ¥? C T e t0 the notice of the POM"
bat taat was in regard to their activities against the
Muslims. Even though Apte had been named as one of
the, persons connected with bombs, there is no evidence
against him or against Godse of being violently iXS
Sd%W l6aSt ™ - fo rmaIion Cl wIs
collected Dy the C.I.D. m Poona or is discernible from the
documents or from the evidence of witnesses
<5) h?^ 33 no . in ?ication in Poona that there was going to
be any use of violence against the Congress leaders itill
tea against Mahatma Gandhi and certainly nofto murder
(6y nu^LrZ Vi ° le T in P °° na ' there was h0 ™b throwing a
M T u? sear 1 ches were made in the house of Hindu
(?) fn^^f f° m u en * m ^ heTs of the Hyderabad State Congress
and State Hmau Mahasabha had settled down in PW a
more useful ,t„ these people than the Congressmen WeK
(8) It may be added that the collection oi arms was on a laree
gun P P 6 ° r Badge f0r the P^chase of a machine-
(9) The Savarkarites which included Godse Ante anr, iuj*
(10) None of the police witnesses seem to have known tw
Madanlal had any associates in Poona still less ffpS
..II
M C A and Mr. G. V. Kctkar did know that the atmos-
phere' in Poona was surcharged and tense, the writings m
the Press the speeches on public platforms and private
afks and rumours afloat portended danger to top Congress
leadership particularly Mahatma Gandhi, Mr. Nehru
Sardar Patel and Maulana Azad. Of these genlemen only
fwo-Balukaka Kanitkar and Mr. Bhagwat-informec, Ore
authorities, Mr. B. G. Kher and Sadar Patel, but not the
police or local authorities.
It is surprising that this information was not
authority to the C.I.D. for being vetted.
on by any
15 274 The police officers did not know in which direction the
Hindu 7 Rashtra P Dal was operating. There f ^^TrelTtt
documents showing any proper exercise of vigilance m regard to
feelings of anti-Gandhism whether against the polices of Mahatma
Gandhi of appeasing Muslims etc. or against him personally.
15 275 (a) Before the Delhi bomb explosion, no information was
given to the Poona Police or the Provincial C.LD about the danger
to the life of Mahatma Gandhi. Neither Mr. P, K. KhadiUkar, nor
Balukaka Kanitkar, nor Mr. S. R. Bhagwat, gave any information to
the police.
(b) Whatever information the Bombay Premier or the Home
Minister got from Balukaka Kanitkar or which they otherwise had
relatine to the danger to the life of Congress leaders, including
. Mahataa GandS was not reported to the police to be ve ted by
careful inquiry. This, in the opinion of the Commission, should have
been done. Not doing it was an error.
(c) After the bomb was thrown at Birla House no information
as to what Madanlal had stated was given to p <™* Pohc %f*Z ™:
rial C.I.D. nor were they asked anything about Karkare. Of .full par-
ticulars of an information about the latter could be obtained from
the Poona C.I.D. after the murder, it could have been obtainable alter
the bomb explosion also.
(d) If it was possible, the services of Angarkar and Deulkar
should have been called for earlier.
(e) Mr Rana had seen the report about Madanlal and Karkare
sent by Ahmednagar Police and even if he could not, while at Delhi,
recQile anything about them, he could have, even as a precautionary
measure, asked his office if there was any information about them.
(f) Even as late as the 28th January when Mr. Rana reached
Poona in the evening, he met his officers. Rao Sahib Gurtu gave him
-the various names of persons whose description was given by Madan-
lal in his statement. He took no action on that information. JNo
information was sent to Mr. Nagarvala or to Mr. Sanjevi or to Mr.
Kamte Nor did he take any precaution of immediately flying his
Poona Police officers to Delhi to spot and watch the conspirators and,
if possible, to arrest them. It is true Angarkar was sick and Deulkar
was not there, but Deulkar could have been called to Bombay and
given instructions there to fly to Delhi along with other policemen
11 he could not, for any reason, come to Bombay, the fault would nM
have been of the D.I.G., C.I.D.
(g) There is no indication of co-operation of Delhi, Bombay and
Foona police officers to make a combined and co-ordinated effort to
find the antecedents of Karkare and to find out who his associates
were. As a matter of fact, there was a complete lack of co-operation
between the various police forces.
(h) Ahmednagar Police had a complete record of Karkare and as
to who his associates were. It was known at Ahmednagar that Ante
was his associate and Godse also used to visit him with Apte This
information could have been worked out by the Poona C I D ' as re-
ports about Madanlal and Karkare had been sent to the DIG* C I D
The statement of Madanlal should have been sent to Poona 'by air
Poona S y a circuitous route-Delhi-Allahabad-Bombay-
catid S thf if'nrn 11 *S e ?*£ °! Delhi PoIice not to have indi-
cated to the Poona C.I.D. about Karkare direct and ask them to
investigate To leave it to Mr. Eana's slow process investigation was
?Snr; in U fu cont " butor y factors in facilitating the conspi-
rators m achieving their nefarious design. M
the^o^CH? °rPr^-n lig n r r king p0li T ° fficers at Delhi and ° f
l„t T ■ ni ( Provmcial ) lay m complacency, thinking that the
anTSnlySor ^ S ° ** ™ S ™ d ™ * ^ ^Sg
events took place. Age and lapse of time affect memory and also
SSe^Sf* v Ut 7Z then br ° ad facts such ^TeSity of the
atmosphere and feelings tending to violence against Mahatma Gandhi
wh ch couMel^T G T- d !ff Y - be fOTg0tten or innocence aSou
udging the action of tlf ^r ?* ^ T Va ," ment of one ' s faculties. In
afl the fSf a ^ ^ ° f v h f V ° hQe i lf should not be ^gotten that, now
these varToLo^ceT? 0163 ?* k ? 0W , n which Was not the «»* when
mese various officers were investigating.
CHAPTER XVI
Index of Paragraphs
16.3 D. M. S. objection refugees coming.
16.4 V. R. Karkare.
16.6 Balkundi's report about Karkare.
16.7 Razak's list.
16.11 Commission's narration of evidence and comments thereon
16.24 List of bombs throwers.
16.25 . Narration and comments continued.
16.44 Suspicion about Madanlal.
16.51 Deshmukh goes to Poona and Bombay.
16.55 Dy. Supdt. Deshmukh (then SI.).
16.58 Insp. Razak No. 34.
16.80 Sub. Insp. Rane.
16.85 Sub. Insp. L, N. Joshi.
16.96 Sub. Insp. Balkundi (Dy. S. P.).
16.106 D.S.P. J. S. Rane.
16.120 Mr. R. C. Joshi (D. M.).
16.135 Conclusions from evidence.
CHAPTER XVI
Ahmednagar
16.1 Documentary evidence regarding Ahmednagar shows that
Karkare even in the beginning of 1947 was prominent among the
Hindu Mahasabhaites. He went to Noakhali and was making provo-
catory speeches on Noakhali happenings. So much so that the
District Magistrate made orders under section 144 Cr.P.C. againsf him
and another. There is a later report showing that he was importing
arms but people did not care much for him and the Muslims were
dead against him and a strict look-out was maintained against him.
This is shown by Exs. 257— 259A.
16.2 The order passed by the Government of Bombay for the com-
piling of the list of Hindu Mahasabha and R.S.S. leaders was appli-
cable to Ahmednagar also. Ex. 114A relates to that District and V. R.
Karkare was one of the names therein mentioned. This was up to
August, 1947.
16.3 On September 13, 1947, the District Magistrate of Ahmednagar
Mr. H. A. Khan wrote to Government of Bombay, that coming in of
ten thousand refugees into Visapur Camp would create communal
disorder in the District which was hithertofore free from communal
trouble. This proposal was rightly criticised in the Secretariat office
but ultimately the Minister ordered that some kind of restriction
should be placed on the visitors to the camp and it should not be
turned into a fair, which was likely to happen if no control was kept.
Whether such an order was right or wrong or justified or not is not for
this Commission to decide because the sole judge of what should be
done in circumstances such as the ones that then existed was the
authorities then exercising power. Law and order was their
responsibility and nibbling at them is not conducive to orderly
administration of agitating areas.
16.4 On 14th October, 1947, there was a note, Ex. 260(1), regarding
news in the Hindu Rashtra that Karkare was called to the Police
Station; several of his letters were confiscated; his specimen signa-
tures taken and the people of the city were agitated about it but
Karkare had not been arrested. But Government had "a strong eye
on him". On 6th November, 1947, Ex. 212, from a house in Ahmed-
nagar occupied by Hyderabad State Congress workers, arms were
found. On the same day, the District Magistrate passed an order
prohibiting bringing or transporting knives and other sharn-edged
weapons into or through Ahmednagar City and Cantonment.
(Ex. 148). The order under section 144, Cr.P.C. issued by the
District Magistrate was extended by Government Ex. 149.
16.5 Ex. 266 dated January 22, 1948, is an extract from the Weekly
Confidential Report of the District Magistrate. It shows that V R.
Karkare had gone to consult the Hindu Mahasabha leaders about the
future line of Hindu Mahasabha work and the local Hindu Maha-
sabha workers did not co-operate with him on account of his activities
amongst the refugees. This appears to be an incorrect report because
there is other evidence to show that Karkare had vanished from
Ahmednagar before the 10th of January, 1948, and had gone on the
nefarious task of murdering Mahatma Gandhi and not consulting the
leaders about the future line of Hindu Mahasabha work. Ex. 227
dated 31st January 1948 shows that Karkare had been out of Ahmed-
nagar for the last 12 or 13 days and he was reported to have paid a
visit to the Refugee Camp at Chembur and was moving about in
Bombay, which was only partially correct because he was not in
Bombay but in Thana and was not moving about in Bombay. Ex. 228
is an innocuous kind of a report showing that Karkare had not been
arrested under the Detention Order as he had absconded from
Ahmednagar.
16.6 Ex. 67 dated January 29, 1948 is Sub-Inspector Balkundi's
report to the D.I.G., stating that Madanlal appeared to be the same
person who was operating in Ahmednagar and that he had left with
V. R, Karkare "some 15 days back" and had not returned to Ahmed-
nagar. Madanlal was a staunch R.S.S. member and was a revolu-
tionary. But this report whatever its authenticity was a belated
document.
16.7 On January 26, 1948 Inspector Razak sent a report to the
D. S. Ps. of Ahmednagar and Poona including therein a list of persons
named by S. V. Ketkar and other persons. These names had been
obtained with the help of Inspector Savant of the OLD presumably
during the investigation. This report attached to Ex. 58— Razak's
letter has the names of 25 persons amongst whom were S V Ketkar
V. R, Karkare, R. S. Rekhi and D. V. Godse. Amongst the Ketkar,
Karkare and Rekhi were considered to be persons holding extreme
views, - whatever that word may mean. Two of them D. V. Godse
and Chandekar were stated to be from Poona. S. V. Ketkar and
Rekhi were connected with Karkare's Guest House and D V Godse
was a brother of Nathuram Godse, and others were members of
Karkare's amateur dramatic troupe.
16.8 In his testimony before the Commission Inspector Razak
stated that nothing came out of this report but his investigation
disclosed that Madan Lai was inclined towards violence. In the
report no recommendation was made.
16.9 The importance of this document, Ex. 58 containing the list
sent by Inspector Razak lies in this that a number of Hindu Maha-
sabha workers in Ahmednagar had some direct or indirect connection
with Karkare — some were employed by him, others were members of
his amateur dramatic troupe. Some of them' had the requtation of
having extreme views. But either this document was not seen by
the officers to whom it was sent or its implications were wholly ignor-
ed. It does show this much at least that Karkake was an important
personage in the Hindu Mahasabha movement. He was one" of the
persons who had extreme views. He had considerable influence in
so far as the workers were either employed in his guest house or were
collaborating with him in stagir dramas and plays. Madan Lai was
817
rn-ntrol a closer watch would have been kept on both KarKare ana
S£'t a l and the watch that was being kept on their movements
She trathnf whTch was being done might have been a little more
i J.nt and stringent to be effective. It gives one the impression
Sit whateve? watch was kept was neither ^equate nor efficient
Wha Should be the extent of closeness of watch is a matter for which
there is no evidence.
16.10 The incidental and happenings at Ahmednagar from an
important link in the chain of events which, culminated m the conspi-
racy to murder Mahatma Gandhi. What was happening there was
the precursor of that diabolical crime. The district of Ahmednagar
borders on what was then the Hyderabad State and they hadcommon
borders of considerable length on the north and ^ea^ on Je og^
borders were the districts of Poona and Nasik. The political affilia-
tions in this town and the district were, not to an inconsiderable
extent, linked with the rather militant and none too non-violent
activi ties of the Hindu Mahasabha and R.S.S, and allied groups of
Hindus All its various activities, mostly anti-Muslim and directed
agS those who had what is popularly called a secular approach
to national or local problems, were bound up with Poona which pro-
jected themselves into Ahmednagar. and in other bordering districts
i of the pre-1947 Bombay Province.
1Q47 Adhere was a wSl organised, strong and extremely anti-
part oT BritS India which included Ahmednagar Accogtagto
CoPseaueX he had to visit the border areas several times; and was
SxeS absent from the headquarters quite often and for long
periods because of the depredations of the Razakars resulting m
excitement among the people of the district and the town of Ahmed-
S?ar The Hindu Mahasabha agitation became intensified n
Alfmednaear partly as a consequence of the Razakar trouble in
Hvd?rab-f State and partly because of the advent of a large number
S Y Su refugees who came from that part of the country which
Scame the weltern wing of Pakistan. As a matter of fact, Mr. B C
Toshi the then Collector of Ahmednagar, witness No. 80 has state a
Sat hi predecessor Mr. Khan had warned the Provincial Govern-
ment that tV bringing in of large number of Hindu refugees from
Wert Puniab/Sindh etc., would create law and order problem because
tf resuS communal tension. But in spite of this advice, which
1 have been given from the best of motives but without realising
the problem of rehabilitation of millions of displaced persons, about
10 000 Hindu refugees were brought to Ahmednagar and were given
AWdSir "3? ^ 3 Pia ^ C F ed VisapUr ' about 26 nrilesSSJ
Alimeonagar. These refugees had passed through blood, and fire
n i ad , c ° me . to Lndl f ^-eerated in body and soul* deprived of their
wordly belongings and robbed of honour? The horrors they had been
through are to horrible to relate here. One can take juofcial notice
of Mr. Justice G. D. Khosla's book "The Stern Reckoning" The Sn-
go^TplaTLlnvTtW 7 n A t0 be Sh6ltered Md ViSpur was™
8£t?oS£ SSnSon theory. " "^ "* " aftermath of
P D i^'« Am ° n f t^ refugees was one Madanlal Pahwa from
Pakpa.an, a tehsil town in Montgomery district of West Punjab wnh
^nfi ^ effervescent tem Per, who subsequently figured prom*
nently m tne conspiracy to murder Mahatma Gandhf belause he was
the person who exploded the bomb at the prayer S of Tbe
Mahatma on the 20th January 1948 and was the^rstTo basted
\r i 6 ' 13 r> Thi i M f danlal came into contact with and was helned hv
Vishnu Ramkrishna Karkare who was also an acSdJftE5
racy to kill Mahatma Gandhi. He owned T and ran a noLHn
Ahmednagar and used his position and influence t^h» fullest exteS
_ 16.15 Besides the razakar activities and their consequences tho
induction of refugees from West Punjab and N.WT ? faam'e an
additional factor 'which disturbed the communal atmosphere of the
District and of the town of Ahmednagar. This is not to sav th?t tie
refugees shou d not have been brought. But tney wer I Slem
though a problem resulting from the Partition. If the refugees wire
m an a.igry mood or in aggressive mood or asked for rehaHlitatiVm
by insisting on jobs and business opportunities being ^ given to hem
one cannot blame them for it. After all it was not their fault thS
they had to leave their hearths and homes. It was tne inev taHe
consequence of the Partition of India on the basis of Hindu and
Mahommedans being two nations and all the Hindus and other non-
Moslems being driven away from West Punjab and other units of
western wing of Pakistan.
16.16. As a counter-blast to the atrocities committed by the Raza-
kars and what the refugees had gone through, the already strong
Hindu Mahasabha movement got a fillip and an opportunity to be-
come more aggressive and to operate in a. more fruitful field. These
must have added to the anxieties of the District authorities and must
have given them some very difficult and even anxious moments. In
judging what happened in Ahmednagar, the Commission cannot lose
sight of the conditions created as a consequence of events to which
a "brief reference has been made above.
16.17 Mr. Morarji has stated, when his attention was drawn to
the extension of the restrictions under section 144(6). Cr. P.C. Ex.
149, the original order was dated November 6, 1947 Ex. 148: "From
this order, passed under section 144, Cr. P.C, I would not say that
the general condition of the town was disturbed. I would say that
there were some people who were determined to disturb the peace
of the town. Therefore this precautionary measure had to be taken."
Be also said : "It is not correct to say that general population of
Hindus was arming itself against the Razakars' depredations but some
might have been doing it. The object of passing the order was to
prevent people carrying arms. The Government was not in any way
inclined to overlook the possession of arms even by those who were
ostensibly doing it with the object of meeting the Razakar move-
ment. I must add that there was no such movement in the town
itself. "What was happening was that people on the border were
arming themselves with the help of the R.S.S. and that also only
some people."
16.18 The order under section 144, Cr. P.C. dated 6th November,.
1947 shows that it was to operate not only in the city and canton-
ment areas of Ahmednagar but in several other areas and tamkas,
in all 16. The letter of the District Magistrate dated 1st January,
1948 asking for extension which is based on the letter of the D.S.P.
^hows that due to communal situation in the Punjab and non-co-
op^ration in Hyderabad State "fearful attitude" was arising among
the peoDle in the district, that there was danger of arms being im-
ported m the district with a view to transporting them outsiae for
the sake of protection to which was added his own opinion that tne
standstill agreement with the Hyderabad State had had no effect
on the activities of the people from Hyderabad and reports of trouble
were being received from areas on the borders and therefore ex-
tension was necessary. Here the dividing line between the effect
of Razakar menace and refugee trouble gets obliterated and the two
merge as it were. All this shows that anxiety produced by the Raza-
kar movement was not confined to only a few people but was general
in the district and that attempts were being made to import arms
for protection as well as for export to meet this menace.
16.19 But evidence shows that there was a general apprehension
of trouble from the Razakars from across the border. It may be true
that everyone was not arming himself but people on the border in
particular and some people in the interior were also getting arms—
whether it was actually for mooHnn +!-,« r>,,~ ?
o.t fear of J?aza.fcar aepredations arms were being collected.
th^ 6 ^^^^^^ 63 ^ f ° Ur ? nddents ° f b0mb throwin § but
tfc y w^ £ Tt i directed against the Muslims particularly of
tritfnTi-bL mednaga + r '/ Ith r gh the district authorities had been
treating them as connected with the Razakars.
TW"? 1 IX l ? e meant ™ e > refugees in Visapur were getting restive
They wanted accommodation; i.e. houses to live in Ihops to wori
Stina 1 f Van !v, Peri0d r ho has ^so' stated that the ^eTugees we 712
ayS that tL e ^t Si ° n / the Mahom ^an S from § InmeXaglr
saying that the Mahomedans were setting the best nf hnfh fht
worlds. They did not like the Mahommeolns LvSg S e facilit£
they were having in Ahmednagar while they, an uprooted S of
^tHe^il^ PUnJab ' ^ llVlng ° n d ° 4 in a ™ the^y
g*£? I? w^STroS inineSS? tie* t^ISS, £E
eraofTmL^^ If' it - W111 be - ne -" "y toropt them
theTepoit W CTe Xt 1S necessar y f^ the purposes of
hJn 6 rffJ h n evidence °{ the witnesses and the documents produced
befoie Ine Commission show that four bombs were thrown in KS
nagar town between November 24, 1947 and December^ 1MT%&
Ex. 61 and other relevant evidence). v
16.24 The bombs thrown were a s follows :~
fl) Bazar N ° VSmber ^ ° U the Tazla P roce ^ioh in Kappad
(2) 7th December in Vasant Talkies.
(3) 14th December on the house of Kazi Subhanbhai
(4) 26th December on the Tatti Darwaza Mosque.
In connection with these bombs, information was being sert by the
I stact authorities to Government. On December 8, 1947 th° Dis-
trict Magistrate wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary to th- Bombay
Jvw'TS? g r ng d 1 3ilS ° f the bomb in Vasant Talkies' an™ tie
extent of the damage done. A copy of this letter had been sent to
™.; D - L( i T ' C h D ' Poona - Thereupon Inspector Razak of the CTD
vitnessNo. 34, was sent to Ahmednagar to investigate or to help
m the investigation into the bomb incidents. By then there had
been two explosions. Inspector Razak came and conducted his
investigation and his evidence shows that the bomb explSon "were
caused by the workers of the Hindu Mahasabha but nobody had been
ttSr al i^# h i Carkare and Madanlal who were both accused
in the Gandhi Murder case were suspected to have been at the bottom
of these explosions. On December 18, 1947, he made a report (Ex.
61) stating that the bombs excepting the one that was thrown in
Kappad Bazar which was different, were of the same type, similar
to the bombs which had been found on June 3, 1947, in a bomb fac-
tory owned by Vansen Puspsen in Bombay which had been unearth-
ed by the Bombay C.I.D. and one of which was brought to Poona
by a police officer Inspector Ranbhice and in connection with that
find some Gujaratis had been arrested. This, according to him, show-
ed a common source and a common agency operating. On December
24, 1947 (Ex. 62) the houses of the Secretary of the Muslim League
and Captain of the Muslim National Guards were searched but noth-
ing incriminating was found. The report of this is Ex. 62. This
document also shows that the lives of Congress leaders including the
local Secretary Mr. Saptrishi were threatened and that the bomb
on the Moharram procession was similar to the one that was burst
In Shanivar Pet in Poona.
• 16.25 As a result of these activities and the suspicion which the
police had against Karkare and Madanlal, a watch was kept on their
movements by plainclothes policemen but both continued making
Inciting speeches. Although they were directed against Mahomme-
dans, they did not preach violence; so the evidence of witness No
35, Sub-Inspector Rane shows. There were also police reports that
these people were holding private meetings with the same objec-
tive. These activities were reported to the D.S.P.
16.26 Two reports were sent about the bomb incident in Kappad
Bazar thrown on the shop of one Ismail, M.L.A. reciting what had
happened and the damage which had been done. They are exhibits
73 and 74, dated December 15 and 16, 1947 : the former by the Dis-
trict Magistrate and the latter by the D.SP.
16.27 As a consequence of the suspicion which the police had on
account of the throwing of the bombs, the house of Karkare was
searched but nothing incriminating was found. According to the
evidence of Inspector Razak, witness No. 34, it was as a result of
this suspicion and on account of bomb-throwing that the house of
Karkare was searched but evidently nothing was discovered. Ac-
cording to Sub-Inspector Deshmukh, witness No. 32, the houses of
Karkare and S. V. Ketkar were searched under the orders of the
D.S.P. by Sub-Inspector R'ane, witness No. 35, and Deshmukh, wit-
ness No. 32, and after this the movements of Karkare were ordered
to be trailed.
16.28 As a matter of fact, what seems to have happened is this :
There was a murder of a widow in Poona. That was investigated
by the District Police of Poona but evidently nothing came out cf
it and the investigation was closed and the case ended as being un-
traced but due to the persistence of a brother of the deceased woman,
Inspector Savant, now Deputy Commissioner of Police of Bombay,
was appointed by the Provincial C.I.D. to investigate the case. His
investigation in Poona led to the association of the woman with
S. V. Ketkar who was at that time in Poona but had after the mur-
der of the widow shifted to Ahmednagar and was working as man-
ager of Karkare's hotel. In that connection, on January 1, 1948,
21-259 HA.
there was search of the house of S. V. Ketkar conducted by Sub-
Inspectors Rane and Deshmukh under the directions of Inspector
Savant and a large .quantity of arms and ammunition was found.
The list of these is contained in Ex. 75. Besides arms and ammuni-
tion, some gold ornaments were also found. A list of that is con-
tained in the report of Inspector Savant, Ex. 76, but it is necessary
to set them out or enumerate them at this place. They, to put it
briefly, consisted of country made handgrenades, a revolver, daggers,
explosives, fuses, pistol and rifle rounds and other ammunition— all
cojitained in a steel trunk of which the key was with Ketkar. Be-
sides this, there was a nose-ring, ear-rings, a silver ornament box
and letters. On January 2, 1948, the D.S.P., witness No. 40, made a
report, Ex. 75, regarding the recovery of arms. It also showed that
Ketkar had stated that these arms were kept in his house by V. R.
Karkare; that handgrenades found in the house of Ketkar were of
the same type as those thrown in Vasant Talkies and on the Tatti
Darwaza Mosque in the previous month. Inspector Savant's report,
Ex. 76, also mentioned the articles which were found therein and
about the interrogation of Ketkar. A copy of this report was sent
to the D.S.P. Ahmednagar, the original was sent to the D.I.G., C.I.D.,
Poona. Copies of the report, Ex. 75, were sent to the District Magis-
trate of Poona and Ahmednagar and to the D.I.G., C.I.D. and the
Inspector-General of Police, Poona. Police Superintendent Rane,
witness No. 40, has stated that he took no personal interest in the
matter as it related to the C.I.D. This indeed would have been sur-
prising if it had been literally correct. But the witness added that
the District Police was also taking part and that under police prac-
tice he was sending reports to the Provincial Government. That
explains the reason for sending Exhibits 74 and 75, i.e., relating
to the bombs thrown in December 1947 and the recovery of the
bombs on January 1, 1948 on search of S. V. Ketkar's house. On
the same day, January 2, 1948, Inspector Razak sent a report, Ex.
77, informing his D.I.G., C.I.D. about the nature of the bombs thrown
in Kappad Bazar Mosque and also that he had discussed the clues
with the D.S.P. showing that that officer was kept fully informed
of what was happening. Indeed, that is what one would have ex-
pected because the head of the District Police could not be ignored.
16.29 To revert to Ex., 76, report of Inspector Savant, it shows
that Ketkar was arrested; he had named Karkare as the person who
had given him the bombs; that the matter was reported to the D.S.P.
and that information under Arms Act and Explosive Substances Act
had been laid; that the searches of the house and hotel of Karkare
had been conducted by the City Police Sub-Inspector under the
orders of the D.S.P.; and that the interrogation of Ketkar did not
disclose anything further.
16.30 The weekly confidential diary of the D.S.P. (Ex. 78) dated
January 5, 1948 gives a description of the doings of the refugees from
Visapur camp. It states that the Peshawar group of refugees from
Visapur was committing robberies in the trains, the aggrieved par-
ties being mostly Muslims for whose protection armed Railway
Policemen had been put on duty. It also stated that the refugees
had demanded and got the green flag on a mosque removed and they
had also tried to remove other green flags from other Muslim build-
ings. Thei:e was a procession on 3rd January, 1948 led by Madanlal
-1. Karkare and K. S. Kulkarni who were shouting anti- Pakistan
slogans and demanding the expulsion of Muslims from Ahmednagar.
The procession then proceeded to Sarosh Garrage owned by
Khan Sahib Sarosh where they asked K. S- Sarosh to employ
them in place of their Muslim employees. Sarosh discussed the
matter with Madanlal and four other refugee leaders. The beha-
viour of Madanlal was very rude even when the District Magistrate
and D.S.P. arrived there. The former explained to the refugees
as to what they were going to do for them e.g., opening of a Co-
operative Bank for them, but Madanlal was still very arrogant and
the District Magistrate had to warn him against his rowdy beha-
viour. The report shows that Karkare was inciting the refugees to
create trouble in Ahmednagar. Mr. Raosaheb Patwardhan who had
gone to advise the refugees had to go back because of the attitude
of the processionists. The report adds that it was learnt that Kar-
kare was exciting the refugees and that the people in general did
not like this rowdyism.
16.31 S. I. Balkundi who was then Sub-Inspector, C.I.D. at Ahmed-
nagar, made a report Ex. 66, on 4th January, 1948. It mentions
about this very procession. It also mentions about the arrival
of the D.S.P. and the District Magistrate. It states that Madan-
lal working with Karkare had arranged the procession and the
real object of the procession was to protest against the sear-
ches which had been in the houses of Karkare and S. V. Ketkar
and to put pressure regarding what was said to be the efforts of
the police to get Karkare involved in the bomb cases by using third
degree methods against S. V. Ketkar. The processionists also said
that the police was after the Hindus and was frightened as it were
of curbing the Muslims, that although searches had been made in
the house of Karkare etc. yet no searches were made in the houses
of Sarosh Irani and Ismail Bandhubhai although they possessed a
good number of arms. This report support the incident in regard
to the procession going to Sarosh Garrage and demanding the sub-
stitution of Hindus in place of Muslim employees and also of what
the Collector and the D.S.P. did when they arrived at the spot. The
significant part of this report is in the last paragraph at page 198
which is as follows : —
"It is learnt that this procession was arranged by Mr. Madan-
lal Kashmirilal who is a refugee but staying at Nagar with
Mr. Karkare and working as a paid worker of Maha Sabha.
The procession was taken out more or less as a protest for the
search of the house and hotel of Mr. V. R. Karkare and to
brine the pressure on Police in their investigation of the bomb
cases."
In the end S. I. Balkundi suggested that in order to maintain the
peace of the city Madanlal and Karkare should either be externed
from Ahmednagar or detained. It also mentions that Katchi mer-
chants were winding up their business and were intending to leave
Ahmednagar and that refugees will take their place. Copies of this
report were sent to the D.I.G., C.I.D., to the D.I.B., New Delhi, to
the Home Department of Bombay Government, to the C.I.O., Bom-
bay, and the I.G.P. This report was seen by the D.I.G., C.I.D. on
January 14, 1948 and exhibit 66-A, dated January 7, 1948 is a letter
forwarding copies of this report from the D.I.G.'s office. In his
letter of explanation dated February 9, 1948 (Ex. 69) S. I. Balkundi
said that he had been sending weekly and special reports about
Madanlal and Karkare and also that he had recommended the de-
tention of both these persons as their activities in Ahmednagar had
become more and more dangerous. S. I. Balkundi in his oral state-
ment has supported the contents of his report and also that he had
recommended detention or externment of these two individuals.
Further he stated that Karkare was acting under the Hindu Maha-
sabha and that at that time he did not know Karkare's connection
with Apte or Nathuram Godse. It may be added that in his report
(Ex. 66) he had stated that Madanlal was a bad egg, was instigat-
ing the refugees, was conspiring and trying to contact the Sikh and
Punjabi elements in the Army.
16.32 On the same day the District Magistrate and the D.S.P.
made enquiries after receiving the report regarding the recovery
of arms and ammunition from the house of S. V. Katkar whether
Karkare had any hand in the bomb explosions in the city. There
were references to the recovery of arms and ammunition from the
house of Ketkar.
16.33 On January 5, 1948 a meeting was held at which Raosaheb
Patwardhan, a well-known and respected Congress Socialist leader,
addressed a meeting. This meeting was disturbed by the refugees
including Madanlal. According to S.I. Rane (witness 35) , Madanlal
was in hot temper; while the meeting was being addressed he
was shouting and threatening. S. I. Balkundi (witness 37) has also
deposed about this incident. He has stated that Madanlal and
his companions created disturbances during the meeting but it was
not correct that Madanlal got hold of Patwardhan and tried to
attack him with a knife. Karkare also arrived there and he also
stated shouting and demanded that he and Madanlal should be
allowed to speak. They tried to snatch away the mike from the
rostrum. Thereafter the meeting ended and when the audience
dispersed Madanlal and two others were arrested. Madanlal was
kept in the Jpck-up for some time: and it was added that Madanlal
used to create trouble all the time. Inspector Razak (witness
34) has stated that both Madanlal and Karkare were brought to
the Police Station and interrogated there but nothing useful was
found and there was no indication that their activities were directed
against the Congress leaders or that they were conspiring against
the lives of the Congress leaders. Madanlal on that occasion gave an
undertaking not to take part in violent movements and he was let
off. S. I. Balkundi (witness 37) deposed that on or about January 6,
1948 both Madanlal and Karkare disappeared from Ahmednagar and
police had no information where they had gone. The police were on
the look out for them and were watching the house of Karkare but
to the knowledge of the witness Karkare did not return nor did
Madanlal. The witness was sure that neither of them returned
because the police was on the look out for them. As a matter of fact,
it was S. I. Deshmukh (witness 32) who was on the look out for these
people.
325
16.34 From the testimony of another witness Sub-Inspector L. N.
Joshi (witness 36) who was a Police shorthand reported in Ahmed-
nagar at the time, it appears that Madanlal had told him that he
was going to Delhi to get married. This was on or about 10th January.
1948. This witness was quite friendly with witness No. 32 S. I. Desh-
mukh of the KI.B. and did even accompany him to Poona when
Deshmukh went to search for Karkare and yet he never told S. I-
Deshmukh or any other police officer as to what Madanlal had told
him about his going to Delhi to get married. There is sufficient cor-
roboration of the fact that Madanlal had been saying that he was
going to Delhi to get married. He had said that to Prof. Jain (witness
No. 27). In his statement the latter stated that about a week before
the bomb explosion at Delhi Madanlal came to him and told him
that he was going to Delhi to get married and he would return soon.
So that the recollection of Sub-Inspector Joshi about mention of the
marriage is correct. Sub-Inspecter Joshi has said that it was on or
about the 10th January that Madanlal had told him about his in-
tended going to Delhi. The dates may not be absolutely accurate
but they tally to a very large extent and are sufficiently close to
show that about a week or so before the bomb incident, Madanlal
left Ahmednagar to go to Delhi and one of the police officers did have
that information but for some reason or another the information was
not conveyed by him to his, brother or superior officers. We shall
revert to this matter later.
16.35 On January 11, 1948 S. I. Deshmukh intercepted a letter by
Karkare addressed to the "Dainik Trikal" and "The Hindu Rashtra
where Karkare gave information about the searches which had been
effected in Ahmednagar in connection with the bomb incidents. The
letter which was intercepted is exhibit 43, and was addressed to seve-
ral neswpapers in Poona including Dainik Trikal and Hindu Rashtra.
It evidently was not dated; the date of interception is January 2,
1948. It states that eight days after the search of Karkare's house
another search was made of that house on January 1, also of his tea
house and Deccan Guest house. During the search Karkare and his
staff were present but nothing objectionable was found in the search.
Evidently one of the employees had a dagger which was returned to
him when it was pointed out that it was meant for his protection.
The reason given in the letter for this search was that Karkare was
assisting the refugees and had therefore become an eyesore to the
police and that the refugees did not like Karkare being treated in
that manner. The letter also stated that one of the refugees made
a speech and shouted "Swatantra Vir Savarkar-ki-jai", "Hindu
Rashtra-ki-jai"; finally at Karkare's request the crowd melted away.
The letter also mentioned the trouble which some of the visitors
from outside and guests at the hotel had to undergo. It appears that
there is some discrepancy in regard to the date when the intercep-
tion took place. The witness has stated January 11, the letter seems
to be of 2nd January but knowing as we do that Karkare was not
seem in Ahmednagar after the 6th or so 11th January must be a
mistake due to dimming of memory and lapse of time.
16 36 The weekly report of the District Magistrate, dated Jan-
uary 8 1948 (Ex. 150) had reference to the recovery of handgre-
nades and other arms and ammunition from the house of S. V.
Ketkar and to his statement that Karkare had given them to him
eight days earlier. On January 9, Inspector Razak (witness 34) ad-
yisea Deshmukh, so that evidence of Razak shows, to recommend
the detention of both Madanlal and Karkare. S. I. Balkundi
(witness 37) has stated that he recommended— and that is proved
by his weekly report also, dated 4th January 1948 (Ex. 60)— that
Madanlal and Karkare be detained or externed.
16.37 On the report (Ex. 150), dated 8th January 1948 Mr S- M
Dalai made an endorsement on January 11, and Mr V T Daheiia
on January 12, and on the same day the Home Minister Mr. Morarii
JJesai made an order that the persons mentioned in the report should
earlie? d Whj the District Magistrate had not done so
16.38 As stated above, according to witness No. 37, S. I Balkundi
fee recommendation was made by him regarding Madanlal and
Karkare on January 4, 1948 (Ex. 60). Madanlal was ordered to be
detained on January 16, 1948. What happened between the period
of the recommendation and the order of detention was passed there
is no evidence and it could not be said that on this point the officers
were illuminating. But the matter is very old and perhaps their
memory has got dimmed and one cannot blame them for it Mr
H. C. Joshi, D.M. (witness 80) has stated that he had made the order
because he was satisfied that Madanlal was acting in a manner
prejudicial to the maintenance and safety of public order. He also
made an order for the detention of three or four others but Karkare
was not among them.
16.39 As a matter of fact the order for Karkare's detention was
passed on the 24th January and the suggestion had come from
Bombay Government to take action against him. The only remark
that might be made at this stage is that even though the order was
"semi-judicial" such long delay is inexplicable in a matter of pre-
ventive and not punitive action. It appears that in the Secretariat
itself the order of the Minister ordering immediate arrest was de-
layed and it was not sent out till January 19, 1948 (Ex 80). When
it reached Ahmednagar is not quite clear but in Ex. 145 dated Jan-
uary 21, 1948, Mr. R. C. Joshi writing about the explosion of bombs
and arrest of Karkare, refers to the letter of January 19, 1948. In
that letter he said that the reason for not arresting Karkare was
that apart from the statement of S. V. Ketkar, implicating Karkare
there was no other evidence to connect him with the offence and
that the D.S.P. had explained that it was under those circumst-
ances that Karkare was not arrested; and that the witness had in-
formed the D.S.P., that in view of the Government's orders, Karkare
should be arrested. He also said that according to. the oral instruc-
tions of the Government he had ordered the detention of four re-
fugees who led the procession in Ahmednagar on January 3. What
happened between this letter and the order of detention "of Karkare
on January 24, 1948, is not quite clear. It will be more correct that
there is no evidence on that point but ultimately orders were passed
on the 24th for Karkare's detention. Mr. R. C. Joshi has stated
that he did not know what statement S. V. Ketkar had made and in
his explanation he was really giving the explanation of the D.S..P.
32*
without giving his own opinion regarding sufficiency or otherwise
of the reason for arresting or not arresting Karkare. This is rather
fatuous. If Mr. Joshi was exercising his discretion or what he terms
semi-judicial powers, he could not have acted on this material, but
one cannot presume a misuse or abuse of powers of detention by a
District Magistrate.
16.40 Both the Times of India and the Bombay Chronicle, news-
papers from Bombay, gave the news as to the throwing of the bomb
at Delhi, in their editions of 21 January 1948, Exhibits 106 and 107.
. 'There was some description of Madanlal as being a tall, wheat com-
plexioned but it could not be said that it was very illuminating be-
cause that might fit in any Punjabi refugee. Besides in the Bombay
•Chronicle, Madanlal was described as "fair complexioned, medium
built, Ex-Serviceman, wearing European dress". This description
was equally unilluminating. Witness No. 32, S. I. Deshmukh, has
stated that he had a complete record of MadanlaPs activities and
he knew him and if his photograph was sent to Ahmednagar or his
description had been given, he would have at once spotted him and
would have given a complete record of what he was doing and with
whom he was associating. But even then from the description
which the Press had given he told the D.S.P. Ahmednagar, of his
suspicion about the identity of Madanlal but when he did it he
does not now remember. S. I. Balkundi (witness 37) stated that
from the description of Madanlal in the Press he suspected that
he was the same person who was operating in Ahmednagar. He
conveyed his suspicion to Inspector Razak who in turn informed
the D.S.P. but what orders the D.S.P. made thereon he does not
know.
16.41 The statement of the D.S.P. (witness 49) is that it did not
strike him that Madanlal arrested at Delhi was the same person
of Ahmednagar, but he had a faint recollection that Inspector Razak
and S. I. Deshmukh had mentioned to him their suspicions about
the identity of Madanlal. He told them that if that was so Madan-
lal must have been interrogated by the Delhi Police who would
find out everything. He told Deshmukh that if he wanted to go to
Delhi he could do so and also told Razak that on his return to Poona
he might as well tell the D.I.G., C.I.D., about this suspicion. Sur-
prisingly enough, this gentleman did not think it expedient to tele-
phone the D.I.G., CJ.D., about it nor did he inform the District
Magistrate. He also told S. I. Deshmukh to go to Poona to make
enquiries about Karkare but this was soon after he had come to
know that Karkare had disappeared from Ahmednagar. This ac-
cording to the D.S.P. might have been on or about January 24, 1948,
because a day or so earlier Deshmukh had come to see him. He
has added that suspicion of Deshmukh with regard to Madanlal
was not very strong and that was the reason he had not sent him
to Delhi; and as he did not think the suspicion to be well founded,
therefore he did not make any written report on this matter.
16.42 S. I. Balkundi (witness 37) had his suspicion about Madan-
lal and he made a report (Ex. 67), dated 29th January 1948 and sent
•it on to the DJ.G., C.I.D., Poona, in which he stated that this Madan-
lal seemed to be the same person who was in Ahmednagar and was
working with Karkare and had disappeared from there. He gave
the full address of Madanlal and also something about his Punjab
residence and some other particulars.
16.43 It is indeed surprising that this document should have been
sent on 29th January 1948 by S. I. Balkundi and no report was made
about it to the A.D.I.G. who was camping in Ahmednagar, round
about that time. As a matter of fact, on 6th February 1948 (Ex. 68)
Balkundi's explanation was called by Mr. N. S. Gurtu, A.D.I.G., on.
this point. There is some mistake in this document about the desig-
nation of the officer. It was not the D.I.G. but the A.D.I.G. who.
was camping in Ahmednagar at the time. The explanation of Bal-
kundi among other things, was that he did not at the time know that the
D. I.G. was there. Literally it is true. D.I.G. had not come to Ahmed-
nagar, the A.D.I.G. had come. Between them it is difficult to be-
lieve that Balkundi would not know about it or that he would not.
go to him and thus not give such an important bit of information.
to him. Of course, the witness could have had good reason for it
which he has not disclosed to the Commission. He further stated
in his explanation that he had been reporting about the activities.
of Karkare and Madanlal and had recommended their detention be-
cause they were becoming more and more dangerous and that after
the meeting of Raosaheb Patwardhan that was disturbed by these;
people, the atmosphere of Ahmednagar had become too hot and
therefore they stopped their activities and left for Poona in the
second week of January 1948, and since then Karkare had not re-
turned to Ahmednagar.
16.44 If the evidence regarding the suspicion which the various
witnesses had in regard to the identity of Madanlal is correct then
Ex. 67 is a very important document, if true. This document, as.
stated above, is dated January 29, 1948. When it reached Poona, we
do not know. What endorsements were made on it, that also we do>
not know because the original is not before the Commission. But
there is no cogent explanation why Sub-Inspector Balkundi should
have sent a written report on the 29th when all the time he was.
satisfied with having mentioned his suspicions as to Madanlal to
Inspector Razak. It was this witness who had made a written re-
commendation for the detention of Madanlal and Karkare and he
was watching their activities which shows that he was sufficiently
alert as to what was happening in the town. But why he should not
have sent a written report about his suspicion earlier is difficult to
understand. His explanation for not sending report earlier is that
he had talked to Inspector Razak and Razak had told the D.S-P. But-
still he wanted to put something in writing. On February 1, 1948,
A.D.I.G. Gurtu called Balkundi to Poona in connection with the
inquiry in Ahmednagar about Karkare. It appears that Mr. Gurtu did
not know anything about the report nor does it seem to have been men-
tioned to him. As said earlier in his explanation, Ex. 69, dated Febru-
ary 9, 1948, Balkundi gave three reasons: (1) That he was not aware
of the DIG's camping at Ahmednagar. Literally it may be true that
D.I.G. was not there and it was the A.D.I.G. but why A.D.I.G was not
informed is not clear. (2) That the D.S.P. informed him (Balkundi)
that he was wanted at Poona with full details regarding the relatives
and servants of Karkare and the collection of that information had
kept him busy and that he had handed over the information with
m
Karkare-s photograph to Dy. S. P. Chaubal. (3) Thftt he ■*!■ «K
stantly reporting about the movements of Karkare and Madanlal and
had finally recommended their detention.
16 45 It is difficult to believe that the A.D.I.G. or the D.LG. should
be camping at Ahmednagar and a Sub-Inspector of CIE > would no
know about it. It is also difficult to accept the explanation of not
sending the report earlier. It is possible that this witne ss had a sus-
picion about Madanlal but like others in his force he acted in aratnei
slovenly manner. Of course, it must be mentioned that it may
equally be difficult to find an explanation for putting in a false report
at that stage. That it did go to Poona is proved by a subsequent
document, a letter by the A.D.I.G. making a reference to this repoit.
The Commission finds it difficult to accept that at such a late staga
this document could usefully be written but at the same time it
cannot come to the conclusion that this document is wholly a faked
document subsequently introduced but its utility was nil and its.
objective difficult to find.
16 46 It is, of course, possible and even probable that Sub-Inspector
Balkundi had suspicion .about the identity of Madanlal. He might
even have mentioned it to Razak who in turn informed the U.b.F.
but the attitude of this witness does not show that this suspicion was
so strong or really was anything more than vague or nebulous.
16 47 When Mr. Gurtu called Balkundi and asked him why he
had not submitted his report about the activities of Madanlal and
Karkare, his replv was that he had been sending reports from time
to time and it was on this occasion that he brought this Ex. 67 from
the record room and that is how it was produced.
16.48 From the evidence it does appear that S.I. Balkundi was
aware of the activities of Karkare and Madanlal. It- also appears
that he did suspect that Madanlal. the thrower of the bomb, was
the same who had been operating in Ahmednagar but for some rea-
son he did not put his suspicion in writing and when he did so its
utility was nil. It also appears that it was this witness who gave
the particulars of Karkare to Poona C.I.D. and the photograph which
was on the LB. file was supplied by him.
16.49 Nov/, we come to another portion of the activities of the
Ahmednagar Police.
16.50 Sub-Insoector Balkundi, witness No. 37, has stated that both
Nathuram Godse and Apte used to come to Ahmednagar and they
met Karkare and that he and his staff were watching the activities
of both these persons although nothing emanated from this attempt-
ed intelligence. He also stated that he did not know if Karkare W8I
sending any money to Godse and Apte. But he did know that
Karkare was acting under the aegis of the Hindu Mahasabha. Ho
further stated that when Madanlal and Karkare had left Ahmed-
nagar in or about the second week of January 1948 as the place wtl
too hot for them, he thought that he might have gone to Kolhapui
to stay with one Jere who was one of the paid workers of the Hindu
Mahasaoha. Now this is an important piece of evidence because in
his explanation, Ex 69, dated February 6, 1948, also he has said that
Karkare so it was learnt, had gone to Kolhapur and was likely to
take shelter with one Mr. Jere who had been working at Nagar and
that this information had been passed on to Inspector Razak who was
working on it; but that unfortunately this was on February 7, 1948.
16.51 After Madanlal had thrown the bomb, a letter addressed to
Karkare was intercepted by witness No. 32, Sub-Inspector Deshmukh
The wruer of that letter could not be traced but in that letter it was
written that a building had to be constructed in Bombay which was
not possible without Karkare's help. Deshmukh took this letter to
the D.S.P. and told him that it meant much more than what appear-
ed on the suriace. In other words, it was in code. A copy of the
letter was sent by the D.S.P. to the DIG, CID requesting that
inquiries be made in Bombay. Deshmukh suggested to the DSP
that he (Deshmukh) should go to Bombay and Poona to find out
about the whereabouts of Karkare and he left for Bombay on the
pretext of purchasing a rectophote machine, taking with him .Sub-
Inspector L. N. Joshi, because Joshi belonged to Poona and knew
Apte and Godse. They went to the Agrani Press and made inquiries
about Apte and Godse. This was on January 29, 1948. They were
told that neither of them was in Poona. They then went to Apte's
house on some pretext and asked Mrs. Apte about Apte's address.
She said that Apte had gone to Gwalior. Joshi remained on in
Poona and Deshmukh went to Bombay to find out about Karkare's
brother who was working in a mill in Dadar. He made inquiries
about Karkare till about 9 p.m. when he learnt about the murder of
Mahatma Gandhi.
16.52 An extract from the weekly diary of Deshmukh, Ex. 53,
shows that he arrived at Poona on 28th January, 1948 and made con-
fidential inquiries till 11 p.m. On January 29 he made more
confidential inquiries and left Poona at 11-30 a.m., arrived at Bombay
at 4 p.m. and went to Kurla and made inquiries there and then
returned to Dadar. On the following day, i.e., January 30. he moved
about in Byculla, V.T., Kalbadevi, Dadar and Parel areas and made
confidential inquiries. In this report it is not stated as to what con-
fidential inquiries he was making or about whom, but one or two
important matters emanate from this portion of the testimony of this
witness.
(1) That Deshmukh had gone to Poona to look for Karkare; and
if that was so it is difficult to imagine why he should have gone to
the Agrani Press and asked about him and then there he made
inquiries about the whereabouts of Apte and Godse. It is still very
•surprising that Deshmukh and L. N. Joshi should have gone to
Mrs. Apte to find out where her husband was and then this witness
(Deshmukh) should have left for Bombay to look for Karkare. The
whole thing does not fit in or appear to be very logical. If Karkare
was being looked for then the witness should have stated that they
went to find out about him from the Agrani Press and from Mrs- Apte
which he has not stated. And this connection between Karkare and
the Agrani Press or Mrs. Apte should appear somewhere at least in
the evidence before the Commission.
m
(2) It shows that the witness was connecting Karkare with Apte
and Godse. Why it is not clear. He has nowhere stated in his evi-
dence that according to his knowledge, Godse and Apte were asso-
ciating with Karkare in Ahmednagar although Sub-Inspector
Balkundi, witness No. 37, has stated that both Godse and Apte used
to meet Karkare in Ahmednagar.
(3) If Karkare had taken shelter in Kolhapur with Jere, why was
he being looked for in Poona? Besides why was the police' in Kolha-
pur not contacted about him?
(4) It is difficult to find out any cogent reason for the inquiries
made by these witnesses about Apte and Godse and not about
Karkare. As has been said above, the thing does not fit in property
and picture seems to be out of focus as it were. Either these wit-
nesses had knowledge about the association of Karkare and Apte
and Godse or they had not. If they had, one would have expected
that they would have informed the authorities about this matter and
when Karkare disappeared from Poona, they might have looked for
him at places where Apte and Godse were or they had no knowledge
about this association.
16.53 But this much is clear that Sub-Inspector L. N. Joshi did
know Mrs. Apte. As a matter of fact, he has stated that he had
helped Karkare to start business and Karkare was helping Apte in
his publication work. He has also stated that Deshmukh had suspi-
cion that Apte and party had gone to Delhi but he does not seem to
have mentioned the fact to anybody nor informed the DSP He has
further stated that Mrs. Apte had no suspicion when he made
inquiries about Apte because they had known each other for some
time lhis previous acquaintance of Joshi with Apte and Karkare
can have a sinister meaning and yet may be more or less innocuous.
Joshi has stated that he had n sympathy for the Hindu Mahasabha.
L.. JN. Joshi also stated that he accompanied Deshmukh because he
knew friends of Karkare in Poona and went to the Agrani office for
that reason In the circumstances, it was, perhaps, not very wise
for Mr. Deshmukh to have taken L, N. Joshi with him.
16.54 But the reason of his going to Poona and Bombay remains a
mystery in view of his previous knowledge about the hiding of
Karkare m Kolhapur with Jere.
16.55 Witness No. 32, Police Deputy Superintendent Narayanrao
Kunjvihan Deshmukh, who was a Sub-Inspector in the Local Intelli-
gence Branch at the relevant time was stationed at Ahmednagar to
keep watch over the activities of different political parties including
the Hindu Mahasabha and R.S.S. He has stated that to his know-
ledge there was no organisation known as Hindu Rashtra Dal in
Ahmednagar. The leaders of Hindu Mahasabha were C. M. Saptrishi
and Gaikavaai but he had not heard the name of Apte but he knew
Karkare He used to visit Visapur refugees' camp where refugees
trom Peshawar had been brought— probably he does not distinguish
the Peshawari Hindu from any other from West Punjab. There the
talk among the refugees, as one would expect, was against Muslims;
the complaint being that the Muslims had abducted, raped and
molested Hindu girls and young women in Pakistan and they were-
enjoying themselves in India while the refugees had suffered great
indignity and barbarity at the hand of Muslims and had to come
all the way from their homes in the Punjab to Ahmednagar nearly
2,500 kilometres away. They wanted service, jobs business and they
objected to living on Government doles and loans. One can well
believe that they were work hungry, angry young men and uassivity
was not one of their virtues nor laziness their shortcoming. Madanlal
and Karkare became prominent in the Hindu Mahasabha. In order
to bring refugees into the Hindu Mahasabha movements Karkare
promised them business and other kinds of help.
16.56 The refugees, led by Karkare, used to take out procession in
Ahmednagar. On one occasion they took a procession to the Garage
of Khan Bahadur Sarosh Irani. The District Magistrate and the
District Superintendent of Police came to the spot. The District
Magistrate promised them help but at the same time warned them
that he would not allow them to misbehave by taking down green
flags from the mausoleums and tombs of Peers and others and from
other Muslim religious buildings. Thereafter the processionists went
away. This was some time in the first week of January 1948.
16.57 This witness has referred to a circular (Ex. 54) which was
issued by the D.I.G. of Police, C.I.D.- on May 9/10, 1947, asking the
District Superintendents of Police of the province to maintain a close
watch on the Hindu Rashtra Dai's activities and to report to him any
attempt made by its volunteers and others to implement the advice
given by Barrister Savarkar at the meeting of the Dal at Dadar on
the 9th and 10th May 1947. Accompanying this document is a precis
of the summary of the proceedings of the Dal of that date at which
about 125 volunteers were present from all over the province of
Bombay and neighbouring Hindu States like Hyderabad, Kolhapur,
Sangli, Miraj, Indore, Baroda besides others from the province of
Bombay itself. Savarkar there delivered four speeches giving the
aims and objects of the Hindu Rashtra Dal, its constitution and his
views on the communal riots in India and the partition of the Punjab
and Bengal. The aims and objects of the Dal were to propagate
Hindu Sangathanist ideas. Savarkar was its dictator. He retired
and nominated his successor who was authorised to nominate provin-
cial and district organisers. During the course of his speeches
Savarkar asked the volunteers to establish mass contact and propa-
gate Savarkar-vad in the villages and to inculcate in the villagers a
spirit of aggression; to protect themselves from Muslim atrocities;
and also advised them to assist the villages to secure arms licences.
He had emphasised the necessity of the Hindu Rashtra Dal and refer-
red to Muslim atrocities in the Punjab and in Bengal, and preached
retaliation. "You should not stop until you retaliate in the same
spirit and manner. If Hindu women were raped and Hindu temples
damaged, equal number of mosques should be destrpyed. He advised
the volunteers to oppose the Constitution if it was detrimental to the
interests of Hindus and the "Hindudom".
16.58 In December 1947, said the witness, there were some bomb
incidents but the local police could not find out, who were respon-
sible for them. The Provincial C.I.D. was therefore called in from
Poona but the culprits could not be traced or found.
16.59 According to this witness, on 1st January 1948, as is shown
from his daily bulletin report there was a search in the house of
Karkare and in the house of S. V. Ketkar, and large quantities of
arms and ammunition were found. This search was conducted by
Sub-Inspector S. S. Rane. Thereafter, Karkare's movements were
watched and there was a policeman trailing him.
16.60 On the 11th January 1948 this witness intercepted a letter
of Karkare addressed to the Danik Hindu Rashtriya wherein Karkare
had given information about the searches.
16.61 Letters of Karkare and other Hindu Mahasabha leaders in
Ahmednagar began to be censored, i.e., outgoing and also their incom-
ing letters. This witness was making reports in regard to these
letters which he was intercepting.
16.62 On the 16th January 1948, orders were passed for the deten-
tion of Madanlal and on the 24th January for the detention of
Karkare. It appears that both Madanlal and Karkare disappeared
from Ahmedngar and they were never arrested till one after the
'bomb incident and the other after the fatal shot was fired which
ended the life of Mahatma Gandhi.
16.63 The witness also stated that the activities of Karkare were
-not of a violent nature but he was taking part in the Hindu Maha-
sabha meetings. The witness never came to know about any secret
meeting between Madanlal, Ka'rkare, Apte and Godse; his duty being
to make enquiries about illegal activities of persons, correlate them,
.and to submit them to the D.S.P.
16.64 Madanlal and Karkare disappeared in about the second
-week of January and the matter was reported to the D.S.P. and he
must have informed the DIG of Police, CID. From what this wit-
ness knew the activities of Madanlal and Karkare were not directed
against the Congress leaders nor did they attack them nor was there
.any indication of their intention to commit violence against them but
they were anti-Muslim. He was not present at the meeting where
Madanlal assaulted Raosahib Patwardhan but he went subsequently
when Madanlal was brought to the Police Station. The witness inter-
cepted a letter addressed to Karkare— the sender's name he did not
"know nor find out. In that letter it was stated that a building had
to be constructed in Bombay and that without Karkare's help it
■could not be constructed. The letter was taken by the witness to the
.D.S.P. To the witness the letter meant much more than what it
.apparently said and it appeared to be in code. The letter was sent
to the DIG, CID reauesting that enquiries be made. This letter was
received after the bomb was thrown at Delhi and before the murder.
What became of this letter or what action was taken is not indicated
lay the evidence before the Commission.
16.65 The witness had a complete record of Madanlal's activities
and he knew Madanlal. He says that if a photograph of Madanlal
had been sent to Ahmednagar or had appeared in the newspapers or
his description had appeared, he would at once have been able to spot
him and would have given a complete record of what he wa, doino
and with whom. He stated that h e had told the S AhmedS
of his suspicion about the identity of Madanlal; when exactTy i?was
done ne does not say. On some pretext, on December 29 1947 he
15£ ° ^ mb ^ takm u g WitneSS L N " J^whc w£ ^stenographer
(witness No. 36) with him. They first went to Poona and Se
IXntn lT W^ft PreSS ab ° Ut A ^ te and Godse ^io w
On The nreW of a ?, Ut th6y ™T *? ld that the ^ were not in P °°na.
Un the pretext of getting some books printed, they went to Apte's
keloid them d th e a t q A ir t ieS fr ° m ^ f Pte ab0Ut ^ addJessand
she told them that Apte was in Gwalior. Leaving Joshi in Poona
the witness went to Bombay looking for Karkare in Dadar and heard
H^ln'lhTtr^i Pm - l hat the Mahatma h ad been slot dead
He said that they had gone there because of their (Apte and Godse
association with the Hindu Mahasabha movement. It is a little sur-
prising that this witness should have gone to enquire about Ccdse
and Apte when he has deposed before the Commission that he did
net know of any connection between Madanlal, Karkare, Godse and
Apte. He also stated when his attention was drawn to his weekly
™ e ™! nt , d i ary tha t he left Ahmednagar on the 28th. He made
enquiries at .Poona l the whole day and at 11 p.m. he left for Bombay
and on that day he made confidential enquiries at Bombay on the
30th January learnt of the murder of the Mahatma and returned the
w fh gh + \?/ h r dn u agar - Even on the 29th Jan A him lot
know that Madanlal who had been arrested at Delhi was the Vm
person whose activities they had been watching in Ahmednagar
Nobody had conveyed that information to him. ^
16.66 He did not go to the Bombay CID because they were not
likely to know anything about Karkare who was only a hotel keeper
and was not a big man. ^
hoJ^^-^^ 653 sus P ected that Madanlal who had thrown the
bomo might be the same person about whom orders of detention had
been passed in Ahmednagar and he told the D.S.P. about this also
'nZp n ° tS ^ ^ T S er o hat r ntleman P a ^ed on the informa-
tion ,o the Provincial CID. But this witness seems to be drawing
more upon his imagination because in the latter part of the statement
thi a M,Sn? a i tnat T", HP to «« 29th January 1948 he did not know
that Madanlal arrested in Delhi was the same person whose acti-
vities they had been watching in Ahmednagar. Then it is difficult
to see what he was going to do at Poona or at Bombay. At any rate
there is no indication of what he did there except that he looked for
Karkare. It is important to remember that Karkare's name had not
been mentioned to this witness as an associate of Madanlal in the
bomb throwing.
R J. 6 , 6 ? Th % J" 3 ? wi tness regarding Ahmednagar is Sheikh Abdul
Razak Ismail (witness No 34). He i s now an Additional Superinten-
dent ox Police, C.B.I, (on leave preparatory to retirement) in charge
of corruption. At the relevant time he was Inspector in the Provin-
cial C.I.D. and was stationed at Poona and incharge of the cirr>lp in-
cluding Ahmednagar. As there had been some bomb explosions in
Ahmednagar he was called in on December 13, 1947 to Ahmednagar
330
•o investigate these incidents (Ex. 60). There had been some bomb
explosions, one of them inside the Vasant Talkies belonging to
K. B. Sarosh Irani on 7th December, 1947. The other bomb incidents
were in Kappad Bazar, Tatti Darwaza Mosque and one other on the
occasion of the Muharram festival but nobody had been arrested in
connection therewith although Madanlal and Karkare were suspected.
On 18th December he made a report (Ex. 61) stating that the bomb
was thrown on the Swari on 24th November, 1947 but it caused no
damage because it did not explode. On 7th December, 1947" there
was an explosion inside Vasant Talkies of a crude handgrenade which
injured about 12 persons. On the 14th December, 1947, a bomb was
thrown near the shop of Ismail Bandhubhai, M.L.A. which miured
an omooker. This was at about midnight. His report Ex. 61 shows
that all these bombs except the one of Kappad Bazar which was
different, were of the same type and were similar to the bomb s which
had been found on June 3, 1947 in a bomb factory in Bombay owned
by one Vansen Puspsen (Ex. 62) unearthed by the Bombay CID
and were brought to Poona by a Police Officer and in connection with
that case some Gujaratis had been arrested. This shows a common
^W^"^ agei ? Cy °P erati ng- According to a document
(Ex. 92) dated 24th December 1947, the houses of Secretary of the
Muslim League and Captain of the Muslim National Guards were
searched but nothing incriminating was found. This document
shows that the lives of Congress leaders including .the local Secretary
bsptrishi were being threatened and that the bomb on the Muharram
bwan was similar to the one burst in Poona Shaniwar Peth on 28th
December 1947.
16.69 As a result of the suspicion on account of the throwing of
(he bombs, the house of Karkare was searched but evidently nothing
was found. And Madanlal had no house. On the 2nd January 1Q48
this witness made a report (Ex. 59) showing that activities of Karkare
were being watched, that Police Inspector Savant of the C.I.D. got
certain information a s a consequence of which the house of S V
Ketkar was searched, from where some bombs and other arms ?no!
ammunition were found. Ketkar had stated that the bombs had
been given to him by Karkare and the interrogation of one Shiru
Limaye which had been ordered was cancelled. He was at the time
in custody in Poona.
16.70 On 5th January 1948 both Madan Lai and Karkare were
brought to the police station and interrogated but nothing useful was
found and there were no indications that they or their activities were
directed against the Congress leaders or they were a danger to the
lives of Congress leaders but Madan Lai gave an undertaking not to
take part in violent movements.
16.71 The witness on or about the 9th January 1948 asked Sub-
Inspector Deshmukh to make a report and get both Madan Lai and
Karkare detained. On 18th January the witness returned to Poona.
Before that he had asked S.I. Deshmukh as to what had been dono in
regard to his suggestion of getting detention orders. Deshmukh's
reply was that h e had sent a report but no orders had until then
been received. The witness was sending his reports from time to
time. He says it was for the higher officers to send Special Police
officers to investigate the bomb cases.
16 72 On the 26th January 1948 (Ex. 58) he made a report to the
DIG- C I.D., Poona, about the activities of 25 persons giving details.
Copies were sent to D.S.Ps. of Poona and Nagar. These contained
names of persons some of whom S. V. Ketkar had "involved" in his
statement. Of these some were active workers of a group holding
"extreme views"; and two D. V. Godse and V. V. Pandit were from
Poona. About D. V. Godse it was mentioned that his brother was
prominent in a dramatic society, but evidently no action was taken
on this report, and it had recommended none. This report is Exhibit
58 The significant part of this report is that he had mentioned
therein five persons S. V. Ketkar, V. R. Karkare, B. B. Paradkar,
Rekhi and Dattaraya brother of Nathuram Godse. Their activities
are very clearly given in this document, but there is no mention of
Madanlal in this report and the witness says that he did not know
about him. Anyhow it showed a probable source of the bombs
thrown in Ahmednagar. Whether a more vigorous investigation
could have led to anything more relevant to this enquiry before the
Commission would be in the realm of conjecture. But this does show
that Karkare was not a man whose activities could be ignored.
16.73 About 2 days after the bomb incident at Delhi this witness
and S.I. Deshmukh went to the D.S.P. and mentioned to him their
suspicions about the identity of Madanlal arrested at Delhi indicat-
ing that he might be the same person who was active in Ahmednagar
but this witness has not mentioned it in any of his reports.
16.74 He has also stated that at Ahmednagar his investigation
showed that Karkare and Madanlal were indulging in anti-Muslim
activities. They had tried to incite the Hindus by showing a naked
Hindu woman being outraged by persons who looked like Moham-
madens. But he came to know that the photograph was that of a
local prostitute who had been got hold of by Karkare and the photo-
graph was manufactured in order to incite the Hindus against the
Muslims. He has also said that he did not^eport this matter to the
D.S.P.
16.75 He was cross-examined by Mr. Vaidya and he reiterated
that he along with S. I. Deshmukh told the D.S.P. of their suspicions
regarding Madan Lai and that the D.S.P. after the 26th January 1948
ordered Sub-Inspector Deshmukh to go to Delhi and search for
Karkare and verify if Madanlal was the same person. He has also
referred to a confidential letter written by the District Magistrate,
Mr. R. C. Joshi (witness No. 80) to the Chief Secretary, Bombay
with a copy to the D.I.G., C.I.D., Poona. But this letter does not
throw much light on anything excepting that the District Magistrate
had reported about the bomb incidents which appeared to be of a
communal nature, that the Police was investigating but it adds
nothing to what this witness has already stated.
16.76 He could not remember whether he received any instruc-
tions from Mr. Rana, D.I.G., C.I.D. of the Province regarding the
persons mentioned in the witness's report between 26th January and
have led to the arrest of his co-conspirators. He produced a copy of
a statement of Madanlal which was* given to him on 2nd Febmary
extend, nve?T« ked ?**£ ^ ^ a lon S ish document andt ?yp?
extends over 18 pages. He could not say whether there was a™
contact between Bombay City Police and the PoonI PoHce betweeX
fomb^wrafDS^^ 1948 ^ ^^ t0 Madan C £ai e rr e
^^T^^^T^L^SS^ rthirStfS
AfTte^r B ? i e did not know that Nath ^ a ™ c£E 5
Apte were helping Karkare or Madanlal. He came to know of
heir activities between 20th January and 26th JaiSv and "hit is
the reason why he has mentioned their names in his report But
sets jss?s ?sr not know of the actMties & »™
found m the house of S. V. Ketkar there were no indications lhat
hey were after the life of Mahatma Gandhi o other Congress
leaders and Madanlal had given an understanding not to take part
in violent movements. He further stated that he did not read any
EaX^'R W K ^ S? ^T Was drawn t0 the description o?
Madanlal in Bombay Chronicle' he said that the description would
JKhJSS f^ SU ^ dent t0 e r nable him t0 connect M ^an Lai w?th
Madanlal of Ahmednagar. In the end he stated that if any of the
?° llC K 1 °^ C fil wl10 knew M «danlal had been sent to Delhi it is
SIh u a * thG mUrd6r ° f Mahatma Gandhi might have been pre-
Jbout An ft nr T?Z 1Smg K thlS WitneSS did £* l^ow anything
aoout Apte or Nathuram Godse in Poona.
16.79 His evidence and his reports before the Commission gives no
indication that his energies were directed to anything othe? San en-
quiring into the anti-Muslim activities of Karkare and his conferers
The mention of Nathuram Godse in the report is also indicative 3
The'wholft 011 7 l ) + V he Ahmed ^gar People in the same connecrlon
The whole trend of the report Ex. 58 is towards showing, association
of these persons as members of an anti-Muslim movement acting S
tne guise of a dramatic society amongst other illegal Activities He
has mentioned about the suspicion of Deshmukh retarding Madanlal
mL h 1S 6Vlden r J S * ndicative of the disturbed condition of
Ahmednagar with bomb throwing and Karkare and Madan LaT
association with these incidents and also that their activities were
sufficiently prejudicial to merit detention. amities were
16.80 Sub-Inspector Shantaram Sakharam Rana, witness No 35
gas stationed m Ahmednagar in 1947-48 as Officer-'in-Charge of' the
£KL =kI S l atl ° n ' . Hekn ^ w Karkare as a member of the Hindu
Mahasabha whose activities became intensified after the partition of
22-259 HA
the country in 1947. Karkare made propaganda against Muslims
and "talked" against the Congress. He was associating and mixing
with the refugees. The activities of such persons had, according
to the witness, to be watched by the police.
16.81 The witness also knew Madanlal, a refugee at Visapur, who
took a prominent part in refugees' processions and meetings.
Madan Lai became acquainted with Karkare and was staying with
him in his hotel. The activities of Madanlal were also anti-Muslim.
In November and December 1947, four bombs were thrown in
Ahmednagar — one on a procession of Tazias on the occasion of the
Moharram; another bomb was thrown on a mosque; the third in
Vasant Talkies; and the fourth at the Tatti Darwaza. Investigation
into these incidents and the searches made by the police could not
produce any results and the culprits could not be found. The propa-
ganda carried on by Karkare and Madanlal and others was mainly
directed against Muslims but was also against the Congress-
16.82 In December 1947, watch had to be put on the movements
of Karkare and Madanlal. Both of them continued, however, making
inciting speeches but they did not preach violence, not even against
Muslims. Police also got information about the private meeting
held by these people. In the beginning of January 1948 refugees
took a procession to Khan Bahadur Sarosh asking him to give them
employment. In that procession Madanlal and Karkare were
present. The D.S.P. and the District Magistrate arrived there and
asked the processionists to come over to his (D.M.'s) bungalow and
discuss their grievances there. On January 5, 1948, there was a
meeting held which was addressed by Raosahib Patwardhan.
Madan Lai disturbed that meeting; he was shouting and threatening
and was in "hot temper". Madanlal was arrested at the Patwardhan
meeting and was brought to the police station and was kept there
the whole night. Although the witness knew that Karkare was a
companion of Madanlal he did not know anything about Godse and
Apte nor did it strike him when Madanlal was arrested in Delhi
that it was the same person who was creating trouble in Ahmednagar.
16.83 This witness made reports against Karkare. The move-
ments of Madanlal and Karkare were being watched and plain-
clothes policemen were deputed from November 1947 to do so.
Orders for their detention were passed later on different dates in
January. This witness was asked to be on the look out for them to
arrest them. But about the middle of January 1948 or even a little
earlier they disappeared from Ahmednagar and their whereabouts
could not be traced. The police was giving information to the
D.S.P. whenever any person left the jurisdiction of Ahmednagar
City Police. No attempt was made to find out where Karkare or
Madanlal had gone. All that the police knew was that they had
gone out of their jurisdiction. The witness talked to Deshmukh
about the vanishing of both Karkare and Madanlal but he already
knew about it.
16.84 The point in this witness's evidence is that the movements
of both Karkare and Madanlal were ordered to be watched from
389
November 1947 and they were even trailed but they managed to
escape without anyone knowing when they went away or where.
And as far as one can see, no attempt as made to find cut where
taey had gone This fact of vanishing was known to Sub-Inspector
iJeshmukh of the City Station. His evidence also shows that Madan
Lai was hot-tempered and had assaulted Raosahib Patwardhen.
16.85 Witness No. 36, Lakshman Narayan Joshi is a DSP
attached to the C.I.D., Bombay C.B.I. He was working as a Sub-
Inspector in the C.I.D., Ahmednagar, in 1947—50 under the D.SP
Ahmednagar. His duties at the time were only to take down
Marathi shorthand notes. There were no particular directions as to
what meetings he should attend but he went whenever the DSP
ordered him to go. In the later half of 1947, there was a great deal
of commotion in the city and number of meetings were held and
addressed by various leaders but the speeches of Karkare and
Madan Lai were not recorded. The witness knew Madan Lai who
told him that he was studying in a college. He also narrated to him
about the conditions of refugees and their disabilities and also com-
mented on the riots that took place in Pakistan. The witness did
not know if Madan Lai took part in any violent movement He
never talked about any Congress leader from which it might have
been gathered that he was anti-Gandhi or anti-Congress He
(witness) was specifically asked if the Ahmednagar Police was pro-
Hindu Mahasabha or pro-R.S.S. to which he gave an emphatic reply
that they were doing, their duties impartially and even obtained
warrants for the arrest of Madan Lai and Karkare.
16.86 On January 10, 1948, Madanlal told him that he was going
to Delhi to get married. When the news of bomb throwing at
Gandhi] i's meeting came on the radio or was published in the news-
papers it struck the witness that it was the same Madan Lai who
was m Ahmednagar and he talked to the Sub-Inspector about the
suspicion. But evidently no use was made of this information if
indeed it was given. Secondly, when detention orders against
Madan Lai were passed and he absconded, this witness gave no in-
formation of the absconding; or his going to Delhi assuming he knew
of the detention orders. He also was searching for Madan Lai Sub-
Inspector Deshmukh had a similar suspicion and he* went to speak
to the D.S.P. about the identity of this Madan Lai. This was on or
about the 24th January 1948. They both went to the D.S.P but
Deshmukh did the talking and Inspector Razak was also there Ac-
cording to him the D.S.P. said that the Delhi Police would be coming
to enquire and that they should not bother themselves about it but
should arrest Karkare and get all the details of Madan Lai. What
that meant the witness did not know.
16.87 On the 27th or 28th January, Deshmukh asked the witness
tc accompany him to Poona. Why it was five days or so later he
could not say. As he knew some friends of Karkare in Poona that
is why they went to Poona. They visited Agrani Press and some of
Deshmukh's friends. While Deshmukh used to make enquiries, this
witness used to stand outside. He does not know whether they
went to Nathuram Godse's House but they did go to Apte's house
at about 15-30 or 16-00 hours, Anand Ashram. The witness went
in and asked Mrs. Apte about the whereabouts of Karkare and she
said that she did not know about Karkare but Apte had gone to
Nagpur for publishing Savarkar's literature and from there he might
have gone to Gwalior.
16.88 Deshmukh went to Bombay and the' witness remained in
Poona because he had some business in C.I.D. office. From their
talk with Mrs. Apte, etc., they did not conclude that Apte and his
friends had gone to Delhi. But Deshmukh did suspect that Apte
and his Mahasabha friends with Madan Lai and Karkare had gone
to Delhi. He also said that Inspector Abdul Razak was present
when they went to see the D.S.P. but about this he was not quite
sure. "
16.89 The statement of this witness is rather important. Al-
though he knew that Madan Lai had gone to Delhi, he gave no
information to Sub-Inspector Deshmukh. If the movements of
Madan Lai and Karkare were being watched and the witness knew
Madan Lai, as he says he did, it is difficult to believe that he did not
know that the movements of Madan Lai were being watched.
Besides he took his meals at Karkare's hotel and so did Madan Lai.
16.90 Another matter which is rather important is this that he
knew Apte's family because Apte's father and his father were school
friends as students and were on visiting terms.
16.91 The witness was a ticket collector at the railway station
when Apte was a teacher in the Mission High School in Ahmednagar
and he had helped Karkare with money to start a hotel. He says
he knew Karkare but was not a friend of his. He says that he did
not know about the activities of Karkare nor did he enquire from
Deshmukh as to why Karkare was being chased by the police on the
ground that that was not within his province. Nor did he ask after
the D.S.P. had ordered that search should be made for Karkare.
About the middle of January he came to know that there was a
warrant to arrest Karkare, that he did not ask Deshmukh about the
activities of Karkare because that was none of his business. Nor
was it his business to find out whether Karkare was in Ahmednagar
when orders for his detention and warrants to arrest him were
issued. He knew that Inspector Razak wanted Karkare to be
detained and both Razak and he were staying at the Police Club.
16.92 Deshmukh had asked the witness to go with him to Poona
in order to help him and the witness went to Poona partly for that
and partly for his official duties which he had with the C.I.D. office
there. Nobody at the office asked him about Karkare. He visited
Apte's House at about 3-30 p.m. but he did not know anything about
Godse but he did know about the relations between Karkare and
Apte. Karkare was helping Apte in his publication but he was not
sure whether Karkare was financing the project. He went to Apte's
house because he knew about the relations between the two; he did
not know anybody at the Agrani Press. He asked Mrs. Apte if her
husband was insured on the specious plea that one of her friends
Yadarkar was an insurance agent and he asked Mrs. Apte about her
husband and others going to Delhi, because Deshmukh was asking
him to do so.
16.93 But from the information given by Mrs. Apte he did not
conclude that they had gone to Delhi, although his companion
Deshmukh had such suspicion.
16.94 The witness says that he did not know about the activities
of Karkare although he was friendly with him since 1937. He did
not know that Karkare's house was searched in connection with
bomb explosion and yet in the next breath he says that he knew
that Karkare's house was being searched in connection with bomb
explosions, and that Inspector Razak had come in that con-
nection. He has admitted that he knew Mrs. Apte and her
husband since long and that his friend wanted to get insurance of
Apte but he does not know what company his friend was an agent
for. He did hear Razak and Deshmukh talking about the detention
of Karkare.
16.95 This witness was friendly with Karkare. He had helped
him to start a hotel. He had been friendly with Karkare for ten
years and it is difficult to believe that he did not know about his
('Karkare's) activities. He also knew Apte and was aware of the
fact that Apte and Karkare were friends. He knew that Karkare
was out of town and yet he gave no such information to the police
when the police was looking for him. He also knew that Madan Lai
was leaving for Delhi, this information he did not give to the police.
He had gone to Poona to find out Karkare some of whose friends
he knew there.
16.96 Police Deputy Superintendent Anant Shamrao Balkundi,
witness No. 37, is now the Deputy Superintendent of Police C.I.D.
Aurangabad. From July 1945 to July 1948 he was a Sub-Inspector,
C.I.D., at Ahmednagar and his duty was to watch political activities
of persons and parties and submit reports. In about the ?niddle of
1947 a refugee camp was established at Visapur near Ahmednagar.
Karkare who was a Hindu Mahasabha leader took the earliest oppor-
tunity of working amongst the refugees. He incited the refugees
against the Muslims and held Morchas in Ahmednagar. As a result
of his activities Madan Lai and some other refugees were attracted
towards Karkare and they also started taking part in Hindu Maha-
sabha activities. They led black flag processions. From the
Mausoleums and tombs of peers, etc., they removed green cloth
coverings. There were also bomb explosions from about the middle
of 1947, one of which was thrown in Vasant Talkies which created
panic amongst the public. The object of these activities was to
scare, away Muslims and force them to quit which was one of the
objectives of the party. As a result of these activities M.nl.in l„il
Pahwa came into lime-light and his movements began to be watched
by the Police. As the activities of Madan Lai and Karkare were
dangerous, this witness made a report to the D.I.G., C.I.D. on
January 4, 1948 for their detention or externment. On the same day
a report (Ex. 66) was made by this witness which shows that a
procession of refugees carrying lathis and hockey sticks and shouting
slogans against Muslims was led by Karkare, Kulkarni and Madan
Lai. They passed through the Muslim localities shouting that
Muslims should be driven away. They were also shouting that the
Police was maltreating S. V. Ketkar who had been arrested in
connection wih the possession of bombs, fire-arms and ammunition
and that the reason of this maltreatment was to make him involve
Karkare as the real possessor of these things. This procession, ac-
cording to the report, was arranged by Madan Lai who was staying
with Karkare and was a leading worker of the Hindu Mahasabha
and its real objective was to protest against the searches of the
house and hotel of Karkare and to pressurise the Police in regard
to the bomb case investigation to stop or soften it. The report
states further that Madan Lai was a bad-egg who instigated the '
refugees; the recommendation was that Madan Lai and Karkare
should be detained or externed from the city so that they do not do
any mischief. The report also stated that Muslims were getting
nervous and that Katchi merchants were winding up their business
to leave the city.
16.97 There was a public meeting on 5th January, 1948 and one
of the speakers was Raosahib Patwardhan. Madan Lai and his
companions created disturbance at this meeting but the story that
Patwardhan was got hold of by Madan Lai and he attacked or
attempted to or wanted to attack Patwardhan was not correct. How-
ever, both Karkare and Madan Lai were shouting that they wanted
to speak. They snatched away the mike from the stage and the
meeting then dispersed. Two or three persons including Madan Lai
were arrested. Madan Lai was kept in the Police Station and evi-
dently nothing more was done in regard to the incident at the
meeting; that from about the 6th January 1948 both Madan Lai ind
Karkare disappeared from Poona. But the witness could not lemem-
ber if he mentioned this in his report to the D.I.G., C.I.D. The
house of Karkare was being watched but the witness did not know
whether he returned or not. Madan Lai, however, did not return
to Ahmednagar. An order for detention of Karkare and Madan Lai
was passed but the witness does not know when and nothing of
importance took place upto 20th January 1948.
16.98 When on the 20th January a bomb was exploded at Birla
House at Mahatma's prayer meeting and the matter was reported
in the Press this witness suspected that Madan Lai therein described
was the same person who had been carrying on activities in
Ahmednagar. He conveyed his suspicion to Inspector Razak who in
turn informed the D.S.P. but what orders the D.S.P. gave, the witness
does not know.
16.99 On 29th January 1948 and it is not clear why it is so long
after the news appeared in the Press the witness sent a report
(Ex. 67) to the D.I.G., C.I.D. The purport of this report was that
from the description which appeared in the Papers about Madan Lai
who was arrested in Delhi it appeared that this Madan Lai was the
same person who was operating in Ahmednagar and creating trouble.
Madan L^l and Karkare had left Ahmednagar fifteen days earlier
148
and had gone to Bombay but their further movements and where-
abouts were not known and it was worthwhile making enquiries
from Delhi Police about Madan Lai who according to the report was
a staunch Sanghite (R.S.S.) and had revolutionary ideas.
16.100 This (Ex. 67) is a very important document if it is a true
document. This report has no endorsement on it of the office of
the D.I.G. of its receipt or what happened to it. This witness had
not made a report in writing about the absconding or disappearance
of Madan Lai or Karkare. The explanation of the witness about
not sending, his report earlier is that he had talked to Inspector
Razak. If that was sufficient one fails to see the necessity of
making this report on the 29th January, 1948. The A.D.I.G. was camp-
ing at Ahmednagar about this time but no report was made to him
while he was there. On 1st February 1948 Mr. Gurtu, A.D.I.G.P.,
C.I.D. Poona called witness to Poona in connection with the enquiry
in. Ahmednagar about Karkare. There Gurtu gave him certain
instructions about Karkare. But Mr. Gurtu did not know anything
about the report nor does it seem to have been mentioned to him.
16.101 The next piece of evidence which is of importance in
connection with this witness is his explanation dated 9th February
1948 (Ex. 69) . He stated therein (1) that he was not aware of the
DJ.G's. camp at Ahmednagar; (2) that he could not make arrange-
ments for interrogation of Ved Prakash on 1st February 1948 because
of disturbances in the city; (3) that the D.S.P. informed him that
he, the witness, was wanted at Poona with full details regarding
the relatives and servants of Karkare and the collection of that in-
formation had kept him busy and he had handed over the information
along with Karkare's photograph to Deputy Superintendent Chaubal-
(4) that he was constantly reporting about the movement of
Karkare and Madan Lai through weekly and special reports and had
finally reported about the detention of both of them on 4th January
194'8; (5) that after the meeting of Raosahib Patwardhan on 6th
January 1948 the atmosphere at Ahmednagar had become too hot
lor Karkare and Madan Lai and therefore they had disappeared
from Ahmednagar; (6) that Karkare had written to his wife that
he would be arriving during the course of the week and strict watch
was being kept at the Railway Station and motor stands; (7) that
Karkare had gone to Kolhapur where he was likely to take shelter
with a Mr. Jere.
16.102 This document has already been discussed at a previous
page and it is not necessary to deal with it again.
16 103 Another important piece of evidence which emanates from
the statement of this witness is that Godse and Apte both used to
come to Ahmednagar and met Karkare and that this witness and
^is staff were watching the activities of both Apte and Godse in
Ahmednagar although nothing emanated from this attempted intelli-
gence. The witness did not not know if Karkare was sending any
money to Godse and Apte. And he had no information about any
plot being hatched in Ahmednagar.
m
16.104 This witness was cross-examined both by Mr. Vaidya as-
well as by Mr. Chawla. He was asked about the search into the
house of Ketkar where arms and ammunition were found but he
does not remember whether he was present when Ketkar was
interrogated. He was asked if he had made any report in regard
to Karkare's connection with arms and ammunition and his reply
was that he could not say anything unless he saw the report. Now
this is a very peculiar answer. If a report was made the question
would not arise and if no report was made there was nothing that
this witness could see. The witness was asked about the activities
of the Hindu Rashtra Dal but he said that he could not remember.
16.105 The evidence of this witness shows that both Karkare and
Madan Lai had earned notoriety in Police circles because of their
anti-Muslim activities and the incitement to refugees and also in 1
regard to the bombs which have been thrown; that Madan Lai had
disturbed the meeting of Raosahib Patwardhan in a disorderly
manner. Hs was arrested in connection therewith but what
happened next one does not know; that the activities were of such
a prejudicial nature that this witness had to recommend the extern-
ment or detention of those two persons as early as 4th January 1948;
that soon after both Madan Lai and Karkare vanished from
Ahmednagar in spite of the fact that a Police watch was being kept
on them and that this witness had a suspicion that Madan Lai
arrested at Delhi was the same person who had been operating in
Ahmednagar. He conveyed his suspicion to Inspector Razak who
in turn gave the information to the D.S.P. If this statement is true
and it might well be no one seems to have done anything in regard
to the suspicion possibly because it was not considered well founded.
However, the most important bit of information that this witness has
given is that both Apte and Godse visited Karkare and there was
information with the Ahmednagar Police therefore that these two
persons were co-workers in the Hindu Mahasabha with Karkare
and even their movements were watched but With negative results.
16.106 Jagannath Shivram Rane, witness No. 40, was the D.S.P
at Ahmednagar during the period October 1947 to April 1948. His
evidence shows that during that period there were two main pro-
blems which were occupying the attention of the police in the
district: one, the Razakar trouble in Hyderabad State and the other
the Hindu Mahasabha agitation in Ahmednagar town itself The
State of Hyderabad was in Razakar turmoil. That trouble had given
an exciting time to the police because the people used to come from
Hyderabad State and were causing excitement. Some Razakars
were arrested. The witness had to go to the border areas often
because of a number of incidents of arson and murder committed
by the Razakars and sometimes he had to stay there for lorig periods
which meant absence from the headquarters. One can well under-
stand that the Razakar problem was causing serious and acute
anxiety to the District administration in respect of areas bordering
Hyderabad State— good bit of Ahmednagar was surrounded by
territories of Hyderabad State. Those areas of that State which are
called Marathwada now from part of the Maharashtra State 'after
the linguistic readjustment and territorial changes.
'
345
16.107 Hindu Mahasabha agitation also was another Rouble spot.
There was a section of the local population winch were its protago
niS aid then there were refugees from Pakistan who were
having the facilities they were having In that agi f^f ^adan Lai
harl started taking and did take a leading part— pulling down green
flags from Durgahs, mausoleums and other Muslim places of worship.
Thl loca"man g connected therewith was Karkare The = m-ts
of both these persons were being watched by the Intelligence
Branch The Reports showed that the agitation by Karkare and
Madan Lai was directed against Muslims; and the bomb incidents
which had taken place were also directed again * them ; These
incidents were reported to witness by the intelligence staff The
investigations into the bomb incidents had been mfruc tuous although
directions used to be given by this witness as to what should be done.
16 108 There were searches made in Ahmednagar in connection
with possession of illicit arms. Therefore, the houses of S. V. Ketkar
>d V R Karkare were searched and in the formers, some explo-
sives, a pistol and a revolver and ammunition were found and as a
result Ketkar was arrested and was sent up for trial and convicted.
But the search of Karkare's house did not result in finding any in-
criminating article.
16109 There were no reports to the witness of Madan Lai and
Karkare making anti-Congress speeches pr propaganda. But they
were kept under watch. The Sub-Inspector who kept watch over
Karkare and Madan Lai sent daily reports to the witness but in his
(witness's) opinion the watch was kept because of Hyderabad It
is unfortunate that the witness was not asked to explain what he
meant by "because of Hyderabad". But in his note at the time ot
signing his statement he has said that it was not because ot
Hyderabad but because of their attitude towards Muslims, which
makes more sense.
16 110 Warrants were issued for the detention of Madan Lai and
Karkare on the report made by the Provincial C.I.D. Evidently, the
DSP was not consulted. But the detention according to him was
because of their anti-Muslim activities, and as far as one can see had
no connection with their anti- Congress tendencies.
16111 There are some reports made by this witness and others
to the Government which would merit mention at this stage. On
15th December 1947, the District Magistrate made a report (Ex Id)
to the Government of Bombay on the bomb explosion on the 14th
December near the shop of Ismail, M.L.A. in Kappad Bazar. On the
16th December, the witness made a report (Ex. 74) to the Govern-
ment about the same bomb incident. On 2nd January 1948, this
witness made a report (Ex. 75) regarding the recovery of arms and
ammunition on the previous day from the house of S. V. Ketkar. It
also shows that Ketkar had stated that these arms had been kept
in his house by V. R. Karkare from whose house, when searched,
nothing incriminating was found. The report also shows that the
grenades found in the House of Ketkar were of tHe same type as
those thrown in Vasant Talkies and on the Tatti DarwaS Ssque
in the previous month. In this connection, reference may Sso be
made to Ex 76 dated 2nd January 1948, by Inspector S™t under
S 0S 4tfH" Ct f 0n tbe * earc h W , 3S con ducted y in Ketkar's louse, aSoS
A oZ if J nd th f rem and about the interrogation of Karkare.
A copy of thzs report was sent to the D.S.P. Ahmednaear th P
Ongmal to the D.I.G. of Police, C.I.D, Poona Anmedna § ar > the
slotS h?% T tU T ! f tatSd ln reply t0 a ^ uestion h y the Commis-
sion that he did not take any personal interest in these searches as
KnYf a ^- LD ^ mat u te ^ ThiS detente would be surprising if true
unrl^ a ? dea tha t the D is t rict Police was also taking part and that
e^nment ThS'wn'li 18 w f. se * din S re P^ts to the PrLncfal Gov- ,
refened 'to Pv 7 ? i ex ^ m h ™ r ^ OT ts Exs. 74 and 75 above-
retened to Ex. 76 also shows that Ketkar was the Manager of
Karkare's hotel and that among other things found at the 1?
^Tl T T Il° me ornamen ts also-these ornaments resembled Xse
which had been removed from the body of the woman ip^na
m regard to whose murder Inspector Sawant waTiSktata ^investi-
gation although Poona Police seemed to have closed the cZTL
untraced Why the clues arising from the recovery of ornament
fen wl ±0U + r ed UP - ° ne d °t s not know - At an y rate, it would only
fa 1 withm the purview of this inquiry showing what the local pS
was doing m regard to this group of Hindu Mahasabha workers
16.113 Ex. 77 is a report by Inspector Razak showing that the
bomb thrown on the mosque within the city police jurifdiction was
S^tSthPW H^ re f a l d t0 Which he had -ade prevoSs re
ports that he had discussed the case with the D.S P and the varini^
clues that were being followed up; and that the activities of Karkare
Sven rfhr*? Gd - r The , ^ als ° said that instructions had been
they also wanted to know why he had not been detSed earner
16.116 About the warrants for the detention nf vr*^™ +i.
::<r/
bombs found in the house of Ketkttr had connection with the pre-
vious bomb incidents. He also said that he did not recommend the
detention of anybody in connection with these bombs because he
aid not think the mattter sufficiently serious as to merit detention
under an extraordinary law. In his clarification, he said that he did
not think that the detention of these persons was on account of their
activities against Hyderabad but a consequence of their anti-
Ivlanomedanism.
16.117 The witness stated that it did not strike him that Madan Lai
who was arrested at Delhi was the same person who was operating
in Ahmednagar although he had a faint recollection that Ins. »■<•„„'■
Razak and Sub-Inspector Deshmukh had mentioned to him that they
suspected him (Madan Lai) to be the same person. The witness told
them tnat if that was so then Madan Lai must have been interrogated
by the Delhi Police who would find everything out. He told Desh
ft t R hat t f ^ ™nted to go to Delhi he could go and arse , Sid
Abdul Razak that on his return to Poona he might as well tell the
D.I.G, C.I D about Madan Lai. But he himself did not think it
necessary to telephone the D.I.G. about it nor did he inform his
District Magistrate about it. He also told Deshmukh to go to Poona
and make enquiries about Karkare but this was soon after it was
a ?oTthp a 4tw kare h *d ^appeared. This must have been on ox
a a ™ P \ ! l h Jan rf7 i 9 ^. because a day or so earlier Deshmukh
came to see him. Deshmukh's suspicion according to the witness was
not very strong and therefore the witness did not send him to Delhi
re^onaily, he did not think the suspicion to be wellfounded and so
he did not make any written orders in regard to the matter.
16.118 Ex. 77 shows that Inspector Razak, witness No. 34 had dis-
fnfwi T° m ^ QaS t s with this witne ss and the ciue s that he had
I u j- T P. also shows - th at Karkare's movements were being
watched. It is surprising, however, that although the offences fell
Jearche' wer Xpl ° Si J e Substances Act which is a serious matter and
seaiches were made in connection therewith, this witness did rot
take any serious interest in the matter. Of course, it is possible that
he was more concerned with what was happening on the Hyderabad
?^n%° r What f was happening in Ahmednagar town itself owing to
^-M^aSfc thSre ^ the HlndU ^-^ Caf ™ ° n
^J~iB 9 - ? U i ° ne . th 1 ™ g seems t0 be clear that higher authorities in
K^Sl ™H+w n * 0t kn °^,°f attach im Portance to the association of
Kaikare with Apte and Godse about which evidence has been given-
and that a facade unknown to the Police, had been created for the
of 1 ahSGandhf 13 ^ WMCh CUlminated in the —Nation
R. C. Joshi, wit. 80
r.h a S°rSw e a val ? able hit of information was given by Mr. Ram-
'Snf Chmtaman Joshi, I.C.S., witness No. 80, now Secretary, Re-
n1^tt a M ° r + eSt . S D , e P a ; tm ent, Bombay, who was the Collector and
mli rr gl . S , ate of Ahmednagar from November 1947 to February
W Sr, flf e ™ denc f shows that there was considerable communal ten-
™£,™ I 1Ct I s WeU aS in the town of Ahmednagar one of the
main cuses being the presence of refugees from the western wing
846
of Pakistan. These refugees were lodged at a place called Visapur
about 26 miles away from Ahmednagar. They have been described
as "certainly not non-violent and quite turbulent". Another reason
for communal tension was incidents connected with razakar activity
in the neighbouring Hyderabad State which incidents affected both
the District and town of Ahmednagar.
16 121 As a matter of fact, Mr. Joshi's predecessor, Mr. H. A. Khan,
on September 13, 1947, made a report to Government pointing out that
the coming of about 10,000 refugees from the Punjab side would
create a difficult communal situation and he suggested that the visits
bv local leaders to the camp should be restricted and speeches relat-
ing to Punjab atrocities should be prohibited He also pointed out
that Ahmednagar District was on the borders of Hyderabad State and
people from that State were frequently coming to Ahmednagar and
were carrying on propaganda there; that up to that time the District
was free from communal disorders but if no check was kept on the
acUvities of the refugees, it was likely that communal agitation would
flare up.
1fil">2 This gentleman, Mr. H. A. Khan, on November 6, 1947,
issued an order under section 144, Cr. P.C. prohibiting the importa-
tion transportation or sale of consignments of knives and other -sharp
S Canons like daggers, spears, axes, either by post, railway oi
other meanr o fconvey¥nce' without the previous permission of the
MaSrtSte Sis is Ex. 148. Mr. Joshi sent a report o the Govern-
ment requesting extension of that order under section 144(6), Cr. P.C.
Can indefinite period (this is Ex. 149) and the order was extended.
The ?e ulee Tin Visapur were getting restive. They wanted houses
and employment andthey were agitating and taking out processions
to emphasise their demands-
16.123 There was throwing of bombs in Ahmednagar town; there
were four bomb incidents :
1. 24th November 1947 on the Tazia procession in Kappad
Bazar.
2 7th December in Vasant Talkies.
3. 14th December on the house of Kazi Subhanbhai.
4. 26th December on the Tatti Darwaza mosque.
ThP. P activities this witness did not suspect as being directed
Mr. Joshl an, | fcie ha:; get (
the measures which had (
D.S.P.
U. the damage Lliat it had caused and also
rdered to be taken by the C.LD. and the
16.125 On January 2, 1948, Inspector Savant made a report to the
D.I.G., C.LD., Poona giving the facts of the case in regard to S. V.
Ketkar against whom there was suspicion of murder of a woman in
Poona. This is Ex. 76. S. V. Ketkar was at that time working as a
manager of Karkare's boarding houses. S. V. Ketkar's house was-
searched and quite a number of handgrenades, revolvers, daggers,
fuses, explosives and ammunition were found. Besides this, some gold
and silver ornaments were recovered and S. V. Ketkar was arrested.
His explanation to the police was that about a week earlier all these
things had been given to him by V R. Karkare who was a Bindu-
Mahasa.bha worker. The matter was reported to the D.S.P., Ahmed-
nagar. A report was lodged under the Arms Act and Explosive Sub-
stances Act. Karkare's house was also searched but evidently noth-
ing incriminating was found there. The possession of explosive sub-
stance is rather a serious matter but there is nothing to indicate that
this report was sent to the District Magistrate or was seen by him
Mr. Joshi has stated that the D.S.P. had informed him of the recovery
of bombs from Ketkar's house and about the search conducted at his
house. S. V. Ketkar was prosecuted under Explosive Substances Act
and as no prosecution can be entertained without sanction, this wit-
ness must have seen the report. The matter is 20 years old and it
may be that the witness cannot now remember it.
16..126 Ex. 66 dated January 4, 1948, is a confidential report sent
by Sub-Inspector A. S. Balkundi showing the taking out of a proces-
sion by the refugees on January 3, led by Karkare, Kulkarni and
Madan Lai— the first two being Hindu Mahasabha workers and the
latter a refugee. They were shouting slogans against Pakistan and:
Muslims and Savarkar ki jai'. The object of this procession was to
put pressure on the police because of their searching Karkare's house
arid it was being said that Ketkar was being maltreated and pressuris-
ed m order to force him to implicate Karkare. This document also
refers to the procession marching to Khan Bahadur Sarosh's Garage
and their leaders being received by Sarosh and the arrival of the Dis-
trict Magistrate and the D.S.P. The District Magistrate tried to-
pacify them by promising help but at the same time was firm against
.neir illegal activities. The District Magistrate has stated that Ex 67
was not brought to his notice. After his attention was drawn to
i^x. 66 of 4th January and Ex. 67 of January 29, 1968, the later was
also a report of Sub-Inspector Balkundi, the witness said that he had
met the processionists at Sarosh's Garage, but he did not know about
7^4. ^"? r was Ex - 67 brou g ht to his notice. Ex. 67 mentions the fact
. that Madan Lai arrested at Delhi was probably the same person
whose activities were being watched in Ahmednagar.
16.127 On January 8, 1948, the witness submitted his weekly re-
Fw v h $? h J S mentioned in Ex. 150. In this document it is stated
that S V Ketkar from whose possession the arms and ammunition
were found had stated that the articles had been given to him by
Karkare for being kept in his house about 8 days earlier thereby
involving Karkare. This information was conveyed to Mr. Morarfi
.Desai through. the Home Secretary, Mr. Dehejia, on January 12, 1948,
.and the same day Mr. Desai passed the following order :
"Immediate arrest of the persons concerned should have been
made re: 'A' and 'B' pp. 2 and 4 (B. refers to Karkare). Why
was this not done? The D.M. might detain these people even
now."
-It appears that in pursuance of this order, the witness passed an
order for detention of Karkare on January 24, 1948. The letter from
the Home Department, Bombay to the witness directing him to make
immediate arrest of Karkare and asking him why he had not done
so earlier is Ex. 80 dated January 19, 1948. It is not explained why
-an order made by the Home Minister on January 12 directing imme-
diate arrest of Karkare was not sent from the Bombay Secretariat till
the 19th January and why the order for detention was not passed
earlier than the 24th January if it had to be passed at all. Either
the activities of Karkare were prejudicial to the safety etc. of the
public or they were not; if the former, immediate action was neces-
sary and if the latter then no action should have been taken. The
witness, in reply to the letter of the 19th asking him to explain why
he had not arrested Karkare earlier, sent his explanation which is
Ex. 145 dated January 21, 1948. In this the witness has stated that
the reason for not arresting Karkare was that apart from the state-
ment of Ketkar implicating Karkare there was no evidence to con-
nect him with the offence and the D.S-P. did not think that to be
sufficient for the arrest of Karkare. On this statement the action
against Karkare was uncalled, for. It shows some very slow thinking
and slower action. The activities of Karkare, even on the evidence
before this Commission, were not very peaceful or even legitimate.
This hesitency of the district authorities has remained unexplained.
If preventive powers under extraordinary laws are meant for the
preservation of law and order, then the situation created was such
that they should have been used unless the situation in Hyderabad
was such that the use of these powers would have added to commo-
tion and general insecurity. The Commission cannot ignore that
aspect of the evidence before it. But there is no evidence submitted
to justify the conclusion that the hesitency was partly or even wholly
attributable to the Razakar depredations. The document also men-
tions that according to the oral instructions sent to him he had
ordered the detention of four refugees who had taken part in the
procession on January 3, 1948-
16.128 Sub-Inspector Balkundi, witness No. 37, has stated that he
made a report to D.I.G., C.I.D., recommending the detention or ex-
ternment of Madanlal and Karkare by his report Ex. 66 dated Jan-
uary 4, 1948 but he did not know when the orders were passed. This
document which is before the Commission is a copy and does not
show what happened to it in the C.I.D. office and when it was sent
to the District Magistrate at Ahmednagar or the D.S.P. or whether
the orders were passed on the basis of this document.
16.129 The order detaining Madanlal is Ex. 42 dated January 16,
1948. This again is not clear why if the Government order was on
.January 3 and report of Sub-Inspector Balkundi was on January 4,
881
1948, this detention order was delayed to such a long time H ii„
SXl^ given. oral instructions for detention on i,]„ ;;,,!
unless there was something very special on which the District IVI.-um,'
trate warned to be satisfied under the law, there does not seem i,,'"i„-
any reason why the detention should have been so Ion'- .l.-hv. ,1
iutner the refugees who were ordered to be detained were' ■..•!..... ,,
I <* ^^Prejudicial to the maintenance of public safety or II,,, .
f n* IJ^F^f S ' ° ne WOUld haVe ex P e cted immediate on I
TX e t%iofZ^l not - then the exercise of * e "<— 5
orders were issued so late or why he was not arrested but e
evidently make an inquiry as to the reasons for and the circumsta icei
under which Karkare managed to escape from Ahmednae'ir' • m ,'|
according to Sub-Inspector Balkundi, witness No. 37, he ami iVUi ■„',! -,l
disappeared from Ahmednagar on or about the 6th .January 'tIm •
event must or at least should have a place in the Police Week lv'
reports whicn unfortunately . have not been produced.
1Q i 61 Tl The exP^tion of Mr. Joshi is Ex. 146 dated February 7
1948. Therein it is stated that the report of the finding of arms vu
received by him on January 3, 1948 and he was making einiiiiri.-
from the District Superintendent of Police as to whether Karkare
had any connection with the bomb explosions but h e wa s told thai
vvith the exception of Ketkar's statement there was no evidence The
investigation had been entrusted to the Provincial CI D Poena who
did not Keep him in touch with the investigation and it 'was not due
to his mistake that Karkare escaped from Ahmednagar He left
Ahmednagar a f u soon as Ketkar was arrested and his escape was
mainly due to the inaction of the C.I.D. but even then he himself felt
throughly ashamed but he had ordered the detention of 5 refugees
and also he had ordered that whereabouts of Karkare should be
traced out.
1QR« 6132 7 The Wi + tn l SS was , also asked ab °ut Ex. 67 dated January 29,
1968, a document about which reference has been made in the evi-
dence of Sub-Inspector A. S. Balkundi. In this document, Balkundi
nad reported to the D.I G, C.I.D. that Madanlal who had been 3
™„ ^T ^ lg r be thesame person who was operating in Ahmed-
E v I he DlStnCt Magistrate evidently had not seen this document
because it was never brought to his notice and he has stated that he
did not know or suspect Madanlal who was arrested at Delhi of being
the same person as the one who was in Ahmednagar and that it was
after the. murder that it became a common knowledge that .imonpst
persons who were connected with Mahatma Gandhi's murder, were
Madanlal and Karkare and that they were the same persons against
whom detention orders were passed by him.
16.133 Some orders had been given about the detention of some
persons connected with R.S.S. and it was with regard to thorn that
this witness talked to Mr. Morarji Desai mm, f lhat was after the
murder. If the use of telephonic c wtlon was pc "
the murder, it was equally so before and It [ s difficult to £
•Government did not convey its orders for detention using that vehicle
of communication. But it was not done and that can only be t xplain-
ed on the usual secretarial procedural red tape of having everything
in writing. The witness has stated that Ex. 145 which he sent to the
Government was really the explanation of the D.S.P. which had been
given to him and that he himself was very unhappy about the inci-
dent. In his view, Karkare should have been arrested on S. V. Ket-
kar's arrest. But there is no explanation why it was not done. Most
of all, if Madanlal and Karkare were indulging in unlawful or harm-
ful and prejudicial activities, why proper watch on them was not kept
and when they disappeared why no alarm was given or information
sent to the Provincial Police to trace them.
16.134 Also why no such action was taken after the warrants for
• detention became impossible of execution is not explained.
' 16.135 The evidence of witnesses' from Ahmednagar shows that
<1) there were bomb explosions there; (2) there was a strong anti-
Moslem movement there; (3) the refugees were restive and wanted
to be rehabilitated; (4) the Hindu Mahasabha was using the refugees
.for their own ends; (5) arms were found from S, V. Ketkar's house
which he alleged had come from Karkare; (6) the D.S.P. did not
think the explosive substances cases to be serious; (7) Karkare had
.association with Godse and Apte of which the police was aware;
(8) there was a full record of Madanlal's doings in Ahmednagar with ■
the Police; (9) Madanlal when arrested at Delhi was suspected by
Ahmednagar police to be the same who was operating in Ahmed-
nagar; (10) the D.S.P. was apprised of this suspicion but it was either
not well founded or was not taken seriously; (11) Bombay Police did
not seek any information from Ahmednagar Police regarding
Karkare or Madanlal; (12) Karkare was acting under the aegis of the
Hindu Mahasabha but Sub-Inspector Balkundi did not know whether
he was sending money to Godse and Apte. Balkundi also stated that
Godse and Apte used to meet Karkare at Ahmednagar. Their acti-
vities were watched but nothing was found against them. (13) Sub-
Inspector Balkundi also stated that he was called to Poona by
Mr. Gurtu and his report dated February 9, 1948 shows that he gave
the information which was required from him. He gave a photo-
graph of V. R. Karkare to Dy. Supdt. Chaubal on February 3^ 1948.
He went to Poona on February, 7 as a result of a wireless message
summoning him to Poona.
16.136 This evidence shows that had efforts been made earlier
either by the Delhi Police or the Bombay Police the complete record
of Karkare as well as of Madanlal would have been available and if
a photograph had been published in the newspapers, the Police of
Ahmednagar would have come to know about him and would have
been in a position to give the information. Commission would like to
add that issuing photographs of arrested persons is not always a very
wise mode of investigation because of the fear that identification
parades or identification by witnesses might be held to be valueless.
CHAPTER xvii
fr Razakar IYIovciih-iiI
17.1 The statements of Ahmednagar dislriel oHici.-i l ;; give ;i I'anb
clear account of the Razakar s and their depredations .in. I spolubu \
activities and the consequential effect on the people of the aiatriOl
J. S. Rane, wit. 40
17.2 The statement of Mr. J. S- Rane, witness No. 40 (page 11 !},
who was the D.S.P. of Ahmednagar from October 1947 to April Pi !::
shows the conditions prevailing in Ahmednagar during his term ol
office. He has stated that he had an exciting time because ol i;.
Hyderabad problem which was due to people coming I'r
Hyderabad and causing excitement. He arrested some Razakars and
had to go to the border areas because there were a number of inn
dents of arson and murder committed by Razakar s; somef s In-
had to be away from the headquarters for long periods and : ,i., ,
the border areas.
R. C. Joshi, wit. 80
17.3 According to the District Magistrate Mr. R. C. Joshi, witneaa
No. 80, (page 2), there was border trouble due to Hyderabad becauae
of frequent acts of violence of the Razakars against the people of
Ahmednagar District which the Police had to watch. So prominent
was the Razakar trouble in the minds of the district officials that they,
the District Magistrate, Mr. R. C. Joshi, and others, connected the
bomb thrown on December 8. 1947, with it. Mr. Morarii Desai, Wit
ness No. 96 has also stated that it was not the general population
which was arming itself but the people on the border with the help
of the R'.S-S. and that there was no such movement in the town itself.
This statement of Mr. Morarji Desai tends to minimize the disturbed
and troublous conditions resulting from the Razakar movement, but
it is difficult to imagine that only a fringe of the population in theas
border districts were agitated by Razakar depredations thou
haps only a few suffered as a result thereof. This is all the moi-i- so
as it was agitating the whole country practically. He was dealing
with the Razakar movement in his official capacity. He stated, "me
razakar was creating a kind of commotion amongst certain sections
of Hindus in these two districts specially because the razakar:; v ere
indulging in raids into the border villages of these two district!-:", the
two districts referred to in the statement, being Ahmednaear and
Snolapur. The District Magistrate of Ahmednagar evidently did
think that the trouble of the borders of the Nizam's State was serious
a A n u d s0 . did the D -S-P, so much so that even the bombs thrown In
Ahmednagar were taken by these gentlemen to have a Razakar on
gin. The reports of these officers contained in official files show II, e
seriousness of the situation.
17.4 The report of the District Magistrate dated December I" pi r,
shows the disturbed conditions resulting' in murder an; ulh,,.. ,,i
crops lifting of cattle and molestation or women Tin
attack on village Khandoi on Ahmednagar bordera On '
354
1948 there was firing on village Jainpur. The weekly letter of Janu-
ary 12, 1948 shows the number of murders, rapes, etc. in Hyderabad
State itself which could not but cause commotion amongst the Hindus
of the bordering districts if not of the Hindus of the whole Maharash-
tra area as also in the rest of India.
17.5- Razakar trouble in Hyderabad State, the atrocities committed
on Hindus in Pakistan and including those who were fleeing from
the inferno, caused a strong reaction in India. In the Marathi-
speakmg areas of Bombay Province there was a strong though not so
numerous a militant group, a section of the Hindu Mahasabha which
could not bear all these atrocities on their co-religionists and remain
quiet or quiescent. They never liked the Congress policy of non-
violence and still less what they considered the policy of appeasement.
Tms added to their dislike of the Congress and Congress leaders and
a fillip to Savarkar's school of thought. They started arms collection
for Hyderabad State and made every effort to do so even in breach
of the provision of the Arms Act; so much so that the D.S.P of
Ahmednagar requested the District Magistrate to promulgate a pro-
hibitory order under section 144, Cr.P.C; against import" export or
transport of arms. This order was later extended under section
144(6), Cr.P.C. by Government. (Ex. 148— original order). "Whether
in view of the dangers to which the Hindu inhabitants of the State
of Hyderabad and those residing on its borders in Bombay Province
were exposed, this was a wise or unwise policy or whether an admin-
istration, which could not protect its citizens against desperadoes
who had assumed the role of Ghazis, should have acted in this manner
or not is not a matter on which the Commission is called upon to
express its opinion. The fact remains that there were Indian agencies,
some genuine and others not so altruistic, which considered the col-
lection of arms and supplying them to people who were being
subjected to lust and blood thirsty greed of fanatical religionists as
the proper answer and took active steps to put their plan of meeting
the- menace into operation by procuring and supplying arms. This
also gave an opportunity to use this menace as a facade by the Hindu
Mahasabha for their anti-Congress propaganda.
17.6 Amongst those who advocated the supply of arms the place
of prominence goes to the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha, but even-
some Congressmen did not hesitate to join the cry for arming the
people. Mr. H. B. Bhide in his speech at Belgaum on the occasion
of protesting against the Direct Action Day (on May 23, 1947),
Balshastri Hardas at Nasik vide weekly letter of Mav 24 1947- and
Mr. Ashutosh Lahiry and Mr. V. B. Gogte, all members of the Hindu
Mahasabha. advocated collection of arms. They got the support of
Mr. K. M. Jedhe in January or February 1948. And in January 1948
Bf'ukaka IKanitkar extended his weighty support which was further
buttressed by the resolution of the Maharashtra Provincial Conors
Committee:, referred to in the speech of Mr. V. B. Goete, Ex. 214 dated
January 6, 1948. Ex. 211-A contains on various pages accounts of
persons collecting and selling arms in widely distant places; e.g.,
Manmad. Batara, Londa, Godhra and Bijapur, and also speeches of
Messrs.. A'lnasahib Shinde. Nag-re. V. B. Gogte and Joshi, showing a
spectrum of political opinion.
GMGIPKID-T.S.S— 259 H.A._i9-5- 7 c~ M oo
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